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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
A. THE MODERN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
The modern corporation operates within a business environment that
is unlike the textbook world of perfect competition. According to
Galbraith and others, the economic system in the United States is
dominated by large, diversified corporations in which stock ownership
is widely dispersed and effective control is exercised by corporate
managers, rather than by the shareholder-owners of the firm. This
separation of ownership from control, it is argued, permits a considerable
degree of managerial discretion, and it is largely for this reason that
researchers, particularly economists, have recently devoted a great deal
of effort to reformulating the theory of the firm. Their research has
resulted in a variety of models, each of which attempts to provide a more
realistic explanation of the behavior of the firm than that provided by
the traditional theory. While these modern revisions have gone a long
way toward improving the theory — by incorporating managerial objectives,
by giving financial considerations an important role, by dealing with the
growth of the firm over time, and by treating uncertainty — the task of
theory building is, in the opinion of this writer, not yet complete. The
purpose of this paper is to survey the literature dealing with the theory
of the firm. This is done in the second chapter. The main purpose of this
thesis is first, to extend the theory of the firm by developing a model
of the firm that can be used to study the behavior of the firm within a
multiperiod stochastic environment; and, second, to apDly the model to
firms in the U.S. airframe industry in order to study the behavior of
these firms in the context of that industry's institutional milieu.
ABSTRACT
This thesis contains a formulation of a dynamic stochastic
model of corporate behavior over the business cycle and
applies the basic model to firms in the U.S. airframe industry.
The literature dealing with the theory of the firm is surveyed
and a taxonomy is developed within which the major contributions
to the literature are appraised.
The basic model is formulated as an optimal control
problem. The model is used to study the behavior of the
firm over the business cycle and to suggest a possible
reconciliation of the traditional and managerial theories
of the firm. Financial considerations are incorporated
into the model and the relationship between the firm's
optimal operating decisions and its optimal financial
decisions is examined. Organizational factors are introduced
and some of the consequences of decentralized decision-making
for the loss of control and X-ef f iciency are studied.
The basic model is extended to the major airframe builders
by incorporating factors specific to that industry's institutional
milieu. A model of a representative airframe builder is
formulated as a stochastic optimal control problem and is
used to study the impact of the government's progress payments
policy and the likely impact of making interest expense an
allowable cost under government contracts.
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Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt
from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some
academic scribbler of a few years back.
- John Maynard Keynes
General Theory of Employment
,
Interest , and Money
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE PAPER
A. THE MODERN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
The modern corporation operates within a business environment that
is unlike the textbook world of perfect competition. According to
Galbraith and others, the economic system in the United States is
dominated by large, diversified corporations in which stock ownership
is widely dispersed and effective control is exercised by corporate
managers, rather than by the shareholder-owners of the firm. This
separation of ownership from control, it is argued, permits a considerable
degree of managerial discretion, and it is largely for this reason that
researchers, particularly economists, have recently devoted a great deal
of effort to reformulating the theory of the firm. Their research has
resulted in a variety of models, each of which attempts to provide a more
realistic explanation of the behavior of the firm than that provided by
the traditional theory. While these modern revisions have gone a long
way toward improving the theory - by incorporating managerial objectives,
by giving financial considerations an important role, by dealing with the
growth of the firm over time, and by treating uncertainty - the task of
theory building is, in the opinion of this writer, not yet complete. The
purpose of this thesis is to model the behavior of the modern corporate
enterprise over the business cycle and to apply the basic model to firms in
the U.S. airframe industry. The principal purpose of this chapter is to
characterize the modern business enterprise.
The traditional view of the individual firm being buffeted about by
market forces beyond its control is, in the opinion of this writer,
The traditional view of the individual firm's being buffeted about
by market forces beyond its control is, in the opinion of this writer,
inappropriate in the context of the modern corporate economy. In 1975
there were 169 manufacturing corporations each with assets over $1 billion.
Collectively these firms controlled 67 percent of all manufacturing assets
and earned 61 percent of all sales of manufacturing corporations. In the
same year there were more than 750 manufacturing corporations with assets
in excess of $100 million, and collectively these firms controlled roughly
90 percent of all manufacturing assets and earned roughly 86 percent of
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all manufacturing sales. These large firms enjoy considerable degrees
of market power, and in many cases they are capable of dominating the
markets in which they participate. As a consequence, they play a crucial
role in determining how efficiently the economy functions. For these
reasons it is the behavior of the large dominant corporations that the
modern theory of the firm seeks to explain.
The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the reader for the next
chapter's survey of models of the firm. The present section characterizes
the modern business enterprise and its operating environment and discusses
in broad terms some of the important differences between the traditional
view and the modern view(s) of the firm. Sections B and C discuss the use
of mathematical models in the theory of the firm and define the important
economic terms that are used throughout the thesis. Section D describes
the differences between models of the firm, which are the subject of this
thesis, and models of industry and general equilibrium models, which are
not. Some interesting features of these latter types of models, and
their relationship to models of the firm, are also discussed in section D.
The final section summarizes the chapter and provides an overview of
the thesis.
1. The Objectives of the Firm
A crucial aspect of any theory of firm behavior is the nature
of the firm s objectives. In the opinion of this writer, in order to be
able to understand how firms behave and to be able to use this under-
standing to indicate how firms should be expected to behave under
differing sets of circumstances, it is first necessary to determine the
3firm's objectives — i.e. what it is trying to achieve. The traditional
view is that the corporation is owned by the stockholders. This
subsection discusses the objectives of the firm, taking as its point of
departure the traditional view that the firm seeks to maximize the
economic welfare of the firm's owners. The remainder of the subsection
deals with challenges to this view, with attempts to defend it, and with
the alternative objectives that have been suggested.
According to the traditional view, the managers of the firm act
as the agents of the owners, and in this capacity, try to make as much
money for the owners as they possibly can. However, when control is
exercised by the managers, rather than by the owners, there is no guarantee
that the objectives of the firm will be those of the owners. Robert J.
Larner carried out a study of corporate control in which he classified
firms as management-controlled unless 10 percent or more of the firm's
voting stock was held by an individual, family, corporation, or group of
4business associates. He estimated that in 1963, 84 percent of the
largest 200 nonfinancial corporations and 75 percent of the largest 500
nonfinancial corporations were management-controlled. In addition, he
found that management control had increased substantially since 1929
when an earlier study had been carried out by Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and
Gardner C . Means . The main implication of Larner's study is that, to an
increasing extent, effective control of the largest firms is exercised
7 8 9by professional managers, rather than by the firm's shareholder-owners. *
This has led economists to study whether the goals of these two groups —
the shareholders and the managers — conflict. It is generally accepted
among economists that shareholders derive utility (or satisfaction) from
the dividends they receive and the market value of the shares they hold.
It is also widely held that managers derive utility from the size and
rate of growth of the firms they manage, the amount of compensation they
receive, and the size of the staffs they control. It follows that,
to the extent that faster growth, larger executive salaries, and larger
staffs mean lower dividends and lower share values, the separation of
ownership from control will permit the firm's managers to pursue their
own goals at the expense of shareholders' goals, and further, that the
degree of management control will determine the relative weights attached
to each set of goals when the firm sets its policy. When share ownership
is widely dispersed, as it is in modern large corporations, the firm's
managers may be free to pursue their own goals to the detriment of the
goals of shareholders, with the only restraints on their activities
being those imposed by the product markets, the financial markets, and
the government.
Though the apparent separation of ownership from control gives
corporate managers the freedom to pursue their own goals, economists are
not in agreement as to whether corporate managers take advantage of this
freedom. The traditional (or neoclassical) view, which will be considered
in more detail in sections B through E of chapter two, maintains that the
firm seeks to maximize total profit. One generally held interpretation
of the traditional view is that the firm is run by an owner-entrepeneur
who maximizes total profit in order to optimize his own welfare. In
the context of a multiperiod model that takes into account the separation
of ownership from control, neoclassical economists have substituted the
goal of maximizing the stock market value of the firm's equity shares
for the goal of maximizing profits, arguing that the overriding
objective of the firm's managers is to do the best they possibly can for
the firm's shareholder-owners. In each case the firm is assumed to




The neoclassical view has been widely criticized. In light of
the apparent separation of ownership from control, it is difficult for
many economists to see why corporate managers would feel compelled to
maximize the return to shareholders. As Edith Penrose has argued,
"providers of capital, like providers of labor services, must be
remunerated, sometimes handsomely, but a desire to remunerate them as
handsomely as possible is not a plausible explanation of the behavior
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of modern corporations." Might the managers of the firm be forced
by external market forces to maximize profits (or the market value of
the firm's shares)? Friedman and others have argued that there is an
economic natural selection mechanism at work that forces firms to
maximize profits. For example, in the competition for investment
funds in the capital markets, the competitive mechanism operating within
these markets will ensure that only those firms that maximize profits
will survive. Yet, Sidney Winter has carefully shown that this argument
may not always hold and that, in some states of the environment, firms
that seek only a satisfactory level of profits or firms that seek to
maximize some other quantity, such as the rate of growth of the firm,
are more likely than the profit maximizers to survive. Moreover,
Gordon Donaldson has shown that large firms raise a very large portion
of their investment funds internally, which gives them a high degree of
independence from the capital markets and the discipline these markets
might otherwise be able to impose on the firm's behavior.
A second argument put forward in defense of the profit maximiza-
tion hypothesis maintains that, unless the firm maximizes profits, it
18
will find itself vulnerable to a takeover raid. That is, some other
firm, once it recognizes that profits are not being maximized, will
purchase a controlling interest in the non-profit maximizer, and then,
by operating the company more efficiently, increase the profits of the
taken over firm, and thereby increase its own profits as well. This
argument assumes, of course, that sufficient information is available to
enable firms to determine how large another firm's profits would be if
that firm were operated at maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, the bulk
of the financial information released to the public relates to actual
operating results and provides little indication as to what might have
happened to profits under some alternative operating policy. Also in
contrast to the takeover argument, two recent studies by Singh have
suggested that, over fairly wide ranges of profitability, the probability
that a firm will be taken over does not decrease as the firm's profita-
19bility increases. In addition, two other recent studies have shown
that acquired firms earned profits that were only slightly below average
for their industries and that many of the firms acquired by conglomerate
20
firms were among the more profitable firms in their industries. These
studies imply that a firm's relative profitability may have little effect
on its probability of being taken over, and hence, that the threat of
21takeover may not be strong enough to force firms to maximize profits.
Moreover, it may be size rather than profits that provides the firm the
greater protection against a takeover, by making it more difficult for
a potential takeover raider to raise sufficient capital with which to
purchase a controlling interest. Marris takes this counter-argument
a step further by arguing that the rise of management-controlled
corporations has brought about a fundamental change in the way the
corporate sector of the economy functions and has altered the selection
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process in such a way that only firms that maximize growth can survive.
Thus, according to Marris, it is growth maximization, rather than profit
maximization, that gives the greater probability of survival.
A third line of argument offered in support of the hypothesis
that corporate managers seek to maximize profits focuses on executive
compensation. Wilbur Lewellen carried out an extensive study of top
executive compensation for fifty very large manufacturing firms over the
period 1940 to 1963. He found that their ownership-oriented compensation -
primarily from profit-sharing and stock option plans — was the only source
of growth of total executive after-tax compensation during the period
1940 - 1963, and that it formed approximately one-half of total executive
after-tax compensation during the period 1955 - 1963. Over the period
1940 - 1963 salary and bonus averaged somewhat less than one-quarter of
23
total executive before-tax compensation. In a subsequent study he
found that executives' total compensation was more closely related to
the profitability and to the market value of the firm than to the firm's
24level of sales. In view of these results, it would appear that the
interests of corporate managers are closely allied with the interests of
shareholders, but there exists evidence to the contrary. D. R. Roberts
and J. R. McGuire et al. carried out cross-section regression studies of
executive compensation which revealed that measures of size explained
a larger portion of the inter-firm variation in executive compensation
25than measures of profitability. The best way to obtain high compensa-
tion is to become a high-ranking executive of a large corporation. In
addition, Robin Marris and others argue that large firms show a general
preference for internal promotion and that professional managers are
willing to sacrifice some of the firm's profits in order to achieve a
faster rate of growth and greater size because more rapid growth and
larger size mean more higher-paying jobs near the top of the corporate
26
ladder and more opportunities for promotion. According to this line
of argument, managers' salaries are more closely correlated with factors
other than the firm's profitability, such as size, and, to the extent
permitted by the separation of ownership from control, managers will
sacrifice profits in order to pursue these other objectives.
Within the last two decades economists' efforts have intensified
to formulate alternative models of the firm that the modelers believe
27
reflect more accurately the objectives of corporate managers. These
alternative theories have been labeled 'managerial' because of their
identification of the firm's objectives with the objectives of the firm's
managers (rather than its owners). William J. Baumol has developed a
28
sales maximization model. In describing his model Baumol argued that
sales were more amenable than profits to objective measurement and that
the salaries of top executives were more closely related to the size of
29
the firm than to its profitability. Robin Marris and Oliver Williamson
have developed models in which managers act so as to maximize their own
utility. In the Marris model the manager's utility function has two
arguments, the rate of growth of the firm's productive assets and what
he calls the valuation ratio, which is the ratio of the stock market
30
value of the firm to the book value of the firm's net assets. In the
Oliver Williamson model the manager's utility function has two arguments:
first, staff expenditures, which include outlays on advertising, research
and development, and managerial emoluments; and second, discretionary
profits, which are profits that are spent at the discretion of the firm's
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managers. These three models will be discussed more fully in section G
of chapter two, where it is argued that the Baumol model can be regarded
as a utility maximization model in which the utility function has, as its
lone argument, the level of the firm's sales. It is also pointed out
that, in contrast to the neoclassical models, the level of the firm's
overall (as opposed to discretionary) profits enters each of the three
managerial models as a constraint rather than as an argument of the
objective function.
The foregoing has indicated the range of views concerning the
appropriate objective function for a model of the modern business
enterprise. By way of summary, the debate is, in essence, over whether
the utility function of the firm's owners (the traditional view) or the
utility function of the firm's managers (the managerial view) is more
appropriate as the objective function of the firm. Stated somewhat
differently, the debate concerns the extent to which the apparent
separation of ownership from control has permitted corporate managers
to pursue their own goals to the detriment of those of the owners.
Before concluding this subsection it should be noted that there
is a third view concerning the objectives of the firm. According to
this view the modern corporation is a diversified and complex bureaucratic
organization comprised of various social groupings, each with its own set
of objectives, and the behavior of such an organization is the result
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of a bargaining process among the various social groupings. The main
consequence of this interactive process, so the argument goes, is that
the firm has no single, all-embracing objective, such as profit maximiza-
tion or growth maximization, and the objectives of the firm cannot be
identified strictly with those of any one grouping, such as the share-
holders or top management. The observed behavior of the firm is unlikely
to be optimal with respect to the objectives of any one grouping or
with respect to any one goal. Rather, in order to accommodate the
conflicting interests of top executives, middle managers, shareholders,
etc., the firm's managers aim toward a satisfactory level of profits,
a satisfactory level of sales, a satisfactory rate of growth, and
satisfactory values for the other variables of interest, where in each
case the 'satisfactory' value is established through the bargaining
process. The behavioral models of the firm, as they are called, are
discussed in section H of chapter two, where it is pointed out that,
while the behavioral models have performed well in terms of explaining
certain types of behavior, such as price setting behavior, of particular
firms, they have yielded little in the way of general results. In
particular, due to the absence of optimizing behavior on the part of the
firm, it is virtually impossible to determine how the firm will, in
general, react to external stimuli, such as an increase in the corporate
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tax rate. In the opinion of this writer, while the descriptive
features of the behavioral models are not without merit, a model of the
firm is more likely to yield useful analytical implications if it is of
the optimization variety. With the exception of the behavioral models
discussed in section H, all the other models of the firm discussed in
chapter two assume optimizing behavior on the part of the firm.
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3 is the author's opinion that a more general treatment than
the ones described above can be given the firm's objectives. Moreover,
this more general treatment could draw on the behavioral, as well as the
traditional and managerial, views of the firm. It is the author's opinion,
which is based in part on his own field research, that corporate objectives
are set largely by top management, but that the goals of shareholders and
other groups within the firm can have a direct impact on the firm's
behavior. Hence, the objective function of the firm should reflect the
goals of managers as well as those of shareholders and other groups within
the firm — but as interpreted by top management. The corporate utility
function, then, should not be that of any single group, but rather, should
at least reflect both traditional and managerial sources of utility.
A model of the firm incorporating the corporate utility function
just discussed in its objective function could, in contrast to the
behavioral models, be of the optimization variety. One of the uses to
which such a model could be put is the study of the trade offs between
traditional and managerial sources of satisfaction. Another of the
possible uses is the study of the behavior of the modern corporate enter-
prise over the business cycle. If the corporate utility function has
several arguments — or loosely, several goals — it might be shown that the
relative weights attached to these goals may vary over the business cycle
in response to changes in the firm's operating environment and the resulting
changes in the severity of the constraints within which the firm must
operate. One of the important implications of such a systematic shift
in goals may be that in certain time periods it appears that a firm is
maximizing profits (or owner utility) , while during other periods it
appears that the same firm is maximizing growth (or managerial utility)
.
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In this subsection it was suggested that the growth rate of
the firm is a variable that is of interest to corporate managers. The
next subsection examines the corporate growth process and an important
closely related phenomenon, diversification.
2. Corporate Growth and Diversification
One of the phenomena of the modern corporate economy that has
most impressed the proponents of the managerial theories of the firm
34is the rapid growth of firms that are already large. Such rapid
growth, and in particular, the apparent failure of growth to slow
noticeably when the firm becomes large, is at variance with the
traditional theory of the firm.
According to the traditional view, for each industry there
is an optimum size for the firm. If a firm expands beyond this opti-
mum size, it will suffer an unavoidable decrease in profits. Since,
according to the traditional theory, the firm must maximize profits
in order to survive, the firm must stop growing once it achieves the
optimum size. A modern version of the same argument maintains that
firms may grow very rapidly — they may even maximize the growth rate
at the expense of short run profits — until they reach this optimum,
35
but once the optimum has been reached, the growth rate falls to zero.
The existence of an optimum size was initially argued on the grounds
that production functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale, if not
36
over the entire range of output, then at least at high rates of ourput.
When empirical studies revealed that returns to scale were either con-
stant or increasing in most industries, proponents of the traditional
theory argued that even with constant or increasing returns to scale
12
there would still be an optimum size because, as the firm grows,
37
managers find it increasingly difficult to control the organization.
The loss of control would gradually erode operating efficiency and
would eventually cause the long run average total cost curve to turn
upward. Oliver E. Williamson has described how the multidivision
structure of the modern corporate enterprise, with responsibility for
the day-to-day operations vested in individual profit centers and with
the head office responsible for long-range planning, coordination of
the activities of the divisions, and corporate policy, has enabled
corporations to achieve large size without suffering the serious losses
38
of internal efficiency predicted by the traditional theorists.
Moreover, the empirical evidence indicates that "firms which are at
present small or medium-sized do not in general tend to display either
39higher or lower growth rates than firms which are already large."
Thus, empirical support is lacking both for the optimum size hypothesis
and for the natural life cycle hypothesis. In the opinion of this
writer, any theory that attempts to explain the behavior of modern
corporations should be consistent with the empirical finding that
firms, no matter how large they become, continue to grow.
The growth process proceeds along two avenues. Along the
first, a firm can grow internally by expanding its capital stock to
support increasing sales in existing product lines or by undertaking
investment and developing new product lines, i.e., by diversifying.
As Galbraith has pointed out, the large modern corporation can spend
tremendous sums on advertising in order to foster demand for its
40
products. A firm is not restricted to the markets in which it
currently operates and in both markets for new products and markets
13
for existing products, market demand — both the shapes and the posi-
tions of the demand curves facing the firm — can be influenced through
advertising. As Marris has pointed out, the modern corporation also
expends huge sums on research and development in the hopes of developing
new products in the sale of each of which it can exploit a temporary
41
monopoly. Through its outlays for advertising and research and
development the firm is able to promote its own growth from within.
42
Firms also grow externally by taking over — i.e., by purchasing
43
a controlling interest in — other firms. This was the primary vehicle
for corporate growth during the 1960's. Between 1966 and 1970 con-
glomerate mergers were responsible for the disappearance of 72 indus-
trial firms from Fortune magazine's list of The 500 Largest Industrial
44 45
Corporations (hereafter shortened to FORTUNE 500) . ' Through a
succession of mergers some companies were able to grow at phenomenal
rates. Getty Oil, which had previously been too small to make the
FORTUNE 500, took over Skelly Oil and Tidewater Oil and made the list
in 1967 as No. 79. Through a series of mergers I.T.T. rose from No.
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28 in 1966 to No. 8 in 1970. Indeed, the period from 1954 to 1974 was
one of sustained growth for many companies. One of the most remarkable
is Occidental Petroleum, which experienced an average annual rate of
growth of sales of 106 percent — an increase of 191 million percent
47
over the two decades. Nearly as remarkable is Beatrice Foods, which
has acquired nearly 400 companies over the past quarter-century —
probably more than any other company in the FORTUNE 500 — and has,
largely due to these acquisitions, increased annual sales from $200
48
million to $4.6 billion over this period.
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Due to the conglomerate merger movement and to the internal
development of new products, the modern corporation is not only large,
but it is also highly diversified, producing hundreds, and sometimes
even thousands, of different products. Beatrice Foods, for example,
has established 397 individual profit centers that are responsible
49
for the production and sale of 8000 different products. Such diver-
sity can, however, have disadvantages as well as advantages. Con-
trolling so diverse a company requires a highly efficient internal
organization that can ensure that poor coordination does not dissipate
the gains that accrue from spreading the production and financial
risks over many product lines.
With the exception of the work of Monsen and Downs and the
important contribution of Oliver Williamson, economists have been very
slow to apply organizational theory to the theory of the firm.
According to Williamson, this failure is the result of the "common
tendency to invoke the standard behavioral assumption (profit maximi-
zation) without regard for circumstances." Yet firms expend large
sums in an effort to determine how the efficiency of their internal
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operations can be improved. In addition, over the past fifty years
large firms have replaced what Williamson calls the unitary form of
organization and its highly centralized decision-making with what he
calls the multidivision form and its more decentralized decision-
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making. According to Williamson, the multidivision form of organi-
zation enables these large, diversified firms to achieve greater
operating efficiencies than would be attainable under the unitary form.
Both diversification and the rise of the multidivision form
of organization have facilitated rapid and continued growth. If a firm
15
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chose to produce only a single output, its expansion would be limited
by the growth of market demand for that good and by the retaliatory
actions of its market rivals should it try to expand its market share.
If a firm chose to maintain a unitary form of organization, its growth
would be limited by the decision-making capacity of top management.
In the opinion of this writer, increasing diversification and the
development and further refinement of the multidivision organizational
structure are crucial aspects of the process of sustained growth. It is
also the opinion of this writer that the formulation of models of the firm
that reflect the importance of the firm's internal organization — in terms
of both operating efficiency and growth — is a direction in which further
research could fruitfully proceed.
3. Corporate Planning under Uncertainty
The top management of the typical large firm spends a signifi-
cant portion of its time engaged in corporate planning. This is partly
in response to the need to coordinate the activities of the various
operating divisions and to ensure that the different parts of the
organization act in a manner consistent with the objectives of the
whole. But the need for effective corporate planning can be attributed
primarily to the existence of uncertainty. Because the state of the
environment at some future point in time cannot be known with certainty,
the firm must develop a set of contingency plans. A firm can set
various targets, for example, a target level of profits and a target
rate of growth of sales, but the actual level of profits and rate of
growth of sales will depend on the state of the environment as well as
on the operating policy of the firm. In establishing its operating
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policy — the prices of the products it sells, the amounts to be spent
on advertising and on research and development, and so on — the firm
must take into account the possible future states of the environment,
the relative likelihood of each, and the effectiveness of each of the
alternative sets of operating policies in terms of meeting the firm's
objectives.
The uncertainty a firm faces can be categorized as being of
two types: production (or business) uncertainty, which is associated
with the production and investment decisions of the firm, and financial
uncertainty, which is associated mainly with the financial decisions
of the firm. Both types of uncertainty and the relationship between
them are discussed at greater length in section I of chapter two, where
they are treated in connection with Vickers's model of the firm and
Arzac's extension of that model. For the purposes of this discussion,
it is important to note just that there are uncertainties (or risks)
associated with both types of decisions.
A second aspect of the firm's financial and business decisions
that is explored further in chapter two should also be mentioned. It
concerns the issue of whether the firm's financing decisions can be
separated from its investment decisions. This question is examined
in sections I and K of chapter two, where it is shown that, under
certain restrictive conditions, the firm's financial decisions —i.e.
its decision concerning what portion of profits to pay out as dividends
and its decision concerning the relative proportions of debt and equity
to have in its capital structure — can be made independently of its
investment decisions. It is also shown that, in general, under
17
uncertainty these decisions are not separable. Leland's model of the
firm in the context of stock market equilibrium, which is presented
in section K, illustrates this last point.
In terms of modeling the behavior of the firm under uncertainty,
either of two general approaches may be adopted. One approach is to
employ a mean-variance framework. An example of a model that uses
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this approach is the Lintner model discussed in section J of chapter
two. The second approach — which can be shown to be inclusive of the
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first — is the time-state-preference approach, which is discussed
and illustrated by two models developed by Leland in section K of
chapter two.
4. The Constraints on the Firm
In the foregoing discussion much was said concerning the objec-
tives of the firm and the extent to which the firm's objectives reflect
the managers', rather than the owners', objectives, and much was also
said concerning the complexities that are due to the existence of
uncertainty. But very little was said concerning the constraints the
modern corporation faces. The discussion of constraints has been left
until now because there is general agreement among economists and
businessmen as to the nature of these constraints, whereas the nature
of the firm's objectives is a subject on which there has been, and
still is, considerable disagreement.
In spite of its tremendous economic power, the modern corpora-
tion must plan and carry out its activities subject to the following
constraints:
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— The government (sometimes with the help of various special
interest groups that suggest new legislation) establishes the legal
framework within which the firm must operate. It protects private
property and the sanctity of contracts, sets the minimum wage, protects
workers' collective bargaining rights, establishes standards of product
quality, and so on. By lobbying the firm can work through the poli-
tical process, and in so doing, it can exercise influence, though not
control.
— The stockholders reelect the board of directors each year.
If profits are judged by shareholders to be inadequate, or if the firm
engages in questionable overseas activities, the shareholders could
vote the current directors out of office and elect new directors who
would see to it that the firm's behavior is more in line with share-
holders' interests. When share ownership is widely dispersed, how-
ever, it is very expensive and very time-consuming for shareholders
to organize and to agree on a new slate of directors. Shareholder
fi •}
reaction is normally felt only when the situation has become serious.
In addition, low profits may depress the stock market value of the
firm's shares and thereby increase the threat of takeover. This threat
intensifies if the lower share value arouses the firm's shareholders
and if other firms attribute the low profits and low share value to
ineffective management of the firm's assets. The reason why top
management is so fearful of a takeover is that the acquiring firm
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often replaces top management soon after the takeover. It is largely
for this reason that the managerial models of the firm developed by
Baumol, Marris, and O.E. Williamson each impose a constraint either
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on minimum total profit or on the minimum stock market value of the
firm.
— Another serious danger that may arise when profits are low is
the increased likelihood that the firm will not be able to cover its
bond interest obligations, in which case the firm's bond creditors can
order that the firm be liquidated. Even if bond interest can be
covered, if the surplus of profits over bond interest obligations is
small, it may be very costly, or even impossible, for the firm to
raise additional finance from external sources.
— The current state of technology, as embodied in the firm's
production function, limits the amount of output that can be obtained
from any given quantity of inputs. The firm can try to alter the state
of technology by spending funds on research and development, but it
is normally assumed that such spending is subject to diminishing returns
(at least beyond some point).
— There are market- imposed constraints. Customers can refuse to
purchase the firm's product if quality is judged to be poor or price
is judged to be excessive (or both). While the firm can influence the
state of demand for its products through advertising, it is normally
assumed that such expenditures are subject to diminishing returns.
Moreover, the price a firm can charge for each of its products is
limited to some extent by the prices charged by its competitors.
If the firm purchases inputs from another large firm or hires workers
that belong to large powerful unions, then the ability of the firm to
influence the cost of its inputs may be restricted.
— The rate at which the firm can grow is limited by the need
to bring new managers into the organization and by the adverse effect
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these new managers will have on the firm's internal operating
efficiency if too many are brought into the organization too fast.
If a firm continues to increase its growth rate, then this 'Penrose
effect' will eventually cause the firm's profit rate to fall. If
carried to excess through the acquisition of marginally profitable, or
possibly even unprofitable, enterprises, the acquiring firm damages
its long run profitability and increases its risk of encountering
serious financial difficulties, as the recent experience of the high
growth conglomerates of the 1960 's attests.
— The unpredictability of acts of nature, such as floods, earth-
quakes, and lightning, constitutes a constraint, though of a sort
different from those constraints mentioned previously. In particular,
the potentially adverse impact of this constraint can often be miti-
gated through the judicious selection of plant locations and through
the purchase of insurance.
— The lack of perfect knowledge of future market conditions,
future technologies, future actions and reactions of competitors,
etc., also imposes a constraint on the firm's policy choices. Indeed,
this lack of perfect knowledge is one of the major sources of uncer-
tainty. Unlike the constraints mentioned earlier in this subsection,
which are normally incorporated in models of the firm in the form of
constraining equations or inequalities, the uncertainties resulting
from the unpredictability of acts of nature and from the lack of
perfect knowledge, normally necessitate a fundamental change in the
form of the firm's objective.
If the reader will permit an analogy to be drawn between the firm's
selection of its 'best' operating and financial policies and a mathematical
programming problem the significance of the above constraints can be
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explained in the following manner. As the firm seeks the set of operating
and financial policies that will optimize its performance with respect to
its objective, it must ensure that all the constraints are satisfied.
That is, the constraints delimit the set of feasible policies from which
the optimal policy is to be chosen.
5 . Summary
The managers of modern large diversified corporations possess what
amounts in many cases to a considerable degree of discretion that permits
them to pursue their own objectives, possibly even to the detriment of
shareholders' objectives. Yet each firm's managers must always be mindful
of the limits of their power and of what lies beyond their control.
In setting corporate policy, the managers of each firm must make
difficult policy choices under uncertainty. Top management must balance
its own objectives against those of the firm's shareholders and those of
middle managers and other groups within the firm, subject to a multiplicity
of constraints and subject also to the complexities attributable to uncertainty
To make the necessary policy choices under these conditions requires
careful planning. To coordinate the activities of the divserse operating
components of the corporation and to guide the firm toward the attainment
of its objectives require a decentralized form of organization that still
permits top management to exercise effective control. In the opinion of
this writer, if economists are to be successful in their efforts to under-
stand how the modern corporate enterprise behaves, they must first construct
models that incorporate the internal planning and decision processes of
these firms.
B. THE ROLE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
What economists call the theory of the firm is actually a collection
of models, each of which purports to explain the economic behavior of
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business firms. The modern revisions to the theory of the firm, in
particular, attempt to explain the behavior of the large corporate
enterprises that dominate the economy. The purpose of this section
is to describe in general terms the use of mathematical models in the
theory of the firm and to indicate the modeling techniques most frequently
employed.
An economic model is a simplified analytical framework; it is the
representation of, as well as the embodiment of, an economic theory.
While there is no inherent reason why economic models must be mathe-
matical, it is the approach normally adopted, and the use of mathe-
matics in formulating economic models has become increasingly sophis-
ticated in recent years. One need only compare current issues of the
major economic journals with issues published five or ten years ago
to recognize this trend.
One of the branches of economic theory most affected by the increas-
ingly sophisticated use of mathematics is the theory of the firm. Both
the traditional theory and the modern revisions may be conveniently
expressed as mathematical models, and once expressed in this form,
the models can be used to study the implications of each of the
alternative theories concerning the behavior of the firm. This mathe-
matical approach has a number of advantages. The use of mathematics
facilitates a precise and more concise statement of each theory. It
requires that assumptions be made explicit and that the firm's objec-
tives and the constraints it faces be specified clearly. It also
permits the modeler to draw on a variety of mathematical techniques,
such as mathematical programming and the calculus of variations, to
assist him in discovering the implications of his assumptions. In
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recent years the development of new models has often been accompanied
by the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques as economists
have sought to capture in their models intertemporal dependencies, the
impact of uncertainty, and the interrelationship between the firm's
financial decisions and its operating decisions. The discussion in
chapter two, which parallels the evolution of the theory of the firm,
illustrates this tendency.
1. The Static Optimization Problem
Models of the firm are typically expressed as mathematical
programming problems. The general mathematical programming problem
is:




where x is a n-component vector and ft is a subspace of Euclidean n-space
called the feasible region. Additionally, it is usually assumed that
f is twice continuously differentiable with respect to all of its
arguments
.
Problem (1) is a static optimization problem. The solution
$ &
to (1) is the vector x e ft for which f (x ) _> f(x) holds for all
x e ft. The method of Lagrange multipliers can be used to obtain a
characterization of the solution to (1) provided ft is defined by a
set of equality constraints. If ft is delimited, by a set of constraints
that includes one or more inequality constraints, then the method of
generalized Lagrange multipliers (i.e. the application of the Kuhn-
Tucker necessary conditions) must be used to obtain the characterization.
If f(x) and the constraints defining ft are all linear, then linear
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programming can be applied, although this technique is generally more
useful when a numerical solution, as opposed to a characterization,
is desired.
The objective function f(x) in problem (1) is the firm's
objective function; it reflects the goals and objectives of the firm.
The objective function varies according to whether the objective of
the firm is to maximize one of the following:
— size of profits, sales, capital stock, or staff
— growth of profits, sales, or capital stock
— stock market valuation of the firm
— market share (of sales)
— total compensation of top executives,
or possibly some other variable or some function of the above variables.
In the traditional models of the firm, which are discussed in sections
B through E of chapter two, f(x) is of the form Tr(q) , where tt is
total profits and q is the rate of output. When the traditional
model is modified to allow for uncertainty, f(x) becomes the mathemati-
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cal expectation of the utility function of (risk averse) shareholders.
A model possessing such an objective function is discussed in section
K of chapter two. Recognizing the separation of ownership from control
in modern corporations, many economists have suggested that the behavior
of these firms is determined by the objectives of the firm's managers,
in which case f (x) becomes the utility function of managers and x
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is the set of arguments of the managerial utility function. This
treatment of f(x) is explored more fully in section G of chapter
two.
25
The feasible region Q is determined by the constraints the
firm faces. The nature of these constraints was discussed in the
previous section. In formulating a model of the firm it is necessary
for the modeler to incorporate each of the constraints he believes to
be material. Normally this involves expressing each (economic) constraint
as an appropriate equation or inequality that must be satisfied.
It should be noted that in the actual statement of a model it
is often the case that one or more constraints are either left implicit
or omitted altogether. There are a number of reasons for this. First,
the nonnegativity constraints are not always stated explicitly. For
example, a firm's rate of output must always be nonnegative, but in
statements of the traditional models this constraint is usually left
implicit. Second, some of the constraints may be assumed away, as, for
example, when it is assumed that uncertainty does not exist. This is
usually done in order to simplify the model by omitting constraints
that the modeler believes to be incidental to the questions the model
is designed to answer.
Third, it is often possible to use one or more of the original
equality constraints to reformulate the problem with fewer decision
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into an equivalent unconstrained problem
maximize f(x.,x„, . .., x ) (3)







by appealing to the implicit function theorem. However, such a
simplification requires that information concerning the nature of the
solution — information that is provided by the values of the Lagrange
multipliers — be sacrificed. Thus a model may be expressible in more
than one form, although these mathematically equivalent forms may not
be equivalent in terms of the amount of useful economic information that
is obtainable. In this particular case, formulation (3) would be
preferred to formulation (2) in terms of computational simplicity,
though (2) might be preferred to (3) in terms of more fully characterizing
the economic nature of the solution to the problem. The modeler will
select the formulation that best balances the advantages of computational
simplicity and the informational requirements of the economic problem at
hand.
Fourth, sometimes it is simpler to remove a constraint and
compensate for this by adding a variable to the objective function, even
though this procedure does not necessarily produce an equivalent problem.
For example, a firm's managers may feel constrained by the need to
maintain good employee relations. Rather than trying to formulate this
constraint on the basis of some measure of employee satisfaction, such
as the number of days work lost due to strikes, and having to specify
some minimum number b to go into the constraint g(x) ^ b , it might
prove easier to treat the state of employee relations — the number of
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days work lost due to strikes — as an argument of the managerial utility
function (i.e. the objective function). This approach was adopted by
Marris, who suggested two possible forms for the valuation constraint in
his model. According to the strong form, there is a market-determined
minimum valuation ratio below which the firm's valuation ratio cannot
fall without the firm being taken over. According to the weak form of
the constraint, the firm's valuation ratio becomes an argument of the
managerial utility function (whereas previously under the strong form
managerial utility had been a function of the firm's growth rate only).
As discussed in section G of chapter two, incorporating the valuation
ratio in the managerial utility function implicitly involves the
assumptions that both the growth rate and the valuation ratio contribute
directly to managerial utility and, in view of the standard differen-
tiability assumptions, that a continuous rate of trade off exists
between the two (at least over some range of growth rates) . For such
a continuous trade off to exist it is necessary that the Lagrange
multiplier that measures the trade off between the growth rate and the
minimum valuation ratio, when the strong form of the constraint is
hypothesized, be a continuous function of the minimum valuation ratio.
Most of the models of the firm examined in chapter two have been
expressed in the form of mathematical programming problems. The models
expressed in this form are of two general types. In the first case,
the model involves a single time period within which a single set of
simultaneous decisions concerning prices, input levels, output levels,
will be made. Once determined, the values of these variables remain
fixed for the duration of the period. The models discussed in sections
B through E of chapter two are of this type. In the second case, the
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model involves more than one time period, but decisions are made in
the initial period that lock the firm onto a steady state growth path
in which all quantities, such as total revenue, total assets, the stock
market value of the firm, etc., grow at the same constant rate forever.
Once this steady state growth rate has been determined, the values of
these quantities remain in fixed relation to one another throughout
subsequent time periods. The Marris model in section G and the Lintner
model in section J of chapter two are of this type. In each case, the
nature of the economic model makes it amenable to formulation as a
mathematical programming problem.
2. The Dynamic Optimization Problem
The mathematical programming problem (1) is a static optimization
problem. Characterizing its solution involves the determination of the
optimal values of the decision variables for an economic problem that is
stationary either with respect to the variables themselves or with respect
to the relationships among the variables over time. Many of the modern
revisions of the traditional theory of the firm discussed in chapter two
are multiperiod models in which the relationships among variables such
as total assets, total revenue, and total profit are free to change
over time. In other words, the firm is not assumed to be on a steady
state growth path. In such models, where the values of variables such
as the firm's capital stock may be temporally interdependent, the model
normally cannot be expressed adequately as a static optimization problem.
For example, in the Arrow model, which is discussed in section L of chapter
two, investment is irreversible in the sense that imperfections in the
market for capital #oods makes it impossible for the firm to disgorge unneeded
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fixed assets instantaneously. Therefore, the current investment
decision must take into account the possibility that demand for the
firm's products may fall sharply several periods into the future.
While the firm might, on the basis of strong current demand, want to
purchase additional fixed assets, the prospect of sharply falling
demand and its inability to instantaneously adjust its capital stock
when that happens may cause it to postpone its investment plans. A
more general treatment of the firm in a multiperiod context that allows
for factors such as the irreversibility of investment requires the use
of a dynamic optimization technique.
In building multiperiod non-steady state models of the firm,
most economists have chosen to express their models as optimal control
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problems. The general optimal control problem may be written:
H - - ^
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where t denotes time, which is measured in continuous units over the
interval t < t < t. ; x(t) is a n-component vector of state
variables; u(t) is a m-component vector of control variables;
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U is the set of all admissible control trajectories; and S d
E
is the terminal surface. In words, the vector x(t) characterizes the
state of the firm, as for example, the size of its capital stock, at each
time t . The vector u(t) contains the firm's policy variables, as
for example, current output, current outlays for advertising, and the
current investment decision. Typically, t = , and, if there is a
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finite planning period of length T , t- = T , while, if the firm's
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time horizon is assumed to be infinite, then t is replaced by °°
in (A) . For the finite horizon problem, the terminal state of the
system, x(T) , must satisfy the equation of the terminal surface, S
,
as for example, a required terminal capital stock.
There exist the following three approaches to solving problem
(4): the calculus of variations, dynamic programming, and the maximum
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principle of Pontryagln. The analysis of the Jorgenson model in
subsection 1 of section L in chapter two demonstrates the application
of the calculus of variations. The other models discussed in section L





The objective functional J - I(x(t) ,u(t) , t) dt
t
o
in problem (4) reflects the objectives of the firm, just as the
objective function f (x) in problem (1) represents the objectives of
the firm. Also analogous to problem (1), the constraint set in (4)
reflects the constraints the firm faces. That is, problem (4) can be
viewed as the dynamic analogue to problem (1), with the control variables
—
— 82
u(t) in (4) playing the same role as the decision variables x in (1).
The difference between the two problems lies in the control problem's
treatment of temporal interdependencies , which are captured both in
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the objective functional and in the n first order differential
equations that form part of the constraint set.
3. Optimization vs. Non-Optimization
Problems (1) and (4) are optimization problems. Models of the
firm expressed in either of these forms assume that the firm exhibits
some sort of maximizing behavior, whether it be the maximization of
profits, the maximization of the stock market value of the firm, the
maximization of its rate of growth or of managerial utility, or the
maximization of some other quantity. Such models have been criticized
on the grounds that modern corporations are bureaucratic organizations
in which the information required to make important decisions is imperfect
and in which major decisions are arrived at through a bargaining process
that involves the various special interest groups that comprise the
organization. As a result, business firms do not exhibit optimizing
behavior, but rather, as the economists of the behavioral school of
thought argue, they exhibit a satisficing behavior — aiming toward a
level of profits, a rate of growth, etc., that are satisfactory to the
competing interest groups.
In spite of the arguments of the behavioralists, the great
majority of economists conducting research on the theory of the firm
prefer to work with optimization models. As a more careful examination
of the behavioral models that are discussed in section H of chapter two
will bear out, these models yield very little in the way of meaningful
predictions as to how the firm will behave in response to various
external stimuli such as a change in the corporate tax rate. The
behavioralists hypothesize the firm's use of rules of thumb for such
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activities as price-setting — indeed, several behavioralist studies have
provided strong empirical support for such behavior — but these theories
generally fail to explain how these rules of thumb are determined or why
83
they may change over time. Often, the behavioral models are simply
attempts to explain specific patterns of observed behavior (e.g. how a
particular department store establishes its prices) , rather than attempts
to develop a more general analytical framework that can be used to
predict changes in behavior (e.g. how the department store's mark-up
will change in response to a change in its overhead) . As regards the
objectives of the firm, the behavioral models leave essentially
unanswered the question: what are satisfactory values for total profits,
the rate of growth, etc.? While the behavioral studies have led to
interesting results, the deficiencies just discussed limit the ability
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of these models to yield useful policy implications.
It is the opinion of this writer that a model of the firm, if it
is to yield meaningful policy implications, should hypothesize some form
of optimizing behavior. The problem of imperfect information to which
the behavioralis ts refer is a realistic one, but the impact of imperfect
information can be incorporated in an optimization model that allows for
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uncertainty. For example, instead of attempting to maximize utility,
under uncertainty managers aim to maximize expected utility — where the
group whose (expected) utility is being maximized will depend on whether
the model is of the traditional or of the managerial type. Moreover,
a comparison of the certainty and the uncertainty versions of such an
optimization model would indicate the impact of uncertainty on the
86behavior of the firm.
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As indicated earlier in this chapter, it is this writer's
opinion that the objective function in a model of the firm should reflect
both traditional and managerial sources of utility and that the model
should also reflect the importance of factors internal to the firm.
The development of such a model, if it allowed for uncertainty, could
be used to study the impact of uncertainty on the firm's decision-making
processes and on its resulting behavior. Such a model could have the
advantage of capturing many of the important factors that influence the
behavior of the firm, as observed by the behavioralists, while retaining
the optimizing quality that is so useful analytically.
4. Characterizing a Solution
Thus far in this section, the discussion has concentrated on
the nature of the modeling techniques employed in the theory of the
firm, and very little has been said concerning the solution of the
mathematical programming problem (or the optimal control problem), in
which form the model was expressed. In this regard, a careful distinc-
tion needs to be drawn between the 'characterization' of a solution and
the 'computation' of a solution.
In chapter two various models of the firm, each of which is
expressed in the form of either a mathematical programming problem or
an optimal control problem, are studied with the aid of the standard
mathematical techniques for solving these problems. In each case, one
of the primary objectives of the analysis is to characterize the solution
to a mathematical programming problem (or optimal control problem) that
is representative of a typical firm and to interpret this solution's
general economic implications, rather than to compute the optimal value
of the objective function in a problem that is specific to a particular
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firm. While a mathematical programming problem in which the objective
function and constraints were specific to a particular firm in a
particular period of time could be used to compute specific values for
the decision variables, such as price, output, and input levels, and
from these the resulting values of total revenue, total profit, etc.
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for the firm, the purpose of the models discussed in chapter two is
more general. Actual numerical values are not important to these
modelers, but rather, it is how the firm determines these optimal values
that is their primary concern. For example, in the traditional models
of the firm it is the decision rules, such as the marginal revenue equals
marginal cost rule for profit maximization, that characterize the optimal
solution to the mathematical programming formulation of the model that
are the end toward which the analysis is directed. A specific numerical
problem and its solution might also be of interest, but generally only
as an illustration.
C. DEFINITIONS
In the introductory discussions of the modern business enterprise
and of the role of mathematical modeling in the theory of the firm
there were several economic terms, such as capital, profit, and risk,
that were used repeatedly. These terms, many of which have specific
economic meanings that differ from their meanings in other forms of
usage, are used throughout the paper. The purpose of this section
is to give each of these important terms a specific economic meaning.
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1. Firms, Plants, and Industries
The subject with which this paper deals is the theory of the
firm. A ^AJun is a business enterprise that purchases economic inputs,
such as land, labor, and capital, that it uses to produce goods and
services that it sells to consumers, other firms, and the government,
all taking place under the direction and control of a single management
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group. A firm may produce a single product, as often assumed in the
traditional models, or it may produce a range of products. The term
conglomerate is often applied to a firm that produces a widely varied
set of products, although this notion is not precise. This paper is
concerned with a particular subset of the set of all firms: the large
multiproduct corporation. What distinguishes the corporation from the
other two forms of business organization — the proprietorship and the
partnership — is that the corporation is itself a legal entity that can
raise investment funds by selling shares, or certificates of ownership.
This characteristic bestows upon the firm certain advantages not shared
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by the other forms of business organization. In this paper the terms
corporation, corporate enterprise, business enterprise, and firm are
used interchangeably.
The term firm needs to be clearly distinguished from the terms
ptant and ^LnduitAif. The former refers to the numerous different
production facilities operated by a firm, while the latter, in principle
at least, refers to a set of firms that either (i) all produce the same
product or (ii) all use a production process that can produce the same
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set of products. For example, the United States aerospace industry
consists of makers of military aircraft as well as makers of commercial
36
aircraft (and some firms that currently produce both types of aircraft)
,
and also consists of builders of missiles and space vehicles. It should
be noted, however, that defining an industry may involve rather difficult
practical problems since, in practice, it often proves difficult to
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delimit products and production processes sharply. For this reason
several different classification schemes may exist for an industry. For
example, the United States aerospace industry contains the United States
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military airframe industry, which may be defined to include those firms
that work as prime contractors for the U.S. government and produce the
technically sophisticated attack, fighter, bomber, cargo and tanker
aircraft used by the Department of Defense. This definition excludes
producers of missile airframes, helicopters, and commercial aircraft
that do not also produce the above-listed military aircraft, though,
under a wider definition, one, or possibly all, of these might be
93included. How broadly one defines a product and the boundaries of
the industry associated with that product generally depends on the
nature and scope of the study requiring the definition.
2. The Production Function, Capital, and Investment
The ability of the firm to combine inputs to produce goods and
services is restricted by the state of technology. The firm's
ptioducJxon ^unatlon is a technological relationship between the various
inputs it purchases and the various outputs it produces and may be
expressed mathematically as
F(q ,..
. ,q ,.. . ,q x , . . . ,x , . . . ,x ) = , (5)1 l n 1 j m
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where there are n products and q stands for the output of product
i and where there are m inputs and x represents the amount used of
input j . The economic significance of the production function (5) is
twofold: (i) at any point in time the state of technology, and hence
the firm's ability to combine inputs to form outputs, is constrained,
but (ii) over time the firm can alter the state of technology by increasing
its expenditure for research and development (and thereby trading off
94present profit for future profit)
.
One of the arguments of the production function (5) that is of
particular interest to economists is the input capiX&L, which is the
stock of goods that are used in production and that have themselves been
95produced. The term capital has several meanings, and the notion of
capital as a productive resource is also referred to as pKodiidQA 1^
CCLftiAaZ to distinguish it from other forms of capital. Producer's
capital consists of buildings, plant, and equipment, which are referred
to collectively as {,^ixzd CWp<LtodL t and inventories of raw materials,
components, and semi-finished goods, which are collectively called
WOHkying CCLpAJtaJL. In terms of the production function (5) , when economists
speak of the input capital they almost always mean fixed capital, rather
than the more inclusive producer's capital. Fixed capital is singled out
for special treatment because of its 'fixity', i.e. because the process
of adding to a firm's stock of fixed capital is relatively more time-
consuming than adding to its stock of working capital, to its labor
force, or to its supply of any other 'variable input'.
The concepts of fixed capital and working capital refer to
physical goods, or what is commonly called real capital. A distinction
must be made between real capital, which is a productive resource, and
38
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money cap.JjaJL t which is not. This distinction will become important
when the role of financial capital in the theory of the firm is
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discussed in chapter two.
When a firm increases its producer's capital by exchanging money
capital for physical goods it is said to invest. IwJQAtmnwt involves
the purchase of additional plant and equipment and the building up of
inventories. A portion of total investment is intended to replace worn
out machinery and the remainder represents nzt <Ln\JQJ>tmzvut. The reduction
in the firm's capital stock through wear and tear is called depA-ZCAJLtcon,
and net investment, which represents the net expansion of the firm's
productive base, is equal to total (or gross) investment minus
depreciation.
3. Profit
In the traditional models of the firm the goal of the enterprise
is to maximize total profit. ?K.O^aX is the difference between the total
revenue accruing from the sale of the various products the firm produces
and the total cost incurred in producing those goods, measured over some
specific time period. It is important to distinguish clearly between the
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accounting notions of profit and the economic notions of profit. The
distinction arises essentially from the manner in which accountants and
economists define C.0&£&>, In arriving at figures for income from
operations, pretax income, income before extraordinary items, or net
income, any one of which may be loosely referred to as profits, the
accountant subtracts money outlays and depreciation from sales revenue.
In contrast, an economist would subtract the opportunity cost — the
maximum amount the input would earn in its best alternative use — of each
39
input rather than its money cost. The economist would also deduct
the opportunity cost of inputs, such as the firm's capital, that the
firm owns and uses in production. When such inputs have alternative
uses, the firm incurs an opportunity cost by not renting the services
of these inputs to other producers who would be willing to pay for
them, and for this reason, economists impute a cost to the firm's
use of these inputs. For example, if a firm owns the land on which
its production facilities rest, the rent the firm would have had to
pay, if it had leased the land, would not be deducted by the accoun-
tant, whereas the imputed rent would be deducted by the economist,
Therefore, the economic concept of profit would agree with the accounting
concept only in special cases, as for example, when the firm actually
rents all the capital services it uses; and when this is not the case,
a firm may be earning a positive profit in the accounting sense, but
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experiencing a negative profit (i.e. a loss) in the economic sense.
Another distinction that should be made with regard to profit
is the difference between reported profit and discretionary profit.
In this paper Jizpofctzd plo^iX is the net income (before
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extraordinary items) reported in the firm's income statement and
diACAeXsLonaAy pfio^iX. is reported profit plus discretionary expenses
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in excess of what would be required for profit maximization. Dis-
cretionary expenses include the firm's outlays for advertising,
research and development, training, and staff — all of which are made
at the discretion of management. This distinction is important
for two reasons. First, to the extent that the firm desires to smooth
out fluctuations in reported profit, it can do so by varying discretionary
expenses. Second, the managerialists argue that a portion of what
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would otherwise be reported profit, which would in that case either be
paid out as dividends or else added to retained earnings
, will be used by
the firm's managers to pay for larger staffs or to finance additional
advertising and growth-promoting research and development. That is,
discretionary profit is the vehicle by which managers can promote
their own goals.
In this paper both the economic definition and the accounting
definition of profit are important. While it would be desirable to
work with the economist's definition of profit exclusively, since it
reflects the opportunity cost of all inputs, it is the accountant's
definition of profit that is reflected in the annual income statements
each firm furnishes its shareholders. When the role of finance is
considered in section I of chapter two, the importance of the accountant's
definition of profit will become clearer. To preview that discussion,
fluctuations in the firm's reported profit — and in particular, fluc-
tuations in its net income — will play a major role in determining the
stock market value of the firm.
4. Utility
In contrast to the traditional models of the firm in which
the goal of the business enterprise is to maximize total profit, in
managerial models the goal is to maximize the UutULLti] of the firm's
managers. Managers derive utility, or satisfaction, from a number of
sources. In the O.E. Williamson model these sources include staff
expenditure, managerial emoluments, and discretionary profit. In
the Marris model the sources of utility are the firm's growth rate
41
and its valuation ratio. In these models the level of utility,
U , is expressed in fuctional form as
U = U(qJ,..., q. q) , (6) *l 1 n
where q, is the quantity of the i source of utility and where
*r- > for all i .8qi
There are two important theoretical issues connected with
utility functions that should be noted. The first concerns the non-
measurability of utility. Utility, or satisfaction, is a subjective
concept, and the utility index embodied in (6) is ordinal rather than
cardinal. In contrast to traditional economic theory, in which total
utility U and marginal utility 9U/9q. each were given a quantita-
tive significance, modern economic theory does not assume such measur-
ing
ability. But while the numerical value of 8U/8q. is no longer
important, its sign is. The condition 3U/3q. > implies that the
firm's managers never become satiated. For example, for the Marris
model's utility function, this nonsatiability means that, no matter
how fast the firm is growing, faster growth will always increase the
level of managerial utility.
The second important issue concerns revealed preference.
Provided that certain 'axioms of revealed preference' are satisfied,
the existence and nature of the managers' -Oidt^eAence map — a collec-
tion of surfaces, along each of which all combinations (q,,...»q )
yield the same level of utility — can be inferred from the managers'
policy choices (i.e., from the preferences managers reveal as they
select from among the alternative business strategies). The significance
of this result is that, while the Marris and O.E. Williamson models are
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based on the assumed existence of managerial utility functions
exhibiting certain specified properties, it is possible, in principle
at least, to carry this analysis a step further and infer these
properties from the axioms of revealed preference. At the very least,
the existence of utility functions of these types might be tested
empirically via revealed preference theory.
5. Size and Growth Rate
One of the arguments of Marris's managerial utility function
is the firm's rate of growth. Measurement of the firm's rate of growth
requires a measure of the firm's size. At present there is no single
measure of size, and hence no single measure of growth, that is free
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of conceptual difficulties. In the economic literature a wide
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variety of measures of size have been employed. It is important
to note that, as Marris argues, capital, profits, and output grow
together in moving equilibrium so that "maximizing the long run growth
rate of any one indicator can reasonably be assumed equivalent to
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maximizing the growth rate of most others." Moreover, Bates has
demonstrated empirically the high degree of correlation among alterna-
tive measures of size. For the purpose of consistency in
discussing the size and the growth rate of the firm, the 4^ze of a
firm is defined to be the book value of its net assets, where net
assets are the sum of fixed assets, plus inventory, plus current
assets net of current liabilities, and where assets are valued at
historic cost net of depreciation. The firm's Qfiowth Hat<L is the
annual growth rate of its net assets. In view of Bates's empirical results,
the implications to be derived from models of the firm should be
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relatively insensitive to these particular measures of size and the
growth rate.
6. Perfect Competition, Monopoly, Oligopoly, and Monopolistic
Competition
The firm's freedom to pursue its own objectives, whether that
involves greater profits, faster growth, or an increase in some other
quantity that contributes to managerial utility, is constrained by the
environment within which the firm operates. One of the more influen-
tial factors is the structure of the industries to which the firm
belongs. The behavior of the traditional firm under different indus-
trial structures is discussed in sections B through E of chapter two.
The purpose of this subsection is merely to characterize the main types
of industrial structure identified in the economic literature.
Economists identify four types of industrial structure:
perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition.
Under pQA^tcX COmpoXAJtion all firms produce a homogeneous product and
each firm acts as a price-taker. One practical explanation for this
type of behavior is that there are so many firms, and every firm is so
small in relation to the size of the market, that no single firm is
capable of altering the market price through its own actions. Under
monopoly the firm takes the market demand curve for the product as the
demand curve for its output and determines both price and the quantity
of output in light of market demand and the costs of production. The
practical explanation for this sort of behavior is that there exists
just one producer.
Under oLigopoty there is more than one producer. Each has
some influence over market price and each has to weigh carefully the
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potential reactions of its competitors when it changes its operating
policies , One practical interpretation of this is that there are only
a few large producers, such as in the U.S. automobile industry, who
recognize the interdependence of their actions.
Under monopolistic compoXijtion each producer's output is
slightly differentiated (either in its physical characteristics or in
the minds of consumers) from what other producers in the industry are
selling. In addition, each producer is able to act like a monopolist
in the sale of its own product. One practical explanation of this is




Empirical studies have revealed that oligopoly is a prevalent
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form of industrial structure in the U.S. economy. In particular,
the U.S. military airframe industry, which was referred to earlier
in this chapter, can be described as an oligopoly.
7. Uncertainty and Risk
A second quality of the firm's environment with which it must
contend is uncertainty. Some economic theorists distinguish between
HJJ>k t a situation in which all possible outcomes and the probability of
occurrence associated with each are known, and iiy\XlQAJjOU.YiX.y , a situation
in which the possible outcomes or the probabilities (or both) are
120
unknown. In what follows such a distinction will not be employed.
Following Hirshleifer, the term uncertainty will be used as a synonym
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for risk. That is, KaJ>\i and unc&utcu.n£y will both refer to a
situation in which the possible future states of the economic environ-




In an uncertain world the attitude of managers toward risk
can have a significant impact on the firm's behavior. It is normally
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assumed that managers are HJJ>k. CLveAAZ. Given the choice between a
fair gamble — one in which the mathematical expectation of return just
equals its price — and the expected return with certainty, the risk
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averse individual will take the certain amount. Put differently, a
risk averse individual will demand more than a fair gamble before
agreeing to play. The implication is that a risk averse manager might
be willing to sacrifice some of his expected return in exchange for a
reduction in risk.
The concept of risk aversion can be illustrated with the aid of
a risk-expected return indifference map, such as the one shown in
Figure 1-1. Each curve, called an indifference curve, shows those
risk-expected return combinations that yield the same level of expected
utility. Expected utility increases in the northwest direction due to
decreasing risk or increasing expected return, or both. Under risk aver-
sion, the indifference curves are drawn upward sloping, as in Figure 1-1,
to reflect the fact that an increase in risk necessitates an increase in







Figure 1-1 Indifference Curves under Risk Aversion
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risk (a)
For the hypothetical manager having indifference curves like
those shown in Figure 1-1, the risk-return combination (a ,u ) would
be preferred — in the sense of being on a higher indifference curve —
over the combination (a ,y ) , even though the latter involves a
D D
lower expected return than the former. If (<*,,» VL) is attainable,
say, by adopting more 'conservative 1 operating policies or by using
part of the expected returns to purchase additional information and
thereby reduce risk, the risk averse manager will do so. What this
implies for models of the firm that allow for uncertainty is that the
objective function must be formulated in terms of expected utility
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maximization (rather than in terms of expected returns maximization)
.
Another useful concept, which is illustrated in Figure 1-1 and
which will be needed in the discussion of the Lintner model in section J
of chapter two, is that of a c&utcUytiy zquuvcULzYVt nztxxhn. In Figure 1-1,
the risk-expected return combinations (a,j,y_) and (0,u_) lie on thefib L
same indifference curve and therefore yield the same level of expected
utility. Since the combination (0,U ) is riskless, or certain, and
c
since it is equivalent to (a_,jO in terms of expected utility, it
is called the certainty equivalent return of the combination (CtjjIO •
fi B
Moreover, (0,y ) is the certainty equivalent return for each of the
risk-expected return combinations that lies on the same indifference
curve.
8. Takeovers and Mergers
A third factor affecting the firm's choice of operating policies
is the takeover mechanism. A tdktOVZA is said to occur when firm X
127
acquires more than 50% of the equity of firm Y . Firm X is called
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the OLcquAJbLng {Vim (or more colorfully, the takzoveA. hXLi&zfi) and firm Y
is termed the CLCqiuAzd ^tAm. Singh and Kuehn distinguish between a
takeover, in which the acquired firm becomes a part of (normally an
operating division of) the acquiring firm, and a meAgeA, in which the
128firms X and Y amalgamate to form a new legal entity, firm Z .
This distinction is important in that mergers usually take place under
the mutual agreement of the parties involved, often for financial
129
convenience, whereas takeovers are frequently contested affairs that
130
result in the dismissal of the acquired firm's managers.
The economic significance of takeovers is twofold in nature.
For the acquiring firm, takeover is a means of rapid growth and is also
a means of rapidly diversifying into new product lines and thereby
diminishing the risk associated with profit fluctuations that occur
131
over the business cycle. For the acquired firm, takeover carries
with it the danger of dismissal of the firm's managers. Therefore,
according to Marris, the threat of involuntary takeover imposes a
132
constraint on the firm's managers' policy choices. If policies are
adopted that lead to poor performance — as judged by the firm's share-
holders — then the firm's shareholders will be more willing to sell
their shares to a takeover raider. Such a constraint plays an
important role in each of the managerial models of the firm discussed
in section G of chapter two.
9. The Business Cycle
A fourth aspect of the firm's environment, and one that will be
discussed in connection with the Arrow model presented in section L,
is the biit>£nej>6 (or tAado.) cyctz, which refers to the more or less
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regular oscillations in the level of aggregate economic activity that
occur over time. While the judicious use of demand management policies
in the western industrial economies appears to have sharply reduced the
possibility of a depression, the recent pattern of economic activity
bears witness to the fact that the possibility of recession has not
133
been eliminated. The amplitude of the fluctuations has been
diminished, though not all the way to zero.
The importance of the business cycle as it affects the behavior
of the firm is, in the opinion of this writer, lost in static theories.
The level of business activity — the state of the business cycle — is,
however, one of the fundamental determinants of what Marris calls the
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'super-environment' of the firm. In the opinion of this writer, the
business cycle can exert a significant impact on the behavior of the
individual firm, and the nature of this impact is examined in chapters
three and five of this thesis.
D. MODELS OF THE FIRM, MODELS OF INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, MICRO-MACRO
MODELS, AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
Models of the firm can be developed for any one of a number of purposes
One use, which is examined in chapter two of this paper, is the study of
the individual economic unit — the firm — in isolation. Such models of
the individual firm have been used to study the behavior of the firm
under alternative objectives and to learn how that behavior changes in
response to external stimuli such as an increase in the corporate tax
rate. In addition, models of the firm can be incorporated in models
of industrial structure in order to study how the interaction of firms
affects prices, output levels, etc.; in micro-macro models in order
to study the interaction between decisions at the microeconomic
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level (e.g. pricing decisions) and observed macroeconomic phenomena
(e.g. the rate of inflation); and in general equilibrium models in
order to study how the interaction of all economic agents (firms,
consumers, etc.) determine prices, output levels, etc., throughout
the economy.
The purpose of this section is to describe briefly models of in-
dustrial structure, micro-macro models, and general equilibrium
models. It is this writer's view that important developments in
these three classes of models will follow closely on the development
of more meaningful models of the individual firm. Particularly useful
in this regard would be models of the firm that gave some role to the
firm's internal decision-making processes and that could be used to
study the firm's reactions to such external stimuli as a key rival's
change in behavior.
1. The Need for a Theory of the Firm
To quote Robin Marris: "The 'firm' is the unit of delegated
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authority in a decentralized productive system." The individual
firm plays a crucial role in deciding what goods will be produced,
by what methods and in what quantities they will be produced, and in
«
what geographical markets and at what prices they will be sold.
The theory of the firm is directly concerned with this unit
of delegated authority. It is concerned only indirectly with how the
interaction of firms in an industry may give rise to a particular
industrial structure* or with how the growth of the individual firms
that comprise the economy affects the growth rate of the economy*
or with how the interaction of producers, consumers, workers, and the
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government determines the allocation of the nation's resources and
the distribution of national income. The first is the concern of
models of industrial structure; the second is the concern of micro-
macro models; and the third is the concern of general equilibrium
models
.
Traditionally, economists have been more interested in ex-
plaining how the economic system functions than in describing how the
individual firm behaves. In the traditional theory, the model of the
firm is designed to explain and predict changes in prices in the
13fi
market place rather than the behavior of real firms. Along with
the increasing awareness that firms are no longer so small, so numerous,
and so competitive — as the traditional theory suggests — that indi-
vidually their influence on the economy is hardly significant, have
come increasing efforts directed toward developing a theory that can
explain the process of corporate growth and diversification described
in section A. In short, it has become increasingly evident to
economists that:
the analysis of a decentralized economic
system will depend on a specific theory of
the behavior of the [productive] units to
which decisions are delegated, in other
.^7
words on some kind of theory of the firm.
This heightened interest in the firm is due not only to the
interesting theoretical questions that have been raised, but also to
the important policy implications that answers to these questions are
likely to provide. Such questions include the following:
— What effect does a motive other than profit maximization have
on the efficiency with which resources are allocated within
138
the firm, both at a point in time and over time?
51
— Is a conglomerate better able (and if so, is it also more
likely) to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources
139than a population of independent single-product firms?
— To what extent is the large diversified corporation better
able than smaller, less-diversified firms to cope with
uncertainty?
Such questions are concerned mainly with the efficiency of markets
internal to the firm relative to markets external to it, as for
example, differences in efficiency that may be implied by the differ-
ences in transactions costs — either explicit or implicit — in these
two sets of markets. Answers to the above questions would, to the
extent that they made clearer the costs and benefits associated with
breaking up large firms, be likely to have important implications for
141
the future course of antitrust policy.
In addition to policy questions that could be answersed directly,
a more meaningful theory of the firm would, by contributing to models
of industrial structure, micro-macro models, and general equilibrium
models, also help provide answers to policy-related questions such
as the following:
— What is the link between the individual firm's ability to
142
set prices and the overall rate of inflation?
— What is the link between the growth of the individual firm
143
and the growth of the economy?
The remainder of this section contains a survey of these
other three classes of models.
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2. Models of Industrial Structure
Models of industrial structure fall into three classes:
(i) analytical models using discrete size, (ii) analytical models
144
using continuous size, and (iii) simulation models. Models of
industrial structure are chiefly concerned with the size distribution
of firms within an industry and with explaining and predicting changes
145
in this distribution. In particular, economists have used these
models to help explain the process of increasing industrial concentra-
146
tion that has been observed throughout the postwar period. Such
models are of interest because of the relationship between industrial




Models of industrial structure are directly concerned with
whole industries. They are not directly concerned with the behavior
of the individual firms that comprise the industry, and as a result,
the individual firm has no significant role to play. All firms in an
industry are considered identical, except for size. These models
generally are also stochastic. Any differences that exist among the
firms in an industry, say, differences in the quality of management,
differences in policy choices, etc., and the effects of these differences
on the growth of the firm, are captured within the random character of
the model. As discussed below, this randomness assumption requires, at
the very least, that all firms within the same size class face identical
growth opportunities. This simplistic treatment of the individual firm
148
is one of the major weaknesses of these models.
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a. Models Using Discrete Size
In models using discrete size the growth pattern of firms
in an industry is modeled as a finite state Markov chain. The population
of firms is divided into M size classes. For convenience, the classes
are normally arranged in ascending order, so that class 1 contains
the smallest firms and class M contains the largest firms. In
addition, there is a class , the purpose of which is to allow for
births (entry of new firms into the industry) and deaths (exit of firms
from the industry, say due to bankruptcy or takeover).
Let S denote the size class to which an arbitrarily
selected firm belongs in period t . By the definition of a Markov process,
the probability of a change in size — i.e. of a movement from one size
class to any other size class — in the future is conditional on the
present size of the firm only. Additional information concerning the













are integers between and M inclusive.
Equation (7) states that the conditional probability that the firm belongs
to class j .j in period t+1 , given that it belonged to class j in
period t , to class j , in period t-1 , ... , and to class Jq
in period , is just the conditional probability that the firm belongs
to class j ,. in period t+1 , given that it belonged to class j int+1 ^
period t . If the conditional probabilities (7) are independent of
the time variable t , then the process is said to have stationary
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-i , for all t .
The transition probabilities are arranged in a transition
probability matrix, denoted by P , in Figure 1-2. For classes 1 to
M the diagonal probabilities, p. ..
, p_ , ... , p„__ , give theIX ZZ MM
probability that the firm will remain in its present size class.
M
P00 P01 P02







Figure 1-2 Transition Probability Matrix
The probabilities above the diagonal, p , 0<i<j , give the
probability that the firm will grow, i.e. move to a higher size class,
while the probabilities below the diagonal, p , i> j >0 , give
the probability that the firm will decrease in size, i.e. fall to a
lower size class. The zeroth class, which can be interpreted as a pool
containing both potential members of the industry and firms that have
failed during previous periods, is not a size class. The transition
probabilities pn . , j > , represent the probability that a new firm
will enter the industry, starting out in class j . The transition
probabilities p n , j >0 , give the probability that a firm in class
j will leave the industry.
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Since there is nothing, in theory at least, that prevents
a firm in one size class from reaching any of the other M-l size
classes or from failing (i.e. transitioning to the zeroth class), all
states of the Markov chain communicate and the chain is said to be
152irreducible. Since the chain is finite and irreducible, all states
must be persistent and non-null. If, in addition, it is assumed that
the states of the Markov chain are aperiodic, and there is certainly
nothing in the nature of the growth pattern of firms that would lead
one to think otherwise, then, by a well-known result, the size
distribution of firms approaches asymptotically the stationary
probability distribution










where P is the transition probability matrix. Moreover, the stationary
distribution (8) is independent of the initial size distribution of
153
firms. The economic interpretation of it is the following: the
growth process of firms in the industry eventually reaches a steady
state in which 71. is the proportion of firms in class i . In steady
state firms may still increase or decrease in size, but entries into
and exits from each state cancel each other out.
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Discrete models are of two types, depending on whether
the law of proportionate effect is assumed to hold. The law of pro-
portionate effect, which was introduced to economics by Gib rat, states
that the distribution of growth rates facing each firm is independent
154
of the firm's size. According to this law, a firm having sales of
$1 million has the same probability of growing by g percent as a firm
that has sales of $1 billion. In terms of the transition probability
matrix in Figure 1-2, when the size classes 1 M are defined
so that firm size increases in a geometric progression as firms move
from lower classes to higher classes, the law of proportionate effect
requires that
Pll " P22 " P33
=
*••
! PMM ; P 12




= *•• = PM,M-1 ; and SO OIU
Eatwell randomly selected 290 U.S. manufacturing corpora-
tions that existed continuously from 1961 to 1967 from among the 2837
firms quoted in Moody's Manual of Industrials . He found that firms
in all size groups have the same mean proportionate growth rate, which
is in agreement with the findings of earlier studies. However, he
also found that the variance of the growth rate was not the same for
all size classes, which is also consistent with earlier findings.
Most studies indicate that the variance decreases with size; that is,
that, as the firm increases in size, its growth pattern becomes more
stable. Also linear correlation and rank correlation studies indicate
that corporate growth rates are serially correlated — growth tends to
persist between periods — which appears to contradict the law of pro-
portionate effect. However, Ijiri and Simon have proposed a model
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in which the law of proportionate effect holds and in which some
158
serial correlation is permitted. When the model was tested in a
simulation study, it was found that it produced size distributions
that closely fitted real world grouped size data. Nevertheless, the
empirical results concerning the variances of the growth rates for
different size classes have brought into serious question the validity
of the law of proportionate effect.
A model that assumes the law of proportionate effect is
159
valid has been proposed by Simon and Bonini. The model, which also
assumes that new firms enter the industry through the lowest size
class at a constant rate, is a continuation of earlier work by Simon,
in which it was shown that under the two assumptions just stated, the
growth process approaches a steady state. In steady state the size
distribution of firms can be approximated by the Yule distribution,
and if the firms are large, it can also be approximated by the Pareto
distribution. Simon and Bonini tested their model against data
on the 500 largest industrial firms in the United States in 1955. Their
results support the validity of the law of proportionate effect, al-
though they were hesitant to draw any conclusions concerning the
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goodness of fit of the Pareto distribution. Engwall used the same
data and concluded that the Pareto distribution fit the data only if
firms with sales in excess of $398 million were included in the sample.
Steindl has reported similar findings: the Pareto distribution is
164
valid only for the largest firms. Quandt tested the goodness of
fit of the Pareto distribution to data on the 500 largest industrial
firms in the United States in 1955 and 1960. " He found that the
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Pareto distribution fit the aggregated data reasonably well, but that
when the 500 largest firms were divided by SIC code into thirty indus-
tries, the Pareto distribution fit the size distributions of firms
within industries very poorly. A possible explanation for this has
been offered by Steindl, who argues that, if the number of firms with
sales above the cut-off ($398 million) is too small, then the fit of
the Pareto distribution will be unacceptable.
One of the reasons the above studies have produced mixed
results is the fact that the steady state distribution holds only in
the limit. The observed distribution at any point in time would, at
best, only approximate the Pareto distribution. For industries that
were expanding rapidly, say as the result of technical progress that
led to new uses for or new variations of the industry's basic products,
the approximation might be rather poor, even if only the largest
firms were included in the sample. For this reason, it is the author's
opinion that studies should consider how the industry's structure
evolves over time. The model discussed next is designed to accomplish
this.
A model more general than the one just discussed has been
developed by Adelman. Her model does not require that the law of
proportionate effect hold. Adelman estimated the transition proba-
bilities for the United States steel industry for the years 1929-39
and 1945-56. Only steel producers having assets exceeding one million
dollars were considered, and these firms were divided into six size
classes, with a zeroth class added to allow for births and deaths.




1 2 3 4 5 6
0.99942 0.00040 0.00016 0.00001 0.00001
1 0.021 0.911 0.068
2 0.024 0.039 0.908 0.028 0.001
3 0.076 0.872 0.052
4 0.008 0.016 0.947 .028
5 0.037 .926 0.037
6 .024 0.976
Figure 1-3 Transition Probability Matrix for U.S.
Steel Industry, 1929-39 and 1945-56
From Figure 1-3 it can be seen that
(i) The probability of remaining in the same class is many times
greater than the probability of leaving the class, and for
all classes but one, this probability of remaining exceeds
.9 .
(ii) The probability of jumping more than one class is either zero
or very near zero,
(iii) The probability of growth is slightly greater than the
probability of decline.
Similar results have been reported by Engwall and by Archer and
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McGuire.
From the transition probability matrix in Figure 1-3
Adelman obtained the following stationary probability distribution
for firms in the U.S. steel industry:
tt - (0.948, 0.00938, 0.01169, 0.00376, 0.00903, 0.00708, 0.01091) .
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This distribution includes the zeroth class. It is more meaningful to
consider the relative distribution of firms in classes 1 through 6 —
those firms that are active in the industry. This can be accomplished
6
by normalizing the results so that £ 7T = 1 . The equilibrium
i=l 1
size distribution of these firms is shown in Table 1-1. Adelman
showed that this equilibrium distribution is independent of the number
171
of firms in the zeroth class.
Table 1-1 Equilibrium Size Distribution of Firms
in the U.S. Steel Industry
1929 1956 Equilibrium
size class % firms % assets % firms % assets % firms % assets
1 25.00 1.15 27.68 0.98 18.09 0.11
2 A3. 47 8.64 39.29 6.79 22.55 0.68
3 16.30 9.49 8.93 4.36 7.25 0.61
4 11.96 24.70 16.96 21.90 17.42 3.92
5 1.09 5.42 5.36 26.86 13.65 12.54
6 2.18 50.60 1.79 39.11 21.04 82.14
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Adelman, op. cit.
, p. 901.
Table 1-1 indicates that considerable growth in the median size firm
is to be expected, on the basis of this model at least. In both 1929
and 1956 the median size firm belonged to the second size class, but
in equilibrium the median size firm will belong to the fourth class.
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The data in Table 1-1 also indicate that a lessening in
the degree of concentration in the U.S. steel industry is to be
expected. In 1929 roughly 15 percent of the steel firms controlled
nearly 81 percent of the industry's assets. By interpolation, in 1956
the top 15 percent controlled roughly 75 percent of the assets, while
in equilibrium the top 15 percent of the steel firms would control
only about 60 percent of the industry's assets.
Adelman also used the steel industry data to construct an
index of industrial mobility based on the index of social mobility
172devised by Prais. The index measures industrial mobility as the
ratio of the average number of years spent in a size class in a per-
fectly mobile industry — one in which p. . is independent of i —
to the average number of years a firm in any size class in the industry
173
and year in question could expect to remain in that size class.
Her conclusion was that the mobility of firms in the steel industry
174
would decline as the industry moves toward the steady state.
Adelman' s model represents an improvement over the discrete
models discussed earlier in this subsection. Unlike those models,
Adelman' s model considers the evolution of industrial structure over
time, rather than just the equilibrium size distribution toward
which current size distributions appear to be converging. Her model
is general enough to be applied to other industries to determine
trends in industrial structure or to be reapplied to more recent data
for the U.S. steel industry to test whether the trend in its structure
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has altered. However, like the models considered earlier, the role of
the individual firm has been subsumed in the random character of the
model.
b. Models Using Continuous Size
The discussion of Adelman's model in the previous subsection
pointed out the major applications of the discrete models, namely, first,
to study trends in industrial concentration and in industrial mobility
as firms in an industry grow, and second, to identify the stationary
probability distribution toward which the size distribution at any
point in time is moving. Continuous models, which are discussed in
this subsection, are applied similarly to the study of real world
industries.
Gibrat formulated a continuous model of industrial structure
based on the following two assumptions: (i) the law of proportionate
effect is valid and (ii) the number of firms is constant. Under
these assumptions the size distribution of firms is asymptotically
lognormal. To see why this should be so, note first that the change
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If the percentage increase g is small, then g. = log (1 + g.) , so
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From the (strong version of) the law of proportionate effect, the random
variables g. are independent and identically distributed. Then, by
the central limit theorem, log S is asymptotically normally distributed
— 2 — 2
with mean t«g and variance t«c , where g is the mean and a is
the variance of the distribution of g . Thus, the size distribution of
firms will be approximately lognormal for large t .
The asymptotic lognormality of the size distribution of
firms is dependent on assumptions (i) and (ii) . Reasons for doubting
the validity of the law of proportionate effect were cited in the pre-
vious subsection. As regards the second assumption, a large turnover
of firms tends to disrupt the limiting process, particularly when large
numbers of small firms enter the industry and large numbers of large
178
firms leave the industry. The less valid are the two assumptions
for a particular industry, the further that industry's size distribution
179
of firms is likely to deviate from lognormality. In spite of these
objections to the model, Hart and Prais, Simon and Bonini, and Engwall
present empirical evidence that size distributions of firms in various
180
industries and in various countries are approximately lognormal.
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Engwall's results are particularly noteworthy because part of his
study is devoted to socialist countries. The evidence of lognormal
size distributions of firms in those countries implies that the observed
stochastic growth process is not exclusively a capitalist phenomenon.
One consequence of the stochastic growth process described
by Gibrat is that concentration will tend to increase over time. Large
firms have the same probability as small firms of growing at any
2particular rate, and as a result, the logarithmic variance, t«a ,
increases without bound as t increases. If the stochastic process is
a reasonable description of the actual growth process of firms, and the
empirical evidence just cited would suggest that it is, then it should
be expected that industrial concentration would increase. This too is
181
consistent with the findings of several studies.
A model that does not require the logarithmic variance to
182
increase steadily with time has been devised by Hart and Prais.
In their model the logarithmic variances in two successive periods are
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(3 = regression coefficient
2
a = residual variance.
e
2
If 8 $ the estimator for (3 > is less than one and a is small,
then the variance will tend to decrease, i.e. the size distribution of
firms will regress toward the mean. If 3=1, growth is purely
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stochastic and the validity of the law of proportionate effect cannot
be rejected. If 3 > 1 , then large firms grow proportionately
faster and concentration will increase faster than predicted by Gibrat's
model.
In proposing their model, Hart and Prais suggest that the
size distribution of firms tends to regress toward the mean as firms
attempt to achieve some optimum size (determined, say, by financial
factors) . This implies that 3 < 1 . Their model has been criticized
on two grounds. Their assumption that there exists an optimum size
requires that firms' long run average total cost curves be U-shaped,
which makes their model incompatible with Bain's findings that firms'
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average cost curves are L-shaped. Second, Eatwell summarizes
evidence provided by a number of empirical studies that implies that
* 185
there has been a recent tendency for 3 > 1 . This also suggests
that the law of proportionate effect is invalid, although as Eatwell
points out, this is not necessarily true for all industries. For the
five recent (running up to 1960) studies cited by Eatwell, in one case
3 was significantly less than one and in three cases it was significantly
. -u 186greater than one.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence accumulated thus far,
there does not appear to be much support for Hart's and Prais 's model.
There does appear to be support for Gibrat's model, although
there are several studies, including Eatwell' s, that indicate that the
law of proportionate effect does not hold universally. Possibly a
somewhat more general model, one that allows for some serial correlation
in the growth rates of firms, is needed. Models that permit this, and





The two previous subsections described analytical models of
industrial structure. In those models all firms were treated identically
and the stochastic processes were assumed to be stationary. The growth
process of each firm in an industry, regardless of the firm's size, the
quality of its management, its previous pattern of growth, or any other
distinguishing features, was explained by the same stochastic process.
Moreover, the nature of the process, as embodied in the transition
probability matrix or the distribution of the growth rate, remained
time invariant. Such models are of considerable value in showing that
industrial concentration can increase steadily through the operation of
a chance mechanism — without concerted efforts by producers either to
take over their rivals or to drive them from the industry. The
empirical validation of such models also lends support to Bain's findings
that there is no optimum size of the firm. But the models' implication
that growth proceeds by historical accident independent of the financial
and productive characteristics of the individual firm and independent of
the influence of the firm's managers is difficult for many economists
to accept. Difficulties in obtaining meaningful results from analytical
models are often encountered, however, when the models are designed so
as to treat the individual firm in what the modeler regards as a
'realistic' fashion. For this reason several economists have turned
to simulation.
Simulation makes it possible to relax the restrictive
assumptions required in analytical modeling. For example, it is no
longer necessary to assume that the law of proportionate effect is
valid. In a simulation model the growth process of firms is determined
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by the set of rules written into the computer program that governs
the simulation. The mechanism that determines the size of the firm
in any period can be designed to take into account (i) the firm's
growth history, e.g. by permitting firms that experience above-average
growth in one period to enjoy above-average growth probabilities the
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following period; (ii) special characteristics of the firm, such as
its propensity to conduct research and development or the expertise
of its management; (iii) variations in the rate at which firms enter
the industry and in the rate at which firms leave the industry (the
latter as a result, say, of a decreasing risk of failure as the firm
becomes older) , both of which cause the number of firms to vary over
time; and (iv) a growth mechanism that is not constant but that varies,
say, over the business cycle. All that is required is a set of rules
to specify the operation of the growth mechanism. If one hopes to
model a specific industry, however, this requires that one have in mind
a valid model of the individual firm in order that the set of rules be
realistic.
To demonstrate the use of a simulation model, the results
of ten runs of a continuous size simulation model, which was developed
by the author, have been provided in Table 1-2. Output is in the form
of four-firm concentration ratios computed at 20-year intervals for
100 years. Initially there wece 100 firms of equal size. Growth rates
were assumed to be normally distributed, with mean growth of five
percent per annum and a standard deviation of ten percent, for each
firm in each year. To reflect the impact of the business cycle, it was
assumed that births occurred according to the following five-year cycle:
three, one, none, one, two (per year). It was assumed that any firm
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whose size had fallen below zero had gone bankrupt. In order to keep
the model simple, takeovers were not permitted and all firms were
assumed to be indistinguishable except for differences in size.
Table 1-2 Four-Firm Concentration Ratios
Resulting from 10 Runs of a
Simulation Model Using
Continuous Size
Four-Firm Concentration Ratio at Year:
Run 20 40 60 80 100
1 4.0 9.7 10.1 13.0 16.3 21.1
2 4.0 7.6 9.7 11.9 13.0 16.0
3 4.0 7.3 10.3 11.9 13.8 15.0
4 4.0 7.5 9.2 8.9 9.6 12.0
5 4.0 7.1 10.1 11.1 11.3 9.8
6 4.0 6.5 7.5 8.9 11.1 12.1
7 4.0 7.7 8.9 12.7 13.8 15.8
8 4.0 6.8 8.2 10.9 12.3 16.0
9 4.0 7.7 10.7 13.5 17.0 16.1
10 4.0 8.5 10.2 12.4 14.9 14.6
Avg 4.0 7.6 9.5 11.5 13.3 14.9
Even though the growth prospects of all firms are identical,
the firms do not remain of equal size for very long. Within 20 years
concentration has nearly doubled, with the industry leader (not shown)
having nearly tripled his market share. The simulation results display
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a clear tendency toward increasing concentration, a tendency that is
even more marked if no new firms are allowed to enter the industry.
A second set of simulation runs, this time with no new entries
permitted, yielded an average concentration ratio of 19.9 at the
century mark, and in one of the runs concentration reached 29.2 after
100 years. If some sort of takeover mechanism had been built in,
concentration would have increased even more rapidly. In addition,
any of the factors (i) - (iv) listed above could be added to the model
to determine what effect they would have, either individually or
collectively, on industrial concentration.
d. Models of Market Organization
The stochastic analysis of changes in industrial structure
has led to some interesting results. Yet, in assessing the true
economic contributions of these models, one must recognize that, by
their very nature, these models can say very little about the individual
firm. For example, one cannot see what connections exist among the
individual firm's policy choices, the firm's interactions with its rivals,
and the performance of the markets it serves. The simulation technique
offers some hope that the models can be made to reflect better the role
of the individual firm. In the opinion of this writer, it would be more
valuable in terms of policy implications to determine how decisions by
the individual firm and how the interaction of the firm with its rivals
affect the level of industrial concentration than it would be to merely
identify the probability distribution — Yule, Pareto, lognormal, or
whatever — that comes closest to fitting actual size distributions of
firms. For while models based on the law of proportionate effect have
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been found to be appropriate for describing actual size distributions
of firms, they say nothing concerning the internal dynamics of
corporate growth.
Recently a number of models of market organization that
attempt to explain the connection between market equilibrium price
and quantity and the objectives and price-setting behavior of firms in
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the industry have been formulated. Winter has devised a markup
pricing model in which each firm each period sets the value of two
parameters: its productive capacity and the price of its product —
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the latter as a percentage markup over average variable cost. Firms
do not optimize, they satisfice. If profits prove unsatisfactory, the
firm alters its markup or its size. Winter's model allows firms to
enter the industry, and this is accomplished by new entrants charging
a lower price than existing producers. Winter permits prices, capacity,
and demand to assume only a finite number of values, and shows that
under the above assumptions, the development of the industry over
time can be modeled as a finite state Markov chain. In the persis-
tent states are firms that employ the same percentage markup that is
sufficient to discourage entry; that earn satisfactory profits at a
level commensurate with profit rates in other industries; and that
experience the same degree of capacity utilization. What is distinc-
tive about Winter's model, as the survey in chapter two will make
clear, is that producers do not optimize anything, and yet, their
market behavior converges to the competitive equilibrium with
probability one.
A more recent model is due to Maccini. His model, while
it is not stochastic in nature, is concerned with dynamic adjustments
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191in market price and output. Two aspects of Maccini's approach are
noteworthy. First he develops a model of the representative firm, in
which the firm sets the price of its product and alters its market
share by varying its price in relation to the ruling market average
price. Then he collects these firms into an aggregate product market
model. However, he does assume that the firm behaves as if any price
changes it makes will not affect the market average price (i.e. he
assumes that monopolistic competition prevails) and that the firm
maximizes the present value of its expected profit stream (i.e. he
assumes that the firm's shareholders and managers are risk neutral)
.
The models of Winter and Maccini demonstrate one of the
uses to which a model of the firm can be put. Two other uses will
be discussed in the next subsection. What models such as the two just
discussed also make clear is the critical role models of the firm can
play in models of industrial structure and in models of market organi-
zation. Similarly, results obtainable from models of the types dis-
cussed in the next subsection are also affected by the treatment
given the individual firm.
3. Micro-Macro Models and General Equilibrium Models
Microeconomics deals with economics in the small — the behavior
of individual economic decision-making units and individual markets —
while macroeconomics deals with economics in the large — the behavior
of broad economic aggregates, such as total investment, and their
role in determining the general levels of prices and employment.
There has always been a rather uneasy coexistence of the two, for while
it is clear that the decisions made by individual economic units
72
determine, through the system of markets that tie the economy together,
the values of the aggregates, no one has been successful in explaining
precisely how this is accomplished. Moreover, it is not assured that
existing macroeconomic models and microeconomic models are logically
consistent. In view of first the power that many firms have to set
prices and then to maintain them in the face of falling demand, and
second, the recent period of high, persistent inflation in the face
of high unemployment, the need for a synthesis of microeconomics and
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macroeconomics appears to many economists to be a pressing one.
Such a synthesis would also be likely to reveal the relationship between
the growth-promoting activities of individual firms and the overall
growth of the economy. Such knowledge would be of particular value
to economies whose industrial sectors are only just beginning to
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develop.
Such a synthesis could be brought about presumably through the
development of general equilibrium models, which determine the simul-
taneous equilibrium of all markets and which also yield the values
of economic aggregates. A somewhat less ambitious approach would be
one that sought to link the relevant microeconomic decisions with a
particular economic aggregate, i.e. a micro-macro model. In models
of both types the individual firm would play a critical role.
Marris has developed a micro-macro model that links the growth
of firms with the growth of the economy, his underlying premise being
that "aggregate behavior must be seen as the specific result of the
194behavior of the firms." In his model the growth rate of the economy
is the weighted average of the growth rates of individual firms. Each
firm selects a steady state growth path, as in Marris's microeconomic
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model of the firm, but actual growth rates may vary due to the
disturbances in the firm's environment. Also as in the microeconomic
model, each firm's optimum growth rate depends on its expected profit
rate, which at the macroeconomic level makes the average (planned)
growth rate of the economy dependent on the macroeconomic average
profit rate. In equilibrium, growth rates, profit rates, and valua-
tion ratios are determined at both the microeconomic and the macro-
economic levels.
General equilibrium models are more complex than micro-macro
models, encompassing simultaneously all micro-macro relationships,
rather than just some small subset (as in a micro-macro model). Con-
sequently, their analysis generally requires the use of more sophis-
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ticated mathematical techniques. It is at least partly for this
reason that general equilibrium models have been slow to adapt to
recent developments in the theory of the firm. The majority of general
equilibrium models have assumed a manufacturing sector throughout
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which perfect competition prevails. Two notable exceptions are the
models of Negishi and Arrow, both of which assume monopolistic compe-
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tition. Both models assume that the firm maximizes profits. Neither
model takes into account either the interaction among the monopolistic
firms or the influence of factors internal to these firms. As in the
case of models of industrial structure, the behavior of the individual
firm has remained an unexplained phenomenon.
E. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER ONE AND OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
The modern business enterprise is large and diversified, and in
many cases, management-controlled. In the opinion of this writer,
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there is little resemblance between the modern corporate enterprise
and the business firm depicted by traditional economic theory. Various
models have been suggested as replacements for the traditional model,
and the majority of these have been most conveniently expressed in
mathematical form. The models that have been proposed are of both
direct and indirect interest, in the first case, because of recent
important policy debates, such as one concerning the breaking up of
the major oil companies and another concerning the importance of
199large size to risk-bearing in defense contracting; and in the
second case, because of the need for more meaningful models of the
firm to be incorporated in models of industrial structure, micro-
macro models, and general equilibrium models.
The remainder of this thesis is concerned exclusively with the
theory of the firm. Chapter two surveys the literature dealing with
the theory of the firm and presents a representative collection of
models of the firm. Each model is carefully set out and analyzed, and
the contributions of each to the theory of the firm are evaluated.
The models are presented in more or less chronological order, beginning
with the traditional models in sections B through E, and then following
the evolution of the theory of the firm through the more sophisticated
treatments given to the objectives of the firm, to the links between
the firm's financial decisions and its operating decisions, to the
behavior of the firm under uncertainty, and to the behavior of the
firm in a multiperiod context. Also discussed is the relationship
between each of these models and similar models that have appeared
in the literature, but which are not presented in detail in chapter
two.
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It is this writer's intention in providing a comprehensive survey
of the literature to indicate, not only the evolution of the theory of
the firm to date, but also the directions in which further research
might fruitfully proceed.
The author's basic theoretical model is developed in chapters three
through five. The model is initially formulated in chapter three, where
it is used to study the behavior of the firm over the business cycle.
The firm is modeled as a discounted collective utility maximizer -
with collective utility reflecting both shareholder and managerial
sources of satisfaction. It is shown that the traditional and managerial
theories of the firm may be reconciled by interpreting these classes of
models in terms of the behavior of the firm over the business cycle.
Financial considerations are incorporated into the model in chapter
four. The modified model, which is formulated as a stochastic optimal
control problem utilizing the time-state-preference approach to
modeling uncertainty, is used to examine the relationship between the
firm's optimal operating decisions and its optimal financial decisions.
Organizational factors are introduced in chapter five, and some of the
consequences of decentralized decision-making for the loss of control
and X-efficiency are suggested.
The extension of the basic model to firms in the U.S. airframe
industry is carried out in chapters six and seven. The institutional
milieu within which these firms operate is characterized and their
planning processes are described in chapter six. A model of the
representative airframe builder is formulated and is used to study
several procurement policy issues in chapter seven.
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CHAPTER ONE FOOTNOTES
1. J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State , 1st ed. (Houghton
Mifflin; Boston; 1967) . This view is shared by the proponents of
the managerial theories of the firm. The managerial viewpoint is
discussed below and several of the managerial models are set out
in section G of chapter two.
2. 'The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations,"
Fortune (May 1976); "The Fortune Directory of the Second 500 Largest
Industrial Corporations," Fortune (June 1976); and Federal Trade
Commission, Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations
Washington, D.C.; 4th Quarter, 1975).
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associated with trying to determine the objectives of actual
firms, are discussed in W. J. Baumol, "Models of Economic
Competition," in P. Langhoff, ed., Models, Measurement and Marketing
(Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; 1965), pp. 143-168.
4. R. J. Larner, Management Control and the Large Corporation (Dunellen;
New York; 1970) . The classification scheme adopted by Larner is
somewhat arbitrary. Berle and Means had required stock ownership
of 20 percent or more for ownership control, but Larner argued
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1929 (the period studied by Berle and Means) and 1963 (the period
studied by Larner). Ibid
. , pp. 10-11. This still leaves unanswered
the question as to why 10 percent is better than 15 percent or some
other figure. Indeed, Larner made two exceptions to his classifica-
tion scheme, classifying May Department Stores Co. as ownership-
controlled, even though the May family held a stock interest of less
than four percent, because the family had five representatives on
the board of directors, and classifying Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp. as management-controlled even though Stone & Webster
Company held 11 percent of the outstanding shares, because the
latter had no representatives on Transcontinental' s board of
directors. Ibid
., pp. 78-79, 84-85.
5. Ibid ., p. 16.
6. Ibid
. , p. 16. The results of the Berle and Means study are reported
in A. A. Berle, Jr., and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property , rev. ed. (Harcourt, Brace and World; New York;
1968), p. 66.
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has been a continuing debate in the economic and business literature
as to the extent of the separation of ownership from control.
Robert Sheehan argues that family ownership and control is still
significant among the 500 largest corporations. Sheehan reported
that in roughly 150 of the 500 largest industrial corporations (as
ranked by sales by Fortune magazine) controlling ownership rested
in the hands of either a single individual or members of a single
family. See R. Sheehan, "Proprietors in the World of Big Business,"
Fortune (June 1967), p. 178. Philip Burch challenges the separation
of ownership from control hypothesis more strongly than Sheehan.
Burch studied ownership and control in 450 large companies and
concluded that 42% of the largest publicly held corporations are
controlled by one person or by a single ramily and that another 17%
are in the "possible family control" category. See P. H. Burch, Jr.,




Peter Drucker argues that management control is diminishing
due to the growing influence of pension funds that own large blocks
of company shares. See P. F. Drucker, The Unseen Revolution (Harper
& Row; New York; 1976). For a contrary view see M. R. Darby's review
of Drucker 's book. M. R. Darby, "Should pension funds be cause for
concern?/' Business Week (July 19, 1976). Evidence in support of
the Berle and Means study and the Larner study is provided by John
Palmer, whose study of the 500 largest industrial corporations
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controlled. See J. P. Palmer, "The Separation of Ownership from
Control in Large U.S. Industrial Corporations," Quarterly Review of
Economics & Business (vol. 12; no. 3; Autumn 1972), pp. 55-62. He
concludes that the separation of ownership from control is widespread,
that there is a strong negative correlation between the size of the
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the smallest percentage of owner control), and that his study is
consistent with those of Berle and Means and Larner and shows that
"the frequency of owner control of large corporations seems to have
declined from 1929 through 1969." Ibid., p. 61. To summarize the
foregoing, the results of the various studies, when taken collectively,
remain inconclusive. This is due at least in part to the differing
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control. Thus, the issue as to whether management-controlled firms
are predominant among the largest nonfinancial firms in the American
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8. Introductory economics textbooks typically refer to the shareholders
of a firm as the firm's owners, but strictly speaking this is untrue.
A corporation is a separate legal entity. All corporate property is
owned by the corporation. Individual shareholders have no specific
claim against any of the corporation's assets. The shares he owns
gives the individual shareholder voting rights, rather than ownership
rights. His shares entitle him to a share of the profits, which he
receives in the form of dividends, and in the event the corporation
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after all creditors have been paid. Thus, while the traditional view
is that the stockholders are the owners of the corporation, this is
only true in a strict sense for those corporations in which the
shareholders are also the firm's managers.
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the interests of the company's shareholders or their elected
representatives , the board of directors . Evidence of this is provided
by the Gulf payoff scandal. Management had been given virtually
complete freedom to run the company, and in fact, had been able to
conceal the magnitude of the payments from its board for a period of
years. Once the deception became apparent, top management was removed.
See B. E. Calame, "Gulf Officers' Ouster Was Boldly Engineered by
Mellon Interests," Wall Street Journal (January 15, 1976), and W.
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See subsection 2 in section G of chapter two.
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likelihood that the different measures of size would be highly
correlated. See the next footnote for a reference.
115. J. Bates, "Alternative Measures of the Size of Firms," in P. E.
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117. What follows is a brief discussion of the distinguishing features
of the four types of market structure. For a more precise economic
definition of each of the market structures see S. C. Webb,
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Figure A Indifference Curves
for a Risk Seeker
Figure B Indifference Curves
Under Risk Neutrality
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big oil," Business Week (August 16, 1976).
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also A. Wood, A Theory of Profits (Cambridge University Press;
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Industrial Structure (D. C. Heath; Lexington, Mass.; 1973).
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Unfortunately, the game theoretic approach has thus far proven
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R. Marris, "The Modern Corporation and Economic Theory," in
Marris and Wood, op. cit.
, pp. 283-304, describes a game theoretic
model that allows for the entry and exit of firms. Game theory,
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of this paper.
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the Levels of 1954 Concentration," Review of Economics and
Statistics (vol. 52; no. 4; November 1970), pp. 411-416. Con-
centration has not increased in all industries, and it has tended
to increase least in those industries that grew most rapidly.
See W. F. Mueller, "Industrial Structure and Competition Policy,"
in Studies by the Staff of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability
(Washington, D.C.; January 1969), p. 62, and J. F. Weston and
S. I. Ornstein, "Trends and Causes of Concentration — A Survey,"
in J. F. Weston and S. I. Ornstein, eds., The Impact of Large
Firms on the U.S. Economy (D. C. Heath; Lexington, Mass.; 1973),
pp. 3-21. Aggregate concentration, as measured by the percentage
of total manufacturing corporation assets controlled by the
largest 100 firms, has also increased. See Scherer, op. cit.
,
pp. 41-44. Both trends are observable in other countries. See
K. D. George, "The Changing Structure of Competitive Industry,"
Economic Journal (vol. 82; no. 325s; March 1972 (Supplement)),
pp. 353-368; K. D. George, "A Note on Changes in Industrial
Concentration in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal (vol.
85; no. 337; March 1975), pp. 124-128; and Scherer, op. cit. ,
pp. 44-45.
147. The prevailing view is that greater concentration — i.e. greater
departures from the competitive ideal — result in higher prices,
more excessive profits, and a less efficient allocation of the
economy's scarce productive resources. See R. E. Caves, American
Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance , 3rd ed. (Prentice-
Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N. J. ; 1972) and J. S. Bain, "Relation of
Profit Rates to Industry Concentration," Quarterly Journal of
Economics (vol. 65; no. 3; August 1951), pp. 293-324. See also
J. S. Bain, Industrial Organization , 2nd ed. (Wiley; New York;
1968); J. S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (Harvard University
Press; Cambridge, Mass.; 1956); J. M. Blair, Economic Concentration
(Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich; New York; 1972); B. Bock and
J. Farkas, "Concentration and Productivity," SBE No. 103 (The
Conference Board; New York; 1969); Y. Brozen, "The Persistence
of 'High Rates of Return' in High Stable Concentration Industries,"
Journal of Law and Economics (vol. 14; October 1971), pp. 501-
512; N. R. Collins and L. E. Preston, Concentration and Price-
Cost Margins in Manufacturing Industries (University of California
Press; Berkeley; 1968); B. T. Allen, "Market Concentration and
Wage Increases: U.S. Manufacturing, 1947-1964," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review (vol. 21; no. 3; April 1968), pp. 353-366;
P. Asch, "Industry Structure and Performance: Some Empirical
Evidence," Review of Social Economy (vol. 25; March 1967),
pp. 167-182; D. F. Greer, "Advertising and Market Concentration,"
97
Southern Economic Journal (vol. 38; no. 1; July 1971), pp.
19-32; C. J. Sutton, "Advertising, Concentration and Competition,"
Economic Journal (vol. 84; no. 333; March 1974), pp. 56-69;
K. Cowling, "Optimality in firms' advertising policies: an
empirical analysis," in K. Cowling, ed., Market Structure and
Corporate Behavior
, op. cit. , pp. 85-103; J. Cable, "Market
structure advertising policy and intermarket differences in
advertising intensity," in K. Cowling, ed., Market Structure and
Corporate Behavior
, op. cit. , pp. 105-124; and J. W. Markham,
"Market Structure, Business Conduct, and Innovation," American
Economic Review (vol. 55; no. 2; May 1965), pp. 323-332. For a
critical review of earlier studies and a discussion of some
important policy implications see H. Demsetz, "Industry Structure,
Market Rivalry, and Public Policy," in Weston and Ornstein,
op. cit.
, pp. 71-82; S. I. Ornstein, "Concentration and Profits,"
ibid.
, pp. 87-102; and W. S. Comanor and T. A. Wilson, "Adver-
tising, Market Structure and Performance," Review of Economics
and Statistics (vol. 49; no. 4; November 1967), pp. 423-440.
148. This leads Marris to suggest a game theoretic approach. See
Marris, Modern Corporation and Economic Theory
, op. cit. ,
pp. 283-304. However, in the opinion of this writer, a great
deal of work needs to be done before this approach begins to
bear fruit. It is also this writer's opinion that the starting
point for such research should be the individual firm.
149. See Engwall, op. cit.
,
chs. 3-5. See also H. A. Simon and C.
P. Bonini, "The Size Distribution of Business Firms," American
Economic Review (vol. 48; no. 4; September 1958), pp. 607-617;
I. G. Adelman, "A Stochastic Analysis of the Size Distribution
of Firms," Journal of the American Statistical Association
(vol. 53; no. 284; December 1958), pp. 893-904; and S. H. Archer
and J. McGuire, "Firm Size and the Probabilities of Growth,"
Western Economic Journal (vol. 3; no. 3; Summer 1965), pp. 233-
246. An interesting discussion of some of the practical limi-
tations of these models is provided in Scherer, op. cit.
, pp.
125-130.
150. While it is normally assumed that the transition probabilities
are constant, it is not necessary to do so. P. K. Newman and
J. N. Wolfe, An Essay on the Theory of Value (Purdue University
Press; West Lafayette, Ind.; 1960) have generalized on Adelman's
results by permitting the transition probabilities to vary.
151. In empirical studies it is necessary to specify the size of the
pool from which potential entrants may enter the industry. Only
then can the transition probabilities in the first column be
estimated. See Adelman, op. cit.
,
p. 899.
152. The basic reference for the terminology and basic results that
follow is W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and





154. R. Gibrat, Les Inegalites Economiques (Sirey; Paris; 1931).
In the economic literature the law of proportionate effect is
also referred to as Gibrat's law.
155. Eatwell, op. cit.
, p. 403. See also Hart, op. cit. t and E.
Mansfield, "Entry, Gib rat's Law, Innovation, and the Growth
of Firms," American Economic Review (vol. 52; no. 5; December
1962), pp. 1023-1051. Singh and Whittington report similar
results for U.K. quoted companies. Singh and Whittington*
op. cit. For a discussion of some contrary results see J. M.
Samuels and A. D. Chesher, "Growth, survival and the size of
companies 1960-9," in Cowling, op. cit.
, pp. 39-59.
156. Eatwell, op. cit.
, pp. 403-406. See also Mansfield, op. cit. ,
pp. 1030-1035; J. M. Samuels, "Size and the Growth of Firms,"
Review of Economic Studies (vol. 32; no. 90; April 1965),
pp. 105-112; S. Hymer and P. Pashigian, "Firm Size and Rate
of Growth," Journal of Political Economy (vol. 70; no. 6;
December 1962), pp. 556-569; and J. M. Samuels and D. J. Smyth,
"Profits, Variability of Profits and Firm Size," Economica
(vol. 35; no. 138; May 1968), pp. 127-139.
157. Steindl, Random Processes , op. cit. , and Singh and Whittington,
op. cit.
158. Y. Ijiri and H. A. Simon, "Business Firm Growth and Size,"
American Economic Review (vol. 54; no. 2; March 1964), pp. 77-89.
159. Simon and Bonini, op. cit.
160. H. A. Simon, "On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions,"
Biometrica (vol. 42; December 1955), pp. 425-440.
161. The characteristics of the Yule distribution are summarized in
N. L. Johnson and S. Kotz, Distributions in Statistics , vol.
1 (Discrete Distributions) (Houghton Mifflin; New York; 1969)
,
pp. 244-247, and the characteristics of the Pareto distribution
are summarized in N. L. Johnson and S. Kotz, Distributions in
Statistics , vol. 2 (Continuous Univariate Distributions — 1)
(Houghton Mifflin; New York; 1970), ch. 19. In fact, there are
several distributions, each generated by a different stochastic
growth process, that fit the skewed firm size distribution typical
of real world industries well enough that it is very difficult
to distinguish one from another statistically. See Simon, Skew
Distribution Functions
, op. cit. , and R. E. Quandt, "On the Size
Distribution of Firms," American Economic Review (vol. 56; no.
3; June 1966), pp. 416-432.
162. Simon and Bonini, op. cit.
,
p. 612.




164. Steindl, Random Processes, op. cit.
, p. 187.
165. Quandt, op. cit.
166. Steindl, op. cit.
, p. 194.




169. Engwall, op. cit. , ch. 5, and Archer and McGuire, op. cit.
,
pp. 233-246.




172. S. J. Prais, "Measuring Social Mobility," Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society (ser. A, vol. 118; 1955), pp. 56-66.
173. The index of mobility for time t is given by
M M
M = I [ir /(1-ir )] / I [s Vd-p..)] ,c 1=1 1 x i=l 1 1X
where s. is the proportion of firms in class i at time t.
The quantity 1/(1 -it.) is the expected number of periods a firm
would spend in class i if the industry were perfectly mobile,
and the quantity 1/(1
-p..) is the number of periods a steel
firm in class i in period t would expect to remain there. The
sums are just weighted averages of these values taken over the M
size classes.
174. Adelman, op. cit.
,
p. 903.
175. See Engwall, op. cit. , chs . 3 and 6. Studies of industrial
structure that employed models using continuous size include Hart,
op. cit. ; P. E. Hart and S. J. Prais, "The Analysis of Business
Concentration: A Statistical Approach," Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society (ser. A, vol. 119, pt. 2;i956),
pp. 150-181; Singh and Whittington, op. cit. ; and Samuels, op. cit.
176. Gibrat, op. cit.
177. The lognormal distribution has been applied to a wide range of
economic phenomena. The characteristics of the lognormal distribu-
tion are summarized in Johnson and Kotz, vol. 2, op. cit. , ch. 14.
For a survey of its uses in economics see J. Aitchison and J. A. C.
Brown, The Lognormal Distribution, with Special Reference to its
Uses in Economics (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1957).
100
178. D. G. Champernowne, "Discussion on Paper by Mr. Hart and Dr. Prais,"
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (ser. A, vol. 119, pt. 2;
1956), p. 182.
179. There is, however, the possibility that the two assumptions are
invalid but that their effects are counterbalancing. If average
cost curves are L-shaped, as Bain has suggested, then it is not
unreasonable to expect that deviations from the law of proportionate
effect would be more common among smaller than among larger firms.
If growth rates are more variable among smaller firms, then chance
will occasionally permit a small firm to grow very rapidly. On
average small firms might even grow faster than larger firms. For
a constant population of firms this would cause actual concentration
to be higher than what the model would predict. (See Engwall,
op. cit.
, pp. 67-68, or Scherer, op. cit. , pp. 128-129, for more
on this point). If, in addition, the number of firms is growing
(as more firms enter than leave) , then concentration would tend to
decrease. Putting these two opposite effects together, the net
effect may be very small.
180. Hart and Prais, op. cit.
,
p. 170; Quandt, op. cit. , pp. 425-427;
Simon and Bonini, op. cit. ; and Engwall, op. cit. , ch. 6. In their
study Simon and Bonini tested the Yule distribution — which is a
generalization of the lognormal distribution in the sense that the
law of proportionate effect still holds but births are permitted —
against data for the United States steel industry and reported close
fits. For some contrary results see I. H. Silberman, "On Lognormality
as a Summary Measure of Concentration," American Economic Review
(vol. 57; no. 4; September 1967), pp. 807-831.
181. See footnote 146 for references.
182. Hart and Prais, op. cit.
183. The underlying relationship is
log [S
t+1
] = 3 • log [S
t
] + e ,
which will generate a lognormal distribution provided 3=1.
If the law of proportionate effect is valid, then S t and £ are
independent, and taking variances leads to equation *10) .
184. Bain, Industrial Organization , op. cit.
185. Eatwell, op. cit.
, pp. 405-406. See also Samuels, op. cit. , and
Singh and Whittington, op. cit .
186. Eatwell, op. cit.
, p. 405. Two standard errors from the mean was
used as the criterion of significance.
101
187. A description of simulation models is provided in Engwall, op. cit.
,
chs. 7-9. Chapter 8 presents a simulation model using discrete size
and chapter 9 describes a simulation model using continuous size.
Two earlier simulation models are those of Ijiri and Simon
, op. cit.
,
and of F. E. Balderston and A. C. Hoggatt, Simulation of Market
Processes (Institute of Business and Economic Research; Berkeley; 1962)
188. Ijiri and Simon devised the following weak form of the law of
proportionate effect in order to build serial correlation into
their model: "the expected percentage change in size of the
totality of firms in each size stratum is independent of stratum."
See Ijiri and Simon, op. cit.
, p. 79.
189. Two partial, though useful, surveys of the literature are presented
in W. D. Nordhaus, "Recent Developments in Price Dynamics," in
0. Eckstein, ed., The Econometrics of Price Determination Conference
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the S. S. R. C;
Washington, D. C; 1972) and M. Rothschild, "Models of Market
Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey," Journal of
Political Economy (vol. 81; no. 6; November-December 1973),
pp. 1283-1308.
190. S. G. Winter, Jr., "An SSIR Model of Markup Pricing," unpublished
paper (University of Michigan; Ann Arbor; 1971).
191. L. J. Maccini, "An Aggregate Dynamic Model of Short-Run Price and
Output Behavior," Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol.90; no. 2;
May 1976), pp. 177-196. Maccini's model generalizes on a previous
model due to Phelps and Winter. Both models assume that firms are
expected-present-value maximizers, but only the Maccini model deals
with dynamic inventory adjustments. In the Phelps-Winter model the
firm faces a dynamic demand function, which causes the firm's rate
of change of sales to depend on the difference between its current
price and the market average price. The time path of the firm's
price gradually approaches the market average price, with the rate
of price adjustment dependent on both the difference between the
firm's price and the expected market average price and the difference
between the firm's market share (of customers) and its expected
equilibrium market share (of customers) . The model predicts homo-
geneity of degree one of the rate of price adjustment with respect
to the expected rate of inflation. See E. S. Phelps and S. G.
Winter, Jr., "Optimal Price Policy under Atomistic Competition,"
in E. S. Phelps, et al., eds., Microeconomic Foundations of
Employment and Inflation Theory (W. W. Norton; New York; 1970),
pp. 309-337.
192. See P. Wiles, "Cost Inflation and the State of Economic Theory,"
Economic Journal (vol.83; no. 330; June 1973), pp. 377-398, and
D. E. W. Laidler and J. M. Parkin, "Inflation — A Survey,"
Economic Journal (vol. 85; no. 340; December 1975), pp. 741-809.
102
193. See S. Lombardini, "Modern Monopolies in Economic Development,"
in Marris and Wood, op . ci t
.
, pp. 242-269.
194. Marris, Why Economics Needs a Theory of the Firm , op. cit.
,
p. 327.
The model is described in appendix 2 of that paper.
195. See section G of chapter two.
196. An excellent discussion of the purpose of general equilibrium
analysis is provided along with a survey of the relevant literature
in K. J. Arrow, "General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic
Techniques, Collective Choice," American Economic Review (vol. 64;
no. 3; June 1974), pp. 253-272. Arrow delivered the paper in
Stockholm, Sweden, in December 1972 when he received the Nobel
Prize in Economic Science.
197. See, for example, K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu, "Existence of an
Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy," Econometrica (vol. 22;
no. 3; July 1954), pp. 265-290, and L. W. McKenzie, "On the
Existence of General Equilibirum for a Competitive Market,"
Econometrica (vol. 27; no. 1; January 1959), pp. 54-71.
198. T. Negishi, "Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium,"
Review of Economic Studies (vol. 28; 1960-61), pp. 196-201, and
K. J. Arrow, "The Firm in General Equilibrium Theory," in Marris
and Wood, op. cit.
, pp. 68-110. A more detailed version of the
Arrow model with proofs appears in K. J. Arrow and F. H. Hahn,
General Competitive Analysis (Holden-Day; San Francisco; 1971).
199. For references see footnotes 140 and 141.
103
II. MODELS OF THE FIRM
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Overview of the Chapter
This chapter surveys the economic literature dealing with the
theory of the firm. Discussed in this chapter are a collection of
models of the firm that, in the opinion of this writer, form a cross
section of the models that constitute the theory of the firm.
The models selected include those that have been cited most fre-
quently in the literature, and in addition, several recent models whose
contributions to the theory of the firm were judged by this writer to
be significant — either because a more general treatment of the firm
was given or because a novel modeling approach was employed (or both)
.
A total of thirty models are discussed. These are listed in
table 11-34 on page 435, which provides a summary look at their economic
content, and also in table 11-35 on page ^Hf-4-, which provides a summary
look at the mathematical techniques employed in their analysis. While
the information these tables convey will be more meaningful to the
reader after he has read sections B through L, the reader may still
find it helpful to refer to these tables during the course of this
introductory section. The next subsection, which discusses the com-
ponents of the analytical framework that is used throughout the chapter,
explains the meaning and significance of the categories of information
summarized in the two tables. The reader may also find it helpful to
104
refer to these tables as he reads through the chapter in order to
appreciate better the distinguishing features of each model.
In selecting models for inclusion in this chapter, the author
decided for analytical purposes to treat the principal variations of
each of several basic models separately. That is, the list of thirty
includes many models that are, along with one or two other models on
the list, variations of the same basic model. The three models of the
firm under perfect competition, the two Baumol models, the two Marris
models, the two Vickers models, the three Lintner models, the Leland
quantity-setting and price-setting models, and the two Meyer models
could in each case be thought of as variants of a basic model. In the
discussion below, each of these variants is treated separately and the
characteristics of each are summarized separately, but care is also
taken to indicate the relationships that exist among the variants of
each basic model.
In this writer's opinion, treating these variants as separate
models helps clarify the analysis. In some cases, for example the
Baumol and Marris models, the two versions were in each case developed
sequentially, and treating the versions separately has the advantage of
making the development of the basic model stand out more clearly. In
other cases, for example the Leland quantity-setting and price-setting
models, the two variants explore and compare the economic implications
of two different types of behavior on the part of the firm. In yet other
cases, for example the Vickers, Lintner, and Meyer models, the variations
of the basic model represent successive modifications that relax
restrictive assumptions — and thereby make the basic model more realistic.
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Treating the versions of each of these models separately (as the
authors did originally) has the advantage of bringing out the effects
of the restrictive assuraption(s) more clearly.
The models discussed in this chapter are presented in more or
less chronological order, beginning with the traditional models of the
firm, and then following the evolution of the theory of the firm through
the more sophisticated treatments given to the objectives of the firm,
to the links between the firm's financial decisions and its operating
decisions, to the behavior of the firm under uncertainty, to the be-
havior of the firm in disequilibrium, and to the behavior of the firm
in a multiperiod context. Each of the models is carefully set out
and analyzed, and the contributions of each to the theory of the firm
are evaluated in terms of the aforementioned attributes.
The remainder of this section discusses first, the analytical
framework that is used throughout the chapter to characterize and to
assess the contributions of the thirty models, and second, the sources
and uses of the accounting information that will be needed in later
sections of the chapter. In connection with the latter, the accounting
information is related to the concepts of 'capital' and 'profit' that
were defined in chapter one, as well as to other concepts, such as 'debt'
and 'equity', that are of critical importance in models that incorpor-
ate a role for the firm's financial policies.
2. Characterization of the Models of the Firm
Each of the models discussed in sections B through L is classi-
fied on the basis of the firm's supposed objective (s) as tAacLutconaZ,
manag&vuiZ, bzkavZofiaX, or modeAn t/iacLLtlonaZ. In the traditional
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models, as indicated in table 11-34, the objective of the firm is to
maximize total profit. In the managerial models its objective is to
maximize total sales, the rate of growth, or some (utility) function of
variables that contribute to the satisfaction of the firm's managers.
In the behavioral models there is no single objective; the firm exhibits
satisficing behavior and seeks to meet several goals simultaneously.
In the modern traditional models the firm maximizes the stock market
value of the firm, the share price, or some other quantity that reflects
the utility of the firm's shareholders. As shown in section F, the
modern traditional objective functions can be interpreted as attempts
to reformulate the traditional objective of profit maximization, where
the common theme is the firm's supposed desire to maximize the welfare
of the firm's owners.
Within these classifications, the models discussed below are
characterized according to their economic content, as shown in table
11-34, and also according to their mathematical form and to the mathe-
matical techniques used in their solution, as shown in table 11-35. The
latter characterization includes the following: the nature of the opti-
mization problem (i.e. static or dynamic, as described in chapter one)
in which form the model was expressed; the existence of nonlinearities;
the nature of the constraints (or the lack of constraints other than
nonnegativity constraints); and the nature of the solution technique(s)
employed in analyzing the model. Since this mathematical characteriza-
tion involves concepts that are likely to be familiar to the reader,
the remainder of this subsection discusses the economic characterization
only.
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The economic content of each of the models of the firm dis-
cussed below is distinguished according to the objective(s) of the firm
assumed in the model; the model's treatment of the firm's financial
decisions; whether or not uncertainty is permitted; whether or not the
behavior of the firm in disequilibrium is considered; and the treat-
ment given the behavior of the firm over time. The objectives of the
firm have been discussed. The remainder of this subsection deals with
the remaining four elements of the characterization.
As discussed below, the traditional models do not incorporate
financial considerations explicitly, but rather, they leave the role
of finance subsumed within the general equilibrium analysis of a market
economy. Most of the managerial and modern traditional models treat
finance explicitly, although only the Baumol growth model, the Herendeen
model, and Leland's managerial model explicitly consider both debt
financing and external equity financing.
As indicated in table 11-34, the traditional models and the
managerial models assume away the existence of uncertainty. The assump-
tion of certainty simplifies these models to a great extent, though at
the cost of abstracting from a factor that can exert a large influence
on the behavior of the firm. Where uncertainty is permitted, it is
handled within either of two frameworks: the mean-variance framework
or the time-state-preference framework. The mean-variance framework
is discussed in section J and the time-state—preference framework is
described in section K.
The third factor that needs to be discussed is the question of
equilibrium and disequilibrium. The economic concept of Q.<\uJJLVoKAjixm
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indicates a state of affairs in which opposing economic forces are in
2balance and in which there is consequently no tendency for change.
By way of contrast, diAequAJLihsujuin denotes the state of affairs in which
equilibrium has not been attained. For example, a market is said to
be in equilibrium when quantity demanded equals quantity supplied at
the prevailing price, and a firm is said to be in equilibrium when
there is no tendency for it to alter its policies. Only the Meyer and
Wong models and Lelands' managerial model explicitly consider disequi-
librium. In the Meyer models disequilibrium occurs in the product
markets served by the models' monopolist when quantity supplied falls
short of quantity demanded at the established market price. The Meyer
models deal with disequilibrium within a single period context, whereas
the Wong model and Leland's managerial model deal with disequilibrium
within a multiperiod context, as discussed next.
The fourth factor that needs to be considered is the model's
treatment of the behavior of the firm over time. The first considera-
tion in this regard is the question of the tJMd 6pan covered by the
3
model. The traditional models are all single period models, whereas
4
most of the others are multiperiod models. For multiperiod models
of the firm there are questions regarding the exXi^ence of a multi-
period equilibrium for the firm, the 6£ab<LUXy of the multiperiod
equilibrium (if one exists) for the firm, and the dynamics of the
firm, i.e. exactly what its true time path looks like. The Baumol and
Marris growth models and the Herendeen model are concerned with steady
state equilibrium growth paths. That is, in their models the firm
selects an equilibrium growth rate and expands forever at that rate,
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unless changes in what Marris calls the super-environment disturb the
equilibrium. The other multiperiod models are also concerned with
characterizing the multiperiod equilibrium of the firm, although these
others do not assume steady state growth. Only the Wong model and
Leland's managerial model explicitly consider the stability question.
In the Wong model the equilibrium question involves the size of the
firm's capital stock. Equilibrium is attained once the capital stock
of optimum size has been accumulated, but until the optimum has been
reached, the firm pursues the dividend policy that leads it as rapidly
as possible toward its optimum size (e.g. if the current capital stock
is below the optimum, no dividends are paid in order that total profit
may be used to increase the firm's capital stock). In Leland's managerial
model the equilibrium question involves profit maximization, and with
his model Leland establishes conditions under which the firm's optimal
current policies converge to profit maximization as the firm's planning
horizon becomes infinite.
For the convenience of the reader, the characterization of each
model is summarized in a separate table that gives the classification
of the model; states the firm's objectives and constraints; identifies
the variables in the model as exogenously determined or as endogenously
determined and also identifies the firm's decision variables; states
the parameters in the model; characterizes the model' s treatments of
finance, of certainty/uncertainty, of equilibrium/disequilibrium, and
of the behavior of the firm over time; and gives the type of mathematical
model (i.e. mathematical programming problem or optimal control problem)
and the solution technique(s) employed in the analysis. Tables II-A
through 11-33 are provided below for this purpose.
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3. The Typical Firm's Financial Statements
This section describes the sources and uses of the accounting
information called for in many of the models discussed in this chapter.
The three main sources of accounting information are the balance sheet,
o
the income statement, and the statement of retained earnings. An
example of the first source is given in table II-l and examples of the
second and third sources are shown in tables II-2 and II- 3, respectively,
9Each of these sources of information is discussed below.
The typical firm's balancz AkzeX is illustrated in table II-l.
The balance sheet summarizes the financial position of the firm at a
particular point in time. The balance sheet shows the total assets
of the firm, which represents the total investment that has been made
in the firm. The assets portion of the balance sheet shows the struc-
ture of this investment, i.e. what portion is in the form of current
assets, which include cash and items that are expected to be converted
into cash or consumed within the normal operating cycle (normally one
year), what portion is in the form of fixed assets, and what portion of
total assets is in some other form, such as intangible assets, land,
or long-term investments in the stock of other corporations. Fixed
assets include plant and equipment, valued at historical cost less
accumulated depreciation, and correspond to what was defined in section
C of chapter one as ^xed (LOJpiXaJi. Total fixed assets, then, is a
dollar measure of the firm's (physical) fixed capital resources. It
represents the difference between the value of these assets at the
time of purchase and accumulated depreciation, which is the accountant's
12
measure of the 'wearing out' of these physical productive resources.
Ill




Accounts receivable (net) ... xxx
Inventories xxx














Short-term notes payable .... xxx
Total Current Liabilities xxx
Long-term Liabilities:
Lont-term notes payable xxx
Bonds payable xxx





Common s tock xxx
Total contributed capital xxx
Retained Earnings xxx
Total stockholders' equity xxx
Total Liabilities and
Stockholders' Equity .. xxx
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The balance sheet also shows the structure of the ownership
claims on these assets. The liabilities-stockholders' equity portion
of the balance sheet shows how these ownership claims are distributed
between creditors and stockholders. It is a basic accounting identity
that the sum of these ownership claims must equal total assets. There-
fore, in table II-l, 'total liabilities and stockholders' equity' must
equal 'total assets'. The former represents the total mono.y ca.p<L£aZ
employed in the firm, so that this fundamental accounting identity says
simply that the total investment made in the firm must equal the total
money capital employed. In other words, the two portions of the
balance sheet represent different perspectives on the firm's financial
structure.
The liabilities-stockholders' equity portion of the balance
sheet shows the distribution of ownership claims between dubt and 2.quu£y,
The distinction between debt and equity, as made by most economists,
differs from the accounting distinction between liabilities and stock-
holders' equity. Debt includes preferred stock in addition to total
liabilities. The reason for including preferred stock in debt, rather
than in equity, is that preferred stock is, in some important respects,
13
very much like a bond. In particular, holders of preferred stock are
paid a specified percentage return; all dividends currently owed holders
of preferred stock must be paid before any dividends on common stock
can be paid; holders of preferred stock have preference in the distri-
bution of assets over holders of common stock in the event the firm
goes bankrupt; and holders of preferred stock often are not given the
right to vote at stockholder meetings. Adding preferred stock to total
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liabilities gives debt, which is that portion of the firm's money
capital with which are associated (what may be treated as) fixed
interest obligations. Stockholders' equity less preferred stock repre-
sents what the economist calls equity. Holders of equity are the
residual claimants on the assets of the firm in the event the firm
goes bankrupt. They are also the individuals most directly affected
when the firm varies its dividend policies, and they are the persons to
whom a takeover raider would have to pitch its offer.
The second source of accounting information, the yincome. 6tcutZim.yit t
is illustrated for a typical firm in table II-2. The income statement
summarizes the profit performance of the firm for a specific period
14
of time. Two entries in table II-2 are particularly important. The
first is nzt opQAcuting -tncome, which is obtained by subtracting from
net sales — i.e. gross sales revenue less an allowance for returned
items — the costs of operating the business, including a dollar measure
of depreciation. It should be emphasized that these dollar cost figures
do not necessarily equal the opportunity costs of the respective inputs.
Net operating income is the accountant's measure of the excess of
revenue over costs generated from the firm's operations that can be
used to pay debt holders and equity holders (after allowance for
profit taxes, of course).
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Table II- 2 The Typical Firm's Income Statement
Total Sales (net) xxx
Less operating costs:
Variable factor costs xxx
Selling expense xxx
Administrative salaries xxx
Research and development expense xxx
Depreciation xxx
Other operating expenses xxx
Total operating costs xxx
Net Operating Income xxx
Less interest expense on notes
payable and on bonds payable .. xxx
Income before tax xxx
Less income tax expense xxx
Net Income xxx
The second important entry in table II-2 is neX -Income., which
is obtained by subtracting interest expense and income tax expense
from net operating income. The entries 'income before tax' and 'net
income' in table II-2 are generally referred to as 'pretax profit'
and 'aftertax profit', respectively. As discussed in chapter one,
the accounting notions of profit differs from the economists'. In
particular, the operating costs in table II-2 would have to be the
true opportunity costs of the resources employed, depreciation would
have to be the true physical wearing out of the firm's plant and
equipment, and the interest expense would have to be the true oppor-
tunity cost of the firm's total assets in order for net income to be
consistent with what the economist calls profit.
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The third source of accounting information, the 6tcut2jne.nt 0&
tioXaimd za/inlng6
,
is illustrated for a typical firm in table II-3.
The statement of retained earnings explains the increase or decrease
in retained earnings for the period covered by the firm's income
statement. Net income can be used for either of two purposes. It may
be distributed as dividends to the holders of the firm's preferred
stock and common stock or it may be added to retained earnings and
used to purchase additional assets. One of the firm's important policy
decisions involves determining its payout ratio — i.e. what portion
of net income will be paid out as dividends.
Table II-3 The Typical Firm's Statement
of Retained Earnings
Beginning balance, retained earnings xxx
Add net income for the year xxx
Total xxx
Less total dividends paid during the year xxx
Ending balance, retained earnings xxx
Throughout the chapter tables II-l, H-2, and II-3 are used
to establish the accounting identities that are invoked, usually when
an expression is needed for dividends paid in terms of the firm's
policy variables. The distinction that has been made in this section,
as well as in chapter one, between the economists' notions of capital,
profit, etc., and the accountants' measurement of these stocks and
flows does not hinder the analysis in later sections of this chapter.
The same identities continue to hold — although the numbers are different
and their interpretation is different —when the economists' notions
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of capital, profit, etc. are substituted for the accountants'.
In the remainder of this chapter the terms capital, profit, etc. are
given their respective economic meanings, but the reader is asked to
keep in mind the fact that, from a practical standpoint, measuring
these stocks and flows involves certain difficulties and that these
measurement problems cause some of the items reported in a firm's
financial statements to differ in concept from the stocks and flows
that appear in the various models of the firm discussed below.
4. Summary
This section has provided an overview of the chapter. It
has also described the analytical framework that is used throughout
the chapter to characterize and to assess the contributions of the
models that are surveyed in the chapter, and it has also discussed
the sources and uses of the accounting information that will be needed
in the course of the survey.
The survey begins with a description of the traditional models,
each of which places the individual firm within a different market
structure: perfect competition and monopoly (the models in section B)
,
duopoly (Cournot's model in section C) , oligopoly (the kinked demand
curve model in section D) , and monopolistic competition (Chamberlin's
model in section E) . The remainder of the chapter discusses the modern
revisions to the theory of the firm. Each of the modern models of the
firm differs from the traditional models in at least one of the following
four respects: (i) the nature of the firm's objective(s) (for example,
do firms exhibit some sort of maximizing behavior, and if so, what is
it they seek to maximize: shareholders' utility, managers' utility,
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or some other quantity?) ; (ii) the extent to which financial con-
siderations are allowed for explicitly in the model (for example, of
what significance is the manner in which firms finance their activi-
ties?); (iii) the treatment of uncertainty (for example, some models
explicitly allow for uncertainty, while other models ignore it
altogether); (iv) the treatment of disequilibrium questions (for
example, some models consider the behavior of the firm in disequilib-
rium
,
while others are concerned with equilibrium exclusively) ; and
(v) the treatment of time (for example, some models treat the firm
within a single period, while others deal with the firm within a multi-
period steady state framework, while yet others permit non-steady state
growth within the multiperiod context)
.
B. PERFECT COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: OPPOSITE ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM
Traditional economic theory distinguishes four models of the firm,
one for each of the following market structures: perfect competition,
monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition. As described in
section C of chapter one, perfect competition can be interpreted as a
form of market structure within which firms are so numerous that no
single firm can affect the market price by altering its own behavior,
and in which all firms in the industry therefore act as price takers.
In contrast, within the other three market structures firms are not
passive acceptors of environmental information. Under these alternative
market structures firms possess varying degrees of market power, i.e.
each acts to some extent as a price maker. Under monopoly there is a
single firm that produces and sells the entire output of some commodity;
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the monopolist treats the market demand curve as the demand curve for
his product and sets the price that maximizes total profit. Under
oligopoly there are several producers who compete with one another; each
must weigh the potential reactions of rivals before altering the price
of its product. Under monopolistic competition there are numerous
producers who, due to differences in the products they sell, enjoy
some limited price-setting ability in their respective shares of the
market. Thus, in terms of market power, as measured by the number of
firms serving the market, perfect competition and monopoly are seen
to be opposite ends of the spectrum with oligopoly and perfect competition
falling somewhere in between.
The traditional models share several common features. Each postu-
lates that the firm's objective is to maximize total profit. Each
treats the firm within a single time period. Each assumes that market
demand curves, production functions, and the supply curves for factors
of production are known with certainty. Each is concerned with char-
acterizing the nature of equilibrium for the firm. Within each the
problem of financing the operations of the firm is not considered
explicitly as part of the model of the individual firm, but rather,
18
is subsumed within the general equilibrium analysis of a market economy.
Where the traditional models differ is in the market structure within
which the firm is assumed to operate — and by implication, in the
degree of market power the firm is assumed to possess.
The traditional models of the firm are discussed in sections B
through E. It should be noted at the outset that
The model of the firm in [traditional economic]
theory is not, as so many writers believe,
designed to serve to explain and predict the
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behavior of real firms; instead, it is designed
to explain and predict changes in observed
prices (quoted, paid, received) as effects of
particular changes in conditions (wage rates,




In the traditional theory the firm is a theoretical construct, the
20purpose of which is to explain and predict the behavior of prices.
According to Machlup, to criticize the traditional models for failing
to explain the behavior of real-world firms would be unfair. Yet,
because several economists have claimed to have provided empirical
support for the neoclassical theory of the firm (and others have based
21
further theoretical work on these empirical findings) and because
these models of the firm form the basis for the discussion of the modern
theory of the firm in economics textbooks, it is essential that a care-
ful review of the traditional models be undertaken before a presentation
22
of the modern 'revisions' is begun.
1. Perfect Competition
The bedrock of the traditional theory of the firm is the model
of perfect competition. To the economist it has long represented the
ultimate in competitiveness, and to the welfare economist the perform-
ance of the perfectly competitive firm has stood as the norm against
which the performance of firms should be measured; but strangely, were
a perfectly competitive industry to be found in the real world, it
would undoubtedly appear to most observers devoid of any competitive




(i) Each firm takes the ruling market price as given. As indicated
in section C of chapter one, firms might act in this passive
manner because each produces an output so small relative to the
total output of the industry that it is unable to influence the
market price by expanding or contracting the quantity of goods
it offers for sale.
(ii) The products of all firms in the industry are homogeneous;
consumers view the products as perfect substitutes; and product
differentiation is impossible. Thus, there is no need either
for consumers to shop around or for producers to engage in
advertising.
(iii) New firms are free to enter the industry and to produce identical
products under the same conditions as existing producers; there
are no barriers to entry, such as financial restrictions or
coercion on the part of existing producers; and existing pro-
ducers are free to leave the industry to avoid losses. Thus,
no firm will be able to maintain 'abnormal' profits because
high profits will quickly attract new entrants who will eventually
drive profits down to the 'normal' level.
(iv) Firms act independently in deciding whether to expand or to
contract output and whether to enter or to leave an industry.
Thus, there is no collusion among firms.
(v) All buyers and sellers in the market have complete knowledge
as to the bid and offer prices of the other market partici-
pants. Thus, insider information is prohibited and no partici-




Within a perfectly competitive market there is neither price
competition, since all firms are price takers, nor non-price competi-
tion (such as advertising, differences in product design, or special
credit arrangements) , since all products are homogeneous and each
producer can sell as much of his output as he wishes at the ruling
market price. Since all firms pay identical prices for their inputs
and have the same production function, there can be no cost competi-
tion either. The requirements for perfect competition are sufficiently
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restrictive that very few real-world markets come close to the ideal.
Since competition in any one of the many forms it takes in
the real world is absent in the model of perfect competition, one may
reasonably ask why economists continue to profess an interest. Baumol
argues that it is due to the model's tractability and the fact that
once a set of (admittedly questionable) assumptions is granted, perfect
competition automatically leads to an allocation of society's scarce
25
productive resources that is in the Pareto sense optimal.
To describe the perfectly competitive model of the firm it
is best to proceed in the following manner. First, it will be assumed
that the firm employs only two inputs, which will be denoted by L
and K and which may be thought of as labor and capital, and produces
a single output, which will be denoted by Q . For simplicity the
symbols L , K , and Q will be used to represent both the identity
of the resource (good) and the amount used (produced) . The two-
input-single-output case permits the use of geometry to further the
exposition. Having explored this case, the model will then be gener-
alized to permit n outputs and m inputs. However, before explicitly
considering the model of the firm under perfect competition it might be
122
instructive to review from a mathematical standpoint the concepts of
marginal productivity (of an input), average productivity, and the
production function, all of which are basic to the theory of the firm.
In the case of two inputs and a single output the firm's
production function is given by
Q = f(L,K) . (1)
In the long run both inputs are variable. The partial derivatives of
(1) , 8f/dL and 8f /8K , are called the marginal productivity of
labor and the marginal productivity of capital, and are denoted by
MP and MP , respectively. In the short run, by definition, the
L K
firm's plant and equipment — its stock of capital — is fixed, and if
this fixed amount of capital is denoted by K , then output varies as
f(L,K)
a function of labor only. The quantity AP = — is called the
Li Li
average product of labor. It is almost universally assumed that pro-
duction functions exhibit the law of diminishing marginal productivity,
which states that when one input is varied and all others are held
fixed, the marginal productivity of the variable input will eventually
decline. Figure II-l shows the relationship between AP and
Li








Figure II- 1: Marginal Productivity and Average Productivity
The locus of combinations of L and K that yield a particu-
lar level of output, when combined with maximum technical efficiency,
is called an isoquant. Denoting the particular level of output by
Q , (1) becomes Q = f(L, K) . It is assumed that isoquants are
o o
continuous and convex to the origin as depicted by figure II-2. 28
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The negative of the slope of an isoquant at a point, such as point A
in figure II-2, is called the rate of technical substitution and is
given by RTS = - dK/dL . The convexity of an isoquant means that the
rate of technical substitution is diminishing as L is substituted
for K . In words, as L is substituted for K , successively larger
increments in L must be substituted for equal decrements in K in
29
order to hold the level of output fixed. Since within the feasible
region of production an increase in the use of both inputs yields a
greater output, isoquants further from the origin represent higher
30
levels of output. Thus, in figure II-2 Q > Q > Q .
When both product markets and factor markets are perfectly
competitive, the firm takes factor and product prices as given. Let
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the unit prices of L, K, and Q be denoted by w, i, and p ,
respectively. The firm's total profit, it
, is equal to total revenue,
R
, less total costs, C ,
tt = R - C
, (2)
where total revenue is equal to product price times the quantity of
output,
R = p • Q = p • f(L, K) , (3)
and where total cost is the sum of the payments to the two inputs,
C = wL + iK . (A)
Substituting (3) and (A) into (2) , the model of the perfectly competi-
tive firm can be formulated as the following nonlinear programming problem:




_> , K > .
In the short run K is fixed so that problem (5) simplifies to
the following:
maximize: tt(L) = p *f(L, K) - wL - iK
(6)
subject to: L >
126
First solving the short run optimization problem (6), the
31
necessary conditions are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
dTT df _
_= p • — -w<
diT T , df N
- • L = (p • - - w) L = (7)
L >
J
Since df/dL = MP , conditions (7) require that
Lt
p • MP = w if L >
Lt
(8)
L = if p • MP < w (9)
The product p • MP is interpreted as the value of the marginal
productivity of L , measured as its contribution to total revenue.
Since w is the cost of an additional unit of L , condition (8)
states that, if labor is employed, the profit-maximizing firm will
continue to hire additional labor up to the point at which the value
of the marginal productivity of the last unit hired, p • MP , just
Lt
equals the ruling wage, w . Condition (9) states that no labor will
be hired unless its contribution to revenue exceeds its cost.
127
If L > , then problem (6) is unconstrained and the second








which requires that profit be declining with respect to further
ii 9 9 A
applications of L to production. Since d f/dL = — (df/dL)
,
the rate of change of the marginal productivity of L , the law of
diminishing marginal productivity guarantees that (10) holds over
some range of L . What condition (10) means is that the profit
maximizing producer would hire L 9 rather than L units in figure
II-3.
p • MP T
w
Figure II-3: Value of Marginal Productivity
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The ratio on the right-hand side of (11) is interpreted as the cost
of an additional unit of L divided by the additional output due to
the application in production, of an additional unit of L . This ratio
is interpreted as marginal cost, or the cost of an additional unit of
output. Denoting marginal cost by MC , equation (11) can be rewritten
as the familiar
p = MC (12)
rule for profit maximization. The profit maximizing producer should
continue to expand output until the point at which price equals marginal
w
cost. Since MC = r=r- and since MPT has the inverted U-shapeMP L
Lt
depicted in figure II-l while w is constant, it follows that MC
will have the U-shape depicted in figure II-A. For the same reason
that L« was preferred to L. in figure II-3, output level Q 2 is
preferred to output level Q
1
























Figure II-4: Short Run Optimum for the
Perfectly Competitive Firm
As long as inputs are used by the firm in the most technically
efficient manner, the foregoing results demonstrate that maximizing
profit in the factor market and maximizing profit in the product
market are really just two ways of characterizing the same optimization
process. This is the consequence of the fact that the solution to
problem (6) yields both condition (8) for optimality in the factor market
and condition (12) for optimality in the product market.
Turning to the long run, in which, by definition, the firm's
capital stock is variable, the model of the perfectly competitive firm
can be formulated as problem (5) . The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
problem (5) are analogous to (7) , with one set of conditions each for
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L and K and with partial derivatives in place of simple derivatives:
3tt 3f . _ 3tt 3f . „ .
--P • 3L-WI -= p ._- i< o
f • L - (p • f - w) • J. - || • K - (p • || - i) • K -
W13)
L > K >
-J
With L > and K > , conditions (13) lead to the optimality
conditions
p • MP = w and p • MP = i , (14)
which are analogous to (8) . Equations (14) can be interpreted as the
requirement that each factor be hired up to the point at which the
value of the marginal productivity of the last unit hired just equals





which once again can be interpreted as the requirement that price










Since MP /MP = °
^
- RTS
, condition (16) can be interpreted as
the requirement that the profit maximizing firm combine inputs in such
a way that the rate of technical substitution — the rate at which
technology permits the factors to be substituted for one another in
production — equals the ratio of the factor prices — the rate at which
the market place permits the factors to be substituted for one another.
Condition (16) is better understood when it is recognized that
the optimization problems (5) and (6) necessitate two simultaneous
optimizations, one with respect to the product market and one with
respect to the factor market (s). In order to earn maximum total profit,
the firm must produce whatever level of output it selects at minimum
cost. That is, the (simultaneous) determination of the optimal output
level and the optimal input combination could be thought of as a two-
step process. At step one, the firm determines the cost-minimizing
combination of inputs and the associated total cost for each level of
output. At step two, the firm selects the profit-maximizing level of
output on the basis of both the demand conditions it faces and the cost
relation determined at step one.
The first step in this process can be represented by a mathe-
matical programming problem, and in the simple case of a single output
and two inputs, it can also be represented geometrically. Consider the
perfectly competitive firm in the long run. Both capital and labor
are variable, and the firm's total cost is given by equation (4). For
any particular level of output Q , the cost minimization problem can
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be expressed as the mathematical programming problem:




f(L, K) = Q
where for simplicity it is assumed that L > and K > . This
problem has been represented geometrically in figure II-5. The graph
of C = wL + iK , where C is treated as a parameter, is linear and
is called an isocost ( equal cost ) line. In order to produce Q
o
units of output at minimum cost, the firm will find the input combina-
tion on isoquant Q that lies on the isocost line nearest the origin.
In figure II-5 this occurs at the point A , where the isoquant and









which is the same as condition (16)
.
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Figure II-5: Least Cost Combination of Inputs
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If this procedure were followed for all feasible output levels,
the set of ordered pairs (Q, C(Q)) would define a long run total
cost function C C(Q) , from which the long run marginal cost function
LRMC = C'(Q) could be computed by differentiation. A typical LRMC
curve is shown in figure II-6 along with a typical LRAC curve, which
is given by LRAC = —
-^- . It should be emphasized that the LRAC
curve, as just defined, gives the minimum average cost of producing each
level of output when the plant is of optimum size for that particular
output level. According to the traditional theory, the LRAC curve
is U-shaped because of internal economies and diseconomies of scale
which are caused either (i) by indivisibilities of the factors that
give rise to a most efficient mix of men and machines, or (ii) by the
increased difficulty of managing a larger organization that eventually
outweighs economies resulting from the increased specialization that
larger size makes possible (or (iii) by both of these factors reinforcing
one another)
.
In the short run the firm's capital stock is fixed. The short
run total cost function gives the total cost of producing each level
of output, given this fixed stock of capital. The short run average
cost function, SRAC , and the short run marginal cost function, SRMC ,
are constructed in a manner similar to that illustrated for the long
run case. It should be noted that LRAC < SRAC except for that level
of output for which the current plant size is optimal. In terms of
figure II-5, the firm's current plant size is K
,
which is not optimal
when Q = Q , so that LRAC(Q ) < SRAC(Q ) . Mathematically, the
o o o
LRAC curve is the envelope of all the SRAC curves , of which there
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is one for each value of K . Each SRAC curve is tangent to the
LRAC curve at the point at which the corresponding plant size is
optimal, as in figure II-6. Note that for both the short run cost
curves and the long run cost curves, marginal cost lies below (above)
35
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Figure II-6: Long Run Equilibrium for the
Perfectly Competitive Firm
Given the short run and long run total cost functions, the
profit maximizing firm's objective is to find the level of output Q
that solves the problem
maximize: tt(Q) = p • Q - C(Q) , (18)
where C(Q) represents the short run or long run total cost function
depending on whether K is constant and where it is understood that
in the short run version of problem (18) the plant size K is fixed,
while in the long run version K is variable and C(Q) gives the
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total cost of production when the optimum amount of capital K is
employed. The first order condition for a solution to (18) is
p - C*(Q) = or p = MC
, (19)
which is identical to conditions (12) and (15) . The second order
condition is
tt"(Q) = - C"(Q) < or C ,? (Q) = 4tt(MC) > . (20)dQ
Together (19) and (20) characterize the equilibrium position — as viewed
from the product market — of the individual firm under perfect competi-
tion. According to (19) and (20) , in order that the firm be in equilib-
rium , it is necessary that price equal marginal cost and that marginal
cost be increasing. The short run case is depicted in figure II-4,
where the firm earns positive profit equal to the area of the shaded
rectangle.
By way of summarizing this section's discussion up to this point,
the characteristics of the model of the firm under perfect competition,
for the special case of one output and two inputs, are summarized in
table II-4. The analytical framework on which the table is based was
discussed above in section A.
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Table II-4 Model Summary: Perfect













Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
traditional (see (5) , (6) in text)
profit maximization
technological (embodied in the production function)
,
nonnegativity constraints on the decision variables
prices of inputs (w and i) and of output (p)
,
capital stock (K) in the short run model (6) only
input level(s) (L in both models, K in the
long run model (5) only) , output level (Q)
,
and total profit (tt)
labor input (L) in both models, capital input





static optimization (nonlinear programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization under assumption that
solution is nontrivial; otherwise generalized
Lagrange multipliers.
If the individual firm, which until now has been considered in
isolation, is placed within a perfectly competitive market situation,
it is possible to suggest the nature of market equilibrium. Over the
long run positive profit cannot persist since, by assumption (iii)
above, new firms are free to enter the industry. The effect of new
entrants will be to reduce the market price p until it equals average
cost. In long run market equilibrium, all firms earn zero economic
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profit, as depicted by figure II-6, and p = SRMC = SRAC = LRMC =
LRAC.
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Having dealt with the two-input-single-output case the model
of the profit-maximizing firm under perfect competition will now be
generalized to permit n outputs and m inputs. The production
function, which is most easily stated in implicit form, is
F(q
, ..., q , x , ..., x ) = , (21)l n 1 m
where q. denotes the output of the i-th product and x. denotes the
amount used of the j-th input, and where it is normally assumed that
all first- and second-order partial derivatives are continuous and
37
nonzero for all nontrivial solutions. If all product and factor
markets are perfectly competitive, then the firm takes all output
prices and all input prices as given. Letting the price of each output
be denoted by p. and the price of each input be denoted by r. ,
the firm's total profit, tt , is given by
m
tt= £ p.q. - £ r.x. , (22)
and the obiective is to select q.'s and x.'s that maximize (22)
i J
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subject to (21). Stated more compactly in vector notation, the
model of the firm is formulated as the following nonlinear programming
problem:
maximize: tt = q • p - x • r
{q,x}
(23)
subject to: F(q , x) = ,
138
where q is the 1 x n row vector of outputs, p is the n x 1
vector of output prices, x is the 1 x m row vector of inputs, and
— 39
r is the m x 1 vector of input prices. Applying the method of
Lagrange multipliers, the Lagrangian is
L
A
= q • p - x • r + A • F(q , x)
,
where X is the Lagrange multiplier, and the first-order conditions
for an optimal solution are the following:
—
=





Taking any two of the first n equations, solving each for X
,
equating the two expressions, and rewriting gives
Pk
9F/8q




where the last equality follows from the implicit function rule. The
quantity - 8q 8 /9q is called the rate of product transformation, and
it is interpreted as the rate at which one product can be traded off
for another when the firm's production function, all inputs, and all
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other outputs are held fixed. Condition (25) is interpretable as
requiring that, for every pair of outputs, the rate of product trans-
40formation equal the ratio of the prices of the two goods. Next,
taking any two from the second set of m equations and performing the
same operation as that done to obtain (25) yields
r 9F/9x 9x 1 <_ k < m
h ' ™S."K
, < c <
<26)
1 £ m
Condition (26) is equivalent to condition (16) for the case of two
inputs and is interpretable as requiring that, for every pair of
inputs, the rate of technical substitution equal the ratio of the
prices of the two inputs. Finally, taking any one of the first n
equations and any one of the second m equations and performing the
same manipulation gives






or r,. - Pl ^ (27)
PjL dF/dq z 8xk *k
*-! 9^
1 < k < m
Condition (27) is equivalent to condition (14) for the case of two
inputs and one output and is interpretable as requiring that the value
of the marginal product of each input with respect to each output
equal the input price. Collectively, conditions (25) - (27) are the
41
necessary conditions for profit maximization for the individual firm
using m inputs to produce n outputs when all markets are perfectly
competitive. Collectively, conditions (25) - (27) characterize the
140
equilibrium position of the individual firm under perfect competition;
if the firm is to be in equilibrium, it is necessary that its input
and output levels satisfy these three sets of conditions.
In terms of the analytical framework set out in section A,
the characteristics of the model are summarized in table II-5.
Table II-5 Model Summary: Perfect









traditional (see (23) in text)
profit maximization
technological (embodied in the production
function) , nonnegativity constraints on the
decision variables
prices of inputs (r.) and of outputs (p.)
input levels (x.), output levels (q.), and total
profit (tt)
input levels (x.) and output levels (q.)
J J
subsumed








static optimization (nonlinear programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization under assumption
that solution is nontrivial; otherwise generalized
Lagrange multipliers.
With the model of the individual firm under perfect competition
having been described in mathematical terms, the comments made at
the beginning of this section should be more meaningful. The model is
concerned with characterizing the equilibrium position of the individual
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firm, and it is partly for this reason that the model appears devoid
of any competition. But even in disequilibrium, the perfectly com-
petitive firm would not, by assumption, engage in advertising or any
other form of nonprice competition. Yet, there is considerable support
for the view that, in the real world, the various forms of nonprice
competition can play a significant economic role, as for example,
advertising and sales promotional efforts that disseminate information
and product differentiation that involves improvements in product
42
quality and service. The perfectly competitive firm is a price-
taker, a passive participant in the economy. In contrast, Schumpeter
has emphasized the importance of the active innovating role that firms
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play — a role that is not in the repertoire of the perfectly com-
petitive firm. In addition, the model of the firm under perfect com-
petition does not treat the role of finance explicitly and it assumes
away uncertainty, thereby abstracting from two significant real-world
complications. For example, empirical evidence indicates that small
firms, which, according to the standard economic realization of perfect
competition, would be typical of a perfectly competitive industry,
are constrained in their spending on research and development (and
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more so than larger firms) due to financial limitations. So, whether
or not the perfectly competitive model was ever intended to explain
the behavior of actual firms, in the words of Baumol:
It is likely to be ill-advised and inappro-
priate to hold perfect competition up as a
model for the structure and conduct of industry
in practice. Unfortunately, this precaution
is not always carefully observed. ^-*
But before a more acceptable standard can be devised, it is, in the
opinion of this writer, necessary that economists develop a better
understanding of the way in which actual business enterprises operate.
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2. Linear Programming Formulation
The model of the firm under perfect competition, or under any
other market structure for that matter, could be formulated as a linear
programming problem provided the objective function and the constraints
could be made linear. Under perfect competition the objective function
in problem (23) is linear in the decision variables because both output
prices and input prices are taken as given, and hence, are treated
as constants. It remains to be shown that the constraint set can be
linearized. How this is accomplished is discussed below.
Before discussing the linear programming formulation, some
conceptual differences between it and the nonlinear programming formu-
lation (23) should be noted. Lagrange multipliers were used to char-
acterize a solution to problem (23), that is, to develop rules (25) -
(27) for determining the optimal usage of inputs and the optimal levels
of output. In using linear programming the purpose is usually to obtain,
rather than characterize, a solution. Linear programming is a technique
for determining the optimal allocation of fixed amounts of inputs,
and the solution to the linear programming problem gives the specific
optimal allocation of these stocks of resources. Since there are fixed
supplies of some inputs, the linear programming problems discussed in
this section are best thought of as short run optimization problems.
In this subsection two types of linear programming problems are
discussed. In the first there are n outputs and m inputs, but
only one technique available for producing each output. In the second
there is only one output, but there are n productive techniques avail-
able and again there are m inputs. These relatively simple problems
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bring out the distinguishing features of the linear programming
formulation.
In the first case the firm produces n outputs, the amount
of each being denoted by q. , j=l,...,n. For each unit of
48
the j-th output the firm sells it earns a profit of c. . The total
profit it earns is the sum of the amounts earned on sales of the
different products,
n




Assume there are m inputs, where m < n , and denote the amount
available of each input by b. , i = 1 , ..., m . Further assume
that each unit of the j-th product requires a. . units of the i-th
input, where a. . is a constant l<^i<_m, 1 <_ j £ n . Then since
the firm cannot use more than the available amounts of the m inputs,
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In addition, the optimal output levels must satisfy the nonnegativity
constraints
q.>_0, j = l,...,n (30)
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The profit maximizing firm's objective is to maximize (28) subject
to (29) and (30) , which is easily carried out with the aid of the
simplex algorithm. For convenience the optimization problem can be
stated more compactly using vector-matrix notation as
maximize: tt = c • q
subject to: A • q _< b (31)
q > ,
where c is the 1 x n vector of contribution margins, q is the
n x 1 vector of outputs, A is the m x n matrix of fixed production
coefficients, and b is the m x 1 vector of resource availabilities.
As a consequence of the extreme point theorem, the optimal solution to
problem (31) can have no more than m decision variables at a positive
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level. Thus, at least n-m of the output levels are zero, i.e. it
is not optimal for the firm to produce all n goods. In terms of
the analytical framework set out in section A, the characteristics of
the model are summarized in table II-6.
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Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
traditional (see (31) in text)
profit maximization
technological (embodied in the fixed production
coefficients), resource availabilities, and
nonnegativity constraints on the decision
variables
contribution margins _(vector c)
,
production
coefficients (matrix A) , and stocks of resources
(vector b)




input and output levels (vector q")
subsumed
: assumes certainty
determination of equilibrium input and output
levels
single period
static optimization (linear programming problem)
simplex method could be used.
As a consequence of the fixed production coefficients, the
production function represented by the matrix A exhibits constant




where B is the matrix formed by the columns of A that remain in
the basis at the final step of the simplex algorithm. If all inputs
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are increased by the same proportion k , while the coefficients c.
and a.
.
are not altered, the basic variables do not change and the
new optimal solution is
q
fc
* = B • (k • b) = k • B • b = k • q
Thus, outputs increase in the same proportion k and returns to scale
are constant. This result marks one of the differences between the
linear and the nonlinear formulations: in the nonlinear case the
production function could be made to exhibit either increasing or
decreasing returns to scale, as well as constant returns to scale.
The dual linear programming problem to (31) is also of economic
interest. Denoting by w the 1 x m vector of dual variables, the
dual of (31) is
minimize: w • b
subject to: w • A >^ c (32)
w > .
The dual variables serve the same mathematical role and have the same
economic interpretation as the Lagrange multipliers in the nonlinear
formulation. The variable w gives the rate of change of total
profit, tt
,
with respect to an increase in b . In symbols,
w. = 8tt/8x, , and w, is called the implicit price of an additional
J J J
unit of input j . In the nonlinear formulation of the previous subsection
for each input that is in fixed supply a constraint of the form
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g. (x_ , ..., x ) < b. must be added and an additional Lagrange multi-
l 1 m — 1 D
plier A. must be introduced when the problem is solved. This
Lagrange multiplier is also interpreted as an implicit price
A. = d-n/db. .
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The second type of linear programming problem that is of interest
is that in which the firm produces one output and has a choice of n
productive techniques that it may use individually or in combination.
In the linear programming formulation the notion of a production
function is replaced by the somewhat simpler notion of a process, or
• ,
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rxn. C .activity. The firm produces its output using one or more processes,
for each of which the input coefficients are fixed for all levels of
output. Thus, each process exhibits constant returns to scale. For
example, suppose there are three production processes. Process 1 uses
3 units of K and 1 unit of L for each 5 units of output, while
process 2 uses 2 units of K and 2 units of L and process 3
uses 1 unit of K and 4 units of L for each 5 units of output.
Each of these processes is represented by a ray emanating from the
origin in figure II-7, the slope of each being the constant input
proportion that characterizes the process.
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Kprocess 2
Figure II-7: Three Production Processes
To produce Q = 5 units of output the firm can use process 1
only, which is represented by point A in figure II-7; or it can use
process 2 only (point B) or process 3 only (point C) ; or it can use
the processes in combination. If it were to use processes 1 and 2
in combination, the firm could produce Q = 5 units of output using
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any of the input combinations lying on the line segment AB. Corres-
pondingly, using processes 2 and 3 would require the input combinations
lying on BC
,
with the particular combination depending on the propor-
tion of output produced using each process. Clearly the firm would
not combine processes 1 and 3 since the required input combinations,
which would lie on AC
, exceed the amounts that would be used to
produce the same level of output if processes 1 and 2 or processes 2
and 3 were combined to yield the same input proportion. Thus, the line
segment joining A and B and the one joining B and C define the
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54Q - 5 isoquant, which is analogous to the isoquants in figure II-2. The
difference is that in the linear case the isoquants are piecewise
linear and are not differentiable at points where one process only
is used.
If one were to increase the number of processes in figure II-7,
the isoquants would begin to look more and more like the smooth iso-
quants in figure II-2. As the number of processes increases, the line
segments shrink in length and the piecewise linear contour approxi-
mates a smooth contour more and more closely. The nonlinear case
with its smooth isoquants can be viewed as the limiting case of the
linear model in which there exist an infinite number of available
processes. Moreover, the conditions of optimality derived in the
linear case carry over to the nonlinear case.
The economic choice facing the firm is the selection of the
levels at which the processes are to be operated. When operated at a
higher level a process requires proportionately more of both inputs
and yields proportionately more output. For example, the activity
level of a process for producing cars could be the speed of the assembly
line. Once the optimal operating levels of the various processes have
been determined, the output level is uniquely established, and from
the fixed input coefficients the input usage levels are also uniquely
determined. Thus, unlike the nonlinear case in which the input levels
were found directly, in the linear case the input usage levels are
set indirectly.
To express the problem in linear programming format it is easier
to express the objective function and constraints in terms of output
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levels rather than levels of operation of the various processes. The
problem confronting the firm is then the same as (31), where q. is
the level of output using process j, c. is the contribution margin
earned on each unit of output produced using process j , and the j-th
column ot A contains the fixed input coefficients for the j-th
process. Once again b is the vector of resource availabilities.
For the above example, if 24 units of K and 16 units of L are
available and the contribution margins are c. = 5 , c = 7 , and
c~ = 10 , then the problem is to
maximize: tt = 5.0q + 7.0q_ + 10. Oq










> q 2 . q 3 >
o
the solution to which is q = 20
,
q = 30 , and it = 310.
The two problems considered above are simple versions of the
more general problem in which the firm must decide which products to
produce and which processes to use. Since both problems are of the
form of (31) , it should be clear that the more generalized problem
will be also. Indeed, by looking at each process available for
producing each product as a process for producing revenue (rather than
output) , figure II-7 can be generalized to permit many products and
many processes available for producing each. In this formulation
isorevenue lines would replace isoquants, and each product produced
by a different process would be treated as a separate q. with its
own contribution margin c. , and the resulting linear programming
problem would look like (31)
.
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The problems discussed above were all market-oriented. One
other important application of the linear programming technique is to
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internal corporate planning. For example, the dual variables can
serve as transfer prices when resources are transferred within the
firm from one division to another or from one plant to another. Thus,
as far as the internal workings of the firm are concerned, the dual
problem is of somewhat greater interest than the primal problem.
3. Monopoly
Thus far it has been assumed that all markets are perfectly
competitive. The individual firm has been unable to influence the
prices it receives for the goods it sells or the prices it must pay
for the inputs it purchases. In most cases, however, markets are
imperfectly competitive. The actions of one or more buyers are per-
ceived to have an influence on price. When the firm is able to
influence the price of its output, it is said to possess some degree
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of monopoly power. This section deals with the limiting case in
which there is a single seller of a product for which there are no
close substitutes — a market structure known as monopoly. Sections
C, D, and E discuss market structures in which there is more than one
seller, with each having some degree of monopoly power.
A monopolist can influence the market price of its product by
varying the amount of the good it offers for sale. Normally, consumers
of a good would be willing to purchase more of a good only if the price
were lowered, and the demand function
q = D(p) (33)
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expresses the quantity, q , consumers would be willing to purchase
if the market price were p . The demand function (33) is single-valued
with dq/dp < , so that it possesses an inverse function
P = P(q) (34)
with dp/dq < , which shows how market price will vary in response to
the changes in the amount of the good the monopolist offers for sale.
The demand curve facing the monopolist is downward-sloping like
ft 1
the DD curve in figure II-8. Since the monopolist is the sole pro-
ducer of the good, its demand curve is the market demand curve for the
product. This is in contrast to perfect competition, where the market
demand curve is also downward-sloping but the demand curve facing the
individual producer is horizontal since, by assumption, each producer
is able to sell as much as it likes at the prevailing market price.
The monopolist's total revenue, R , is equal to price times
quantity, and since price is a function of quantity sold, so is total
revenue:
R(q) = p • q = p(q) • q . . (35)
Differentiating (35) with respect to q gives marginal revenue,
MR(q) =
-^ R(q) « p + & . q , (36)
which is less than price since dp/dq < . Marginal revenue is
interpretable as the net addition to total revenue resulting from the
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sale of an additional unit of output. Marginal revenue is less than
price since an increase in quantity sold necessitates a decrease in the
price of all units sold. The marginal revenue function (36) has been
graphed as the MR curve in figure II-8.
The monopolist may also have some influence over the prices it
pays for inputs, with the price of each depending on how much it
purchases. The price it pays for the j-th input, r. , is then a
function of x. , the amount purchased:
r - *jOO » j = 1 , ..., m . (37)
Since in general the firm can purchase more of an input only if it is
willing to pay a higher price, dr ,/dx. >0, j=l,...,m. The
total outlay, C. , for units of the j-th input is then
C, = r. • x. = r.(x.) • x. . (38)
j J J J J J





MC.(x.) = -~-C. = r. +-r-L x. , (39)
J 3 j 3 : j J
which is more than the price of the j-th input since dr./dx. > .
J -J
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J J J (40)
subject to: q = f(x, , ..., x ) ,i m
where q - f(x, , ..., x ) is the firm's production function.
1 m
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Once agaitj focusing on nontrivial solutions and applying Lagrange
multipliers , the Lagrangian is
m
L^ P(q) * q - 2 r^(x4) * x
-i
+ *(f(x
» •••» x ) - q)
j-l 3 3 3 m







p(q) +"jjjj- • q " A =
dr,
3f





^r— = f(x , ..., x ) - q = .9X m
=
, j = 1, . m > (41)
J
The three conditions in (41) can be used to characterize the equilibrium
position of the monopolist. The first condition in (41) requires that
at optimality the Lagrange multiplier equal marginal revenue,
X = p(q) + |E- • q = MR (42)
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= W + d^ xj ' j "* — m (43)
Using (39) and (42) and the fact that 9f/3x. is interpreted as the
marginal productivity of the j-th input, condition (43) can be
reexpressed as
MR • MP, = MC. . (44)
J 3
The product MR • MP. is interpreted as the marginal revenue product
of input j and is the increase in revenue resulting from the use of an
additional unit of input j. In words, condition (44) is interpretable
as the requirement that usage of the j-th input be increased up to
the point at which the net addition to revenue attributable to the
last unit of the j-th input just equals the net addition to cost
required to obtain it.
The last condition in (41) is just the production function.
It should be noted that the appearance of the production function as
a necessary condition can be given the following economic interpretation,
If problem (40) had been stated with the constraint expressed as the
inequality




and if the modified problem had been solved with the aid of generalized
Lagrange multipliers, the set of necessary conditions would have
included the following three necessary conditions:
q < f (x. , ..., x ) A(f (x_ , . .
.
, x )- q) = A > .
— ± m 1 m —
If, at optimality, marginal revenue is positive (as it must be, except
in the unusual case in which marginal revenue and marginal cost are
both zero at optimality) , it follows from (42) that A = MR > .
Since the middle of the three conditions requires that at least one of
the terms in the product A(f(x. , . .
.
, x ) - q) be zero, it follows
1 m
that
q = fCx^ ..., x
ffi
) ,
which is interpretable as the requirement that, at optimality, the
inputs be combined with maximum technical efficiency in order that
maximum output be obtained from the amounts of inputs applied in
production. Thus, the last condition in (41) can be interpreted to
mean that profit maximization requires maximum technical efficiency.
Condition (43) can also be reexpressed so as to yield the
product market solution. Dividing each side of (43) by df/dx. and
using (42) yields
dr.
r.(x.) + -j-J- x.
J J dx j
A = m
- v^T • (45)
3
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which is interpreted to mean that, at optimality, marginal revenue
must equal the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output
in terms of each of the j inputs individually. But this common
value of marginal cost in terms of each input is what was called
previously the marginal cost of output, MC , so that (45) is equivalent
to the familiar
MR = MC (46)
rule for profit maximization under imperfect competition. The
optimum level of output is determined in figure II-8 by the intersection






Figure II-8: Optimum Output for a Monopolist
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The situation depicted by figure II-8, with the monopolist
selling q* units of output at price p* and earning positive economic
profit equal to the area of the shaded rectangle, could persist until
some new entrant were able to break into the industry, in which case
the industry would no longer be a monopoly. If entry were prohibited,
monopoly profits could persist forever. This is in contrast to what
happens in market equilibrium under perfect competition where free
entry forces each firm to produce at the minimum point on its long run
average cost curve and to earn zero economic profit in the long run.
Under monopoly, the firm in long run equilibrium can earn positive
economic profit. In addition, in long run equilibrium the monopolist
will not minimize average total cost and its price will exceed marginal
cost, as illustrated by figure II-8. In terms of the analytical frame-
work discussed in section A, the characteristics of the model of the
monopolistic firm are summarized in table II-7.
Monopoly is criticized because it tends to lead to output that
is 'too low' and price that is 'too high', and by implication, any firm
that possesses some degree of monopoly power is tainted. In the United
States true monopoly is not a common occurrence, almost always being the
result of either government policy, such as in the case of regulated
utilities, or a temporary situation that results from a successful
innovation and that lasts until a competitor can enter the market.
In the first case, monopoly status may be conferred on a firm because
of the existence of substantial economies of scale in production, and
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traditional (see (40) in text)
profit maximization
technological (embodied in the production
function), nonnegativity constraints on the
decision variables, market demand relation







none (input prices if factor markets were
perfectly competitive)
price (p) , output level (q) , input levels (x.),
input prices (r.), and total profit (tt) j
output level (q) and input levels (x.)
subsumed








static optimization (nonlinear programming
problem)
Lagrange multipliers (could have solved (40)
as an unconstrained problem by substituting
for q in the objective function, although
the information conveyed by A would have been
lost) if nontrivial solution is assumed;
otherwise generalized Lagrange multipliers.
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in the second case, the temporary monopoly situation may be viewed as
CO
a reward for successful innovation. With the exception of these
special cases, it is generally believed that, on grounds of economic
welfare, monopoly is undesirable, and more specifically, that whatever
social benefits might be derived from taking greater advantage of
economies of scale in production, distribution, research and develop-
ment, etc., are outweighed by the potential loss of social welfare
due to price exceeding marginal production cost, to long run average
total cost not being minimized, and to the potential social costs
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associated with possible abuses of monopoly power. Accordingly,
government antitrust policy has sought to prevent monopolies from
developing (e.g. as through mergers). Unless this policy changes,
monopoly in the American economy will continue to be confined to
regulated industries and to temporary situations.
C . COUKNOT* S MODEL OF DUOPOLY
A market structure in which there are a few sellers and in which
each of these sellers perceives the other sellers serving the same
market as rivals is called an oligopoly. Duopoly is a special case
of oligopoly in which there are just two sellers. Because there are
few sellers, under oligopoly competing firms can influence the market
price, and the profits earned by any one firm therefore depend on the
policies of all firms in the industry. Each firm chooses its policies
in recognition not only of their direct effects, but also with a view
toward their expected indirect effects — the likely reactions of their
competitors. What makes duopoly so much simpler analytically than
the more general case involving two or more sellers is that taking
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into account the reactions of one firm to the policies of its rival(s)
is much simpler when there are only two firms.
The first part of this section describes the Cournot analysis
of duopoly and mentions some extensions of the Cournot model. The
second part describes a game theoretic approach to the analysis of
duopoly in which the behavior of the two firms is modeled as a two-person
game.
1. Cournot' s Model and Conjectural Variations
Assume there are two firms producing a homogeneous product.
Total industry output of the product is the sum of the amounts produced
by the two firms, q = q + q , and market price is a function of
this aggregate output p = p(q, + q~) . Since each duopolist's output
is sold at price p , the total revenue earned by each is dependent
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(47)
Similarly, each duopolist's total profit depends on its own and on
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(48)
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where it has been assumed that each firm's total cost depends on its
72
own output only. Each firm's objective is to select its own level
of output so as to maximize its total profit. Differentiating each
firm's profit function in (48) with respect to its own level of output
and setting the result equal to zero gives:
d7T dq dC




? H« d<*l dC9
d^J " ^l + ^ + ^- (1 + dqf -dqf " ° (50)
The derivatives dq /dq in (49) and dq /dq in (50) are called
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conjectural variations. The conjectural variation dq_/dq, can
be interpreted as the first duopolist's expectation as to how its
rival's output, q. , will respond to changes in its own output, q ,
and dq /dq„ is interpreted similarly. In the Cournot analysis
conjectural variations are always zero, i.e. dq„/dq = dq /dq_ =
Equations (49) and (50) can be rewritten as










where the expression on the left-hand side of each equation represents
marginal revenue (the appropriate derivative of (47)) and the right-
hand side represents marginal cost. Thus, equations (51) represent the
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74familiar MR = MC necessary condition for profit maximization.
Equations (51) also imply that each firm's marginal revenue and
equilibrium level of output are dependent on its conjectural variation.
Equations (49) and (50) cannot be solved for the equilibrium
levels of output q and q» unless the conjectural variations are
specified. In the Cournot analysis it was assumed that each conjectural
variation is zero, which implies that each duopolist assumes that
variations in its output level will not induce changes in its rival's









which can be solved simultaneously for the equilibrium levels of output.
Another approach to finding the equilibrium output levels, one
that describes the market process more fully, involves the use of reac-
tion curves. This modern approach to the Cournot analysis of duopoly
is described below. After the interpretation and use of reaction curves
has been described, the reaction curve framework will be used to suggest
how the original Cournot analysis might be extended to a multiperiod
context and to a consideration of equilibrium/ disequilibrium questions.
A pair of reaction curves, one for each duopolist, can be
constructed in the following manner. After the conjectural variations
have been specified, equation (49) can be solved for q as a function
of q_ and equation (50) can be solved for q„ as a function of q. .
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Each function is called a reaction function and the graph of each
reaction function is called a reaction curve. Each producer's reaction
curve shows its profit-maximizing output level contingent upon its
rival's output level. By recognizing that equilibrium — both for the
market and for each firm — can occur only when the levels of output
q and q„ are such that first, each firm maximizes its profit,
given its rival's output, and second, neither firm wants to alter its
output level, the optimum output levels can be determined from the
intersection of the reaction curves. In other words, the reaction
curve is a convenient device — one that has also been used in inter-
national trade theory — for illustrating one producer's reactions to
decisions made by its rival. Moreover, the use of the two producers'
reaction curves permits a geometric representation of the notion of
equilibrium for the two producers. As a simple example, the reaction
curves for two firms having total cost functions
C. = cq. + d , c>0, d>0, i=l, 2, (53)
where the demand for their product satisfies
p = a - b(q. + q 9 ) , a > , b > , (54)l l M 2
are given in figure II-9, where it has been assumed that conjectural
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Figure II-9: Reaction Curves and Cournot Equilibrium
If each conjectural variation is zero, then figure II-9 can
also be used to suggest the behavior of the two producers when the
product market is in disequilibrium. In particular, the figure can be
used to illustrate the point that the market is not in equilibrium
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unless each individual producer is in equilibrium. To see this, note
first that if an output combination (q , q ) lies on one of the
producer's reaction curves, then the producer whose reactions are
depicted by the curve is, by the way in which the reaction curve was
constructed, in equilibrium. That is, according to the assumption of
zero conjectural variations, the producer treats its rival's output
level as a constant, and, by the construction of its reaction curve,
the firm is producing the profit-maximizing level of output, given
its rival's output level, and therefore has no incentive to alter its
output. But suppose that only one producer is in equilibrium. For
example, if the current output combination is represented by Point A
in figure H-9, then firm 1 is in equilibrium, but firm 2 is not since
the output combination does not lie on its reaction curve. Indeed,
given the output level of firm 1, firm 2 would prefer to reduce output
(and to shift the output combination to point B) and to earn higher
profit. If firm 2 did reduce its output accordingly, it would be in
equilibrium at B
,
given the output of firm 1. But firm 1 would not
be in equilibrium at B . Given the output of firm 2, firm 1 would
want to increase output (and to shift the output combination to point
C ) . The adjustment process would cease once the Cournot equilibrium
had been attained, since then each firm would lie on its reaction curve
and neither would have any incentive to alter its output level. The
above argument also suggests that, as long as each conjectural variation
remains zero, the Cournot equilibrium is stable, i.e. whenever the
market is out of equilibrium, forces are set in motion to return it to
equilibrium.
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The foregoing is also suggestive of how the duopolists might
behave over time. That is, the successive movements toward equilibrium
could be thought of as occurring in successive time periods as first
one firm and then the other adjusted to the actions of its rival (all
the while, however, continuing to assume that its rival would not
retaliate by altering output) . Attempting to extend the Cournot model
in this manner serves to emphasize one of its major weaknesses. The
assumption of zero conjectural variations implies that each firm is
ignorant of the behavior of its rival. In the multiperiod context,
the firm would have to remain ignorant over time, i.e. there would be
no learning process at work by which each firm would come to learn that
78its assumption that its rival would not retaliate is false. The main
reason for this limitation can be attributed to the model's primary
79
concern with characterizing equilibrium in a single period context.
Before considering a model of duopoly that permits nonzero
conjectural variations, the characteristics of the Cournot model of
duopoly are summarized below in table II-8.
The output levels given by (55) were the result of one of many
possible modes of behavior on the part of the duopolists. Another
80
interesting type of behavior is suggested by von Stackelberg.
Each of the duopolists may act either as a follower or as a leader. A
follower obeys its Cournot reaction function, adjusting its output so
as to maximize its total profit, given the output level of its rival,
whom it views as a leader. A leader does not obey its Cournot reaction
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Type of Model :
Solution Technique
traditional (see (48) in text)
profit maximization
market demand relation (p = p(q.. + q?)) and actions
of the firm's rival, also, implicitly, the production
function that underlies each firm's total cost
function (which enters the model exogenously)
implicitly, input prices (in order that each firm's
total cost function depend on its own output level
only)
output levels (q. and q_ ) , market price (p)
,
and total profit for each producer (it and tt ) ;
in addition, input usage could also be determined
if the model were modified to allow the firm to
select its optimal input combination
each firm selects its output level (q. and q ,
respectively), and in the fuller analysis, input
levels could also be determined
subsumed
assumes certainty
characterization of equilibrium, though the analysis
can be extended with the aid of reaction curves to
deal with disequilibrium issues
single period
static optimization (model formulated as two
unconstrained optimization problems — one for each
firm)
unconstrained optimization problems solved
simultaneously
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function but rather, sets its output so as to maximize total profit,
given the reaction function of its rival, whom it views as a follower.




, and if firm 2 acts as a leader, then dq../dq - -1/2
,
the slope of firm l's reaction curve. Any one of three possible
situations may arise:
(i) Both firms behave as followers, which leads to the Cournot
equilibrium. This equilibrium is unstable in this case because
each firm could improve its profits by becoming a leader while
the other remained a follower.
(ii) One firm behaves as a leader and the other behaves as a follower,
with the leader earning more profit and the follower earning
81
less than in the Cournot equilibrium.
(iii) Both firms behave as leaders, which gives rise to the von
Stackelberg disequilibrium. Each firm believes that the other
will behave according to its reaction curve, but neither one
does and both consequently earn smaller profit than they did
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under the Cournot equilibrium. This situation is likely to
lead to some sort of economic warfare until either one firm
emerges as the leader or some form of collusive agreement is
o o
worked out. The eventual equilibrium is indeterminate.
In the Cournot analysis conjectural variations are always zero.
In the von Stackelberg analysis conjectural variations are zero or
Q /
negative. It is also possible for conjectural variations to be positive,
with one or both producers anticipating that an increase in its output
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level will elicit an increase in its rival's level of output. There
could be tacit collusion between the producers as they attempted to
8 5
maximize joint profit (t^+tt ). Generally, positive conjectural
variations on the part of both duopolists would lead to lower output,
higher price, and greater profits than in the Cournot equilibrium,
whereas negative conjectural variations would have the opposite effect.
But the exact solution depends on the exact behavior of the duopolists
as reflected in specific values for the conjectural variations.
As in the Cournot analysis, the von Stackelberg analysis is
mainly concerned with characterizing equilibrium within a single period
context. For this reason, it too does not lend itself well to
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extension to a multiperiod context. In particular, the von Stackelberg
model, to the extent that followers are present, suffers from the same
88
limitations as the Cournot model.
2. Duopoly As A Two-Person Game
Under duopoly the market price of the good and the profit earned
by each producer depend on the output decision of both producers. The
firms are players in a two-person game in which each player's strategy
is represented by its output decision and the payoff to each player is
the total profit it receives. By modeling duopoly as a two-person game
the results of game theory can be employed to determine under what
conditions a solution exists.
The theory of games originated from the work of von Neumann and
89
Morgenstern. Briefly, game theory is the study of situations involving
two or more decision-makers, called players, each of whom makes policy
decisions, called strategies, that collectively determine the rewards,
called payoffs, each player receives on each play of the game. The
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collection of strategies each player may adopt together with the rules
that determine the payoffs as a function of the strategies the players
adopt is what constitutes the game. As such, game theory is concerned
with situations like duopoly, or more generally oligopoly, in which
conflict and cooperation play significant roles.
If a game involves two players and if one player's gain is the
other player's loss, then the payoffs to the two players sum to zero
and the game is called a two-person zero-sum game. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern showed that if the number of pure strategies is finite and
mixed strategies are allowed, a two-person zero-sum game always has a
90
solution as long as the players are rational. Each player will adopt
a 'minimax' strategy (or set of strategies) — the one that minimizes
its maximum expected loss (or equivalently , maximizes its minimum
expected gain) for whatever strategies its rival might adopt. If
duopoly were a zero-sum game, then presumably the duopoly problem could
be solved by appealing to this result.
Unfortunately, as von Neumann and Morgenstern realized, the
kinds of rivalry observed in the real world seldom are zero-sum situa-
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tions. Normally, there is the possibility of mutual gain or loss,
as for example, when each firm can increase its profits by cooperating
with its rival. As such, these situations correspond to nonzero-sum
games. The payoff matrix might look like the one in figure 11-10,
where the strategies have been defined in terms of von Stackelberg's
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definition of follower and leader modes of behavior. The payoffs are
the profits earned by the two producers, the left-hand entry in each
case referring to firm 1. The underlying demand curve is (54) with
a = 610 and b = 10 and the underlying cost curve for each firm is
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(53) with c = 10 and d = 200 . The entries in the payoff matrix





follower (3800, 3800) (2050, 4300)
Firm l's
Strategy
leader (4300, 2050) (2680, 2680)
Figure 11-10: Payoff Matrix for Two Firms
Illustrating the Prisoners' Dilemma
According to Figure 11-10, either firm may adopt either strategy
and both firms will earn positive economic profit. If both firms act
as leaders, then the von Stackelberg disequilibrium results and each
firm earns a profit of 2680 . If both firms act as followers, then
the Cournot equilibrium results and each firm earns a profit of 3800 .
Note, however, that this equilibrium is unstable because each firm has
an incentive to alter its behavior. If one firm becomes a leader
while the other remains a follower, then the leader increases its profit
while the follower suffers a decrease in its profit. However, if both
try to act as leaders, then the von Stackelberg disequilibrium results
and both firms are worse off than they were in Cournot equilibrium.
This illustrates the so-called Prisoners' Dilemma: the two players
would be better off if they could agree to act as followers, yet under
such an agreement, each is tempted to double cross the other, and if
94
both cheat, then both are worse off than they were initially. Of
course, they would be best off if they could coordinate their activities
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95perfectly and maximize joint profit. In any case, the eventual solu-
96
tlon is indeterminate. Output and price will ultimately depend on
whether a collusive agreement can be reached and then maintained, and
accomplishing this may require a long and painful learning process
97before the two parties are able to work together.
Though game theory has not furnished solutions — in the conven-
tional sense at least — to the problem of determining price and output
under duopoly, it has provided some interesting insights into the
nature of conflict and the incentives for cooperation under duopoly,
and more generally, under oligopoly. Unfortunately, as the number of
player firms increases, the game becomes more complicated with oppor-
tunities for two or more players to form a coalition against the others.
As a consequence of this , the game theoretic approach has thus far
proven no more successful than other analytical approaches at providing
general characterizations of the pricing and output decisions reached
98by firms under oligopoly.
D. OLIGOPOLY AND THE KINKED DEMAND CURVE
In recent years many economists, including Galbraith, have argued
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that oligopoly has become the dominant form of industrial structure.
In many industries, including the automobile, aluminum, steel, and
rubber industries, there are a small number of large firms that wield
considerable economic power that enables them to influence the markets
for their products, but who must carefully weigh the likely reactions
of their rivals when reaching their price and output decisions. The
classic approach to oligopoly is by extension (i.e. by increasing the
number of participants) of the duopoly models of Cournot and von
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Stackelberg that were discussed in section C. Each of these approaches
has been criticized and an almost bewildering array of alternative
103
approaches has been proposed in their stead. The purpose of this
section is to describe just one of these models — the kinked demand
curve model that seems to dominate textbook discussions of oligopoly.
The kinked demand curve model is based on the assumption that an
oligopolist's rivals will match a price decrease but will not follow a














The oligopolist's current price-output relationship is represented by
the point E ; current price is p* and current output is q* . The
demand curve dd has been drawn under the assumption that the oligopo-
list's price changes will not be matched by its rivals and demand curve
DD has been drawn under the assumption that price changes will be
matched. The curve dd is flatter, or more elastic, than DD because
when price changes go unmatched, the oligopolist's unit sales, q ,
are more responsive to changes in price; by decreasing price it can
increase sales at the expense of rivals who maintain their prices,
but by increasing price it will lose part of its market share to its
rivals
.
The oligopolist's effective demand curve is comprised of that
portion of dd that lies to the left of E and that portion of DD
that lies to the right of E . This gives rise to a corner, or kink,
at E . As a result of this kink the oligopolist's marginal revenue
function is discontinuous at E , being comprised of the marginal
revenue function corresponding to dd for output levels q < q* and
of the marginal revenue function corresponding to DD for output
levels q > q* . The oligopolist is unable to equate marginal
revenue and marginal cost, but q* is optimal since MR > MC for
q < q* while MR < MC for q > q* .
The jump discontinuity in MR at E implies that costs can
increase or decrease without causing a change in either price or output
as long as the MC curve continues to lie between A and B . However,
a change in either DD or dd would lead to a change in price, unless
the curves were to shift in such a way as to leave the kink at E .
This implies that firms' price behavior will be relatively unresponsive
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to changes in cost, but will be responsive to changes in demand. This
is a major weakness of the model, for most empirical studies have
shown that in oligopolistic industries the reverse is true: price
tends to be responsive to cost changes but unresponsive to changes in
A 106demand
.
The kinked demand curve model was originally proposed in order to
explain the observed price rigidities in oligopolistic industries, yet
a limitation of the model is its inability to explain how the kink got
there in the first place. Furthermore, Stigler has offered empirical
evidence against the existence of a kink in the demand curves of firms
in several industries, including the steel, automobile, and potash
industries
.
Table II-9 Model Summary: Oligopoly
(kinked demand curve)
Class : traditional (see figure 11-11 in text)
Firm's Objective : profit maximization
Constraints : reactions of rivals; implicitly, the production
function that underlies the cost curves in
figure 11-11
Variables :
Exogenous : current output and the current market price of
output (which together locate the kink); implicitly,
input prices (in order that the cost curves can
be drawn in figure 11-11, it is necessary that
input prices remain fixed; when one or more
input prices change, the cost curves shift)
Endogenous : there are no endogenous variables, since the
purpose of the model is to explain why prices
tend to remain rigid, rather than to explain how
they first got to where they are currently
Finance : subsumed
Certainty /Uncertainty : assumes certainty
Equilibrium/
Disequilibrium : characterization of equilibrium
Time: single period
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In summary, the kinked demand curve model, the characteristics of
which are summarized in table II-9, is not widely regarded as a
108
satisfactory general model of oligopoly pricing. A generally more
valid model may be the mark-up pricing model, which has been described
and subjected to considerable empirical testing by proponents of the
behavioral school. This model is discussed in section H. One of the
attractions of the mark-up pricing model is that it makes price more
sensitive to changes in cost than to changes in demand, thereby
correcting a major weakness of the kinked demand curve model.
E. CHAMBERLIN'S MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
In the Cournot analysis of oligopoly it is assumed that each pro-
ducer takes the output level of each of its rivals to be fixed. While
this appears to be a shaky assumption concerning the behavior of firms
in markets where there are just a few producers, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that, when the number of firms is large, so that each has
only a small share of the overall market, each firm can treat the price
and output of other producers as fixed when it sets its own price and
output. Such a market situation corresponds to the model of monopolistic
competition, according to which each firm's product is somehow differ-
entiated through advertising, variations in style or quality, etc., from
those of every other producer, and, as a consequence, each firm faces
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a downward-sloping demand curve for its product. In such markets
each firm possesses some degree of monopoly power — i.e. an ability to
influence the price it receives for its product by adjusting quantity
supplied and also an ability to influence through advertising expendi-
ture — the quantity of output it sells — in its own corner of the market.
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A practical realization of this model is a situation in which the
number of firms is so large that a change in price or quantity by
any one firm would not be perceived as having any impact on any other
firm. As a result, in determining price and output in the short run,
the firm assumes the corresponding choices of the other firms fixed
and behaves like a monopolist in its corner of the market. Over the
long run, the existence of a large number of close competitors produces
a situation somewhat like the long run solution under perfect competi-
tion. In the long run all firms earn zero economic profit, although
unlike perfect competition, all firms are operating slightly below
optimal scale. The purpose of this section is to discuss the model of
monopolistic competition due to Chamberlin and to illustrate these
results
.
For ease of exposition, let the demand functions facing the firms
be linear and identical, satisfying the equation
p. = a - b q - b Z q , i = 1 , ..., n , (56)
j?X
where there are n firms; p. is the price charged and q^ is the
output of the i-th firm; a , b- , and b„ are all positive constants;
and 8p./8q. -b ? , i ^ j , is numerically small. Also let the firms
have identical cost functions C.(q.) . Then, even though their products
are differentiated (in the eyes of consumers, at least), the firms
will have identical cost and revenue functions and will exhibit identi-
cal maximizing behavior. It should be noted that the demand relation
(56) involves certain conceptual difficulties. The output levels of
the rivals are summed as if these other goods were identical, even
though th( basic assumption underlying Chamberlin's model is that they
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are not identical. The conceptual problem associated with 'adding up'
things that are, by assumption, 'different', is discussed further
later in this section. Until then, suffice it to say that, while
these assumptions are restrictive, they do permit the model to be
developed in terms of the behavior of the 'representative' firm.
From (56) the profit earned by the representative firm is
"i
= piq i -w = (a - b iqi - b 2
,i v «i -w • (57)
Since b_ is numerically small, any change in the i-th firm's output
will have a negligible impact on its (n-1) rivals, and therefore, the
i-th producer will act as if variations in q will have no effect on
q. , j ^ i , or in symbols, it will act as if 8q./8q. = , j ^ i .
Differentiating (57) with respect to q. , setting the result equal to
zero, and rearranging terms yields
a - 2b q - b I q = C.'(q.) , (58)
which is the familiar MR = MC rule for profit maximization.
Since all firms will behave identically under the above assumptions,
when one firm finds it profitable to adjust output, so will all the
others. Thus, while the representative firm tries to adjust its price
and quantity in accordance with the demand relation given by (56) , the
collective actions of producers will cause each individual producer's
price and quantity to vary in accordance with the demand relation,
Pi







which has been obtained from (56) by setting q . = q . The demand
curve (56) for the individual firm is drawn as dd in figure 11-12
under the assumption that the output levels of all other producers are
fixed. In addition, the demand curve (59), which represents overall
demand for the products of the n firms, is used to determine each
firm's pro rata share of overall quantity demanded for each (common)
price, and this pro rata demand curve for the individual firm is
112drawn as DD in the same figure. Note that even though b is
small, (n-1) is not. It is this latter term, which reflects the fact
that all producers adjust output simultaneously, that accounts for
the steeper slope of DD .
It should be noted that the demand relation (59) and the demand
curve DD in figure 11-12 involve the same conceptual difficulty
noted in connection with (56) . In (59) and in its geometric represen-
tation DD
,
the output levels of all n producers have been added
together, even though the products themselves are 'different' in the
sense of being differentiated either in terms of their actual charac-
teristics or else in terms of their perceived characteristics. Chamberlin
justifies this approach by introducing the concept of a 'group'
of "producers whose goods are fairly close substitutes" for one another,
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as for example, a group of automobile manufacturers. Accordingly,
the demand curve DD , is meant to represent each automobile manu-
facturer's pro rata share of the overall market demand for automobiles
when all automobile manufacturers charge identical prices. Yet, as
Stigler argues, it is difficult to attach any economic meaning to the
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statement that physically different goods must have the same price.
As illustrated by the discussion of Chamberlin's model earlier in this
181
section, Chamberlin further assumed that the "demand and cost curves for
all the 'products' are uniform throughout the group. ,,115 As pointed
out by Stigler, this uniformity assumption implicitly defines the
products of the group as a set of physically homogeneous goods.
Chamberlin 's model and the conclusions to be derived from it depend
then, on a key component — the firm's pro rata share of overall demand
for the products of the group (illustrated by DD in figure 11-12) —














Figure 11-12: Short Run Optimum for the Firm Under
Monopolistic Competition
182
In setting price and output the representative firm treats dd as
its relevant demand curve, but the collective action of all firms makes
DD the representative firm's effective demand curve. As the repre-
sentative firm's price and output are adjusted in accordance with DD
,
the demand curve dd 'slides along' DD
, with the two demand
curves always intersecting at the point representing current price and
output. Thus, in figure 11-12 (a) the firm is selling q at price
p , but it is not maximizing profit since mr (which corresponds to
dd) exceeds MC at that point. The representative firm expands output,
and the collective action of all firms causes price to fall and dd
to shift downward. The process continues until condition (58) is
satisfied, at which point mr intersects MC and total (short run)
profit is maximized. This short run equilibrium situation is illustrated
in figure 11-12 (b) .
It should be emphasized that, even if the individual firm realizes
that DD rather than dd is effectively its demand curve, it is
unable to exploit this knowledge. For unlike oligopoly, under monopo-
listic competition the individual firm has no impact on its rivals'
output levels. Each firm acts individually so as to maximize its own
profit. Since the behavior of the individual firm under monopolistic
competition has no perceptible impact on any of its rivals, and since
adjusting price and output in accordance with dd holds out the
prospect of greater profit (as long as these changes go unnoticed)
,
the firm is likely to continue to treat dd as its relevant demand
curve and to adjust price and output accordingly. Moreover, the firms
are so numerous that collusion, tacit or otherwise, is virtually
impossible, and should some sort of collusive agreement be reached, it
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would be likely that each individual firm's incentive to cheat would
be strong enough — for the reasons just cited — to cause the arrangement
to be shattered within a short time.
In the long run free entry and exit drive economic profit to zero.
Unlike oligopoly, firms are so numerous that it is impossible for
them to get together and erect barriers to entry. As new firms enter
the industry, the representative firm finds that the amount of output
it is able to sell at any given price decreases, and both dd and DD
in figure 11-12 shift to the left. Long run equilibrium is finally
attained when the representative firm's perceived demand curve dd
is tangent to the long run average cost curve. This long run equili-
brium situation is illustrated in figure 11-13. At the point of tan-
gency, point A in figure 11-13, dd and DD intersect each other
and AC
,
so that price equals average cost and total profit is zero.
The firm is maximizing long run profit, for at all output levels other
than q* , dd lies below AC . But since dd is downward sloping,
the point of tangency must occur to the left of the minimum point on
the AC curve. The firm produces less output at a greater average
total cost than would obtain under perfect competition.
In terms of the analytical framework discussed in section A,
the characteristics of Chamberlin's model of the firm under monopo-
















Figure 11-13: Long Run Equilibrium for the Firm
Under Monopolistic Competition
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traditional (see (57) in text)
profit maximization
overall market demand for the products of the
group and market demand for individual firm's
product; implicitly, the production function
that underlies each firm's total cost function
(which enters the model exogenous ly)
implicitly, input prices (in order that each
firm's total cost function depend on its own
output level only)
output levels (q , ..., q ), market price (p)
,




in addition, as in the duopoly analysis, input
usage could also be determined if the model were
reformulated to permit this
each firm selects its output level (q , ..., q ,
respectively), and in the fuller analysis,
input levels could also be determined
subsumed








static optimization (model formulated as an
unconstrained optimization in terms of the
'representative firm 1 )
unconstrained optimization for determining the
short run equilibrium position of the individual
firm in isolation; graphical analysis for
determining the long run equilibrium of firms
in the industry.
Chamberlin's model of monopolistic competition suggests what can
happen when the assumption of product homogeneity made in section B is
dropped. Even if firms are so numerous that the behavior of any one
firm will not affect the behavior of its rivals, and even if there is
free entry and exit, over the long run output will not be produced at
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minimum average total cost. However, as noted previously, Chamberlin's
model is not without its shortcomings.
The assumption that one firm's behavior will not influence the
behavior of the other firms in the industry — or equivalently , that
every firm has a tiny share of the market — is atypical of the product
markets in the American economy. While there may be thousands of
service stations, retail clothing stores, and supermarkets, the behavior
of rivals generally cannot be ignored. Instead of behaving according
to the model of monopolistic competition, industries such as the
118
above three each behave more like a series of linked oligopolies.
The model of monopolistic competition also shares the basic limita-
tions of the models discussed in sections B through D. The models are
concerned mainly with the determination of market price (or, in the case
of the kinked demand curve model, with explaining the rigidity of
current market price), and in achieving this determinancy, they have
abstracted from several factors that are likely to have a significant
impact on the behavior of actual firms. For example, it is assumed
that each firm knows its cost and revenue functions with certainty,
and while this might be acceptable under perfect competition where
each firm takes prices as given and only needs to estimate its produc-
tion function, in the real world uncertainty as to future costs and
the future state of demand are a major source of concern to the
corporate manager. In the remainder of this chapter models of recent
vintage that attempt to explain the behavior of the modern corporation
are examined.
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F. REFORMULATING THE FIRM'S OBJECTIVE FUNCTION: MAXIMIZING THE STOCK
MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
In the traditional models of the firm discussed in sections B
through E it was assumed that the firm maximizes total profit. In
those single period optimization models long run profit maximization
is consistent with short run profit maximization, i.e. the firm does
not suffer any harm to its long run profitability by pursuing the
myopic policy of maximizing short run profit. Both in the short run
and in the long run the firm selects the cost-minimizing combination of
variable inputs with which to produce its chosen level of output, the
only difference being that in the long run the set of variable inputs
includes the firm's capital stock and in the short run it does not.
Short run profit maximization is consistent with long run profit maximi-
zation because the former involves maximizing profit subject to the
constraint that the firm's capital stock is fixed, while the latter
involves the same optimization, but with capital variable.
In the real world, however, firms are typically faced with having to
make intertemporal profit trade offs. Current decisions are likely
to affect future profits, as for example, when a decision is made to
reduce price this period (say, the price of automobiles) , and as a
result, an increase in the quantity of units sold occurs this period,
but at the expense of units sold, and possibly at the expense of profits
as well, next period. More recent attempts to model the behavior of
the firm have taken into account the multiperiod context within which
actual firms operate. In these modern models, intertemporal profit
trade offs are explicitly taken into account. Such models conform
with the widely held view that actual firms are not much interested
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in the quick kill that short run profit maximization implies and that,
as a consequence, it is unlikely that an actual firm would as a
general practice, intentionally pursue short run policies to the
119detriment of its long run objectives and continued survival.
Moreover, actual firms operate within a multiperiod context that is
characterized by uncertainty, and in such an environment, the exact
meaning of 'profit maximization 1 is unclear.
In this section the traditional profit-maximizing model of the
firm is reformulated. The single period objective of maximum total
profit is replaced by the objective of maximizing the stock market
value of the firm, one of several possible objective functions that
explicitly take into account intertemporal profit trade offs. Then
an example of such a model is presented. In the last part of the
section, alternative objectives, such as sales maximization and growth
maximization, and their relation to the objective of profit maximization
are discussed.
1. Maximizing the Stock Market Value of the Firm
The most obvious way to adapt the objective of profit maximi-
zation to a multiperiod context is to have the firm maximize the
present value of the future flow of profits. If the firm's profit in
each period t is denoted by tt , and if the firm's rate of discount,
p , remains constant throughout future time periods, then the present
value, V , of the future flow of profits is given by
oo tt
V = I £-r , (60)
t=l (1+p)
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where it has been assumed that profit is realized at the end of each
121
period. If profit is initially tt and is growing at an annually
compounded rate of g • 100 percent per annum, then (60) simplifies
to
°° tt (l+g) t
V = I -2 = tt (il&)
, (61)
t=l (l+p) t ° p-g
provided g < p . If profits remain constant forever (i.e. g = 0) ,
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then (61) simplifies further to the present value formula
V = Vp . (62)
The use of present value calculations in deriving formulas
(60) , (61) , and (62) takes into account intertemporal profit trade
offs. If the firm attempts to maximize short run profit, it may
wind up setting high prices that bring about a loss of consumer good-
will and adversely affect future sales or it may cut costs by reducing
product quality only to find that future sales suffer as a result.
Given that most individuals — either in their role as shareholders or
in their role as managers of firms — have a positive preference for
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income now rather than in the future, the firm will be willing to
124
some extent to sacrifice future profits for present profits. But
it is unlikely that the firm would, as a general operating policy,
125
strive all out for maximum profit in the short run.
Given that certain conditions are satisfied, V in formulas
(60) , (61) , and (62) can be interpreted as the total market value of
the firm. Modigliani and Miller have shown that, when capital markets
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1 0£
are perfect, the total market value of the firm— the market value
of its equity plus the market value of its debt — is independent of the
firm's capital structure — the distribution of ownership claims between
equity and debt — when the capital markets are in equilibrium, and
that, with additional assumptions, this result continues to hold even
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when there is uncertainty present. Under Modigliani's and Miller's
assumptions and with tt interpreted as expected profit and with p
128interpreted as the appropriate discount rate, formula (62) expresses
the total market value of the firm under uncertainty when capital
129
markets are in equilibrium. Thus, the traditional model could be
reformulated with either the present value of future profits or the
total market value of the firm as the objective function, and the two
reformulations would be equivalent when the capital markets are in
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equilibrium, provided capital markets are perfect and complete.
Formulas (60), (61), and (62) would be appropriate as the
objective function of the firm — interpreted as either the present
value of the profit stream or the total market value of the firm —
provided the firm were owner-controlled, because under owner control
the firm's owners, rather than the firm's managers, decide how total
profit is distributed between dividends and retained earnings. More
importantly, the owners would determine the firm's investment policy
and its financial policy, both of which will, in general, affect the
firm's profitability and its total market value. As long as greater
wealth is preferred to less, the owners could be expected to select
those policies that, given the operating and financial decisions of
131
all other firms, maximize the total market value of the firm.
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Given the separation of ownership from control, however, the
shareholders of the firm have only an indirect say in the firm's
operating policies and they do not control the distribution of profits.
Their ownership is limited to the shares they hold and they have two
sources of income: the dividends they receive periodically and the
132
capital gains they realize upon sale of their shares. For this
reason, it is the stock market value of the firm's shares, rather than
the total market value of the firm, that contributes directly to the
utility of the owners. Since a higher market value of the firm's shares
ceteris paribus increases shareholders' current wealth, which in turn
implies greater shareholder utility, the criterion of maximizing the
utility of the firm's shareholders is identified with the maximization
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of the current market value of the firm s shares, although at the
very least this requires that capital markets be perfect and, in an
uncertain environment, it requires that additional conditions be satis-
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fied. Given that the appropriate assumptions are satisfied, the
maximization of the stock market value of the firm's shares is the
appropriate objective function for a model that is based on the view
that the firm's managers act in a manner consistent with the best
135
interests of the firm's shareholders.
The reformulation of the traditional model's objective function
in terms of the stock market value of equity has taken either of two
1 36
forms: maximizing the share price or maximizing the aggregate
137
market value of the firm's equity. In each case, however, a variety
138 139
of specific formulations exist. The two approaches are equivalent
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when the number of shares outstanding is held fixed. It should be
noted that the objectives of short run profit maximization, maximization
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of the total market value of the firm, maximization of the stock market
value of the firm, and maximization of the share price cannot, in general,
be used interchangeably. While an exhaustive examination of conditions
under which different objectives are interchangeable lies beyond the
scope of this paper, it should be mentioned that the four objectives can
be used interchangeably (i.e. short run profit maximization is equivalent
to the other three) when (i) the firm's policy choices one period do not
affect its profitability in any other period, (ii) capital markets are
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perfect, and (iii) there is perfect certainty. Since actual capital
markets do not possess these characteristics, the four objectives cannot
be regarded as interchangeable in models that purport to explain the
behavior of actual firms.
In view of the apparent separation of ownership from control
throughout much of the modern corporate sector, the next section describes
a model in which the objective of the firm is to maximize the market value
of the firm's equity. Similar, though more complex, models are discussed
in sections I through L of this chapter.
2. A Value Maximization Model
This subsection presents a simple value maximization model of the
firm. The model assumes that there is certainly with regard to future
events and that capital markets are perfect, so that, in equilibrium
at least, maximizing the firm's stock market value is equivalent to
maximizing shareholder utility. A second value maximization model
that assumes a certain environment is described below in section J.
That model, the certainty version of the Lintner model, is more con-
veniently placed in section J along with Lintner 's uncertainty models,
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which are shown to be straightforward generalizations of his basic
certainty model. As the Lintner certainty model differs from the model
discussed in this subsection — Lintner assumes steady-state growth
whereas the model discussed below permits the firm's rate of growth to
vary over time — the reader might find it interesting to read the
142first subsection of section J right after completing this subsection.
Consider a firm that produces a single product that it sells
in a less than perfectly competitive market. At each point in time it
143
sells Q(t) units of output at price p(t) . Demand is a function
of both price and the current level of advertising expenditure. Assuming
that the demand function can be reexpressed with price p(t) as the
dependent variable, demand satisfies p(t) = p[Q(t), A(t)]
,
where
A(t) is the level of advertising expenditure at time t . Total revenue
at time t , R(t) , is then also a function of quantity and the
current level of advertising expenditure, R(t) = R[Q(t), A(t)] . The
current rate of output, Q(t) , is a function of the amount of capital
and the amounts of the variable inputs, such as labor, that are employed
in production. Given the current capital stock, K(t) , and given
perfect factor markets (i.e. constant market prices for all variable
inputs), the firm's cost of production function C[Q(t); K(t)] , which
is written in this manner to emphasize the function's dependence on the
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size of the firm's capital stock at time t , can be determined.
Ignoring corporate income taxes, the firm can use the cash
generated from its operations, R[Q(t), A(t)] - C[Q(t); K(t)] , for
one of the following three purposes: paying dividends, advertising,
and purchasing plant and equipment (i.e. gross investment). Letting
D(t) represent the amount of dividends paid at time t and letting
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I(t) represent the level of gross investment, the sources of cash
must equal the uses of cash, so that the following accounting identity
must always hold:
R[Q(t), A(t)] - C[Q(t); K(t)] = D(t) + A(t) 4- I(t) . (63)
Solving (63) for D(t) yields the following expression for the amount
of dividends paid at time t :
D(t) = R[Q(t), A(t)] - C[Q(t); K(t)] - A(t) - I(t)
, (64)
where D(t) is required to be nonnegative.
Under the assumptions of certainty and perfect markets and the
additional assumption that the market rate of interest, r
, remains
constant over time, the current stock market value of the firm's equity,
V , must, in equilibrium, equal the present value of the future flow
145
of dividends,
V = / D(t) e"
rt
dt . (65)
Adopting the traditional criterion, it is assumed that the firm's
objective is to maximize (65)
.
The optimization is not unconstrained, however. Allowance must
be made for depreciation. Assume the capital stock wears out at a
constant rate 6 , so that 6 • K(t) represents the cost of capital
146 147depreciation. Assuming that all investment is financed internally,
the growth rate of the firm's capital stock, K(t) , where the dot denotes
195
differentiation with respect to time, is identically equal to gross
148investment less depreciation,
K(t) = I(t) - 6 • K(t) . (66)
The objective of the firm is to maximize (65) subject to (66) .
Rewriting (66) as
I(t) = K(t) + 6 • K(t) (67)
and performing two substitutions, the first involving (67) being
substituted for I(t) into (64) and the second involving the resulting
expression for D(t) being substituted into (65) , the model of the
value-maximizing firm can be formulated as the following unconstrained
149
multiperiod optimization problem:
maximize V= / {R[Q(t) ,A(t)] - C[Q(t) ; K(t) ] - A(t)
{Q(t),A(t),K(t)>
- [K(t) + 6 ' K(t)]} e" rt dt
, (68)
which can be solved by employing the classical calculus of variations.
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to problem (68), which
are used collectively to characterize the equilibrium position of the
individual firm through time, are the following:
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where equation (71) is the Euler equation.
Since e > , it follows from (69) that -r- - jjr at
each time t , which is just the familiar marginal revenue equals
marginal cost rule for short run profit maximization. Thus, in
setting its output level, the firm behaves as a short run profit
maximizer. Similarly, (70) implies that -jtt- = 1 at each time t
,
which is just the same short run profit maximization rule applied to
advertising instead of output. The firm should spend on advertising
up to the point at which an additional dollar of advertising expendi-
ture calls forth exactly an additional dollar of revenue.
Evaluating ~7r(-e ) , rearranging terms, and simplifying
inequation (71), yields the following necessary condition for optimal
investment in plant and equipment:
f -I - s + r - (72)
According to (72), at each point in time the firm should invest in
plant and equipment up to the point at which the addition to net
revenue (i.e. total revenue less variable costs) resulting from the
optimal use of the new facilities just equals the cost of capital,
measured in (72) as the sum of the rate of depreciation and the rate
of interest, i.e. the sum of depreciation costs and the opportunity
cost of capital. More simply, the firm should continue to invest up
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to the point at which the marginal profitability of capital just
equals the marginal cost of capital. This is just the neoclassical
criterion for optimal capital investment (when capital goods prices
are held fixed). Collectively, conditions (69) - (71) have been
shown to yield the equilibrium conditions for short run profit maximi-
zation, which bears out the statement made in the previous subsection
that, in a world of certainty with perfect markets, short run profit
maximization and maximizing the firm's share price are equivalent.
By way of summarizing this subsection, the characteristics of
the value maximization model are summarized in table 11-11.














Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (68) in text)
stock market value maximization (where the stock
market value of the firm is expressed as the
present value of the flow of dividends)
implicitly, technological constraint (once again,
embodied in the (implicit) production function)
and implicit product demand (at each point in time)
and factor supply (at each point in time) constraints;
also implicitly, nonnegativity constraints on the
decision variables and on dividend flows
interest rate (r)
for each time t , output (Q(t)), advertising
expenditure (A(t)), capital stock (K(t)),
investment (I(t)), and dividends (D(t))
for each time t , output (Q(t)), advertising
expenditure (A(t)), and capital stock (K(t))
internal financing only
assumes certainty
characterization of equilibrium, and specifically,
of the equilibrium position of the firm at each
point in time and of the equilibrium time path
of the firm's capital stock (K(t))
multiperiod
dynamic optimization (optimal control problem)
classical calculus of variations
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3. Alternative Objectives
Thus far all the models that have been considered have assumed
that the firm's managers try to maximize the welfare of the firm's
owners, which amount to profit maximization in the single period world
of sections B through E and maximizing the share value of the firm,
which reduces to profit maximization when markets are perfect and the
future is certain, in the multiperiod context of the previous subsection,
whether in the modern corporate environment of large, diversified firms
whose managers enjoy considerable discretion it is still reasonable to
assume either that economic forces are at work to ensure profit (or
value) maximization or that managers for some reason feel obligated to
do the best they possibly can for the firm's shareholders has been the
subject of considerable debate, the fundamental issues of which were
summarized in chapter one. A variety of alternative objectives have
been proposed, and the purpose of this subsection is to indicate in broad
terms (i) why these alternative objectives may not be very different
from profit maximization and (ii) even if they are different, it may
be very difficult, if not impossible in many cases, to determine which
objective (or set of objectives) is 'best'.
The next section of this chapter describes models in which
managers are assumed to act in their own best interest, maximizing
sales or a utility function whose arguments are quantities that are of
interest to managers. In each model profit appears as a constraint.
If due to pressure from dissident shareholders or to adverse swings in
business activity the profit constraint becomes binding, the firm will,
152
in effect, be forced to maximize profit. If the profit constraint
is alternatively binding and nonbinding, then the firm's managers may
199
maximize growth (or some other quantity) one period and profit the
next. Trying to determine empirically whether the firm is a profit
maximizer or a growth maximizer would, therefore, be very difficult
153
unless this particular pattern of behavior were correctly identified.
So, while the firm generally cannot maximize two different quantities,
say sales and profit, at the same time, it may pursue different objec-
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tives at different points in time. This point is discussed further
in the next section.
A second complication that makes it difficult to determine the
true objectives of the firm is uncertainty. If the firm's managers are
trying to maximize the market value of the firm, then modifying (62),
they try to maximize V = — . But where uncertainty exists, both
77 and p can vary, and if the firm can adjust its expenditures on
advertising and promotion, research and development, and investment in
plant and equipment in such a way as to reduce the fluctuations in
profit over time, and thereby reduce the level of risk and the value
of p , it may succeed in raising V , even though it is at the same
time reducing 77 . During peak periods the firm may increase adver-
tising or research and development expenditure (or both) beyond the point
at which it is most profitable to do so in order to moderate a rapid
increase in profits. While the firm is actually attempting to reduce
the fluctuation in total profit, it may appear to an outside observer
that it is attempting to maximize sales or growth (subject to main-
taining some satisfactory level of profit, 77 ).
A third complication is that suggested by the behavioralists.
According to the behavioralists, the objectives of firms vary according
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to the goals of the social groupings that make up each firm, and the
goals of any single firm can change over time as the compositions of
the social groupings change and as power — the relative extent to
which a single social grouping is able to influence the other social
groupings to accommodate its goals within the set of goals established
for the firm — shifts among the social groupings within the firm.
There may at no time be any single overriding goal that the firm's
managers seek to maximize. Rather, according to this view of the firm,
the various social groupings have goals that conflict to some extent.
The goals of the firm are established through a bargaining process
that determines a set of compromise goals. For this reason, the firm
is unlikely to optimize with respect to some single objective, but
rather, it is likely to seek satisfactory performance with respect to
each of the several goals that arise out of the bargaining process in
order to try to satisfy each social grouping. The behavioral models,
their strengths and their limitations, are discussed further in section
H.
The next section describes a class of models that reflect the
objectives of corporate managers. In such models profit and the stock
market value of the firm play significant roles, though as constraints
rather than as the single all-consuming goal of the firm.
G. MANAGERIAL MODELS: MAXIMIZING MANAGERIAL UTILITY
Managerial theories of the firm reflect the recognition by econo-
mists first, that corporate managers have objectives other than the
maximization of total profit or the maximization of the stock market
value of the firm, and second, that the separation of ownership from
201
control and imperfections in the capital markets have given corporate
managers some discretion to pursue their own objectives. According
to Mueller:
... managers maximize, or at least
pursue as one of their goals , the growth
in physical size of their corporation rather
than its profits or stockholder welfare ...
both the pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards
which managers receive are closely tied to
the growth rate of their firm.
Moreover, "a growth-maximizing management can be expected to push its
[growth] beyond the point that maximizes stockholder welfare."
Therefore, the managerial theories have replaced the traditional
objective of profit (or stock market value) maximization with other goals,
such as growth maximization, that reflect the objectives of corporate
managers
.
Managers are held to favor growth and large size for a variety of reasons,
158Managers are supposed to value salary, power, and status, all of which
159are positively correlated with the size of the firm. Larger size
provides management with greater security against takeover and with
a heightened ability to raise finance internally that leads to improved
corporate financial security; enables firms to take advantage of
economies of scale in production, research and development, and market-
1 ft 7
ing; leads to market power that facilitates effective corporate
1 ft "\
planning; and makes it easier for firms to diversify into new
164
markets. Faster growth creates more opportunities for the internal
promotion of lower and middle level managers; lends the impression
1 ftfci
that the firm is 'progressive'; facilitates improvements in operating
efficiency as the firm brings new people into the organization and
167
adopts new and better productive techniques; and, given the current
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size of the firm, enables the firm to achieve a larger size, with all
the benefits that larger size entails, more quickly. Growth through
diversification often carries the added advantages of a temporary
monopoly position, when a new product is developed and other firms are
slow to react, and a reduction in the firm's overall level of risk.
According to Marris
,
professional managers are motivated to adopt
policies that promote growth, not only because growth creates new
openings in the corporate hierarchy, but also because the head of a
growing division distinguishes himself as a productive member of the
organization worthy of promotion. Marris and others have formulated
models of the firm in which measures of growth or size enter the
objective function either directly or indirectly through the managerial
utility function.
Corporate managers are believed to have other objectives as well.
Monsen and Downs argue that managers are interested in maximizing the
present value of their lifetime incomes, which they argue, is not
172directly related to the current level of profits. Oliver Williamson
maintains that managers are utility maximizers and that managerial
utility is a function of the size of the manager's staff, total emolu-
173
ments, and the amount of discretionary profit at the manager's disposal.
Gordon argues that managers strive for security and may eschew even
174
relatively safe ways of increasing total profit in order to avoid risk.
Though giving growth a primary role, Marris also incorporates a measure
of security — the valuation ratio — in his version of the managerial
utility function.
This section describes the managerial models of Baumol, Marris,
176
and Oliver Williamson, in that order.
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1. The Baumol Models
a. Baumol' s Sales Maximization Model
Based in part on his experience as a business consultant,
William Baumol has formulated a model of the large oligopolistic firm
in which the firm's objective is to maximize total sales revenue.
Baumol argues that corporate managers are more interested in sales
than profit, partly because sales are more amenable than profit to
objective measurement and partly because the salaries of top managers
are more closely correlated with the size of the firm than with its
178
profitability. Numerous statements by corporate executives and
articles in the business literature would appear to bear this out.
For example, the following somewhat remorseful statement by Brooks
McCormick, President of International Harvester Co., "We became a sales-
oriented organization, assuming the more volume we had, the more money
we would make, We simply did not put sufficient emphasis on profita-
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bility." As this statement attests, the firm cannot ignore its
profitability. There is a profit constraint in the Baumol model, but,
according to Baumol, once this minimum level of total profit has been
attained, the firm's managers are willing to sacrifice any further
c . c . , 180increase in profit for an increase in sales revenue.
The firms with which Baumol is concerned are oligopolistic.
From the discussion in sections C and D it would appear that the oli-
gopolistic interdependence of firms would have to be taken into account.
Baumol circumvents this problem by arguing that the firm follows
established practices in its day-to-day operations and ignores the
181
behavior of its rivals in the short run. This enables Baumol first,
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to focus on the oligopolistic firm in isolation and to draw the firm's
downward-sloping demand curve without any kink, and second, to determine
the firm's optimal production and advertising policies without having
to take into account explicitly the reactions of the firm's rivals.
Since the demand curve is downwapd-s loping, maximizing
sales revenue is not the same as maximizing the volume of physical
output. In the absence of a profit constraint, maximizing sales revenue
would require the firm to locate the level of output at which marginal
revenue is zero, or equivalently , at which the price elasticity of demand
182
is equal to one. In figure 11-14 the firm would produce Q units
of output, which it would sell at price P~ , and earn total revenue of
R(Q ) = P_ • Q . Since MC > MR at Q , the firm would not earn
maximum profit, and in fact, since P» < AC , it would experience a loss.
MC
•'






Figure 11-14: Short Run Optima for a Revenue
Maximizer and a Profit Maximizer
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If there is a profit constraint, then the firm must take
this into account when setting price and output. Because the firm in
the Baumol model would be willing to sacrifice any additional profit
beyond this minimum required amount if, by so doing, it could generate
additional sales revenue, the firm treats the minimum required level
of profit like an addition to its fixed cost. The selling price will
be the sum of the average cost, AC
, plus a mark-up just sufficient
to meet the profit constraint. In figure 11-14 the firm's profit must
total at least tt , and the curve AC + tt /Q has been drawn by adding
o o
tt /Q , per unit required profit, to AC , average total cost, for each
level of output Q . The constrained sales maximizer will produce
Q units of output, which it will sell at price P = AC(Q„ ) + tt /Q ,£ 2. 2. o 2.
and earn total revenue of 0~ • P„ = Q_ • AC (CO + tt and total profit
183
of tt
, as required. Once again, total profit is not maximized
184because marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue at Q~ .
The foregoing has focused on conditions under which revenue
maximizers and profit maximizers can be expected to act differently.
Conditions under which they can be expected to exhibit identical behavior
are also of interest. If the minimum required level of profit were
equal to the maximum attainable profit, then a sales maximizer and a
profit maximizer would behave in an identical fashion, employing the
same combination of inputs, producing the same level of output, and
charging the same price. Moreover, this would continue to be true if
advertising were introduced into the model. In this more general
case, the profit constraint would force the revenue maximizer to adopt
185
advertising policies consistent with profit maximization. As a
second case of identical behavior, even if the maximum attainable profit
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exceeds the required minimum, for given levels of production cost and
advertising expenditure, a sales maximizer and a profit maximizer would
use the same combination of inputs to produce the same level of output.
Since profit equals revenue minus cost, for given levels of total pro-
duction cost and advertising expenditure, revenue maximization is tanta-
mount to profit maximization. Indeed, as demonstrated below, even when
production costs and advertising expenditure levels are permitted to
vary, the sales maximizer, just like the profit maximizer, strives for
maximum productive efficiency, for the lower are the revenue maximizer'
s
production costs, the greater is its surplus of revenue over production
costs, and the greater is the supply of funds that are available (beyond
1 ac
those needed to meet the profit constraint) to be spent on advertising.
Baumol assumed that the marginal productivity of advertising
expenditure is always positive, that is, that a one dollar increase in
advertising expenditure will always call forth some additional sales at
the current market price. For this reason, it is impossible for the
firm to achieve maximum revenue before the profit constraint has been
satisfied. In figure 11-15 the firm has achieved maximum revenue by
producing and selling Q units of output, and profit exceeds the
required minimum, given the firm's current level of advertising expendi-
ture. The firm would react to this situation by spending the excess
of profit above the required minimum on advertising, shifting the total
187
revenue and total cost curves upward. Beyond some point the marginal
productivity of advertising expenditure will diminish steadily, and
this will ensure that successive increases in advertising expenditure
will produce successively smaller increments in total revenue, and
eventually, successively greater decrements to total profit. At the
188



























Figure 11-15: Short Run Optimum for a Sales
Maximizing Firm That Can Vary
Its Advertising Expenditure
The foregoing discussion assumed the firm produced a single
output. A more general model of the revenue maximizing firm, in which
the firm uses m inputs to produce n outputs each with a downward-sloping
208
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where q is the output of the i-th good; x. is the amount used of
the j-th input; A. is the amount spent on advertising for the i-th
good (which is assumed not to affect the demand for any of the firm's
other products); R.(q., A ) is the revenue earned from the sale of
units of output i and is a function of the amount of output and the
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level of advertising expenditure; r. is the unit cost of the
j-th input, which is assumed constant; and tt is the minimum required
level of profit. The objective function expresses total revenue
earned as the sum of the amounts earned on the individual products;
the first constraint is the familiar production function, and the
second constraint is the profit constraint.
The solution to problem (73) can be characterized by
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and the first order conditions are:
9L, 9R ~_ 9R
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Solving these necessary conditions leads to a characterization of the
single period equilibrium position of the revenue maximizing firm.
\ - 1 9F/9q. A 2 - 1Solving each of the equations in (75) for —? gives
and equating any two expressions for









1 <_ i <_ n
1 < k < n
(80)
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where -9q /8q is interpreted as the rate of product transformation.
According to equation (80) , in order for the firm to be in equilibrium,
it is necessary that the rate of product transformation for each pair
of goods equal the ratio of the marginal revenues of the two goods
.
It is noted that condition (80) is equivalent to (25) , where
p = 9R/9q and p. = 3Rp/8qn . Next, solving each of the equations
dF/dx, * 2


















~K 1 < k < m
where -8x
p
/9x^ is interpreted as the rate of technical substitution.
According to equation (81) , in order for the firm to be in equilibrium,
it is also necessary that the rate of technical substitution between
each pair of inputs equal the ratio of the costs of the two inputs.
It is noted that condition (81) is identical to (26) . Taken together,
the equilibrium conditions (80) and (81) imply that the sales maximizer,
like the profit maximizer whose optimal mixes of outputs and inputs
satisfy (25) and (26), respectively, will avoid the production of
relatively unprofitable outputs and the use of relatively unprofitable
inputs
.
Unlike the profit maximizer, the sales maximizer will
produce 'too much' output and use 'too many' of its inputs, with 'too
much' and 'too many' understood in the sense of 'more than a profit
maximizing firm would'. To see why, solve any of the equations in
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From (79), A _< . It follows from (77) and the assumption that
9R.
-pr-— > , for all levels of advertising expenditure A. , thatdA
± 9R.
X
A_ < . Otherwise, for X =




contradiction. Note that A < implies, by (79), that the profit



















1 <_ I < n
1 < k < m
(84)
which implies that the sales maximizer, when in equilibrium would
employ inputs beyond the point at which it is most profitable to do





product of the k-th input, -5— " -5— is less than that input's9xk dqi
marginal cost (in this case r ), in contrast to (27), according
to which the profit maximizer, when in equilibrium, would have hired
inputs up to the point at which the marginal revenue product of each
input just equals that input's marginal cost. Therefore, if each
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9q£
dhinput's marginal revenue product is declining, -r— • -r— <
,
9\ 3q £
as is typically assumed, condition (84) implies that the sales
maximizer hires more of the k-th input than does the profit maximizer,
Since at optimality the marginal physical product of all
3q
(
inputs must be positive, i.e. -jj— > , dividing each side of (84)A
by 8q
p
/9x, will not change the sense of the inequality. Thus,
t 9R
k
> J_i , or MC£ > MR£ , l<i<n (85)
3q£
/3\ 3q£
Unlike the profit maximizer who equates marginal revenue and marginal
cost, the sales maximizer expands production beyond this point so
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that, in equilibrium, marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue. In
the case of one output, this situation is depicted by figure 11-14.
In view of the results just obtained, it would appear
reasonable that in equilibrium the sales maximizer would balance the
relative contributions to revenue and to profit of each output, each
input, and the expenditure on advertising for each good. This is
easily demonstrated. From (75),
9R. 9R. A- r.„




From (76), ^ = - ^r— so that - =— = . _ . — and substituting
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a yi represents the marginal cost of
preted as the marginal profit yield, 3TT./3q.
,
of the i-th output.
Substituting 3tt /3q for the expression in brackets in (87) and





3F73q^ • X - i i n ' (88)
The Lagrange multiplier A_ is equal to the ratio of the marginal
revenue of output i to the marginal profit yield of output i .





A = awa from (75) into (76) and rearranging terms gives
i
3R. 3q. 3R. 3q.





where the expression in parentheses is interpreted as the marginal














which states that A is equal to the ratio of the marginal revenue
product of input j to the marginal profit yield of input j .
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which states that A„ equals the marginal revenue yield of an additional
dollar of advertising divided by the marginal profit yield of an addi-
tional dollar of advertising. Combining conditions (88) , (90) , and
(91) leads to the optimality conditions for sales maximization stated
by Baumol: the sales maximizing firm should set its output, input,
and advertising levels so that the ratio of the marginal revenue yield
to the marginal profit yield is the same for all outputs, all inputs,
193
and all categories of advertising expenditure.
In Baumol' s model the firm's minimum profit constraint,
tt in (73), is not determined, although Baumol does suggest its
194
origin. Needham and J.H. Williamson have shown how to extend the
— 195
model so that it is determined. The extension requires that the
firm's objective be changed from single period sales maximization to
the maximization of the present value of the stream of future sales.
Then, as Needham demonstrates, given the minimum retention ratio per-
mitted by the stock market, the interdependence of the different sales
and profit levels over time guarantees that, once the firm has selected
the current level of sales that maximizes the present value of the sales
— 196
stream, its current minimum profit constraint ff is determined.
Baumol's sales maximization model implies that, ceteris
paribus, the revenue maximizing firm will produce more output and
register greater total revenue, but earn smaller profit, than a profit
215
maximizing firm. When the sales maximizer is in equilibrium, marginal
cost will exceed marginal revenue (and may even exceed price if average
total cost rises sharply enough) and the marginal cost of each input
will exceed its marginal revenue product. The distinguishing character-
istics of Baumol's model of the revenue maximizing firm are summarized
in table 11-12.















Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
managerial (see (73) in text)
maximize sales revenue
technological constraint (embodied in the
production function), minimum profit constraints,
and nonnegativity constraints on the decision
variables; implicitly, product demand conditions
(as embodied in R.(q.,A.))ill
minimum required profit level (it) and input
prices (rj); the profit level could be made
endogenous, as suggested by Needham or by
J.H. Williamson, although that would require
that some stock market-related variable, such
as a minimum retention ratio, be determined
exogenous ly
output levels (q-^) , input levels (xj) ,
advertising levels (A.), total revenue
n
( Z R (q.,A.)), and total profit
i=l X 1





characterization of equilibrium position of
the firm
single period




The Baumol sales maximization model has been criticized
because there is no utility trade off to the firm's managers between
revenue and profit. Up to the constraint, the firm maximizes profit,
but once the constraint has been satisfied, the firm maximizes sales.
A second criticism of Baumol's model is that it assumes certainty.
Recently, Yarrow has reformulated Baumol's sales maximization model
to incorporate uncertainty and has found that the introduction of
uncertainty leads to predictions different from Baumol's regarding
the behavior of the firm in response to various external stimuli,
19 7
such as a change in the (lump sum) profits tax. A third criticism
of the model is that it ignores growth. Spending excess profit on
advertising is not inconsistent with maximizing the firm's growth, and
as Baumol later argued, there is much evidence that corporate managers
198
are concerned with the growth of the firms they control. The next
subsection presents Baumol's growth maximization model.
b. Baumol's Growth Maximization Model
Subsequent to the development of his single period sales
maximization model that was just discussed, Baumol developed a model
in which the objective of the firm's managers is to maximize the rate
199
of growth of sales, rather than the level of sales. Unlike his
single period model, in which the profit constraint appeared to be
arbitrarily imposed from outside the firm, in the growth maximization
model profit becomes a decision variable as management adjusts the
level of profit according to the firm's need for internally generated
funds with which to finance the firm's expansion. Both of Baumol's
models have a managerial character. In the single period model sales
are maximized because that is the objective of the firm's managers.
217
Indeed, the objective function could just as easily have been formulated
n
201
as U( E R.(q.,A.))
,
where U stands for managerial utility.
i=l
Similarly, in presenting his growth maximization model, Baumol argued
that top corporate managers maximize the rate of growth of sales,
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rather than the level of sales or some other quantity. This sub-
203
section describes Baumol 's growth maximization model.
Define the following variables:
g = the firm's annual rate of growth of sales.
I = the annual net (of dividends) flow of money capital
into the firm, expressed as a percentage of the firm's
current stock of fixed assets plus inventories, that
is invested in fixed assets (i.e. plant and equipment)
and in inventories (to support the growth in sales) . ^
ir = total annual profit, expressed as a percentage of the
firm's equity, which is the sum of total annual dividends
paid, D
,
plus total annual retained earnings, E
,
each expressed as a percentage of the firm's equity.
Thus, 7T = D + E
,
which is an accounting identity™"
that appears as a contraint in the model below.
The flow of money capital into the firm is reflected in
the liabilities and stockholders' equity side of the firm's balance
sheet, which is illustrated above in table II-l. If bonds are issued
or if money is borrowed from banks (or from other sources) via the
issuance of notes, then liabilities and total debt both increase. If
shares of preferred stock are issued, then the contributed capital
portion of stockholders' equity, and in addition debt, as defined in
section A, both increase. If new shares of common stock are issued,
then the contributed capital portion of stockholders' equity and
equity, as defined in section A, both increase. The amounts of money
capital raised from all these external sources are combined into the
function (t>(7T,D) , which expresses the amount of money capital that
can be raised (annually) from external sources as a function of the
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firm's total annual profit, it , and total annual dividends paid, D
,
each expressed as the appropriate percentage indicated above. Implicitly,
Baumol assumes this functional relationship to be time invariant. That
is, both debt financing and external equity financing are permitted,
although no distinction is made between them in the model. In addition,
a third source — an internal source — of money capital is total retained
earnings. Adding the amount of money capital generated internally,
E , to the amounts raised externally (in each case, expressed as the
appropriate percentage indicated above) gives an expression for the
total amount of money capital raised annually, I = <Ktt,D) + E »
which appears as a constraint in the model below.
It follows from the basic accounting identity between
total assets and the sum of total liabilities and total stockholders'
equity that any change in liabilities plus stockholders' equity must
be reflected in an equal (in magnitude) change in total assets.
According to the above definition of I , the increase in money capital
is used by the firm to purchase additional plant and equipment and to
build up inventories. This use of money capital is what is implied
when I is included as an argument of the growth rate function
g(I,7T) in the model below. Given the above definitions and relation-
ships, Baumol 's growth maximization model is formulated as the
following mathematical programming problem.
maximize: g = g(I,ir)
{tt,D}
subject to: I = <Ktt,D) + E
it = D + E
219
(92)
The objective function expresses the firm's growth rate
as a function of its investment rate, I , and its profit rate, tt .
It is assumed that 8g/9l > and that beyond some point 3g/37T <
(though, as in the Marris model discussed below, growth and profit
may be directly related for low levels of profit and low growth rates)
.
The first constraint in (92) shows that a higher profit
rate influences the amount of funds available for investment in two
ways: directly through retained earnings and indirectly through the
impact of the profit rate and the profits distributed as dividends
on the firm's ability to raise funds externally. The second constraint
in (92) is merely an accounting identity.
The relationship between tt and g may be explained in
208
the following manner. The present value, R , of the stream of
future sales is
00 00









where S is the initial level of sales and s is management's subjec-
tive time rate of discount of sales, which reflects the value of a
209
dollar in sales today relative to a dollar in sales a year from now.
7)H c
From (93) , -r— = « > , so that the present value of future sales
88 (s-g)
2
is a strictly increasing function of g . On the cost side, let C(g)
represent the present value of all expected future costs as a function
210
of the growth rate.
As the firm grows, it must expand its management team.
Increasing the rate at which new people are brought into the organization
220
can lead to internal inefficiencies, and as a consequence, to higher
costs, if the rate of expansion becomes so rapid that the new people
cannot be properly indoctrinated as to the ways of the organization
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prior to assuming positions of responsibility. If these costs of
growth increase at an increasing rate as the firm's rate of growth
increases, then C'(g) > and C"(g) > , and eventually, the
increasing cost of expansion will catch up with the increasing revenue
derived from expansion.
The curves R(g) and C(g) are shown in figure 11-16
where S and s have been held fixed so that R is a function of
g only. The vertical distance between the curves defines the growth-
profit function, 7r(g) = R(g) - C(g) Up to g , 7r(g) is an increasing
function of g , and beyond g , Tr(g) decreases as the growth rate
increases. At higher growth rates profits compete with sales as the
lower prices and higher advertising outlays needed to promote the
rapid growth of sales cut into the firm's total profit. The profit
maximizing firm would select growth rate g at which
TT'(g) = R'(g ) - C'(g ) = or R'(g) = C'(g) . (94)
m m m mm
Equation (94) is the familiar marginal revenue equals marginal cost
condition for profit maximization, but with marginal revenue and
marginal cost expressed as functions of the growth rate, rather than
212













Figure 11-16: Revenue from Expansion and the Cost
of Expansion in the Baumol Growth Model
Baumol 's growth maximization model (92) is a steady state
growth model. In steady state in the Baumol growth maximization model,
total profit, total sales, fixed assets, and all other quantities
213
grow at a constant rate. In addition, total annual profit, tt
,
total annual dividends paid, D
,
and total annual retained earnings,
E , each remains fixed as a percentage of the firm's equity, implying
that total annual profit, total annual dividends paid, total annual
retained earnings, and the firm's equity all grow at the same constant
222
rate. While it is not required, in general, that these variables grow
at the same rate as sales or as money capital, it can be shown that, if
the firm produces a single good, if the firm's production function is
linearly homogeneous, if input prices and the price of output are fixed
(i.e. the product market and factor markets are all perfectly competi-
tive)
,
and if the amount of money capital raised externally grows at
the same rate as the amount generated internally (i.e. retained
earnings) , then sales and total money capital will, when the firm is
in equilibrium, grow at the same constant rate as total annual profit,
total annual dividends paid, etc.
Having discussed several features of Baumol's growth maxi-
mization model, the remainder of this subsection proceeds with an
analysis of it. Baumol's model of the (sales) growth maximizer (92)
can be simplified through the introduction of the retention ratio, r ,
which will, given the constancy of it , D , and E , remain constant
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in steady state. Since D = (1 - r)ir and E = r tt , it follows
that the model can be reformulated as the unconstrained mathematical
programming problem:
maximize: g = g[<£(TT,(l - r)ir) + r tt , tt] . (95)
{TT,r}
81
Applying the chain rule and the fact that — = 1
,
the first order
conditions for an optimal solution to (95) are found to be:
If - If$ + "-> M " + 1? - o «*>
If - IMS <-»> + « o <">
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By rearranging terms in (96) and by appealing to the implicit function
theorem to write -
*l/li
= §7 ' Provided 3g/3I * , it follows
that (96) is equivalent to
£ " §e +(1 - r) i! + " <98>
which is the partial derivative with respect to tt of the first
constraint in (92) , and hence, which is always satisfied as long as
all the partial derivatives exist.
From (9 7) any one of three possibilities may hold:
|£=0, || = 1 , or tt = 0. If 3g/3I = , then from (96) ,
3g/37T = as well, and the firm has been able to generate enough
finance so that the growth rate is an unconstrained maximum. If the
firm is always able to use additional finance profitably, then
3g/3l > , and this possibility can be ruled out.
If |£ = 1 , then (98) simplifies to |^ = |^ + 1 . The3D 3tt 3tt
economic interpretation of the former is that at optimality the outflow
of an additional dollar of dividends is just sufficient to enable the
firm to raise an additional dollar of funds from external sources, so
that increasing dividends will not alter the net inflow of funds.
The firm is unable to increase its rate of growth of sales due to
financial restrictions.
If tt = , then there are no internally generated funds
to spend for investment purposes or to distribute as dividends.
Presumably, zero profit could not persist, unless there were investors
who were willing to sacrifice all profit (and therefore all dividends)




-r^ =1 to occur before tt . If so, then this third possibility
can also be ruled out.
Thus, the firm finds its growth rate of sales constrained
by financial restrictions. By pushing for growth, it reduces its
profitability and its ability to pay dividends to the point where
additional dividends will not call forth sufficient additional external
finance to permit further expansion.
By way of summary, the distinguishing features of the
Baumol growth maximization model are summarized in table 11-13.













Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
managerial (see (95) in text)
maximize the rate of growth of sales
financial constraint (embodied in the function
4>) ; implicitly, product demand and factor
supply conditions and, also implicitly, the
technological constraint embodied in its
production function (see footnote 214)
profit (it)
,
dividends paid (D) , and retained
earnings (E) , each as a percentage of total
equity; retention ratio (r) ; and growth rate
of sales (g)
profit as a percentage of total equity (tt)
and retention ratio (r)
both debt financing and external equity
financing permitted (in addition to internally
generated funds, i.e. retained earnings)
assumes certainty
characterization of the equilibrium steady
state growth path of the firm
multiperiod




2. The Marris Model
Recognizing first, the considerable exercise of managerial
discretion that is implied by the separation of ownership from control
in the modern corporation, and second, the consequent implied pursuit
of growth-promoting policies by corporate managers, Robin Marris has
216developed a managerial model of the firm in which managers seek to
maximize their own utility, which is a function of (i) the rate of
growth of the firm's productive assets and (ii) security against
217
takeover. This subsection describes the two basic formulations of
the Marris model and explores the important economic implications of
each.
In Marris's view modern corporate managers are primarily
interested in the growth of their firms because of the strong positive
correlation between size and executive salaries and because growth
adds to their prestige and creates opportunities for promotion. But
if the firm strives all out for growth, ignoring its profitability and
permitting the market valuation of its shares to fall, it runs the risk
218
of a takeover bid. There does exist some empirical evidence to
support Marris's view that management can become so preoccupied with
growth that profits suffer, the share value falls, and the disgruntled
shareholders sell out their shares to a takeover raider, or worse yet,
219
the firm goes bankrupt. In Marris's view, corporate managers who
value their own security will maximize growth, but subject to a
valuat ion cons t raint
.
In developing a growth maximization model of the Marris type
there are at least two ways to proceed with the process of model




where g is the rate of growth of the firm's productive assets and
v is the valuation ratio, which Marris defines as the ratio of the
stock market value of the firm's equity capital to the book value of
220 _.
xts net assets. The valuation ratio serves as the measure of
security; as it falls the probability of takeover increases. Having
specified the utility function, the next step is to find what Marris
calls the 'growth-valuation function*
v = v(g)
, (100)
which gives the valuation ratio corresponding to each (feasible)
growth rate g . The problem facing the firm is to maximize (99)




The second approach — the first one adopted by Marris —
is to proceed via the important economic relationships that underlie
(100) and to specify the security constraint in terms of market-imposed
constraints on the firm's selection of values for key financial policy
variables. Then the problem confronting the firm is to maximize g
subject to these constraints. To distinguish the two formulations of
the Marris model, the initial formulation will be referred to as the
'growth maximization' formulation and the recent formulation will be
referred to as the 'managerial utility maximization' formulation.
Depending on the shape of U — whether there is a continual
trade off between g and v along smooth managerial indifference curves,
227
L
or else a clearly specified minimum permissible valuation ratio v*
and a lexicographic ordering of objectives such that first v* is
223
attained and thereafter g is maximized — the two approaches can
yield identical solutions. The discussion of the Marris model begins
with the initial formulation and then proceeds to the second formulation
and examines the relationship between the two.
224
a. Initial Formulation of the Marris Model: Growth Maximization
The objective of the firm is to select the maximum rate of
growth of productive assets consistent with the continued financial
security of the firm. In the model the firm is required to grow in
225
steady state; that is, the model abstracts from the possibilities
that the growth rate might vary with the size of the firm, as has been
suggested by Penrose, or that a particular policy might promise
rapid growth after a few periods of relatively slow growth or vice
227
versa. In the model steady state growth requires that growth be
228
balanced in the sense that the rate of growth of productive assets,
C
,
must equal the growth rate of demand, D
,
or in equation form,
C = D . (101)
When growth is balanced and (101) is satisfied, it is possible to
speak of 'the' growth rate of the firm, and this balanced growth rate
will be denoted hereafter by g .
The growth of demand reflects not only increased sales in
existing product lines, but also sales resulting from diversification,
i.e. from the development of new products. Diversification plays a
crucial role in the growth of demand because of the tendency for sales
228
229
of a product to fall off as the market becomes saturated. The rate
of growth of demand, D , depends largely, then, on the rate at which
new products are added to the firm's catalogue. But the rate at which
new products are added depends not only on the rate at which new prod-
ucts are tried, but also on the proportion of successes, for not all
230
new products will prove to be profitable. By increasing its spending
on market research, product development, and advertising, the firm
can increase the proportion of successes, though at the cost of a
reduced profit margin. Denoting by d the diversification rate, i.e.
the ratio of attempted new products to existing products, and by m
the profit margin, i.e. the ratio of net operating income to total
231
sales, " the rate of growth of demand can be expressed as a function of




where 8D/3m < and dti/dd > . Several demand-growth curves are
shown in figure 11-17, where each demand-growth curve expresses the
relationship between D and d for a different (given) profit margin
m. . A higher value for m. leads to a lower demand-growth curve
since 8D/9m < . For any given value of m. the demand-growth
curve is upward-sloping since 8D/9d > , but rises at a decreasing
rate due to the assumption of diminishing returns.
Similarly, the growth rate of productive assets on the
left-hand side of equation (101) is dependent on the firm's profit rate,
which in turn is a function of the profit margin and the rate of
diversification. The growth rate of productive assets is equal to
229
the ratio of the supplies of new finance (both from retained earnings
and from external sources such as the sale of bonds) available for
that purpose each period to the stock of productive assets at the
beginning of the period. Assuming no new stock issues, a constant
leverage ratio (the ratio of debt to equity) , and a constant retention
232
ratio (the ratio of retained earnings to net income) , the growth
rate of productive assets will be a constant proportion, a , of the
233
profit rate (the ratio of net income to total assets)
, p :
C = a • p . (103)
Equation (103) defines the ' supply-of-finance' function. Due to
the desires of corporate managers for financial security, the retention
ratio (and in an uncertain world where markets are incomplete, the
leverage ratio) will be constrained, so that a cannot exceed some
upper limit a* imposed by the financial markets:
a < a* . (104)
The firm's rate of profit, p in equation (103), is a
function of the profit margin and the rate of diversification, called
the 'prof it- rate' function,
p = p(m,d) , (105)
where 9p/3m > and 8p/8d > over low rates of diversification
and 3p/8d < over high rates of diversification. For a given
230
diversification rate, a higher profit margin implies a higher profit
rate. For a given profit margin, a higher rate of diversification
at first leads to a higher profit rate as the firm's productive
resources are shifted from less successful to more successful products
and the firm's overall efficiency of capital utilization improves.
Increasing the diversification rate, however, requires that the manage-
ment team grow more rapidly, which will eventually lead to internal
inefficiencies, a less efficient utilization of the firm's capital,
235
and a falling profit rate.
If the firm has selected the maximum permissible value for
a , a = a* — its reason for making such a choice is discussed below —
then the supply-of-finance function is of the form
C = a* • p(m,d) . (106)
Several such supply-of-finance curves are drawn in figure 11-17,
where each supply-of-finance curve expresses the relationship between
g and d for a different (given) profit margin m. .
Since the supply-of- finance function is a constant multiple
a* of the profit-rate function, for each profit margin m. the rate
of growth of the supply of finance increases where 8p/8d > and
decreases where 3p/8d < . Since 3p/8m > , a higher profit












































Figure 11-17: Demand-Growth and the Supply-of-Finance
in the Marris Model
Collecting equations (101), (102), (103), and (105), and
the security constraint (104) , the Marris model can be summarized as
follows
:
C = D (balanced-growth condition) (101)
D = D(m,d) (demand-growth function) (102)
C = a • p (supply-of-finance function) (103)
a <^ a* (security constraint) (104)
p = p(m,d) (profit-rate function) (105)
where C,D,m, d, a, p, and a* are as defined above. For
each value of a that satisfies (104) , the four equations (101) , (102)
,
(103), and (105) define a balanced-growth curve like the one shown as
232
a dashed curve in figure 11-17. The balanced growth curve shows the
relationship between the balanced growth rate g = C = D and the
diversification rate d . It is found by varying the profit margin
m , and for each value of m , locating the point of intersection of
C and D . In figure 11-17 the points A , at which C and D
intersect, B , at which C« and D„ intersect, and C , at which
C_ and D intersect, lie on the balanced-growth curve. Note that
as a increases the family of supply-of-finance curves will rise,
thereby increasing the ordinate of each point on the balanced-growth
curve. Since the firm's objective is to maximize its growth rate, it
will select a = a* in order to reach the highest permissible
balanced-growth curve. Maximizing its growth rate along that curve
leads the firm to select the equilibrium diversification rate d* in
figure 11-17. In multiperiod equilibrium the firm grows in steady
state at rate g* , diversifies at the equilibrium rate d* , and
earns an equilibrium profit margin m* which satisfies the equation
g* = D(m*,d*) = a* * p(m*,d*) .
The characteristics of the initial formulation of the
Marris model — his growth maximization model — are summarized in
table 11-14.
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Pi s eq ui lib ri urn :
Time :
Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
managerial (see (101)-(105) in text)
maximize rate of growth of productive assets
(which is also the rate at which all other
quantities in the model grow)
demand-growth function, supply-of-finance
function, security constraint, and profit-rate
function, which collectively subsume single
period and multiperiod product demand, factor
supply, technological, and financial constraints;
also, the leverage ratio and the retention ratio
are required to be constant (both are subsumed
in a)
maximum quasi-retention ratio (a*)
balanced growth rate (C = D = g) , profit rate
(p) , profit margin (m) , diversification rate
(d) , and quasi-retention ratio (a)
profit margin (m) , diversification rate (d)
,
and quasi-retention ratio (a)
the only external source of finance permitted
is debt issuance
assumes certainty
characterization of the equilibrium steady
state growth path of the firm
multiperiod
static optimization (set of simultaneous
equations)
graphical (see figure 11-17)
b. Recent Formulation of the Marris Model: Managerial
Utility Maximization 236
In the initial formulation of the Marris model the con-
237
stant a* is exogenous. If there is no debt, so that a = r ,
then in the initial formulation the stock market places a direct
restriction on r . Greater insight is achieved if the restriction
on r is linked to the stock market value of the firm's shares, for
234
it is a low share value that presents a threat to management by increas-
ing the likelihood of a takeover bid and prevents management from
increasing r all the way up to one. In the more recent formulation
of his model, Marris formulates the constraint in terms of the firm's
238
valuation ratio. In The Economic Tkcoiy oh ' Manag&u.al' CapitaLUm
Marris suggests a way of proceeding from his initial formulation to
239
his recent formulation.
Given a retention ratio r , equations (101) , (102)
,
(103), and (105) can be solved to find a maximum balanced growth rate
g , where the subscript r indicates the growth rate's dependence
on r . For each new value of r the process can be repeated, yielding
a value for g and associated values for p , m , and d6
r *r r r
With each value of r is associated the ordered pair (g ,p ) . Since
dg /dr > , it is possible to associate a single value of p with
each value of g , and these ordered pairs define a function, which
Marris calls the 'growth-profitability' function,
P = P(g) , (107)
where p'(g) may be positive for low growth rates but must eventually
become negative.
To obtain the 'growth-valuation' function, which expresses
the valuation ratio as a function of the steady-state growth rate, an
expression for the stock market value of the firm's shares is needed.
Given the profit rate, p , the retention ratio, r , the current
book value of total assets, K , a constant continuous rate of discount,
i , and the steady-state growth rate, g , the market value of the
235
242firm's shares, V , is equal to
V - *±j^ft (108)
and the valuation ratio, v , is given by
v
- I - *Kf •
From (107) p = p(g) and from (103) g = rp , so that (109) can be
reexpressed in terms of g and i only:
v = P
" rP = P(8> ~ 8 (110)i - g i - g
243
where g £ p(g) and g <_ i . Equation (110) defines the 'growth-
valuation' function. Note that if v < 1 , then the market value of
the firm's shares is less than the book value of the firm's assets.
If the book value closely approximates the market value of the firm's
assets, then v < 1 would be likely to encourage a takeover bid.
For this reason, Marris argues that the firm will maintain v >^ 1 ,
244
which implies from (110) that p ^ i .
In the more recent formulation of the Marris model, the




subject to: v = v(g) - D(g) Y(g)
,
236
where v(g) defined by (110) has been written as the product of two
1 245
functions, D(g) = p(g) - g and Y(g) = ——— . The function
D(g) , which Marris calls the 'general dividend function', expresses
the dividend yield as a percentage of the firm's productive assets,
and if p'(g) < for all g , then D' (g) = p' (g) - 1 < , so that
the general dividend yield is a declining function of the firm's
growth rate. The function Y(g) , which Marris calls the 'present-
value' function, is the reciprocal of the dividend yield (on the
247
share price). For i constant, Y'(g) > .
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to problem
(111) can be used to characterize the equilibrium steady state growth
path of the firm, and in particular, to determine the equilibrium
growth rate g* and the corresponding equilibrium valuation ratio
v* . For comparative purposes, note that, under the traditional
criterion, the firm would select g so as to maximize the valuation
ratio. Differentiating v(g) with respect to g , setting the
derivative equal to zero, and rearranging terms yields the necessary
condition for optimum v :
.di^i = ri&i (112)
D(g) Y(g) ' U±A>
which requires that, for the value-maximizing firm to be in equilibrium,
the firm must select g such that the percentage decrease in the
general dividend yield is equal (numerically) at the margin to the
percentage increase in the share price, with each percentage change
(or 'semi-elasticity') determined with respect to a change in the
firm s growth rate.
237
A growth-valuation curve is shown in figure 11-18, and
the optimum valuation ratio is shown as v . Following Marris, the
max ° '
growth-valuation curve is drawn with the portion of the curve corres-
249
ponding to low growth rates upward-sloping. For low rates of growth
an increase in the growth rate implies a higher valuation ratio. Note
that in this case the value maximizer will grow, i.e. g > .
max
This result depends, of course, on the shape of v(g) , for if
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Figure 11-18: Optimum for a Value Maximizer
and for a Growth Maximizer
238
For managerial utility maximizers, the optimum value of
251






[D ' (8)Y(8> +D (8) Y '(8)] = . (113)
which may be rewritten as
" lu/ff
= D,( 8)Y( 8) + D (8) Y '(8) • d14 )
The expression on the left is interpreted as the managers' marginal
rate of substitution between growth and security, and the expression
on the right is interpreted as the marginal cost of additional growth
in terms of stock market valuation, and when the managerial utility
maximizing firm is growing along its equilibrium steady state growth
path, these two quantities must be equal. In terms of figure 11-18,
condition (114) requires that, at the point of optimality, the slope
of the managerial indifference curve equal the slope of the growth-
valuation curve, i.e. the familiar tangency condition necessary for
252
utility maximization.
From equation (113) it is easily seen that the value maxi-
mizer and the managerial utility maximizer will grow at the same rate
and achieve the same valuation ratio only if 3U/3g = , that is,
only if the managerial indifference curves become horizontal so that
the point of tangency occurs where v = v . This would imply that
beyond some point faster growth brings no additional utility. If
managers' desires for growth are never satiated, so that the indiffer-
ence curves are always downward-sloping, then v* < v . Ceteris
paribus, a managerial utility maximizer of the Marris type (a 'growth
maximizer') grows faster, but has a smaller valuation ratio, than a
239
value maximizer. Since p'(g) < , the growth maximizer also has
a lower profit rate, and since r = g/p , it also retains a larger
253proportion of total profit than a value maximizer.
To summarize the discussion up to this point, the distin-
guishing features of Marris's model of the managerial utility
maximizer are listed in table 11-15.













Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
managerial (see (111) in text)
maximize managerial utility expressed as a
function of the firm's growth rate and
valuation ratio
growth-valuation function; implicitly, single
period product demand and factor supply
conditions and conditions restricting the
potency of the firm's 'growth-promoting'
expenditures, and implicitly, the technological
constraint embodied in the firm's production
function
growth rate (g) and valuation ratio (v)
growth rate (g)
restriction to internal financing
assumes certainty
characterization of the equilibrium steady
state growth path of the firm
multiperiod
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization (this follows from
converting (111) into an equivalent unconstrained
optimization problem, as explained in footnote
251)
Having presented the managerial utility maximization formula-
tion of the Marris model, the relationship between that formulation and
240
the earlier growth maximization formulation is considered next. The
equilibrium steady state growth path characterized by the optimal
solution to the mathematical programming problem (111) leads to an
equilibrium value for v and to an equilibrium value for r . If
the firm were to take the equilibrium value v* as the constrained
valuation ratio, the model of the firm (111) could be reformulated as
one involving the maximization of g subject to v = v* . Alterna-
tively, the corresponding equilibrium value for r could be used, as
in the initial formulation of the Marris model, to obtain the same
optimal g - Adopting the former approach, suppose that a minimum value
for v is determined outside the model. Then the model of the firm
can be formulated as the following mathematical programming problem:
maximize: g (115)
subject to: v(g) >^ v ,
where v is the minimum valuation ratio necessary to prevent takeover.
The model (115) incorporates what may be called the strong form of the
valuation ratio constraint, while the model (111) incorporates the
254
weak form of the valuation ratio constraint. As long as v, < v ,
1 — max
problem (115) has a feasible solution. Since v'(g) < at the optimal




It is possible to generalize the Marris model to permit,
for example, the discount rate i to depend on the firm's leverage
ratio, i.e. the ratio of debt to equity. Rather than carry out the
generalization in this section, it will prove more fruitful first to
241
develop the Vickers and Lintner models in sections I and J and then
to suggest how the presence of uncertainty and the need to consider
the method of financing the firm's activities that are incorporated
in these models affect the behavior of growth maximizers of the Marris
type as well as that of value maximizers.
c. Evaluation of the Marris Model
Empirical support for the growth maximization hypothesis
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has come from three sources. One source is the tests carried out
by Douglas Kuehn of the hypothesis that firms are growth maximizers
against the alternative hypothesis that firms are profit maximizers.
Kuehn finds that the valuation ratio is the most consistent indicator
of whether a firm will be taken over and that, among takeover raiders
at least, the growth maximization hypothesis is more consistent with
the pattern of growth rates, profit rates, retention ratios, and
valuation ratios than the profit maximization hypothesis. While
Kuehn conducted his tests using British data, his findings are
consistent with those of Friend and Puckett, Reid, and others,
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which are based on American data and which are discussed below.
The second source of support is the finding that "when stock prices
are related to current dividends and retained earnings, higher dividend
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payout is usually associated with higher price-earnings ratios,"
for this suggests that firms tend to operate with a retention
ratio in excess of that which would maximize the share value,
which is consistent with the Marris model's implication that a
growth maximizer will have a higher retention ratio and a lower valuation
259
ratio than a value maximizer. The third source of support for the
growth maximization hypothesis are the empirical findings of Reid and
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others that generally support the view that companies merge not for
if)
the sake of profits, but for the sake of increasing size.
On both theoretical grounds and empirical grounds, then,
there is good reason to believe that firms are interested in growth
and that they are willing to accept somewhat lower profitability and
somewhat lower market valuation of their shares in order to increase
the growth rate to the maximum consistent with continued financial
security.
Nevertheless, the Marris model has certain limitations.
The model assumes that the firm selects a steady state growth rate and
that share prices are determined as the present value of the dividend
stream growing at this constant rate, but in order for such a share
valuation model to have empirical validity, it is necessary that growth
and profit rates be stable over time and that the stock market be
2fi 1
aware of this. Even under the assumption of certainty, which Marris
makes, such a valuation model requires that capital markets be perfect
and in equilibrium. Yet, Nerlove shows that there is substantial
disequilibrium in the capital market — "both suppliers of capital to
the firm and investors in common stock share an imperfect and dim
perception of the profitable opportunities for investment open to the
firm." Marris's model rests, then, on a theory of share valuation
that requires that certain strict conditions, including the existence
of perfect capital markets, be met. In fairness to Marris, this is
not as much a criticism of his model as it is a recognition of the
26 ?
limitations of the particular share price formula he adopted. The
significance of the choice of valuation formula lies in the impact
it may have on the shape and location of the growth-valuation curve,
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and hence, on the equilibrium steady state growth path chosen by the
firm.
A second limitation of the Marris model is that it assumes
certainty. Yarrow has modified Marris 's model to incorporate uncer-
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tainty, although he leaves the stock market valuation of shares
26 S
subsumed within what he calls the managerial security function
(which is a generalization of Marris ? s growth-valuation function).
Another approach — one that takes security valuation into account
explicitly — might be to reformulate Marris's model first, with expected
utility maximization in place of utility maximization and second, with
a growth-valuation function based on a security valuation formula,
such as the one suggested by Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin, that takes
nj . , 266uncertainty into account explicitly.
Two other limitations of the model are its treatment of
managerial utility and its assumption of steady state growth. Is
managerial utility a function of the growth rate and the valuation
ratio only, or are there other arguments, such as staff and managerial
26 7
emoluments, that have been left out? As the model purports to
explain the mode of behavior of actual large firms, if there are other
sources of managerial utility that have been left out of the model,
then, depending on their importance relative to growth and security,
the equilibrium steady state growth path chosen by the firm might be
affected. A possibly more serious question concerns how the collective
?6ft
managerial utility function is formed. Do executives at all levels
have the same marginal rate of substitution between growth and security,
or do the top executives, who are more likely to lose their jobs following
a takeover, place a relatively greater value on additional security
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than lower level executives, who are more interested in opportunities
for promotion — or does the managerial utility function reflect the
trade offs of top management only? Might there be a sociological
process at work within the firm by which the firm's objectives are
determined?
Second, it is unlikely that, in planning for the future,
firms ignore the business cycle. In an expanding economy, with markets
growing and profits rising, managers not only desire growth, they are
forced by competition to expand in order to protect their market shares.
It is also advantageous to bring out new products — i.e. to diversify —
in an expanding economy because the firm is better able to obtain the
financial resources with which to finance test marketing and other
selling expenses and consumer attitudes are generally more favorable
than in the downswing. In the downswing, however, the emphasis is
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likely to shift from growth to profits. While this shift can be
accommodated within the Marris model, it requires that managerial
utility be maximized with respect to security and growth lexicographically
i.e. it requires that the firm act so as to maximize v whenever
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v < v .
The above criticisms were not meant to detract from the
significance of Marris 's contribution. The explicit recognition of
the separation of ownership from control, and with it the appearance
of growth as one of the modern corporation's primary objectives, in
a model of the firm is highly significant. In this writer's opinion,
any model that hopes to explain the behavior of the modern corporate
enterprise should include growth among the firm's objectives.
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3. The Oliver Williamson Model
In the Marris model managerial utility is a function of the
firm's growth rate and its valuation ratio. One consequence of faster
growth is that any particular size — and the salary, power, prestige,
etc. that are positively correlated with size and that contribute to
managerial utility — is attained more quickly. Oliver Williamson has
developed a managerial model in which size, and in particular, the
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size of managers' staffs, plays a more direct role. In his model
managers exhibit an expense preference, enlarging their staffs,
increasing managerial emoluments, and spending funds available for
discretionary investment in order to increase their own utility. In
the Williamson model managerial utility is expressed as a function of
the total expenditure on staff, total managerial emoluments, and dis-
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cretionary profit. Staff expenditure includes the salaries of
managerial personnel and expenditures on advertising and research and
development. Larger staffs create advancement opportunities and con-
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tribute to the security, status, and prestige of managers. Emolu-
ments represent that portion of managerial salaries and perquisites
that is discretionary in the sense that their removal would not cause
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managers to leave the firm to seek other employment. Discretionary
profit is the amount by which reported profit exceeds the required
(by the need for financial security) minimum and is the amount that
managers have available for spending on plant and equipment. Investment
expenditures, then, are determined by managerial, as well as by
economic, considerations. In contrast to the Marris model, where the
separation of ownership from control enables managers to pursue growth
at least partly at the expense of the firm's share value, the separation
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of ownership from control in the Williamson model manifests itself in
the ability of managers to exercise some degree of discretion over
the allocation of corporate income.
Williamson's model can be formulated as the following mathe-
matical programming problem:
maximize: U = U(S,M,tt,)
subject to: tt > tt + T
r — o
(116)
where U represents managerial utility, S is staff expenditures,
M is managerial emoluments, tt is reported profit, tt is the
exogenously-determined minimum acceptable level of after- tax profit,
and T is the amount of corporate profit taxes. Reported profit is
equal identically to total actual profit, it , less managerial
emoluments,
TT = TT - M . (117)
Letting t denote the exogenously-determined tax rate (assumed












and substituting T = t • tt and then (117) for tt
, (118) becomes
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TT = (1 - t) [TT - M] - TT . (119)do
Total profit, tt
,
is equal identically to total revenue minus
production cost minus staff expenditure, or in equation form,
tt = tt(Y,S) = R(Y,S) - C(Y) - S , (120)
where Y is output, R is total revenue expressed as a function of
output and staff expenditure, and C is production cost, which depends
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on the level of output. Substituting (120) for tt in (119)
gives
tt,(Y,S,M) = (1 - t)[R(Y,S) - C(Y) - S - M] - tt . (121)
a o
Substituting (121) for tt the objective function in the model (116)
becomes
:
maximize: U = U(S,M, (1-t) [R(Y,S) - C(Y) - S - M] - tt ) , (122)
{Y,S,M} °
where all quantities in (122) are measured in dollar units. Note that
the constraint in problem (116) may be rewritten as tt , >^ , that is,
discretionary profit must be nonnegative. But tt, is one of the
arguments of the managerial utility function. Since it is reasonable
to expect that, because discretionary profit contributes to managerial
utility, tt > at optimality, and hence, that the constraint in
problem (116) is satisfied, the model (116) can be reformulated
2 78
equivalently as the unconstrained optimization problem (122) . The











!" "(#-0 = ° (124)
|S + |2_ (1 . t) ( -i) = o (125)
a
The necessary conditions (123) - (125) for an optimal solution
to (122) can be used to characterize the single period equilibrium
position of the Williams on- type utility maximizing firm. Equation
(123) yields the familiar condition,
dR dc n ,^W " dY * (126)
In equilibrium, the Williams on- type firm equates marginal revenue
(with advertising held fixed) and marginal production cost. Given
the optimal level of advertising (i.e. staff) expenditure, equation
(126) implies that the firm will produce the profit-maximizing level
of output. From equation (124),
£R i 1 8U/8S ( .
3S




— is the marginal rate of substitution between discre-
dit/ dTT,
tionary profit and staff. In the traditional profit-maximizing firm,
the staff has no value in excess of that which is associated with its
productivity, so that this marginal rate of substitution is zero for
the short run profit maximizer and 3R/3S = 1 . But in the managerial
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firm, dU/dS > and dU/d7T > , so that 9R/9S < 1 in equation
(127) . Since the marginal cost of staff expenditure is just one
(since, by assumption, S is measured in dollars) equation (127)
implies that the managerial firm pushes staff expenditures beyond the
profit-maximizing level. How much beyond depends, of course, on the
tax rate t and on the marginal rate of substitution between staff
and discretionary profit. Note the similarity to the sales maximiza-
tion case, where in order to maximize sales (and managerial utility)
the firm carried advertising expenditure beyond the profit-maximizing
level. Here the motivation is different, but the effect is much the
same. Last, from equation (125)
§ - (1 - c > fr • (128)
d
With the constraint satisfied as an inequality (or at least with
9U/9TT, > 0) equation (128) implies that the firm will absorb some
portion of actual profit as emoluments (i.e. M > 0) . The optimal
levels of M and it, must satisfy the condition ^...^ = (1 - t) .
d dU/dTT,
d
The marginal rate of substitution between emoluments and discretionary
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profit must equal one minus the tax rate.
By defining staff expenditure to include managerial emoluments
(i.e. by subsuming M in S) , the Williamson model (122) can be
simplified to permit a geometric representation. With this new
definition of S , reported profit becomes identical to actual profit,
tt = 7T R(Y,S) - C(Y) - S (129)
r
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and discretionary profit becomes
7T, = (1-t) [R(Y,S) - C(Y) - S] - tt
a o
(130)
Note that with t and tt fixed, maximizing (130) is equivalent to
maximizing (129) . For any level of staff expenditure, S , maximizing
(130) with respect to Y leads to a point on the curve tt , - tt ,(S) in
a a
figure 11-19. The utility function to be maximized is U = U(S,tt ) .
In figure 11-19 managerial utility is maximized at the point (S*,tt *)
at which the indifference curve and the curve tt = tt,(S) are tangent,
and where the marginal rate of substitution between staff and dis-
cretionary profit just equals the marginal cost of additional staff
in terms of discretionary profit. In contrast, the profit-maximizing
firm would spend S on staff and earn tt discretionary profit in
figure 11-19, i.e. spending less on staff and earning greater profit





















Figure 11-19: Optimum for a Williams on- type




Figure 11-19 implies that the Williams on- type firm will reach
an output decision different from that of the short run profit maximizer.
The Williams on- type firm pushes staff expenditure (which includes adver-
tising) beyond the profit maximizing level, and if marginal returns to
advertising are always positive, then the Williams on-type firm can be
expected to produce more output than a profit maximizer. Therefore,
the Williamson-type firm is not merely a profit maximizer in which
managers exercise control over a share of the (maximum) profit, but
rather, is one in which managers increase staff and their own emoluments
to the detriment of profit.
The product market solution for the Williamson- type firm is
exhibited by figure 11-20. The firm produces output Q, at which
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marginal revenue equals marginal production cost. The firm charges
price P and reports (pre-tax) profit amounting to (P.. - C„) • Q ,
of which T (C~ - C-) • Q is paid as corporate profit tax,
it = (C, - C_) • Qt represents the minimum acceptable level of after-
o 4 -> -1-












Figure 11-20: Product Market Solution for




By way of summarizing the discussion thus far, the distinguish In;;
features of the Williamson- type managerial firm are set out in table
11-16.
'\ztlt. TI-16 Summary of O.E. Williamson Model
C 1 as 3











Type of Model :
Solution Technique:
managerial (see (122) in text)
maximize managerial utility expressed as a
function of staff, emoluments, and discretionary
profit (and in the simpler version discussed in
the text, with staff and emoluments combined
into a single variable)
minimum acceptable level of after- tax profit;
and implicitly, product demand and factor
supply conditions, and also implicitly, the
technological constraint embodied in the firm's
production function
minimum acceptable level of after-tax profit
(7T ) and the tax rate (t)
o
output (Y) , staff (S) , emoluments (M) , and
discretionary profit (IT,)
output (Y) , staff (S) , and emoluments (M)
subsumed
assumes certainty
characterization of single period equilibrium
position of the firm
single period
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization
The Williamson model has two important implications. First,
managers exercise considerable discretion as to how the surplus of
revenue over production cost will be spent and this has implications
for the efficiency with which resources are allocated within the firm.
Managers exercise their discretion by enlarging staffs, paying themselves
253
emoluments, and possibly even carrying out investment (paid for out
of discretionary profit) beyond the point at which each type of expen-
diture is most profitable in order to increase thereby their own utility.
The second implication is that, if the firm's profitability
were to fall, in order to continue to satisfy the minimum profit con-
straint various types of expenditure would have to be curtailed, and
possibly even discontinued altogether. Williamson provides the following
example of what can happen when profits fall sharply; in response to
a sharp fall in profit one firm reduced salaried employment company-
wide by 32 percent; cut headquarters staff by 41 percent, research and
development staff from 165 to 52, and personnel and public relations
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staff from 57 to seven; and reduced emoluments of all kinds. More-
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over, all of this occurred with production unchanged. This sort
of abrupt cost-cutting behavior is easily explained by Williamson's
model, but it is not well-explained by the profit-maximizing model.
While its implications are consistent with observations of the
behavior of actual firms, the Williamson model does have three limita-
tions. First, it subsumes the financial decisions of the firm. Though
the Williams on- type firm is held to value discretionary profit, which
is available for investment purposes, and though discretionary profit
could be linked to retained earnings and the minimum required level of
after-tax profit could be linked somehow to stock market-imposed
restrictions on the firm's choice of dividend policy, the question
regarding how the utility maximizing firm (of the Williamson-type)
should set its financial policies is not dealt with explicitly in the
model. Second, the minimum acceptable level of after- tax profit is
exogenous; the model fails to explain how this minimum acceptable
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level is determined. Third, the model does not relate discretionary
expenditures directly to the important managerial goals of growth and
security. These three criticisms are related. Presumably, tt is
o
determined, at least partly, by the demands of shareholders, which in
turn places restrictions on the firm's retention policies, and hence,
on the amount that can be spent on staff and emoluments and the amount
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left over as discretionary profit to be spent on plant and equipment.
Thus, while the Williamson model's treatment of discretionary expen-
ditures on staff, emoluments, and plant and equipment makes the model
a significant contribution to the literature on the theory of the firm, the
model's failure to incorporate financial considerations explicitly as a manage-
ment objective is, in the opinion of this writer, a serious limitation.
A. Summary of the Managerial Models
The managerial models of the firm reflect the effect the
separation of ownership from control is supposed to have had on the
goals of the modern corporate enterprise. According to the manager-
ialists, the firm no longer strives for maximum profit or for the
maximum value of the firm's shares, but rather, sacrifices some of its
maximum attainable profit for the sake of promoting sales, raising
the rate of growth, enlarging the staff, or increasing managerial
emoluments, each for the ultimate purpose of maximizing managerial
utility.
Though maximum profit is no longer the single most important
goal of the firm, the firm's profitability continues to play a critical
role in the managerial models as a constraint. Given the managerial
firm's objectives, it will attempt to find the most profitable output
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mix and the most profitable input mix that will enable it to attain
its objectives. Given the level of advertising for the Baumol-type
sales maximizer or the level of staff expenditure by the Williamson-
type utility maximizer, it was found that the firm would select the
level of output for which marginal revenue equals marginal (production)
cost. In addition, John Williamson has asserted that a value maximizer
and a growth maximizer would produce the same short term output, and




In the Marris model the behavior of the firm is not incon-
sistent with maximizing residual (i.e. after-tax and after-dividend)
net revenue (i.e. total revenue less total production cost), for such
behavior generates the maximum supply of funds available for growth-
promoting expenditure. For this reason, Peterson has suggested that
there is little practical difference between maximizing profits and
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maximizing growth. In the managerial models, then, though the firm
is not maximizing total profit, it is, in effect, trying to maximize
the amount of funds available to be spent at the discretion of manage-
ment on those things that most enhance managerial utility.
Given that firms behave as the managerial models describe,
an important question arises. What are the consequences of this sort
of behavior, i.e. can one expect to be able to distinguish empirically
between profit-maximizing behavior and managerial utility-maximizing
behavior? The Kuehn study cited earlier has lent support to the growth
2ftfi
maximization hypothesis. Kuehn' s conclusions, however, apply to
a restricted sample. More generally, Solow demonstrates that, at
the theoretical level at least, the effect of alternative motivations
on the firm's response to various external stimuli is to produce
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responses that differ in degree rather than in direction or kind:"
. . . growth-oriented and profit-oriented firms
would respond in qualitatively similar ways to
such stimuli as changes in factor prices, discount
rate, and excise and profit taxes. On the evidence
only of its behavior in that kind of situation, an
observer would find it hard to distinguish one kind
of firm from the other.
Even if non-profit maximizing behavior can be distinguished from
profit maximizing behavior, there still remains the question as to
how far the non-profit maximizer is deviating from profit maximizing
behavior, and because this would require either the determination of
what profit would have been had the firm maximized profit or else a
comparison of the relative profitability of the two types of firms,
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it might prove to be an impossible question to answer. Indeed,
there may be entrepreneurs who permit nonprofit considerations to
enter their decision-making and professional managers may be suffi-
ciently skilled and dedicated to their firms that they run their
organizations with greater efficiency than an entrepreneur would, with
the consequence that a cross-section analysis that distinguished owner-
controlled firms from manager-controlled firms might discern little
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or no difference in the profitability of the two types of firms.
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The empirical evidence accumulated thus far bears this out. Except
in some special cases, such as the takeover raiders in Kuehn's study,
testing the managerial models against the traditional models would
probably be very difficult.
This section has described the managerial models in which the
utility of the firm's managers is maximized. These models were con-
trasted with the traditional models in which the utility of the firm's
owners — measured as total profit for the entrepreneurial firm and as
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the share value for the corporation — is maximized. The next section
describes the behavioral theory of the firm in which there are various
social groups, each having its own goals, within the firm, but in
which no single group's goals are ascendant.
H. BEHAVIORAL MODELS
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Proponents of the behavioral theory of the firm argue that the
maximization models discussed earlier in this chapter offer little
help in explaining the behavior of real firms. The profit maximization
and value maximization models are criticized because, it is argued,
in a world of uncertainty maximands such as total profit or the present
value of the stream of future profits are very difficult to define in
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an empirically meaningful way. Models that assume a single all-
embracing goal — such as sales or growth maximization or the maximiza-
tion of managerial utility — are criticized by the behavioralists on
the grounds that the modern corporation is comprised of many social
groupings, such as top managers, middle managers, lower level managers,
professional staff, shareholders, etc., whose goals are likely to
conflict. Organizational goals are established through a continual
bargaining process that goes on within the firm among the various social
groupings, and as a result, are more likely to reflect a series of
compromises than the particular goal(s) of any single grouping and are
likely to change through time as the experience of the firm conditions
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the bargaining process. According to the behavioralists the com-
promises and trade offs that are made during the bargaining process,
together with the uncertainties inherent in the real world and the
often high cost of searching for information with which to reduce
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uncertainty, cause the firm to exhibit 'satisficing' rather than
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'maximizing' behavior. That is, the firm does not seek maximum
performance with respect to any single objective, e.g. by trying to
maximize total profit, but rather, seeks only satisfactory performance
with respect to each of the several goals established through the
internal bargaining process. As would be expected, this has led to a
debate over whether managers try to maximize or are content to satis-
fice. But rather than arguing over the nature and sources of managerial
motivation, the behavioralists suggest that economists develop a
better understanding of the managerial decision-making process within
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actual firms.
The behavioralists, and notably the works of Simon, Cyert and March,
and Cohen and Cyert, have drawn attention to the actual decision-making
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processes within firms. Relying on direct observations of actual
decision-making processes, the behavioralists have tried to develop a
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theory general enough to transcend the specific firms studied.
While their work has resulted in several interesting empirical studies
that have shown that at least in some firms some rather simple minded
rules of thumb, such as setting prices by applying a fixed mark-up to
the average variable cost of the item, are used with remarkable consis-
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tency, and while their models have been very successful in predicting
simple business decisions, such as future prices, on the basis of
299
these rules of thumb, the behavioral analysis has provided little
in the way of interesting analytical implications. It has failed
to explain either how the rules of thumb are determined or how they
will vary in response to changes in the values of economic variables
, ,u 4T. 301exogenous to the firm.
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1. The Cyert and March View of the Firm
The behavioral theory of the firm is viewed by its proponents
as a supplement to, rather than as a substitute for, the conventional
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theory of the firm. Whereas the traditional theory of the firm is
mainly concerned with the way in which the price system brings about
the allocation of resources among markets, the behavioral theory is
more concerned with the way in which resources are allocated within the
firm. Since the behavioral theory is designed to answer questions of
resource allocation different from those with which the traditional
theory is concerned, the assumption of profit maximization, which may
serve the traditional theory adequately, is neither necessary nor
sufficient for answering the questions about internal decision-making
and internal resource allocation with which the behavioral theory is
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concerned. Nevertheless, if the behavioral theory is intended as
a supplement to, rather than as a substitute for, the traditional
theory, there remains the problem of resolving the traditional and
behavioral theories into one broadly explanatory model with which the
interface between internal markets (e.g. for the allocation of money
capital within the firm) and external markets (e.g. product markets
and factor markets) can be studied.
The behavioral theory of the firm, according to Cyert and
March, requires the development of the following four major subtheories
(i) a theory of organizational goals that describes the process of
goal formation; (ii) a theory of organizational expectations that
explains the information-gathering behavior of organizations; (iii) a
theory of organizational choice that describes the process of selecting
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alternatives, comparing them, and deciding which one is best; and
(iv) a theory of organizational control that provides needed insight
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into the difference between decision-making and implementation.
Cyert and March conceive of the firm as a coalition, possibly
consisting of smaller subcoalitions whose members share common goals.
Members of the coalition, who may include workers, stockholders, and
customers as well as managers, are responsible for decisions regarding
the goals of the organization. Strictly speaking, the organization
as such cannot have goals. Only the individuals within the organiza-
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tion can have goals. The term 'organizational goals' refers, then,
to agreement among the members of the coalition as to what objectives
the organization should pursue. Cyert and March identify five organi-
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zational goals — a production goal, an inventory goal, a sales goal,
a market-share goal, and a profit goal — which are inconsistent in
the sense that optimizing with respect to one, say profit, precludes
optimizing with respect to some other, for example, sales. Members of
the coalition have different interests, and consequently, rank the five
goals differently. The 'final' set of goals of the organization is
307
the result of a bargaining process among members of the coalition.
All five goals are set at attainable levels (or at least it must be
expected that they are attainable in order that agreement among coali-
tion members be reached) and conflicts among members of the coalition
are resolved by various forms of 'side-payments', which may take the
form of either monetary payments or policy commitments, such as committing
more resources to new product development in order to appease the vice-
president of marketing who had set a higher sales goal than the coali-
tion was willing to grant. Members of the coalition are continually
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making demands on the coalition in accordance with their individual
interests, and this requires that the goals of the organization be
adapted continually. The demands are not mutually consistent, but
by handling the demands sequentially, the organization can remain
viable. This process of mutual accommodation has two important effects
(i) the goals of the organization are set at satisficing rather than
maximizing levels in order that all five goals be attainable, and
(ii) the goals change over time in response to the demands of
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different members of the coalition.
Provided sufficient resources are available with which to make
side-payments, the organization remains viable. Problems arise,
however, when the organization is unable to accommodate the demands
of its members. Since demands will adjust to actual payments, as
well as to alternatives external to the firm, it can be expected that
coalition demands, which are analogous to factor prices in the tradi-
tional theory, will equilibrate with payments in the long run. But
in the short run a disparity may exist between total resources and
total payments. Cyert and March term the difference between total
resources and total necessary payments 'organizational slack'. In
the traditional theory (at least in equilibrium) organizational slack
is zero. Slack refers to payments to members of the coalition in
excess of the minimum needed to keep them in the organization, as
for example, dividend payments in excess of what is needed to keep
shareholders loyal to the firm or executive compensation in excess of
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what is needed to keep them in the organization. When market con-
ditions are favorable slack becomes large, and when market conditions
worsen, slack tightens as the firm reduces payments to some members
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of the coalition and seeks ways to cut costs. Cyert and March do
not argue that firms create organizational slack intentionally. Rather.
they argue that it occurs naturally, and that it acts as a stabilizing
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factor for the organization over time. Of course, the existence of
slack also implies a less-than-optimal allocation of the firm's resources
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and a less-than-optimal long run rate of growth for the firm.
Cyert and March also describe how the firm's decisions evolve
over time and produce a simplified model with which they study the
key decision processes at work in a firm that has only three goals
(profit, production, and sales) and has to make decisions on price,
output, and sales effort in each time period. They simulated the
pricing decision in a department store and were able to predict to
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the penny the prices of 384 items out of the 414 in their sample.
In a later simulation model Cohen and Cyert produced equally impressive
results utilizing a duopoly model to explain output decisions for two
producers of metal cans.
The time path of the firm's decisions can be explained on the
basis of two types of models, the learning process model and the rule-
of- thumb model. The learning process model described by Cyert and
March is roughly the following. Suppose some change is under consid-
eration. Management will apply two tests of its worthiness: (i) will
it meet the firm's satisficing requirements (i.e. is it feasible)?
and (ii) is it likely to improve the overall position of the firm (i.e.
is it desirable)? If it passes both tests it will be implemented, and
if the firm later finds that its expectations were met, or possibly
even exceeded, then further changes of this type will be considered.
According to this iterative process, prices, output levels, advertising
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outlays, etc., are gradually adapted over time. Adjustments take place
through a trial and error process, rather than as the result of some
grand optimization scheme. However, as the goals of the organization
and conditions external to the organization are continually changing,
the adaptations proceed toward a moving target so that the progressive
adjustments do not necessarily converge to zero.







Vi" At = ^t-Vi^t-Vi^lWil • a>0 >
where A is total advertising expenditure and tt is total profit
in period t . According to the first equation in (131) , total profit
is a function of the current level of advertising expenditure, and
according to the second equation, the current change in advertising
outlays will have the same sign as the preceding change provided
total profit rose as a result, but will have the opposite sign if total
profit fell. Quantitatively, the absolute change in the level of
advertising expenditure each period is equal to a times the previous
period's absolute change in the level of total profit.
The second type of model used to describe the time path of
the firm's decisions, the rule-of-thumb model, is the subject of the
next subsection.
2. A Mark-Up Pricing Model
The modern corporate enterprise typically produces a great
315
variety of products that it sells in many different markets.
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Corporate managers have neither the time nor the money necessary
to make detailed pricing decisions that take into account all relevant
supply and demand conditions in each market. While the firm may have
only a few competitors in any one market, overall it is likely to have
a large number of competitors, and at least in theory, the potential
reactions of each should be considered when policy decisions are made.
Faced with this situation, the firm may find it convenient to rely
on conventional rules of behavior.
The behavioralists have shown that in many markets conventions,
or simple rules of thumb, that are known and accepted by all major
participants have developed. According to Baumol:
These rules of thumb do not work out too
badly. They translate hopelessly involved
problems into simple, orderly routines. They
save executive time and permit a degree of
centralized control over the firm's far flung
operations. By and large, they probably con-
tribute considerably to over-all operating
efficiency. Most executives appear to recognize
these rules for what they are — imperfect
expedients designed to cope, in a rough and
ready manner, with a difficult control and
decision problem.
The use of rules of thumb is also intended to reduce the adverse
effects of uncertainty, particularly the uncertainty surrounding the
reactions of the firm's rivals, and in so doing, to bring order into
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the market. To be workable these rules of thumb should satisfy
319
three requirements: (i) they must be easy to apply and based on
criteria Inown to all participants; (ii) they must be accepted by all
participants; and (iii) they must have some degree of flexibility so
that they can change when a fundamental change in the participants'
environment takes plane.
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One of the most common rules of thumb is the standard mark-up
policy, such as that used by retail shops. Cyert and March tested a
mark-up rule for department store pricing of standard items and found
that the simple rule 'divide each cost by 0.6 ... and move the result
to the nearest .95 ' predicted 188 out of 197 prices correct
320
to the penny. Baumol and Stewart retested the Cyert and March
model for a similar, though unrelated, department store in a different
city and found that the mark-up model applied, but that the mark-up
applied to most items had increased (from 40 percent to 45 percent)
321
over time in response to increasing costs. Though the Cyert and
March model exhibited remarkable accuracy in predicting prices, it
neither explains why the mark-up was originally set at 40 percent
nor gives any clues as to why or how the mark-up would change over
time
.
One way of determinng the mark-up, and at the same time showing
that mark-up pricing may be consistent with profit maximization, is the
322
following. Suppose that the average variable cost of production,
AVC , is constant and that the firm sets price, P , by applying a
standard proportional mark-up m to average variable cost. Then
P = m • AVC . (132)
Since average variable cost is constant, marginal cost, MC , and
average variable cost must be equal. To maximize total profit the
firm must equate marginal revenue and marginal cost. Letting Q
represent the level of output, this requires that
„r . JL(P.„) . P + Q^ . P(l +fig - P(l-i) (133)
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where n is the price elasticity of demand. But since MR = MC = AVC
,
substituting AVC for MR in (133) and solving for P yields
P = (^Tj) * AVC , (13 A)
which implies that the optimal mark-up in (132) is only a function of
323
the price elasticity of demand. From (134) it can be seen that the
mark-up will increase as demand becomes less price elastic (i.e. as
D falls) and that price will rise either as demand becomes less elastic
324
or as average variable cost increases. Such a model explains both
the size of the mark-up and how it would be expected to change over
325
time.
3. Evaluation of the Behavioral Models
The behavioral approach has been characterized as one that
strives for ' realism in process' , in contrast to the managerial approach
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that aims toward 'realism in motivation' . This represents a strength
and at the same time a weakness. The behavioral simulation models
emphasize the process of decision-making within actual firms, where
goals continually change and the firm undergoes a learning process
through which it continually adapts its goals and its behavior in light
of its experience. But in order that the theory be given sufficient
precision and sufficient generality that it can be useful for predic-
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tion on a wide scale, it must be given a good deal more content.
In order to use the behavioral models to study any single firm it is
necessary to know a great deal about that organization's responses to
different stimuli. The behavioral theories achieve realism but also
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give rise to certain ambiguities not present in the traditional and
managerial theories. Depending on the goals of the coalition members
and the nature of each organization's internal bargaining process, two
organizations may respond differently to the same stimuli under iden-
tical circumstances. To the behavioralists this variability in response
would undoubtedly be viewed as one of the strengths of their models,
but to an economist primarily interested in the predictive usefulness
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of models of the firm, it would just as likely be viewed as a weakness.
However, as long as the behavioral contributions are seen in the proper
light — as attempts to describe the decision-making processes within
firms and to deal with problems of resource allocation within firms,
rather than as an effort to supplant the traditional theories — their
significance is more easily appreciated.
Possibly an even more important outcome of their work has been
the recognition that a wide range of business decisions, which are not
critical to the organization's continued existence and for which suffi-
cient information with which to determine the profit maximizing course
of action may be lacking, are made on the basis of rules of thumb.
For example, for a company that sells thousands of items, the additional
profit that may result from more efficient pricing of any one item may
not justify the cost of gathering the needed information and carrying
out the required calculations. That is, there exist transactions
costs, as well as costs associated with the search process that precedes
transactions, that are a real part of the profit maximizing calculations,
but that are, in general, left out of the models of the firm. The
existence of such costs implies that the adoption of reasonable rules
268
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of thumb might be a rational course of action, and also, that the
firm could be expected to continue operating in this manner until
better information gathering or better analytical techniques become
.1 ui 330available.
In order to summarize the discussion of the behavioral models
themselves, the distinguishing features of these models are set out
in table 11-17.
Table 11-17 Summary of Behavioral Models
Class : behavioral
Discussion: In general, the behavioral models are intended as
a supplement to, rather than as a substitute for,
the conventional theory of the firm. The behavioral
models strive for 'realism in process', rather
than 'realism in motivation'. They attempt to
describe the decision-making processes within
actual firms.
In general, the behavioral models are non-optimization
simulation models that are designed to explain the
internal workings of the firm, rather than to
characterize some optimal set of operating policies.
The components of these models are, in general, of
the following two types:
- learning process models (see (131) in text) that
seek to explain the time path of a firm's
decisions in terms of an iterative process,
and
rule-of- thumb models (see (134) in text) that
seek to explain the time path of the firm's
decisions in terms of decision rules that may
be, in actual practice, optimally imperfect.
I. THE VICKERS MODEL AND THE ROLE OF FINANCE
In the models discussed thus far the problem of financing the
activities of the firm was given only a very superficial treatment.
In the traditional models discussed in sections B through E, the
financial decisions the firm must make were subsumed within the general
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equilibrium analysis of a market economy, and hence, were not treated
explicitly within any of the models. These traditional models were
concerned with production decisions almost exclusively. In the models
discussed in sections F and G, the role of finance was limited to the
long term financing of corporate growth, and, with the exception of
the Baumol and Marris growth maximization models, each model assumed
331that all investment funds were raised internally. While this treat-
ment was adequate given the assumptions of certainty and perfect capital
markets, the actual business environment does not conform with
these assumptions. For this reason, it is necessary to give the role
of finance more explicit consideration.
Before the role of finance can be discussed, it is necessary that
the distinction between financial capital and real capital be clearly
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made. Real capital, which consists of plant and equipment, land,
and inventories, is a factor of production. Financial capital, which
represents the generalized purchasing power with which real capital,
as well as labor services and raw materials, are purchased, is not.
Ideally, real capital should be measured in physical units. However,
since real capital is not homogeneous, attempts to aggregate different
quantities of capital into a single measure have led to conceptual as
well as practical difficulties. Traditionally, both real capital and
financial capital have been measured in dollar terms, though in the
case of the former, the dollar measure is, at best, a surrogate for
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the pure physical measure that is lacking. Unfortunately, because
both types of capital are measured in dollar terms, it is possible
to confuse them. It deserves to be emphasized that the two are differ-
ent, and that one denotes a physical quantity of productive resources,
2 70
while the other denotes a money measure of the firm's financial
resources. In the course of production the firm combines real capital
with amounts of the other productive resources to produce output. But
in order to command these factor services, the firm must first obtain
the necessary purchasing power, i.e. the necessary financing, through
either retained earnings or the issuance of financial securities
334(including notes issued to banks) . One of the important questions
with which this section deals is the relationship between the firm's
production decisions (including how much real capital the firm should
invest in) and its financial decisions (including how it should finance
the desired level of investment)
.
Until recently the theories of production and of finance had
335
"developed along remarkably independent paths." While the role
•jot ^^7
of finance was not ignored completely, in the words of Vickers:
The microeconomics literature, in addressing
itself to the theory of the firm, has been
preoccupied with a solution to the firm's
production, factor use, price, and output
problems, to the virtual exclusion of the
questions of capital investment and financing.
Neoclassical production models have not needed securities markets
because the assumption of profit maximization leads to a complete
characterization of the single period equilibrium position of the firm
when the firm's environment is certain and when capital markets are
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perfect, both of which the traditional theory assumes. The reason
for this is that, under the assumptions of certainty and perfect
capital markets, the production decisions and the financial decisions




at least in general equilibrium. Moreover, as discussed
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below, this separability remains even under uncertainty, provided
340
capital markets are complete. But as the next subsection describes
when markets are imperfect, say due to the existence of transactions
341
costs or taxes, or when uncertainty is present (and markets are
342incomplete), ' the firm's production decisions and its financial
decisions are no longer separable, and it becomes necessary to consider
the role of finance explicitly in modeling the firm's production
decisions.
Just as the traditional models of the firm did not treat the role
of finance explicitly, so the pathbreaking models of financial equili-
343brium due to Sharpe, Lintner, and Mossin, which contributed signi-
ficantly to a better understanding of the workings of capital asset
markets and investors' selections of optimal portfolios of risky assets,
took the firms' production decisions as given and therefore had nothing
to say concerning the relationship between the firms' production deci-
sions and stock market equilibrium. It was not until some years later
that Diamond and others began to examine the firm's production
344decisions in the context of stock market equilibrium.
There were some earlier attempts, however, to build partial
equilibrium models that linked the investment and financing decisions
of the firm. Some of the earliest were the dividend capitalization models
345
due to Gordon and Shapiro and Walter. The various decision rules
that emerged from these early models tended to be contradictory in
that the different models would often imply different decisions under
346identical sets of conditions, which Senchack attributes to the
varying mixtures of stringent assumptions concerning modes of financing,
347
the time structure of market discount rates, and so on.
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More recent efforts have been directed toward relaxing some of
these restrictive assumptions. Lerner and Carleton modified the
Gordon growth model and developed a sophisticated model that integrates
348
the firm's investment and financing decisions. Their equity valuation
model takes into consideration product-, factor-, and financial-market
constraints as well as investor expectations regarding the firm's rate
of return and retention ratio. Davis extended the Lerner-Carleton
comparative statics (i.e. single period) framework to a multiperiod
framework by formulating his model as an optimal control problem in
which the objective function expressed the share value as a function
of the discounted flow of dividends (as in the Gordon model) and in
which there were two constraints (in the form of differential equations)
,
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one on market price valuation and the other on capital expansion.
Subsequently Krouse adopted a control-theoretic approach to develop a
model permitting market imperfections (in particular, transactions
costs on new equity issues) and a time-varying market rate of discount.
Krouse 's model excluded debt financing, and Senchack later generalized
351
on Krouse 's results by permitting debt financing.
In view of the extensive efforts made toward incorporating finan-
cial considerations into models of the firm, it should be apparent
that the firm's production and financial decisions are related. Yet,
in view of the debate that went on for many years (and that does not
appear to this writer to have been resolved completely) it is worth
pausing to explore those conditions under which the firm's financial
policy may be considered independent of its operating decisions.
Following that discussion two models of the firm that give finance an
important role to play will be presented.
350
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1. Does the Firm's Financial Policy Really Matter?
According to the traditional view of capital structure and
market valuation in the finance literature, there exists for each firm
an optimal capital structure — mix of debt and equity — that simultan-
352
eously minimizes the firm's cost of capital and maximizes the market
353
value of the firm. At the opposite extreme lies the Modigliani
and Miller view, according to which the firm's cost of capital and
total market value are independent of the firm's capital structure.
According to the traditional view expressed in the finance literature,
the market value of the firm is a function of both its investment policy
and its financial policy, whereas the Modigliani and Miller view main-




The traditional financial argument regarding the firm's capital
structure is essentially the following. As debt is first introduced
into the firm's capital structure, the overall cost of capital decreases
357
and the market value of the firm increases. This is due to the fact
that bond interest payments are tax deductible whereas dividend payments
are not, which has the effect of reducing the firm's cost of raising
capital as the proportion of debt increases. As the proportion of debt
is steadily increased, however, the firm's fixed interest obligations,
which must be met out of profits, increase. Since the firm must satisfy
these obligations or else go bankrupt, the increasing proportion of
debt causes the firm's risk of bankruptcy to increase. Eventually
the effect of the increased risk of bankruptcy will outweigh the effect
of the tax advantages associated with debt issuance and will cause the
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firm's market value to fall and its cost of capital to rise. In between
there lies a range of values for the proportion of debt in the firm's
capital structure within which the cost of capital is minimized and
358
the market value of the firm is maximized. The traditional financial
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Figure 11-21: The Firm's Optimum
Capital Structure (s)
Modigliani and Miller argue that both curves in figure 11-21
are horizontal, given the firm's investment policy and provided
that capital markets are perfect. They argue that "the type of
instrument used to finance an investment is irrelevant to the question
of whether or not the investment is worthwhile." That is, they




Modigliani's and Miller's conclusion that the firm's debt-equity
mix is indeterminate even under uncertainty requires that assumptions
in addition to the perfect markets assumption be made. In their
original analysis Modigliani and Miller assumed a zero default risk,
so that all bonds were riskless assets and perfect substitutes for one
another. Mossin and Baron have shown that the market value of the
firm remains independent of the firm's capital structure even when




but Baron's paper and the earlier work of
Hirshleifer indicate that this requires the existence of a set of
complete markets for contingent claims and the absence of any
bankruptcy penalties, such as the legal costs of liquidating the firm
and the opportunity cost of investors' capital tied up in the firm
during the liquidation process.
The significance of perfect and complete markets is that each
individual can create return opportunities equivalent to those that
can be created by a firm as it alters its capital structure. By
selecting its investment policy so as to maximize the equilibrium
market value of its outstanding securities, the firm is maximizing
each individual investor's wealth. Given a set of securities and a
set of (equilibrium) prices for those securities, the existence of
complete capital markets ensures that the firm will, by maximizing
its (equilibrium) market value, also enable each individual investor
to achieve the widest possible range of investment opportunities.
Since the existence of perfect capital markets permits each individual,
by definition, to borrow or lend at the prevailing interest rate (and
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the same interest rate at which firms can borrow or lend) , the exis-
tence of perfect and complete capital markets permits each individual
to achieve his most desired pattern of returns independent of the firm's
choice of capital structure. In such a world debt and equity become
merely alternative ways of channeling ownership claims to income
streams for investors, and the market value of the firm depends only
369
on the total income stream and not on how it is channeled.
Having recognized that the indeterminancy of the firm's debt-
equity ratio depends on the existence of perfect and complete markets,
it becomes easier to reconcile Modigliani's and Miller's claim that,
given the firm's investment policy, its capital structure is irrele-
vant with the recently expressed fears that in American industry "debt
has grown excessively in relation to equity ... and as capital, it is
370
absolutely inferior;" that only recently have equities markets
371
appeared receptive to new issues; and that "there is a tiny group
of companies that can raise new equity capital, a larger group that
can raise debt capital, and a very large group that cannot raise any
372
capital at all." In the real world markets are imperfect and
373incomplete. Thus, the firm s capital structure is not irrelevant
and in general "the cost to a firm of obtaining capital is a function
374
of its capital structure."
A second aspect of the firm's financial policy is its dividend
policy. Modigliani and Miller showed that in a world of perfect
capital markets the market value of the firm's equity is independent
375
of the firm's dividend policy. As in their earlier result con-
cerning the indeterminancy of the debt-equity mix, the firm's operating
o -ic.
policies are given and the result holds even under uncertainty.
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The irrelevance of the firm's dividend policy is easily
377demonstrated. The remainder of this subsection develops a discrete
time valuation model and uses the model to demonstrate the irrelevance
of the firm's dividend policy when the future is known with certainty
378




dividends paid per share in period t
p(t) price of a share (ex any dividend from the previous
period) at the start of period t
p(t) market rate of interest during period t
n(t) number of shares outstanding at the beginning of
period t
m(t+l) : number of new shares issued during the period
(sold without dividend at the closing price
P(t+1))
V(t) : market value of the firm
D(t): total dividends paid to shareholders of record
during period t.
Note that from the above definitions the following identities hold:
V(t) = n(t) • p(t) D(t) = n(t) • d(t)
(135)
n(t+l) = n(t) + m(t+l)
The assumptions of certainty and perfect capital markets imply that
the following equation must hold when the capital markets are in
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equilibrium:




or equivalently , that
p(t) =
i + p( t )
[d(t) + P (t+1)]
'
< 137 >
Equation (136) has the following interpretation. In equilibrium in a
world characterized by certainty and perfect capital markets, the
yields on all securities must be identical and equal to the riskless
rate of interest, p (t) . The left-hand side of (136) is interpreted
as the yield on each equity share expressed as the sum of the dividend
yield, , { , and the percentage increase in share value (i.e.
percentage capital gain) , * j—f . Equation (137) expresses
the same equilibrium condition as (136) . The interpretation of (137)
is that the share price at the beginning of each period must, in
equilibrium, equal the discounted value of the sum of dividends paid
during the period and the share price at the end of the period.
Multiplying each side of (137) by n(t) and simplifying by
using (135) yields
V(t) -
1 + ^ (t)
[D(t) +n(t) p(t+l)]
1 + P(t)
[D(t) +V(t+1) -m(t+l) p(t+l)] . (138)
Equation (137) is one way of characterizing the equilibrium price of
each share. Equation (138) is the analogous characterization for the
equilibrium stock market value of the firm, i.e. for the aggregate
stock market value of all shares outstanding. The interpretation of
(138) is that the stock market value of the firm at the beginning of
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each period must, in equilibrium, equal the discounted value of the
sum of net dividends (i.e. total dividends paid, D(t)
,
less receipts
from new share issues, m(t+l) • p(t+l)) and the stock market value
of the firm at the end of the period.
Equation (138) implies that the firm's dividend decision
affects the current market value of its equity, V(t) (and its current
share price, p(t)) in two conflicting ways: directly via D(t) and
380indirectly via -m(t+l) p(t+l) . In a certain world in which capital
markets are perfect these effects cancel each other out. To see this,
note that if the firm's operating policies are given, so that the
level of investment, I(t)
,
and the current period's net income,
X(t)
,
are to remain constant, then a higher dividend payout is possible
only if the amount of new capital raised from external sources is
increased by just enough to facilitate the increase in D(t) while
I(t) and X(t) are held constant, i.e. the dividend payment is
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financed from outside the firm (by new share sale or new borrowing)
.
The amount of outside capital needed by the firm is
m(t+l) p(t+l) = I(t) - [X(t) - D(t)] , (139)
and substituting (139) into (138) and canceling D(t) gives
V(t) =
x + p (t)
[X(t) - I(t) + V(t+1)] . (140)
Equation (140) reexpresses the characterization (138) of the equilibrium
stock market value of the firm. The interpretation of (140) is that
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the stock market value of the firm at the beginning of each period
must, in equilibrium, equal the discounted sum of net dividends (in
this case expressed as net income less investment) and the stock
382
market value of the firm at the end of the period. Since D(t)
does not appear in (140) and since X(t) , I(t) , and V(t+1) are
all independent of D(t)
,
it follows that the current market value
of the firm is independent of the current dividend decision. By pro-
ceeding in a similar fashion and showing that V(t+1) is independent
of D(t+1)
,
V(t+2) is independent of D(t+2) , and so on, it can
be shown that V(t) is unaffected by the firm's (current and future)
dividend policy.
This proposition on the irrelevance of dividend policy seems
counterintuitive. But the apparent paradox arises from the tendency
to overlook the important qualification 'given a firm's operating
policies . While it might seem reasonable that an additional cash
receipt would always be welcomed, if the firm's operating policies are
truly fixed, then this increased payout requires that additional funds
be raised externally — by selling new shares and thereby reducing the
share of future dividends that will be paid to current shareholders.
In terms of equations (138) and (139), the fundamental principle of
valuation assures that the effect on V(t) of an increased dividend
payout is exactly counterbalanced by the effect of a decrease in capital
gains. What the irrelevance proposition is really saying, then, is
383
that when capital markets are perfect dividend decisions are
O Q A
independent of investment decisions, so that the firm's investment
385
decisions are not contingent upon its dividend decisions. There are
no financial illusions; values are determined by the firm's operating
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policies and not by how the firm chooses to 'package' its returns for
distribution to its shareholders.
Given the strong assumptions on which the irrelevance proposi-
tion rests, it should not be surprising that a number of arguments
have been put forward and some empirical evidence has been gathered
that contradicts the proposition. In an uncertain world it also seems
reasonable that shareholders will generally prefer current dividends
387
to future, less certain, capital gains. There is also some empiri-
cal evidence to support the argument that, due to market imperfections,
retained earnings are a cheaper source of investment funds than new
issues, and that as a result, dividend policy is affected by investment
policy (which determines the residual funds available for distribution
388
as dividends). There is also evidence that, at least over the short
389
run, firms work to target dividend payout ratios. Not only would
this give dividend payments a high 'informational content' for both
current and potential shareholders, but, to the extent that dividends
and investments compete for the relatively limited supply of internal
funds, it would also cause investment decisions to be affected by divi-
dend decisions (which determine the proportion of internal funds
390
available for investment). Hence, there is good reason to believe
391
that the firm's dividend policy is not irrelevant. Yet Fama has
recently offered empirical evidence that is strongly supportive of
Miller and Modigliani, implying that whatever market imperfections
exist in the real world are insufficient to invalidate the proposition
392
that dividend policy is irrelevant.
By way of summary, the conditions required for the firm's
financial policies — its mix of debt and equity and its dividend
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decisions — to be irrelevant are not strictly satisfied in the real
world corporate environment. While there does exist some empirical
justification for assuming that the firm's production and investment
policies are separable from its financial policies, this evidence is
not conclusive. It is the opinion of this writer that a meaningful
model of the firm should allow for the interaction of the firm's
operating and financial policies.
2. The Vickers Model
Douglas Vickers has developed a single period model of the
firm that integrates the firm's production, investment, and financing
39 3decisions. Vickers deals with uncertainty by incorporating risk-
adjusted interest rates and risk-adjusted capitalization rates. Risk
394
is of two types: business risk and financial risk. To simplify the
395
analysis Vickers holds business risk fixed, but as Turnovsky and
Arzac have since shown, allowing business risk to vary does not
396 39 7
materially affect Vickers 's conclusions. '
Unlike the models discussed earlier in this chapter, the
Vickers model takes into account the existence of risk, or synonomous ly
,
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uncertainty. There are two major frameworks available for incor-
porating uncertainty in a model of the firm: the mean-variance framework
399
and the time-state-preference framework. Vickers employs the mean-
variance framework, as does Lintner, whose models are discussed in the
next section of this chapter. Briefly, within the mean-variance
framework, 'the' decision-maker (e.g. the firm's managers or its
shareholders) has two objects of choice: expected returns, as measured
by the mathematical expectation or some other statistical measure of
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the central tendency of returns, and risk, as measured by the variance,
the coefficient of variation, or some other statistical measure of
the dispersion of returns, where, by assumption, the returns (e.g. net
income) are not known with certainty but their probability distribution
is (known with certainty)
. In using the coefficient of variation of
net income as a surrogate for financial risk, Vickers is implicitly
adopting the mean-variance framework. The second framework for incor-
porating uncertainty is described and several models of the firm that
employ that framework are discussed below in section K. As pointed
out in that section, the mean-variance approach is really just a
special case of the time-state-preference approach to modeling the
firm under uncertainty.
Vickers developed his model of the firm in two stages: first
specifying a profit maximization model and then generalizing to a
401
value maximization model. The profit maximization model is the
following:
maximize: tt = p(Q) .f (X ,X ) - w X - w X - r(D) -D
(X., X2 , D}
12 112 2
1 (141)
subject to: g(Q) + aX + $X < E + D
where tt is net income, which is to be maximized, p(Q) expresses
price as a function of quantity demanded (i.e. the inverse of the
demand function), Q = f(X ,X2 ) is output, X^^ is a current factor
of production (e.g. labor) with constant unit cost w , X2 is a
noncurrent factor of production (e.g. real capital) with constant
(direct) unit cost vr
?
that reflects depreciation, obsolescence, and
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scarcity rent but does not include interest charges, r is the
404
average rate of interest on debt capital, which is an increasing
tunction of the debt level, D is the debt level, E is the amount
of equity which is assumed constant, g(Q) expresses net working
capital as a function of the output level, and a and 3 are the
money capital requirement coefficients of the current and noncurrent
405factors or production, respectively. The constraint in problem (141)
expresses the money capital constraint. The money capital requirement
is expressed by g^Q) + otX + (3X,> and money capital availability is
the sum of equity capital and debt capital, E + D . The constraint
is an inequality, implying that requirements cannot exceed availability.
Assuming prudent cash management on the part of the firm, requirements
just balance money capital availability, the constraint becomes an
equality, and the method of Lagrange multipliers can be used to obtain
a characterization of the single period equilibrium position of the
individual firm.
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to (141)
are the following:
_i = m(q) . f|- - wx - Xg'(Q) • |f- - Xa . (142)
j+ = MR(Q) . ||- _ w 2 - Xg»(Q) • ||- - XB - (143)
_^ = -t§ D+r(D)] + X - (144)
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where MR(Q) = p» (Q) -f (X1>X2 ) + p(Q) is marginal revenue. From
equation (144)
X =
-^ D + r(D) . (145)
At the optimum the introduction of debt capital into the firm's capital
structure will have been carried to the point at which the marginal
cost of debt capital, — D + r(D)
,
just equals the marginal contri-
bution of debt capital to net operating income, or equivalently , to
the point at which the marginal contribution of debt capital to net
408income is zero.
The Lagrange multiplier X gives the implicit price of money
409
capital (in terms of net operating income). In view of this,














+ 6] = ° (147)
where the left-hand side of each equation can be interpreted as the
factor of production's marginal revenue product and the right-hand
side can be interpreted as the factor's adjusted marginal cost, which
is equal to the price of the factor plus the additional money capital
required times its implicit price. Thus, it follows from (146) and
(147) that, when the firm is in equilibrium, the marginal revenue product
of each factor will exceed the factor's marginal cost by an amount just
286
equal to the imputed marginal cost of the additional money capital
A 10
required to employ that factor. Solving equation (142) for 8f/3X.
and equation (143) for 8f/9x
?
and then dividing yields the following
expression for the marginal rate of technical substitution between
the inputs when the firm is in equilibrium:
dX 3f/3X w + Aa
ms
" -^ " 3f7HT
= tpn» ' (148)
which is similar to the expression for the marginal rate of technical
411
substitution in the (conventional) neoclassical model, except that
in (148) the marginal cost of each factor is adjusted upward by the
imputed marginal cost of the direct money capital requirement for
that factor. Equation (148) can be interpreted as the requirement that,
when the firm is in equilibrium, the marginal rate of technical sub-
stitution between the factors must equal the ratio of the adjusted
marginal costs of the factors. It follows from (148) that when
— ^ — and A ^ , the money capital constraint causes the ratio
P ^o
of adjusted factor prices to differ from the ratio of unadjusted
412factor prices, thereby altering the firm's expansion path.
Next, the product market equilibrium condition can be compared
with the familiar (conventional) MR = MC rule for profit maximization.
Solving equations (142) and (143) for marginal revenue gives
m *> ' (whq> +x[ 8' (q) + m%] (149)
w
MR(Q) = U./L ) +A [g'(Q) + ,.L, ] (150)(W^ x t 377^]
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where the term in parentheses on the right-hand side of each equation
expresses marginal cost in the conventional sense. The expression in
brackets in each equation expresses the additional amount of money
capital needed to produce an additional unit of output. Hence, equa-
tions (149) and (150) state that, when the firm is in equilibrium,
marginal revenue will exceed marginal production cost (i.e. the marginal
cost of the factors of production used in producing the last unit of
output) by an amount just equal to the imputed cost of the money
capital required.
The product market solution for the Vickers model is represented
in figure 11-22. The traditional solution is price p and output
Q where marginal revenue equals marginal production cost (i.e. marginal




















Figure 11-22: Product Market Solution for the Vickers Model
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The constrained solution is price p. and output Q where marginal
revenue equals marginal cost (inclusive of the imputed marginal cost
of money capital) . Note that the constraint on money capital (and
in particular, on equity capital) has the effect of reducing the scale
of output from Q to Q. (and correspondingly of raising the price
413
of the good from p to p.). Putting this result together with
equation (148) above, it follows that the money capital constraint
affects both the scale of output and the expansion path.
To summarize the discussion of Vickers's profit maximization
model, the main features of the model are presented in table 11-18.
















Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (141) in text)
maximize total profit
technological (embodied in the production
function) and financial (the money capital
constraint) ; implicitly, product demand
conditions, the average rate of interest on
debt capital expressed as a function of the
debt level, and the net working capital requirement
direct factor costs (w and w„) , money capital
requirement coefficients (a and 3) , and the
amount of equity (E)
total profit (tt) , output (Q) , price (p) , input
levels (X. and X~) , debt level (D) , average
interest rate on debt (r) , and total money
capital requirement (g(Q) + ax. + $X )
input levels (X. and X^) and debt level (D)
external finance (debt only) permitted (amount of
equity held fixed)
uncertainty allowed for (mean-variance framework)
characterization of the equilibrium position of
the firm
single period
static optimization (mathematical programming problem)
classical Lagrange multipliers
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To generalize the profit maximization model to a value maximiza-
tion model — in which the capitalized value of the net income stream
being generated for the owners is the quantity to be maximized — the
expression for net income, it in (141) , is divided by the owners'
capitalization rate, p(D)
,
which, for a given amount of equity, will
414be an increasing function of the amount of debt. Letting V
represent the market value of the firm's shares (expressed as the
capitalized value of the net income stream) the Vickers model becomes
the following:
maximize: V = —^ [p(Q) -f (X. ,Xj - w X - w_X_ - r(D) -D]
{X.,X
2
,D} P(D) 1 2 * 1 2 2
(151)
subject to: g(Q) + aX + $X < E + D
where the constraint is the same as before. Note that, since only one
period's net income appears in the objective function in (151) , the
model is still a single period model. Though value maximization is
not, in general, equivalent to profit maximization in (151), the trade
off that exists between profits and market valuation is atemporal,
rather than intertemporal, in nature. The difference between the models
(141) and (151) is that, in general, the debt level affects both
numerator and denominator in (151) , so that the firm may stop short
of profit maximization if further increases in the debt level raise
the owners' capitalization rate, p(D)
,
proportionately more than net
income, it
,
and thereby cause the market value of the firm's shares,
V , to fall. Thus, in the Vickers model profit maximization and value
maximization are not equivalent (unless p is a constant)
.
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The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to problem
415
(151) are the following:
,L
A1£r - m imq) fi " Ki] " AV<Q) Mr <152)
8^- - m w* ' w; - w 2] - *'••<« % - ** - ° (153)
9V _ tt dp_ _ 1 . dr ,. ,
3D "
"[p(D)] 2 * P (D > IdD
'
-^Ftv t + f D+r(D) l +A ' = ° <154)
From equation (154)
tm IV t + i D + r(D)1 • (155)
which is analogous to (145). The Lagrange multiplier A' measures
416
the marginal value of money capital. Equation (155) requires that,
when the firm is in equilibrium, the marginal contribution of debt
capital to capitalized net operating income must equal the capitalized
value of its marginal cost, which in turn equals the capitalized value
of the marginal interest cost, —rrr- [— D + r(D) ] , plus an amount&
' p(D) l dD J r
l do
—
^ just sufficient to take account of the induced increase in
p(D) dD
the debt capitalization rate, p(D)
,
and the consequent fall in the
market value of the firm's shares.
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Next consider equations (152) and (153) , which can be
rewritten as
w
jk ttffi«» If' " ^k + A ' [g ' (Q> % + al (156)
m [MR(Q) %] - m + v tg,(Q) % + ei • (157»
Equations (156) and (157) are interpreted as requiring that, when the
firm is in equilibrium, the capitalized value of the marginal revenue
product of each factor (the expressions on the left-hand side of (156)
and (157)) must equal the capitalized value of that factor's marginal
cost, w./p(D)
,
plus the imputed marginal cost of the money capital
required, A' [g'(Q) |f- + a] .
i
Equations (152) and (153) together yield an expression for the
marginal rate of technical substitution when the firm is in equilibrium.
Solving equation (152) for 9f/8X and equation (153) for 3f/8X
2
and dividing the former by the latter gives
w
dX 8f/8X — + X'am
-




which is analogous to (148) . Equation (158) is interpreted as requiring
that, when the firm is in equilibrium, the marginal rate of technical
substitution must equal the ratio of the capitalized value of the
direct factor cost w /p of the first factor adjusted upward by the
imputed marginal cost of its direct money capital requirement, A'a ,
to the capitalized value of the direct factor cost plus the imputed
417
marginal cost of money capital for the second factor.
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In order to summarize the discussion of Vickers's value
maximization model of the firm, the distinguishing features of the
model are presented in table 11-19.















Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (151) in text)
maximize the stock market value of the firm
(expressed in terms of one period's net income)
technological (embodied in the production
function) and financial (the money capital
constraint) ; implicitly, product demand condi-
tions, the average rate of interest on debt
capital and the owners' capitalization rate
each expressed as a function of the debt level,
and the net working capital requirement
direct factor costs (w.. and w„) , money capital
requirement coefficients (a ana 3) , and the
amounts of equity (E)
stock market value (y) , output (Q) , price (p)
,
input levels (X, and X«) , debt level (D) ,
average interest rate on debt (r) , owners'
capitalization rate (p) , and total money capital
requirement (g(Q) + al + $X.)
input levels (X. and X ) and debt level (D)
external finance (debt only) permitted (amount
of equity held fixed)
uncertainty allowed for (mean-variance framework)
characterization of the equilibrium position of
the firm
single period
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
classical Lagrange multipliers
The Vickers model is noteworthy for its integration
of financial considerations into a model of the firm.
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In both of the models of the firm, (141) and (151), finance,
and in particular the money capital constraint, played an important
role. In each case the optimal solution to the mathematical programming
problem represented a simultaneous solution of the firm's production
and financing problems and led to a characterization of the single
period equilibrium position of the firm in which factor costs and the
marginal cost of output were adjusted for the implicit cost of money
capital.
One limitation of the Vickers model is its single period
nature. Though the discounting by p(D) in (151) might lead one to
believe that Vickers's value maximization model is a multiperiod model,
the complete absence of any intemporal profit trade offs and the
appearance of only a single period's net income in the numerator of
the valuation formula imply that the firm's behavior each period is
being modeled as being independent of its behavior in every other
period. Moreover, if one views Vickers's valuation formula as the
formula for the present value of a perpetual annuity paying tt per
period when the discount rate p remains constant forever, then, in
order for this valuation formula to hold, every period must be indis-
tinguishable from every other period when judged from the standpoint
of the firm and its behavior. Hence, both the profit maximization
and the value maximization versions of the model are of the single
period variety. The next subsection describes a model that not only
incorporates finance, but that also allows for the growth of the firm.
3. The Herendeen Model
418
This subsection describes a model devised by James B. Herendeen.
In the Herendeen model the firm maximizes its rate of growth of total
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assets subject to a valuation constraint on permissible rates of growth.
In this regard it is in the spirit of the Marris growth model discussed
above in section G. But unlike the Marris model, in which all invest-
ment was financed internally and in which the role of the firm's
financial policy was consequently suppressed, the Herendeen model gives
external finance a prominent role to play. One of the firm's decision
variables is the leverage ratio, which is the ratio of debt to equity,
and the leverage ratio influences both the average interest rate on
debt and the owners' capitalization rate. In this regard the Herendeen
model is similar to the Vickers model. But unlike the Vickers model,
in which the market value of the firm's shares was maximized, the
Herendeen model assumes growth maximization and incorporates the market
value of the firm's shares in the valuation ratio that appears in the
model's constraint equation.
The development of the Herendeen model begins with a statement
of some basic accounting identities. To appreciate better what follows
the reader might find it helpful to refer to the typical firm's balance
sheet illustrated in table II-l and the typical firm's income statement
illustrated in table II-2. Define the following variables: E is the
book value of equity, D is the book value of total debt, A is the
A 19 420book value of total assets, tt is net income, L = D/E is
421
the leverage ratio, i = i(L) is the average rate of interest on
422 423borrowed funds, p = p(L) is the owners' capitalization rate,
e = tt/E is the rate of return on equity, p = — is the rate of
return on total assets (before deducting interest on indebtedness)
,
and g is the rate of growth of total assets
.
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2Herendeen assumes that — > and —= > for all L and
i dp _ , d p „that -±- > and —~- > at least in some interval containing the
*- 424
equilibrium leverage ratio. One possible interpretation that can be
given this set of assumptions concerning the signs of the first and
second derivatives of i(L) and p(L) is that the level of risk borne
by the firm increases as its leverage ratio, L
,
increases, thereby
causing i and p to increase (at an increasing rate) . Herendeen
425
confines his consideration of risk to a single footnote, though in
light of the footnote and his assumptions concerning the derivatives
of i(L) and p(L) it would seem that he is subsuming the effects of
uncertainty within the functional forms of i(L) and p(L) . Since




and the first and second
derivatives of each are known with certainty, his model is, in effect,
a model of the firm under certainty.
Continuing the development of the Herendeen model, net income
is equal to gross profit minus interest payments, or in equation form,
Ee = pA - iD . Dividing each side of this equation by E gives
e = (pA - iD)/E . (159)
From the basic accounting identity that states that the book value
of assets equals the book value of total debt plus the book value of
A D + E
equity, A = D + E , it follows that — = —-— = L + 1 , and upon
substitution into equation (159) , this leads to the identity
e = (L + l)p - i(L)-L = L(p) - i(L)) + p , (160)
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which states that the rate of return on equity is equal to the rate
of return on assets plus the leverage ratio multiplied by the differ-
ence between the rate of return on assets and the interest rate on
debt.
If all net income is reinvested, if the firm maintains a con-
stant leverage ratio, and if the rate of return on assets remains
constant, then the rate of growth of total assets will equal the rate
427
of return on equity, or g = e . However, this abstracts from the
firm's dividend policy (assuming the firm pays no dividends as was
done above is tantamount to assuming the absence of any dividend policy
whatsoever), the possibility of new equity issues, and corporate
taxes. Next, these three factors are taken into account. Define the
following variables: tt is net retained current earnings, K is net
A28
dividend payments, k = K/E is the ratio of net dividends to the
book value of equity, t is the corporate tax rate (assumed constant),
and e = it /E is the ratio of net retained current earnings to equity.
Net retained current earnings is equal to net income less net dividend
payments and corporate taxes paid, or in equation form, it = eE - kE - teE
,
and dividing through by E gives e =(l-t)e-k. If all retained
earnings are reinvested and if L and p remain constant, then
429
g = e , so that g may now be expressed in terms of the following
identity:
g = (1 - t)e - k , (161)
which states that the rate of growth of total assets is equal to the
rate of return on equity multiplied by one minus the tax rate less the
ratio of net dividends to the book value of equity.
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One further modification of the expression for the growth rate
of total assets is needed. Equation (161) abstracts from the costs of
maintaining the constant rate of return on assets, p , as the firm
grows. In order to maintain any particular growth rate, g , the
firm incurs real costs of growth in the form of (i) research and devel-
opment costs intended to improve existing products and to develop new
products, (ii) advertising expenditures and price reductions intended
to increase sales of existing products, (iii) the cost of locating and
developing new markets, and (iv) the cost of bringing new people into
430
the organization. Herendeen argues that, in general, these real
costs of growth would tend to depress p , and the faster the firm
tried to grow, the faster these costs would tend to increase, and the
431
greater would be the downward pressure on p . Following Herendeen,
it is assumed that the real costs of growth are proportional to net
432income after taxes and dividends. Letting B denote the total real
costs of growth and b= B/[(l-t)TT -K ] denote the ratio of the real
costs of growth to retained earnings (i.e. net income after taxes less
dividends), 433 it follows from tt = eE and K = kE that b[(l-t)e-k] = B/E ,
the ratio of real growth costs to equity. Since the real costs of
growth must be subtracted from net retained current earnings in order
to determine the change in the firm's equity when the firm's profita-
bility p is to be maintained, it follows that b[(l-t)e-k] must be
subtracted from equation (161) . The growth rate of total assets is
434
given by the following identity:
g = (1- t)e-k-b[(l- t)e-k] = (l-b)[(l- t)e-k] . (162)
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Substituting expression (160) for e into equation (162) gives
g = (1-b) [ (1- t){(L+l)p - i(L) -L) - k] . (163)
Equation (163) states that the growth rate of total assets is equal
to the rate of return on equity adjusted for taxes, dividend payments,
and the real costs of growth.
All that remains to be done before the growth rate of the firm
is fully specified is to express the rate of return on assets, p ,
as a function of the firm's total output and its selling outlays. Once
this has been accomplished, substitution for p in equation (163) will
yield the firm's objective function. Letting R be total revenue,
435 436
C be total production costs, and S be total selling outlays,
then by the definition of p given above,
p = (R-C-S)/A . (164)
437
Further define the rate of revenue r = R/A ; the rate of cost,
438
c = C/A ; the rate of selling outlays, s = S/A ; and the rate of
439
output, y = Y/A , where Y is total output. Assume the following
two functional relationships: r = r(y,s) and c = c(y) , where
2 2
9r/8y > but 3 r/3y < since the demand curve is downward-sloping;
2 2
where 9r/9s > but 9 r/9s < due to diminishing returns to
2 2
additional selling outlays; and where dc/dy > and d c/dy > ,
i.e. where the marginal rate of cost increases at an increasing rate
440
as a function of the rate of output. Then equation (164) may be
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reexpressed in terms of r
, c , and s as follows:
p = r(y,s) - c(y) - s . (165)
Substituting (165) for p into equation (163) yields the Herendeen
objective function:
g = (1-b) [ (l-t){(L + l) [r(y,s) -c(y) -s] -i(L)-L}-k] . (166)
Next, the valuation constraint is formulated. Let V denote
the market value of the firm's equity, and v = V/E denote the firm's
441
valuation ratio. Following Gordon, Marris , and Herendeen define
the market value of the firm's shares as the discounted flow of future
dividends,
V = K/(p(L) -g) . (167)
Dividing each side of equation (167) by E , substituting v for
442
V/E and k for K/E , and rewriting, yields the equation:
g - p(L) + k/v = . (168)
Substituting v , the exogenously determined minimum valuation ratio
o
considered safe by the firm's managers, for v in equation (168)
443
yields the valuation constraint. In equation (168) k/v is the
dividend yield, or the ratio of dividends per share to the market value
of the share. Equation (168) can be rewritten as p(L) = k/v + g ,
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which states that the owners' capitalization rate (i.e. the yield on
equity) is equal to the dividend yield plus the growth rate (i.e. the
rate at which the share price appreciates, or equivalently, at which
capital gains accrue) .
According to the Herendeen model, the objective of the firm
445
is to maximize (166) subject to (168)
.
In this model of the firm
there are only three decision variables: the rate of output y , the
rate of selling outlays s , and the leverage ratio L . The dividend
rate k is assumed given. In reality, the firm's selection of a net
dividend rate, k , is likely to be a matter of concern to shareholders,
in which case p would vary as a function of both L and k ,
446
p=p(L,k) , with 8p/9k < . Permitting the net dividend rate, k ,
to become a policy variable and setting v = v in (168) , the
Herendeen model of the firm, as modified by this author, can be
447
expressed as the following mathematical programming problem:
maximize: g(y,s,L,k) = (1-b) [(1-t) { (L+l) [r(y ,s)-c(y)-s]-i(L) -L}-k]
{y,s,L,k}
(169)
subject to: g(y,s,L,k) - p(L,k) + k/v = .
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to problem(169) , which
can be used collectively to characterize the equilibrium steady state
growth path of the firm, are, in addition to the constraint equation,
the following:
8L, .
-^ = (1-b) (1-t) (L+l) (|i- *£) (1+X) = (170)
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jf- = (l-b)(l-t)(L+l) (|^ - 1) (1+A) = (171)
9L
^- = (l-b)(l-t) [ p - -^ L - i(L) ] (1+A) - A |£ = (172)
^- = (l-b)(-l)(l+A) + A (-|£ + ^) = (173)
o
From equation (170) it follows that in steady state equilibrium
9r dc m/\
9? " dy" ' (174)
Equation (174) is interpreted to require that, in order for the firm to
be in steady state equilibrium, the marginal rate of revenue with respect
to the rate of output must equal the marginal rate of (production)
cost with respect to the rate of output. This equilibrium condition
is analogous to the MR = MC profit maximization rule in the traditional
model of the firm. Equation (171) implies that
If - i • <"»
Equation (175) is interpreted to require that, in order for the firm
to be in steady state equilibrium, the marginal rate of revenue with
respect to the rate of selling outlays must equal one, which is the
marginal rate of cost of selling outlays. Like (174), condition (175)
is analogous to the traditional model's rule that advertising outlays
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should be expanded to the point where the addition to revenue (net of
production costs) resulting from the last dollar of advertising expen-
diture just equals the cost of advertising (i.e. one dollar). Equations
(174) and (175) also imply that
If - If - « • <"«
which is interpreted to require that, in order for the firm to be in
steady state equilibrium, the rate of change of the rate of return on
equity with respect to both the rate of output and the rate of selling
outlays must be zero. Conditions (174), (175), and (176) imply that,
given total assets A , the growth maximizer will select the same
output level and the same level of selling outlays (exclusive, of
course, of those selling outlays specifically intended to promote
449
growth) as the profit maximizer. The reason for this is that the
firm's managers wish to use existing assets as efficiently as possible
in order to generate the maximum possible net income, out of which
dividends and taxes must be paid and further growth must be financed.
From equation (172) it follows that
(i-b)(i-t) P = (i-b)(i-t)(^L + i(l» + YTT II • (177)
which is interpreted to requite that, in order for the firm to be in
steady state equilibrium, the net rate of return on assets (i.e. net
of taxes and net of the real costs of growth) must equal the net marginal
rate of debt cost, (— L + i(L)) (1-t) (1-b)
,
plus the implicit marginal
303
rate of debt cost, . r^ , as reflected in the change in the
discount rate, p , induced by a change in the leverage ratio, L .
451Equation (177) may be rewritten as
(l-bHl-t)ff - T^f . (178)
which is interpreted to require that, in order for the firm to be in
steady state equilibrium, the after-tax rate of return on equity (which
is figured net of the real costs of growth) must equal the implicit
marginal rate of debt cost. Note that when the discount rate is
constant, i.e. -r*- = for all L , equation (178) implies that
de
tjt- = . Thus with p constant the firm selects the leverage ratio
L that makes the rate of change of the rate of return on equity with
respect to the leverage ratio equal to zero. The significance of
this result is that, with k fixed, maximizing the growth rate of
total assets with respect to y , s , and L necessitates finding
y , s , and L such that
F ' If " t " ° • (179)
Thus, given the firm's dividend policy as reflected in k and given
a constant rate of discount, p , growth maximization becomes equiva-
lent to maximizing the stock market value of the firm and, by (179),
is achieved by maximizing the firm's rate of return on equity.
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The last of the necessary conditions is (173), which can be
be rewritten as: \ %n 1
-
(1"b
> " TTX <S " » > • (180)
o
To interpret (130) , note that the left-hand side is the partial
derivative of the objective function in (169) with respect to the net
dividend rate, k , and that the right-hand side is the product of
-
- and the partial derivative of g with respect to k in the
i "i A
constraint equation of (169) . Thus (180) is interpreted to require
that, with y - s , and L at their respective equilibrium values,
the marginal improvement in the growth rate resulting from a decrease
in the net dividend rate, k , must equal the implicit marginal cost
of a reduction in the net dividend rate (measured in terms of the
resulting change in g necessary to offset the effect of the reduction
in k and thereby ensure that v = v remains satisfied) in order
o
453
for the firm to be in steady state equilibrium.
According to the Herendeen model (as modified by the author
to include k as a decision variable) , the firm maximizes its steady
state rate of growth of total assets subject to a valuation constraint
and accomplishes this by selecting its rate of output, rate of selling
outlays, leverage ratio, and net dividend rate to satisfy conditions
(174), (175), (177) (or equivalently , (178)), and (180). The distin-
guishing charcteristics of the model are summarized in table 11-20.
An important implication of the model is that the firm's growth rate
depends net only on how profitably it utilizes its existing assets
(conditions (174) and (175)), but also on how it obtains additional
funds through borrowings, retained earnings, and new equity issues,
and how its financial decisions affect risk, and indirectly, the
305













Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
managerial (see (169) in text)




conditions (as embodied in r(y,s)), factor
supply conditions (as embodied in c(y)),
technology (as embodied in (r(y,s) -c(y)), the
average interest rate on debt and the owners'
capitalization rate (each expressed as a function
of the firm's leverage ratio, with the owners'
capitalization rate also a function of the firm's
net dividend rate) , and the constraints on the
firm's ability to grow (as embodied in
g(y,s,L,k))
minimum valuation ratio considered safe by the
firm's managers (v ) , ratio of the real costs of




growth rate of total assets (g) , rate of output
(y) , rate of selling outlays (s) , leverage ratio
(L) , net dividend rate (k) , rate of revenue (r)
,
rate of cost (c) , average interest rate on debt
(i) , and owners' capitalization rate (p)
rate of output (y) , rate of selling outlays (s)
leverage ratio (L) , and net dividend rate (k)
external finance permitted
effects of uncertainty subsumed within the
functional forms i(L) and p(L,k)
,
so that
the model is, in effect, a model of the firm
under certainty
characterization of the equilibrium steady state
growth path of the firm
multiperiod
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
classical Lagrange multipliers
interest rate on debt and the owners' capitalization rate (conditions
(177) and (180)). Maximizing its growth rate requires that the firm
make not only the correct operating (i.e. production and selling)
decisions but also the correct financial decisions.
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The Herendeen model shares much in common with the Marris
growth model (115) discussed above in section G of this chapter.
It could be transformed into a managerial model like Marris' s managerial
utility maximization model (111) by letting v vary and by introducing
a managerial utility function incorporating v and g as defined by
equation (166) as arguments of the new objective function. Such a model,
by permitting finance a more expanded role, would be more general in
its treatment of the firm than the Marris managerial utility maximization
model.
While the Herendeen model is like the Vickers model discussed
earlier in this section in that both models incorporate risk and make
the firm's financial policy an integral part of the model, the Herendeen
model differs from the Vickers model and most other models of the firm
455
that appear in the financial literature in that the firm is not
assumed to maximize the market value of the enterprise (or the stock
market value of the firm's shares or the share value) . This difference
arises from the Herendeen model's assumption that "it is the enter-
prise, rather than the shareholder, who is residual claimant against
„ ..456corporate income.
One of the uses to which the Herendeen model might be put is
to test the behavior of the firm under the alternative hypotheses of
growth maximization and value maximization. Herendeen does this, but
the analysis is similar and the results obtained are in agreement with
those discussed in connection with the Marris model — namely, that
growth maximizers tend to grow faster, retain a larger portion of their
457
earnings, and have a lower valuation ratio than value maximizers.
As the model discussed in the next section demonstrates, the implications
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of the Herendeen model concerning the comparative behavior of growth
maximizers and value maximizers continue to hold when uncertainty is
permitted.
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J. THE LINTNER MODEL: CORPORATE GROWTH UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The models of the firm discussed in previous sections have either
allowed for risk and uncertainty indirectly, or worse, have assumed
prescience and thereby abstracted from the effects uncertainty may have
on the firm's choice of an optimal operating policy. The models pre-
459
sented above in sections B through H belong to the latter category,
while the Vickers model of section I, which associated the firm's level
of financial risk with the coefficient of variation of net income
and which allowed for risk by making the average interest rate on debt
and the owners' capitalization rate each an increasing function of
the firm's debt level, belongs to the former category. In addition,
the Herendeen model of section I, in which the average interest rate
on debt and the owners' capitalization rate are increasing functions
of the firm's leverage ratio, subsumes the effects of uncertainty in
the functions i(L) and p(L,k), so that, in effect, the model becomes
a model of the firm under certainty.
What distinguishes Lintner's model from these earlier discussed
models is Lintner's more sophisticated treatment of uncertainty. The
managers of Lintner's firm select optimal values for the policy varia-
bles in order to place the firm on the long run expected growth path
that maximizes the stock market value of the firm. But the firm selects
an expected rate of growth — the actual rate of growth realized during
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any particular time period is a random variable. In selecting its
optimal operating policy the firm is actually determining a probability
distribution of growth rates. The variance of this distribution con-
stitutes a risk effect that, in the context of a risk averse stock
market, enters the share valuation formula directly in the form of a
risk premium added onto the market rate of discount. In the inherently
uncertain environment within which the firm operates, the market value
of equity, which Lintner expresses as the present value of the certainty
equivalents of the prospective dividend stream, is affected by both
uncertainty and the degree of risk aversion present in the market for
the firm's shares. Hence, the firm's selection of an optimal operating
policy must explicitly take into account uncertainty and investors'
attitudes toward risk.
In the Lintner model the firm plans for growth, but the firm is
not a growth maximizer. Lintner retains the neoclassical objective
function in which the firm maximizes the current stock market value
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of its equity, and as described below, Lintner demonstrates that
even under uncertainty, maximizing the (expected) value of share-
holders' equity does not imply maximizing the (expected) growth rate
of the firm. The growth maximizer increases retentions until the
marginal growth rate is zero, whereas the value maximizer stops short
of this point, increasing retentions only to the point at which the
marginal gain — in terms of the effect of increased growth on the
share price — no longer exceeds the marginal (opportunity) cost — in
462
terms of the effect of decreased dividend payout on the share price.
Lintner's firm selects an expected rate of growth that is best
463
thought of as a target growth path. It accomplishes this by
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selecting values for the retention ratio and what he calls the 'basic'
464
risk variable. The firm might still take advantage of unexpected
short run opportunities, but only to the extent that its long run growth
465
strategy is not compromised. Thus, the firm in the Lintner model
eschews the myopic profit maximization implied in the traditional
single period optimization models. The target growth rate selected
by the firm is a steady state growth rate in the sense that the firm
expects outlays for research and development, outlays for plant and
equipment, operating costs, dollar sales, earnings, dividend payments,
book values of assets, stock market value of equity, etc., all to
Af.fi
grow at the same average (exponential) rate. Because growth rates
are subject to stochastic disturbances these variables are not assumed
to grow at the same constant rate forever (although all quantities
do grow at the same stochastic rate)
,
and this more realistic treat-
ment of the growth process avoids one of the limitations of the Marris-
type steady state growth model. Moreover, interpreting the expected
growth rate selected by the firm as a target rate of growth also appears
consistent with the way in which corporate planners behave in the real
world.
This section describes the Lintner model of corporate growth under
uncertainty. The discussion follows Lintner's development of the
model by specifying the model first under certainty, then under 'stable
uncertainty', and finally, under 'increasing uncertainty'. The dis-
tinction between 'stable uncertainty' and 'increasing uncertainty'
will be made clear below.
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1. The Model Under Certainty
The objective of the firm is to maximize the current market
value of equity. If capital markets are perfect, then in capital
market equilibrium the current dividend yield plus the rate of change
469
of the share price must equal the current rate of interest. Assume
for simplicity that the current rate of interest, which is denoted by
470
i , remains constant over time and that all growth is financed internally.
In setting its operating policy the firm considers only those policies
that lead to steady state growth. Denoting the steady state rate of
471
growth by g , the retention ratio by r , and the current level
472
of earnings per share "by X , it follows from the above
/to
assumptions that the current share price, P , is:
o
rC \ (l-r)X
P = / (l-r)X e
"CU " 8; dt = —: . (181)
o i-g
In maximizing (181) the firm will only consider for adoption
policy mixes that are efficient in the sense that for all policy mixes
requiring the same retention ratio, only the one offering the maximum
growth rate would be considered for adoption. It is assumed that the
alternative efficient policy mixes are sufficiently numerous that they
can be used to define alternative steady state growth rates as a con-
474
tinuously differentiable function of r , g = f(r) . The set of
efficient policy mixes, as defined above, has the property that, within
this set, faster growth requires greater retentions. It follows that
within the efficient set dg/dr > for all r in the relevant range.
Taking X as given, the firm's objective is to select r
that maximizes (181) . Differentiating with respect to r gives
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dP
- [_^ + MAl j .= p„ [- i—7 -r^rJ • (182)dr o 1-r i-g
From (182) it follows that
dP
^ > 0<r^(l-r) ^ + g > i , (183)
which implies that an increase in the retention ratio leads to an
increase in the share price so long as the dividend payout of the
dc 475




rate itself exceeds the interest rate i . The inequality (183)
can be interpreted as a characterization of disequilibrium. If the
firm's retention ratio is such that equality fails to hold in (183)
,
then the firm cannot be in equilibrium. Indeed, an increase in the
firm's retention ratio would lead to a new steady state growth path
associated with which would be a higher share price P . Rewriting
(183) gives





where y is the current earnings yield on the stock. Since y > ,
(184) implies that the value maximizing firm will never maximize its
rate of growth. That is, when the value maximizing firm is growing
dP
along its equilibrium steady state growth path, -— = and
-r°- = y > , so that increasing the retention ratio would lead to
dr e
faster growth. But since greater retentions would reduce the share
price, the value maximizing firm will stop increasing the retention
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ratio before the growth-maximizing ratio has been achieved. This
also implies that a growth maximizer will tend to retain a greater
proportion of earnings than a value maximizer. This implication is in
agreement with the implications of the Marris and Herendeen models
discussed earlier.
In the next two subsections the certainty model just discussed
is generalized to permit first, what Lintner calls 'stable uncertainty',
and then, what he calls 'increasing uncertainty'. By way of summarizing
the discussion thus far, the distinguishing characteristics of Lintner 's
certainty model are presented in table 11-21.
2. Ihc Model Under 'Stable Uncertainty'
In this subsection the model just described is generalized
to permit 'stable uncertainty'. The objective of the firm's managers
remains unchanged, namely, to maximize the market value of equity.
The firm still plans for growth, but it is no longer assumed that the
future consequences 'of current policy decisions are known with certainty.
Associated with any policy mix is some specified retention ratio, r ,
and an expected growth rate, g . In the presence of uncertainty the
firm can set its policies so as to select an expected growth rate, but
the actual growth rate realized over any period will be a random variable
Consequently future dividends and stock prices are also uncertain.
Following Lintner, in this subsection it is assumed that the
probability distribution of growth rates for time intervals of fixed
477duration in the future is stationary. In particular, this implies
that the variance of the distribution of growth rates is constant
regardless of the futurity of the time interval to which the
478distribution applies. It is assumed that the distribution
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Table 11-21 Summary of Lintner's
Certainty Model
Class ; modern traditional (see (181) in text)
Firm's Objective : maximize the equilibrium market price of a
share of common stock
Constraints : relationship between growth rate (g) and
retention ratio (r) embodied in the set of
efficient policy mixes (g = f(r)); implicitly,
product demand, factor supply, and technological
conditions, all of which underlie g = f(r)
and limit the extent to which additional
retentions can be used to promote growth
Variables :
Exogenous : current level of earnings per share (X ) and
current rate of interest (i)
Endogenous : steady state rate of growth (g) and retention
ratio (r)
Decision : retention ratio (r)
Finance : internal financing only
Certainty /Uncertainty : assumes certainty
Equilibrium/
Disequilibrium : characterization of the equilibrium steady state
growth path of the firm; in addition, disequili-
brium (change in the retention ratio called
for when the share price is not a maximum) also
considered
Time : multiperiod
Type of Model : static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
Solution Technique : unconstrained optimization (by substituting
f(r) for g in (181))
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of growth rates is normal with mean g and variance O , which
implies that assets, total profit, dividends, the share price, etc.,
all of which are growing at the same expected rate g , will be log-
normally distributed. In particular, if the current dividend per
, 481
share is D , then the dividend per share t periods hence, D ,
o t
is lognormally distributed with E [In D ] = In D + g • t , and, under
t o
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the additional assumption that growth rates in different nonoverlapping
2
time periods are independent random variables, var [In D ] = t • a
Further assume that (i) each investor assesses a jointly lognormal
distribution of the total returns (dividends plus capital gains) over
all available securities with respect to a common date in the future
and also assesses the distribution of returns from the whole portfolio
482
to be lognormally distributed; (ii) all investors have hyperbolic
utility functions and choose their portfolios so as to maximize the
expected utility of end-of-period wealth (i.e. as of the common date
in the future with respect to which they make their assessments of
483
security and portfolio returns)
;
and (iii) the stock market is
484
perfect. Then, under these and the previously stated assumptions,
485in stock market equilibrium the current share price is
°°/s °° * (l-r)X
P = / D egt .e_Wtdt = / (l-r)X e- t(a)
- g) dt = &, (185)
° (0-8
where it is required that g < w in order that the indefinite integral
exist and where
g = g - ctCa
2
-af(a ) . (186)
In (185) r and X are as previously defined and oj , which serves
o
as the discount factor (and which Lintner assumes to remain constant
over time) , is the market weighted average of the shadow prices of all
investors' wealth constraints and is interpreted as the shadow price
of the market's total wealth (i.e. the combined wealth endowments of
all investors)
.
In (186) g and a are as previously defined,
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a is the market weighted average of the (constant) elasticities of
all investors' utility functions and may be interpreted as the stock
market's wealth elasticity and as a measure of the market's degree of
487
risk aversion, C > 1 reflects the fact that uncertainties regarding
2
the future dividend (as embodied in a ) are magnified by the somewhat
8
greater uncertainties regarding future share prices, which is due at
least in part to the knowledge that in the future additional information
that may affect the prospective resale value of shares held may beoome
A OQ
available, and f(a..) is a function that reflects the covarianceU
489
of the firm's share price with other stock prices. The term
2
cxOa reflects that portion of risk attributable to uncertainty
g
regarding the future growth of dividends, and hence, that portion of
risk attributable to variation in the share price independent of the
variation in other share prices, and the term af(a.) reflects that
ij
portion of risk attributable to variation in the price of the company's
490
stock relative to the variation in stock market prices generally.
2 -^
Given these interpretations of aca and af(a. .) in (186) g can
g lj
be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the rate of growth of
gt
t(g-oca -af<a ))
dividends. Equivalently , D e 6 = D e 6 J in (185) can
o o
be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the dividend (per share)
gt
expected at time t . With this interpretation of D e° , equation
(185) expresses the share price as the present value of the certainty
491
equivalents of the dividend stream. That is, under the above assump-
tions, the equilibrium price of each share will be equal to the present
value of the certainty equivalents of the stream of dividends that
will accrue to the shareholder. Comparing equations (181) and (185)
it can be seen that admitting (stable) uncertainty to the model has
316
been accomplished by letting certainty equivalents take the place of
certain amounts in (181) and by replacing the riskless interest rate
i by the shadow price w of the market's total investable wealth.
As suggested by (186) , however, there is a significant difference in
content, for the certainty equivalent involves not merely the expectation
_ 2
g and the variance a , but also the stock market's assessment of
g
2
the riskiness of the stock as reflected in aCa * + af(a^ .) .
g iJ
The objective of the firm is to maximize (185) . In the cer-
tainty case the firm had a single decision variable r and the effi-
cient set of growth rates was a function of r only, g = f(r) . The
optimal policy mix was found by maximizing (181) subject to the
constraint g = f(r) that the policy mix be efficient. Thus far,
only the objective function has been modified to reflect uncertainty.
Next the constraint must be modified.







, g , and a are as previously defined. When growth
— 2
rates are normally distributed the two parameters g and a are
needed to specify the distribution that results from the selection
of a retention ratio r (which by assumption will be held constant
over time). Given the risk aversion of investors, one contour of the
set of efficient policy mixes is depicted by the solid line above the
2
a axis in figure 11-23 and, for the same reason that higher retentions
led to faster growth in the certainty case, r > r leads to a













Figure 11-23: Contours of the Efficient
Set of Policy Mixes
Arguing that a larger retention ratio intended to raise the
average growth rate also tends to increase the variability of the
494 2
growth rate, Lintner reexpresses G„ as a function of the retention
o
495
ratio and what he calls the 'basic' risk variable, v :
o
2 2







where v(0) = and v'(r) > and v"(r) < for all r . The
objective of the firm becomes the selection of the optimal pair of
values (v ,r) that maximizes (185) subject to (188).
o
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. p . ^ = :=£>|&- = (189)3v o w - g 3v
o o
aT Po' [T^ + ^H' " 0^(l-r)|f + g - u (190)
According to (189) the firm should select the basic risk level v
(conditional on r) that maximizes the certainty equivalent of the
prospective dividend growth rate. According to (190) the firm should
select the retention ratio r (conditional on v ) that equates the
o
sum of the dividend payout of the marginal certainty equivalent of
the prospective growth rate, (1 - r) 3gV3r , plus the certainty equiva-
lent itself, g , to the shadow price of the market's total investable
wealth (or what may be referred to as the 'riskless rate of interest')
03 •
By expanding 8g/3v and 3g/3r equations (189) and (190) can
each be given a richer interpretation. From (186) and the identity
2
a ' = v + v(r) it follows that (189) can be reexpressed as
8 o
It- = |*--oC = 0«=>!*- = aC . (191)dV dV dv
o
Thus, conditional on any particular value of r , the firm should
vary its basic risk level along the corresponding efficient contour
in figure 11-23 until the point at which the slope of the contour,
3g/3v , equals aC , or equivalent ly, until the marginal improvement
in the expected growth rate (i.e. the marginal value of the incremental
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basic risk) just equals the marginal cost of the incremental basic
risk (as measured by the product of the market risk parameters
a and C)
.
Also note that as long as aC is finite (and this will
usually be the case) equation (191) implies that the expected growth
rate is positive and that the firm does not opt for the minimum level
497
of risk attainable in the efficient set. Next, expanding 8g/9r
gives
8 °
from which it follows that t-°- = r-** , or the marginal certainty3r 9r '
equivalent of the growth rate equals the marginal expectation of the
growth rate, whenever (i) the risk level is independent of the reten-
tion ratio (i.e. v'(r) = 0) or (ii) the firm is pursuing policies
9?that are optimal with regard to the basic risk variable (i.e. -s-"— aC = 0)
dv
o
In both cases (190) reduces to
(1-r) |§+ g = oj , (193)
or
and the optimal retention ratio is that which equates the sum of the
dividend payout of the marginal expectation of the growth rate plus
the certainty equivalent of the growth rate to the 'riskless interest
rate'
.
In comparison with (183) , which gives the equilibrium condition
for the certainty case (when the inequality is replaced by an equality)
,
the marginal expectation of the growth rate -r* in (19 3) corresponds
or
to the marginal growth rate -r°- and the 'riskless rate of interest' u)
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in (193) corresponds to the riskless rate of interest i . But
the certainty equivalent growth rate g in (193) is always less than
the expected growth rate g when uncertainty is present due to risk
499 2
aversion. Moreover, this difference increases as O increases.
g
Consequently, under uncertainty the optimal retention ratio is gen-
erally lower (i.e. the optimal dividend payout is generally higher)
than under certainty, and in general, the retention ratio varies
inversely (and the dividend payout varies directly) with the level of
• , v v i. c- 500risk borne by the firm.
In the previous subsection (183) was used to show that a value
maximizer will not maximize the rate of growth. Equation (193) can
similarly be used to show that under uncertainty a value maximizer
will not maximize the firm's expected rate of growth, but rather,
will tend to retain a smaller portion of earnings and grow more slowly
than a growth maximizer. Solving equation (193) for -r* gives
dr
If fH - f • \ > ° <"*>
502
where y is once again the current earnings yield on the stock.




, but a value maximizer would stop short of this point. Thus,
whether or not there is uncertainty, a value maximizer, as modeled by
Lintner, retains a smaller portion of earnings and grows more slowly
than a growth maximizer. But the existence of uncertainty forces both
types of firms to retain less earnings, and therefore to grow at a slower
average rate, than in the certainty case in order that the dividend
payout be increased and shareholders be compensated for risk.
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By way of summarizing the discussion of Lintner's model of
the firm under 'stable uncertainty', the distinguishing features of
the model are listed in table 11-22.














Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (185) in text)
maximize the equilibrium market price of a
share of common stock
relationship between expected growth rate (g)
and retention ratio (r) embp_died in the set
of efficient policy mixes (g = f(r,v +v(r)));
implicitly, product demand, factor supply, and
_techno logical conditions, all of which underlie
g = f(r,vQ +v(r)) and limit the extent to which
additional retentions can be used to promote
(expected) growth; also implicitly, conditions
in the stock market that determine the equilibrium
share price (e.g. covariance function f((J..))
current level of earnings per share (X )
,
the riskless rate of interest (co) , stock
market's wealth elasticity (a), and magnifica-
tion of uncertainty regarding future dividends
(C)
steady state expected growth rate (g) , retention
ratio (r) , variance of the distribution of
growth rates (CF 2 ) ( and basic risk variable
<V
(Vretention ratio (r) and basic risk variable
internal financing only
permits 'stable uncertainty' and utilizes
the mean-variance framework
characterization of the equilibrium steady state
expected growth path of the firm; in addition,
could consider disequilibrium as in the certainty
version of the model (see table 11-21)
multiperiod
static optimization (mathematical -programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization (by substituting
f(r,v +v(r)) for g in (185))
322
3. The Model Under 'Increasing Uncertainty'
The model of the preceding subsection assumed that investors'
assessments of future growth rates could be characterized by a time
invariant probability distribution, so that, for example, there was
no more uncertainty attached to assessments of growth rates ten years
hence than there was to assessments of growth rates one year hence.
This treatment of uncertainty — merely replacing the point estimate
of g that was treated as a certainty in the initial formulation of
the model with a stationary probability distribution for g — was
overly simplified. Uncertainty tends to increase with futurity; uncer-
tainties as to the outcome in any particular year, say the tenth, are
the "compound resultant of the uncertainties in each of the intervening
503
years"; and uncertainties as to outcomes in the tenth year will
reflect uncertainties as to the outcome one year hence — compounded
by uncertainties as to the outcome in each of the subsequent nine
years. The model discussed in this subsection allows for uncertainties
504
that increase with futurity.
All but two of the assumptions stated in the preceding sub-
section still apply. In particular, it is again assumed that inves-
tors' utility functions are hyperbolic so that the current equilibrium
price of each stock is still equal to the present value of the certainty
equivalents of the elements of the future dividend stream discounted at
the 'riskless interest rate' 10 . The two new assumptions are the
following. (i) The changes in growth rates between all nonover-
lapping pairs of short time intervals in the future are independent
normally distributed random variables. More formally, it is assumed
323
that g(t + 1) = g(t) + u(t) , where the tilde denotes a random
variable and where E[u(t)] = and var[u(t)] = 2t<J (for some
u
2
positive constant a ) for all t and where
u
cov[u(t) ,u(t + t')] = for all pairs (t,t'). (ii) The variance
of the currently assessed growth rate t periods hence exceeds the
2
current variance of the growth rate, O (which is assumed time
2 2 2 2invariant), by the product 2ta , i.e. a (t) = o " + 2to
u g g u
The variance of the cumulated growth beginning now and continuing
2 2
over t periods is then (<J " + to ) t . Under these assumptions
g u
2 2
var [in D 1 = (a + tcr ) t , so that the logarithmic variance is
t g u
a quadratic function of futurity, whereas in the preceding subsection
it was only a linear function of futurity.
Under the above assumptions the certainty equivalent of the
dividend (per share) expected at time t is
D .*' = D e
t(g-aC(o 2 + to
u
2
) - affo »
o o
which differs from the certainty equivalent in the preceding subsection
2 2
by the additional -aCt a term in the exponent. As illustrated
u
by figure 11-24, in the certainty case the logarithms of the certain
future dividend receipts and in the stable uncertainty case the
logarithms of the certainty equivalents of the future dividend receipts
each increased at a constant linear rate over time, but the inclusion
of the negative quadratic term in (195) causes the logarithms of the
certainty equivalents in the increasing uncertainty case to reach a
2
maximum and thereafter decline continuously (as long as a > of
u
course) . The significance of this is that the indefinite integral
324
expression (197) given below for the current share price must exist
regardless of the size of the expected growth rate g , so that the
508
























Figure II-2A: Behavior of Certainty Equivalents in
the Three Versions of the Lintner Model
From (195) the certainty equivalent of the growth rate is the
expression in parentheses, which may be written as
— 2 2
g = g-aCa -af(a..)-aCa t ,
g iJ u
(196)
which differs from (186) due to the -aCa t term. In contrast to
u
(186) , in tfhich g was time invariant, g in (196) decreases with
futurity (due to the effects of increasing uncertainty)
.
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The current share price is
P = /"d egVUtdt = A e-t(^S^C0 2^f(a )^Ou2 t)
° ° °
which does not simplify as P did in (185) due to the presence of
o
the quadratic term in the exponent. It is possible, however, to
evaluate the integrals in (19 7) in terms of the probability density
function and the inverse cumulative distribution function of the
509
standard normal random variable. This simplification does not
require that any restrictions be placed on g , and thus the 'growth
stock paradox' cannot occur. The details of the calculations are
omitted since the effect on P of changes in the various parameters
in (197) can be seen directly from (197). Ceteris paribus the current
share price varies directly with the expected growth rate g and
inversely with each of the following factors: (i) the 'riskless interest
rate' oo , (ii) the market's relative risk aversion a , (iii) the
level of the growth covariance with other stocks f(a.
.) , (iv) the
2
basic own-variance of the company's growth rate of dividends O
,
O
and (v) the time rate of increase in variances with futurity a
The objective of the firm is to maximize (197) subject to (188).
2
Lintner distinguishes two cases, one in which a is independent
2
of the firm's decisions and the other in which a varies with the
u
basic risk level v . In each case there are the two decision variables
o
v and r and the derivation and interpretation of the necessary con-
o
ditions are similar to the treatment of the 'stable uncertainty' case
in the preceding subsection. These two cases are not considered
2
further, although it is noted that the presence of a in both cases
326
reduces tne optimal retention ratio and the optimal expected growth
2 512
rate (and they both vary inversely with a ) , and further, that
making C dependent on v in the second case implies that the
firm will no longer choose the basic risk level v that maximizes
o
513
the certainty equivalents of its prospective growth rates.
The distinguishing characteristics of the 'increasing uncer-
tainty 1 version of the Lintner model of the firm are summarized in table
11-23. By comparing the three versions, the characteristics of which
are summarized in tables 11-21, 11-22, and 11-23, the overall develop-
ment of the Lintner model can be better appreciated.
The significance of the Lintner model lies in its sophisticated
treatment of uncertainty. The objective of the firm is to maximize
its current share price, which is determined by a risk-averse stock
market that evaluates the effects the firm's choice of operating poli-
cies will have on the expected growth rate of dividends and the overall
level of risk. Due to the existence of uncertainty, the firm will
retain a smaller portion of earnings and therefore grow more slowly
than it would under certainty. But even under certainty the value
maximizer would still retain fewer earnings and grow more slowly than
a Marris- type growth maximizer.
Two potential weaknesses of the Lintner model should be noted,
however. The model restricts its attention to internal financing,
though Lintner does note that the inclusion of debt financing would
514
not alter any of the qualitative conclusions drawn from the model.
Second, the model assumes a stochastic steady state environment.
Lintner justifies this by calling g a long run growth target.
Several models that permit non-steady state growth are discussed below
in section L.
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Type of Model :
Solution Technique
modern traditional (see (19 7) in text)
maximize the equilibrium market price of a
share of common stock
relationship between expected growth rate (g)
and retention ratio (r) embodied in the set of
efficient policy mixes (g = f(r,v +v(r)));
implicitly, product demand, factor supply, and
technological conditions, all of which underlie
g = f(r,vQ+v(r)) and limit the extent to which
additional retentions can be used to promote
growth; also implicitly, conditions in the
stock market that determine the equilibrium
share price (e.g. covariance function f(a.
.))
current level of earnings per share (X ) , the
riskless rate of interest (oo)
,
stock market's
wealth elasticity (a) , magnification of uncer-
tainty regarding future dividends (C) , and
variance of growth disturbance term (a 2)
steady state expected growth rate (g) , retention
ratio (r) , variance of the current distribution
of the growth rate (a ^) , and basic risk
variable (v ) °
o
retention ratio (r) and basic risk variable (v )
o
internal financing only
permits 'increasing uncertainty' and utilizes
the mean-variance framework
characterization of the equilibrium steady state
expected growth path of the firm; in addition,
could consider disequilibrium as in the certainty
version of the model (see table 11-21)
multiperiod
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization (after substituting
(188) into (197) and evaluating the integral
as indicated in the text) ; actual solution not
provided in the text; see Lintner, Maximum
Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op. cit .
,
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K. CORPORATE BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THE TIME-STATE-PREFERENCE
APPROACH
In the previous section uncertainty as to future outcomes (and in
particular, uncertainty as to the actual rate of growth realized during
any particular time interval) was handled within a mean-variance frame-
work. The firm's selection of a retention ratio and a basic risk
level determined hoth the expected (or mean) rate of growth and the
overall risk level (i.e. the variance of the probability distribution
C-| £
of the growth rate). The mean-variance framework is one of the
f-vp major lines of approach to the problem of risky choice over time.
The othf- is the time-state-preference approach.
This section describes the time-state-preference framework. It
is shown that when a system of complete markets exists the problem of
risky choice becomes formally equivalent to the problem of choice
under certainty. In such a world, if markets are also perfect, the
Modigliani-Miller proposition on the irrelevance of the firm's debt-
518
equity ratio also holds, and the firm's production decisions and
its financial decisions are separable.
Later in the section two time-state-preference models, both due
to Leland, and a related model due to Meyer, are presented. The first
of Leland's models is primarily concerned with the firm's short run
pricing and output decisions and the second is mainly concerned with
the relationship between the firm's production decisions and the stock
market value of the firm. Whereas Leland restricts his attention to
the single product firm, Meyer allows the firm to produce several
(i.e. n > 1) goods. Meyer also allows explicitly for the possibility
329
that the amounts produced might prove insufficient to satisfy all
demands, and incorporating this into his model leads to a probabilistic
programming problem formulation of the model.
1. The Time-State-Preference Framework
One method of describing uncertainty about conditions in some
future time period is to specify the set of possible states of nature
that, might prevail. For example, during some period there might just
be two possible states of nature, say, war versus peace or prosperity
519
versus depression. There is one such set for each future time
period (and these sets are not necessarily identical) . Associated with
each state of nature and each time period is a definite probability
(possibly not fully known) of occurrence, with the probabilities of
events for each time period summing to one. To continue the previous
examples, war and peace might be equally likely or prosperity might be
twice as likely as depression. For each time period and each state
of nature both the configuration of the environment and the probability
of its occurrence are assumed to lie beyond the control of the indivi~
520
dual. In addition, there exist securities, each of which is a
521
complex entitlement to baskets of consumption claims (loosely,
dividends or interest payments) at various dates, where the amount
received (e.g. the size of the dividend) at each date is dependent on
the state of nature obtaining. For this reason these claims are called
contingent claims. It is these contingent consumption incomes asso-
ciated with alternative possible states of nature, rather than the





A description of a simple time-state-preference framework
might better serve to convey the essential characteristics of this type
523
of framework. In the simplest case, there are only two time periods,
the present (time "0") and the future (time "1") . The present state
is known with certainty, and in the future one of two mutually exclusive
524
states (state "a" or state "b") must obtain. The individual does
not know for certain what the future state of the world will be,
although he can attach a (possibly subjective) probability, tt and
cL
it
, respectively (where tt + tt = 1) , to the occurrence of each. To
simplify the exposition by factoring out the decision as to how to
allocate any one period's income among different commodities, it is
assumed that there is a single generalized commodity, which will be
referred to as "consumption claims" and which will be denoted by c .
In the present period the individual consumes an amount c and in the
o
future he will consume c, if state a obtains and c„. if state b
la lb
obtains.
The consumption claims c , c, , and c,. are the
o la lb
individual's ultimate objects of choice. The individual's objective
is to achieve the most desired time pattern of consumption in light of
(i) his consumption preferences, (ii) his initial endowment, and
(iii) market opportunities for exchanging dated contingent claims.
The role of each of these three factors is described below. A dis-
cussion of the role of production is postponed until the next subsection.
The individual's preferences are represented by a utility
function of the form U = U(c ,c, ,c.,;tt ,tt ) . There are two dimensions
o la lb a b
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of choice, one being the contemporaneous balance of risky claims between
c, and c,, and the other being the time-plus-risk choice between
la lb
certain claims c and uncertain future claims c, and c,, . The
o la lb
first of these choices is represented by figure 11-25 (a) . The contours,
each of which embodies the individual's subjective probability
525
assessments tt and 7T, , are drawn convex to the origin, -just as in
a b J
the two-good-single-period-certainty case (or more simply, the
'ordinary case') presented in introductory economics textbooks.
However, in contrast to the ordinary case in which a point on an
indifference curve represents a combination of commodities, a point
such as A in figure 11-25 (a) represents a pair of contingent claims.
A A
The amounts c, and c,, cannot be consumed simultaneously; rather,
la lb
A A
c, will be consumed only if state a obtains and c,, will be
la lb
consumed only if state b obtains and the two states — and hence the
A A
amounts c, and c,, — are mutually exclusive. Figure II-25(b)
la lb
illustrates the choice between certain claims c and contingent
o
claims c, (and a third figure with c n , in place of c. couldla lb la






Convex Indifference Curves Between
State- and Time-Distributed Claims
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The individual has an initial endowment of contingent
claims (y ,y >y n t ) • In the absence of exchange the consumptionO J. fl .*.u
527
vector equals the initial endowment vector. But where a market for
contingent claims exists, the individual can exchange claims in order
to reach his most preferred position (i.e. maximize his utility) Assume
that the market for contingent claims is perfect, so that there are
528
no taxes or transactions costs, and complete, so that a sufficient
number of securities exist to permit the individual to obtain what-
529
ever distribution of consumption claims (c , c, ,c1L ) he most desires
o la lb
- as restricted, of course, by his initial endowment and the market
opportunities for exchange. For simplicity, assume there are just
530




<J> , <(> ,
and § , , respectively, so that, in effect,
dated consumption claims are exchanged directly. To further simplify
the analysis, certain consumption claims c may be chosen as the
numeraire, so that <b = 1 , and the prices of C, and C,. may beT
o
r la lb J
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expressed in terms of the numeraire. Denoting by W the individual's



















where <\> and <j> are equilibrium prices for contingent claims
and where the second equality follows from the fact that value is
conserved in transactions (i.e. there are no "leakages" in the form
532
of taxes or transactions costs) when markets are perfect.
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The problem confronting each individual is to exchange
securities in such a way as to maximize his utility subject to his
533
wealth constraint:
maximize: U(c ,c ,c ,)
{V Cla' C lb } o' la' lb'
(199)
subject to: W = y + d), y, + d> y„, = c + d) c +(icJ
'o
ylaJ la ylb / lb o yla la ylb lb











where each individual's subjective probability assessments tt and
a
tt are assumed fixed so that they can be suppressed when writing
the expression for U ; where each of the six sums is taken over all
individuals; where the last three constraints require that contingent
claims be neither created nor destroyed during the process of exchange;
and where the nonnegativity constraints c > , c. > , and
o — la —
c_, > can be suppressed in light of the earlier convexity assumptions
lb —
regarding the contours of U . Recalling that y , y , and y,,
o la lb
are given, the simultaneous solution of problem (199) yields the
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The left-hand side of each equation in (201) is interpreted as the
marginal rate of substitution between a future contingent claim and
a present certain claim and the right-hand side of each equation is
interpreted as the price of a certain claim in terms of a future
534
contingent claim. Since, by assumption,
<J>
and (J) , are the
-L cl _LD
same for all individuals, equations (201) imply that, in general
equilibrium in the markets for contingent claims, all individuals must
have the same marginal rate of substitution between any particular
pair of goods.
The problem just considered, in which a system of perfect
and complete markets for contingent claims was assumed to exist, is
535
a natural generalization of Fisher's theory of intertemporal choice
and is formally equivalent to the traditional analysis of consumer
choice under certainty. In such a world there is uncertainty as to
the future state of the world, but due to the existence of perfect
and complete markets , individuals are free to exchange contingent
claims so as to minimize the adverse impact of uncertainty, and as a
result, there is not the vagueness one normally associates with
uncertainty in the real world.
335
b. Production and Exchange
To generalize the time-state-preference framework of the
preceding subsection to include production is easily carried out. To
the economy of the preceding subsection are added one or more firms,
537
each having a production function of the form Q(q ,q, ,q„, ) = ,
o la lb
where the q's are negative if the input flow of the generalized
commodity exceeds the output flow of the generalized commodity and
are positive when the reverse is true. In general equilibrium in the
markets for contingent claims, the market value of each firm, W
,
o
is equal to the net present certainty equivalent value of the firm's







+ i.'i. + Vib (202)
The individual's utility function is as before, but his wealth con-
straint must be modified. Suppose there are F firms and that the
individual owns a proportion af of the f-th firm. Then, in general





o f , f o la la lb lb o la la
T lb lb
Each individual tries to maximize his utility subject to (203)
,
which leads to necessary conditions (201)
.
The conservation relations of the preceding subsection
must be modified to take into account production. Since the amount
336
of the generalized commodity available for consumption equals the
initial endowment plus the amount produced less the amount used as
inputs to production, the conservation relations (200) become




















where, as before, the first two sums in each equation are taken over
all individuals and where the third sum is taken over all firms. If,
as is usually the case, q is negative and q and q are
positive, it is easily seen from (202), (203), and (204) that, quite
apart from individual preferences, each firm should attempt to maximize
its market value, W . Regardless of the shapes of the firm's
o
owners' utility functions, maximizing the market value of the firm is
in the owners' best interests because that policy maximizes W and,
under the assumption of complete markets, provides each owner with the
most inclusive opportunity set (i.e. the set of attainable consumption
538
triplets (c ,c. , c ,)) . When markets are incomplete, however,
the firm's owners' freedom to exchange contingent claims is restricted,
so that the owners' interests might be better served by an investment
539
policy that explicitly takes into account their consumption preferences.
For the problem under consideration the firm seeks to
maximize (202) subject to its production function as a constraint.
This leads to the following additional equilibrium conditions (i.e.
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Equations (205) are interpreted to mean that, in general equilibrium
in the markets for contingent claims, the marginal rate of technical
substitution between a future contingent claim and a present certain
claim must equal the price of the certain claim in tenns of the future
540
contingent claim. Moreover, equations (205) imply that, for any
particular pair of claims, the marginal rate of technical substitution
541
must be the same for all firms.
c. The Indeterminancy of the Firm's Optimal Capital Structure
One of the major sources of disagreement in the area of
corporate finance is Modigliani's and Miller's Proposition I, the first
part of which states that the total market value of the firm (i.e. the
combined market value of its debt and equity) is independent of the
firm's capital structure. This result, which was referred to earlier
542
in sections F and I, " implies that the firm's investment (and produc-
tion) decisions are separable from its financing decisions. One of
the more interesting applications of the time-state-preference frame-
work is the demonstration that Modigliani's and Miller's Proposition
I holds under uncertainty provided markets are perfect and complete.
543
The purpose of this subsection is to demonstrate this result.
Let q denote the total of corporate funds to be committed
o
to investment at time t = and let d denote the portion coming
o
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from borrowings (i.e. debt) and e the portion coming from equity
544
funds. Then
q = d + e . (206)
o o o
Again assuming a two-period world (present and future) with two future
states (a and b) , all future returns from the firm's present invest-
545













where d, is the distribution to bondholders and e, is the dis-
la la
tribution to shareholders at time t = 1 if state a obtains and
d n1_ and e,, are interpreted similarly. Equations (20 7) imply thatlb lb
there are no leakages of investment returns into corporate or personal
income taxes or into transaction costs.
If the market for contingent claims is complete, then, in
equilibrium, the aggregate present certainty equivalent values of
debt, D , and equity, E , can be expressed in terms of the streams
o o
of returns (d ,d. ,d., ) and (e ,e, ,e_, ) and the equilibrium prices
o la lb o la lb
<b. and (t),, as follows:
la lb
D = d +
<J)
d. + A d
o o la la lb lb
E - e + <j> e. +
<J>
e
o o la la lb lb
(208)
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From equation (202) , the market value of the firm, W is given by
o
W = q + <j> q + A q . But when markets are perfect and com-
o o la la lb lb









which is Modigliani's and Miller's Proposition I. Given the firm's
investment policy, its total market value is independent of how it
finances that investment. The firm's investment and financing decisions
are separable; the market's valuation of the firm is based on the firm's
investment policy; and there is no single optimum capital structure
(i.e. debt-equity mix). In a world of perfect and complete markets
financing operations take place within a wealth constraint — they do
not alter wealth.
The simplicity with which the indeterminancy result (209)
was obtained should not obscure the significance of the assumption
that a set of perfect and complete markets for contingent claims
547
exists. The absence of corporate and personal income taxes,
transaction costs, and other external drains —which is assured when
markets are perfect — ensures that individuals and firms collectively
548
form a closed system so that (206) and (207) hold. The completeness
of markets, which underlies (208), permits each stream of contingent
claims to be expressed as a single market-determined present certainty
equivalent value. The existence of complete markets makes the market
value of each firm insensitive to changes in the firm's capital struc-
ture. In the event a change in some firm's capital structure were to
cause one or more of the markets for contingent claims to go into
340
disequilibrium, the arbitrage mechanism would ensure that the dis-
equilibrium was only temporary and would restore the equality between
the sum of the market values of each firm's securities and the present
549
certainty equivalent value of the firm's income stream. When markets
are incomplete (209) no longer holds necessarily because the equili-
brating action of the arbitrage mechanism is impeded.
Having briefly set out the distinguishing features of the
time-state-preference framework in this subsection, the next three
subsections describe several models of the behavior of the firm under
uncprta?'nfv. The first two focus on the individual firm in the short
run in a nartial equilibrium setting, while the third explores the
link between the firm's production decisions and its stock market value.
2. The Behavior of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand
In the traditional theory of the firm, which was discussed
earlier in this chapter, it is assumed that the firm behaves as if
its demand function, production function, and factor costs are known
with certainty. Even if the true demand relation is not known with
certainty, it is still assumed that the firm can formulate a best
estimate of the demand relation, which it then treats as if it were
nonstochastic. This treatment implies that once price or quantity is
set by the firm, the value of the other variable is known with certainty.
In the real world, of course, there may be a high degree of uncertainty
as to the true relationship between price and quantity demanded, and
it is reasonable to expect that the existence of such uncertainty
will have an impact on the behavior of the firm.
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In recent years there have been several attempts to incorporate
uncertainty into the model of the firm by making demand random.
Typically these models have given random demand a specific functional
form by introducing a random variable that is either additive or
multiplicative into the demand relation. One of the advantages
of the model due to Leland discussed in this subsection is its more
general formulation of random demand.
Introducing randomness into the demand relation necessitates
a change in the firm's objective function. According to the traditional
models of the firm, the objective of the firm under certainty is to
maximize (single period) total profit. But under uncertainty, either
price or quantity (or possibly both) is (are) stochastic, and so are
total revenue and total profit. If risk is ignored, or if risk neu-
trality is assumed, then the objective function of the firm in the
552
traditional models can be reformulated in terms of expected profit.
553
Since both managers and investors are generally regarded as risk averse,
it is more appropriate to caste the reformulation in terms of the
554
expected utility of total profit, since the expected utility calcu-
lation takes the attitude toward risk into account. The Leland model
discussed below assumes the firm maximizes the expected utility of
total profit.
A third consideration is whether firms set market price or
the quantity of output to be sold. Uncertainty is usually intro-
duced into the model of the firm under perfect competition by assuming
that price is a random variable and that the firm can sell whatever
quantity it wishes at the prevailing market price, and in the more
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general case of imperfect competition, by assuming that the firm makes
its output decision prior to observing the market price. The
Leland paper discussed below considers the implications not only of
558
this quantity-setting behavior but of price-setting behavior as well.
559
a Stochastic Demand
Assume the firm produces a single output q , that it
knows its total cost function with certainty, and that its objective
is to maximize the expected utility of total profit. Demand is
uncertain. Following Leland, uncertainty is introduced into the
implicit demand relation f(p,q) = , where p is market price, by
assuming that the implicit demand relation itself is random:
f(p,q,u) = , (210)
where u is not known at the time the firm sets quantity (or price)
,
but has subjective probability density dF(u) . It is required that,
for any value of u
, p and q be inversely related in accordance
with economic theory, and that larger values of u be associated with
greater demand. The variable u represents the state of demand and
larger values of u imply a more favorable state of market demand.
With these restrictions (210) can be reexpressed in either of two
forms
:
p = p(q,u) , 9p/8q < , 8p/3u > (211)
q = q(p,u) , 9q/8p < , 3q/9u > , (212)
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where in each case the distribution of the variable on the left-hand
side of the equation can be obtained from the distribution of u ,
but is conditional on the value selected by the firm for the decision
variable on the right.
b. The Quantity-Setting Firm
In this subsection the firm facing random demand must
determine its quantity of output prior to observing the actual market
price. The probability distribution of price is conditional on
the value of q selected, as implied by (211) . The model of the firm




where U(tt) is the utility of total profit and where total profit
it is given by
TT = p(q,u) ' q - C(q) - F , (214)
where C(q) is total variable cost and F is fixed cost. Substituting
(214) into (213) and differentiating E[U(tt)] with respect to q and
setting this derivative equal to zero yields the necessary condition
for an optimum:
E[OTT/8q)U'(TT)] = E{[MR(q,u) - MC(q) ]U f (it) } = , (215)
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where MR(q,u) = p(q,u) + q [3p(q ,u) /3q] and MC(q) = C'(q) . The
sufficient condition for a solution to (213) is:
E[(3 2ir/3q2) U'(tt) + U"(tt) • (37r/3q) 2 ] < . (216)
It follows that when either (i) tt is strictly concave in q for
2 2
all u , so that 3 ir/3q < , and the firm is risk neutral or risk
averse, so that U"(tt) <^ , or (ii) it is linear in q and the
56 ?
firm is risk averse (U"(tt) < 0), (216) holds for all q so that
a solution to (215) provides the global maximum of expected utility.
To explore the effect of uncertainty on the optimal output
of the quantity-setting firm it is necessary to employ a comparative
statics method of analysis. For this purpose, first construct a cer-
tainty demand curve equivalent to the random demand curve (210)
.
56 q
Following Leland, the certainty demand curve used below is the
expected price certainty demand curve formed by associating with each
564
output level, q , the expected price:
p = E[p(q,u)] = f(q) . (217)
It follows from the linearity of the expectation and differentiation
operators that for all q the expected marginal revenue, E[MR(q,u)] ,
is equal to the marginal revenue derived from the expected price
certainty demand curve:
d[q • f(q)]/dq = f(q) +q[df(q)/dq]
= E[p(q,u)]+ q[3E[p(q,u)]/3q] (218)
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d[q • f(q)]/dq = E[p(q,u)] + q [9p(q ,u) /8q]
= E[MR(q,u)] .
It follows from what Leland calls the principle of increasing
uncertainty that a function u (q) can be found such that
E[MR(q,u)] = MR[q,uX (q)] . (219)
When profit is nonrandom, maximizing total profit is
equivalent to maximizing the expected utility of total profit (provided,
of course, nonsatiability is assumed). The profit maximizing firm
Hit A
selects output level q satisfying — = — [q f (q) - C(q) - F] =0 ,
which by making use of (218) and (219) can be simplified to
MR(q ,u ) = MC(q ) ,
c c c
(220)
where u = u (q ) .
c c
When demand is stochastic and u varies about u (q) for
all q , there are three possibilities:
(i) if q satisfies (215) , then the introduction of uncertainty
leaves the firm's optimal output unchanged;
(ii) if (215) is negative when q = q , but (216) is satisfied
everywhere, then optimal output under uncertainty will be
smaller than q , the optimal output under certainty; and
(iii) if (215) is positive when q q and (216) is satisfied
everywhere, then output under uncertainty will exceed q .
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Which of these possibilities will hold will depend on the attitude
of the firm toward risk. Since firms would normally be expected to
exhibit risk aversion, the principle of increasing uncertainty
would imply that the risk averse firm will produce less under uncer-
tainty than it would under certainty (i.e. (ii) holds). This is
demonstrated below.
Risk aversion implies that




) , for u > u
1
, (221)
where tt1 is total profit when u = u . From the principle of
increasing uncertainty and (220)
,
MR(q ,u) > MC(q ) , for u > u
1
. (222)
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1
) , (223)
for u > u . But when u < u both inequalities (221) and (222)
c c















where the equality on the right follows from (219) and (220). Thus,
for q satisfying the necessary condition (215) for an optimum under
uncertainty, it must be the case that q < q . Given the principle3 C
of increasing uncertainty, in the presence of uncertainty the risk
averse firm will produce less than it would under certainty. Under
risk preference the opposite is true; inequalities (221) and (224)
are reversed and the risk preferring firm will produce more under uncer-
tainty than it would under certainty. In the intermediate case of
risk neutrality, the existence of uncertainty will not affect the firm's
output decision.
In the traditional theory of the firm, the firm's output
decision in the short run is independent of the level of fixed costs.
Under certainty a change in fixed costs would not alter optimal output
(or price). This is generally not true under uncertainty. When
the firm is risk averse and when absolute risk aversion diminishes
as total profit increases, increased fixed costs lead to smaller
output. Similarly, if absolute risk aversion increases with
increasing profit, then greater fixed costs lead to greater output,
and if absolute risk aversion is invariant with respect to total
profit, then the level of fixed costs will not affect the firm's output
decision. Intuitively, for any level of total revenue, higher fixed
costs reduce total profit. Under diminishing absolute risk aversion
(with increasing profit) , the lower level of profit implies a rela-
tively greater degree of absolute risk aversion. The firm compensates
for this by setting lower output in order to experience a lower level
of risk (i.e. dispersion of the probability distribution of total
572
revenue). Under increasing absolute risk aversion, the lower level
348
of profit implies a relatively lower degree of absolute risk aversion.
In effect, the firm is able to bear greater risk, and does so by
raising its output level. In the intermediate case, the degree of
absolute risk aversion does not change, and as a consequence, nor
does the firm's output level.
The implication of the traditional theory with regard to
the effect on output of an increase in demand must also be modified
when uncertainty is introduced. This can be shown by utilizing compara-
tive statics. Following Leland, an increase in demand will be defined
as a parallel upward shift in the demand curve by a constant amount a
573
for every state of nature. Such a shift alters the expected value,
but not the shape, of the conditional probability distribution of
price.
The new demand curve is p'(q,u) = p(q,u) + a and the
first order condition (215) becomes
E{[MR(q,u) + a - MC(q)] • U'(tt + qa)} = , (225)
where tt is defined by (214) and MR(q,u) + a is the new expression
for marginal revenue. To find the effect on q of a small change in
a
,
take the total derivative of (225) and evaluate it at q = q and
a
a = (i.e. optimal output for the initial demand curve). This
gives
dq/da = - E[U'(tt) + q(MR - MC) U"(tt)]/D
, (226)
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where D - 9 [E(MR- MC)U' (it) ] /3q <Oatq = q and a = from3
(216) . The overall effect of a shift in demand may be broken down
into the sum of two effects. The first is -E [U' (it) ] /D , which is
always positive since E[U f (7T)] > and D < , and which may be
called the "revenue-substitution effect." As demand shifts upward,
the increase in expected marginal revenue at q = q , with marginal3
cost unaffected, induces the firm to expand output in order to increase
total profit. In the certainty case, the increase in marginal revenue,
with marginal cost unchanged, has exactly this effect.
Under uncertainty there is a second effect, which is
absent under certainty. The term -q • E [(MR - MC)U"(tt)] /D = -q^dq/dF ,
is positive, zero, or negative, depending on whether absolute risk
aversion is decreasing, constant, or increasing (given the principal
of increasing uncertainty)
.
Leland calls this the "risk-income
effect." The importance of this effect is explained as follows.
Under decreasing absolute risk aversion (i.e. the "normal" case) the
risk-income effect would reinforce the revenue-substitution effect,
thereby causing an even greater increase in output. Yet, it is
possible that a firm could become increasingly risk averse as total
profit rose to such an extent that the risk-income effect would out-
weigh the revenue-substitution effect, thereby causing output to
decrease as demand increases.
The next subsection discusses Leland' s model of the price-
setting firm under uncertainty. To facilitate a comparison of the
model of the price-setting firm with the model of the quantity-setting
firm, the main features of the latter model are summarized in table
11-24.
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Table 11-24 Summary of Leland's Model

















Type of Model :
Solution Technique
modern traditional (see (213)
,
(214) in text)
maximize the expected utility of total profit
product demand relation (p = p(q,u)); implicitly
factor supply and technological conditions
embodied in C(q)
level of fixed costs (F)
quantity of output (q) , price (p) , and total
profit (it)
quantity of output (q)
level of fixed costs (F) and demand shift
parameter (a)
subsumed
allows for uncertainty and utilizes the time-
state-preference framework
characterization of the equilibrium position
of the firm and utilization of comparative
statics to determine the effects of uncertainty
on this equilibrium position
single period
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization (by substituting (214)
into (213))
c. The Price-Setting Firm
For the firm that chooses to set price when demand is
uncertain, two cases may be distinguished. First, the firm may set
578
price and then adjust quantity to meet actual demand. This case
is discussed below. Second, the firm may fix both price and quantity,
and if qu-ntity demanded is greater (less) than quantity supplied,
there is a shortage (surplus). This case, first discussed by Mills
351
579
and further explored by Leland and Meyer, is left to the next sub-
section. In the present section the first case is examined and it
is shown that, while the choice of control variable (p or q) is
immaterial under certainty, it is of considerable importance under
uncertainty.
The firm sets price and then observes quantity demanded,
the distribution of which is conditional upon the price p selected,
as suggested by (212) . Total profit is given by
7T = p • q(p,u) - C[q(p,u)] - F , (227)
which differs from the expression for profit (214) for the quantity-
setting firm in that the randomness of q causes total variable cost
580
to become random. Maximizing the expected utility of profit,
where profit it is given by (227)
,
yields the following first- and
second-order conditions:
E[OK/3p)U f (TT)] = E{[MR(p,u) -C'[q(p,u) 3(*!;P > u) ]U' (tt) } = , (228)
dp
where
MR(p,u) = q(p,u) + p[3q(p,u)/8p]
,
and
^- [E[(9tt/9P)U , (tt)]] < . (229)dp
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To explore the effect of uncertainty on optimal price it
is necessary once again to utilize comparative statics, and as in the
preceding subsection, to begin by defining an appropriate certainty
demand curve. The obvious choice is the expected quantity certainty
demand curve
,
q = E[q(p,u)] = h(p) , (230)
which is analogous to (217) in that with each price p is associated
the expected quantity demanded. Under certainty the price-setting firm
will select price p = p satisfying
= h(p ) +p [dh(p )/dp] -C'[h(p )][dh(p )/dp] = . (231)
c c c c c
p = p
c
To evaluate the effect of uncertainty on optimal price it is necessary
to evaluate the left-hand side of (228). If (229) is satisfied for
all p , then the optimal price will be greater than, equal to, or
less than p as (228) evaluated at p = p is positive, zero, or
negative. As in the case of the quantity-setting firm, the firm's
attitude toward risk plays a crucial role in determining the effect
of uncertainty on optimal price. But, in contrast with the quantity-
setting firm, the shape of C(q) will also have a bearing on how
uncertainty affects the selection of optimal price.
Under risk neutrality with constant marginal cost,
uncertainty has no effect on the price-setting firm's selection of
581
p . But when marginal cost is nonconstant, the effect of uncertainty
582
is no longer zero — even if the firm is risk neutral.
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Under risk aversion the effect of uncertainty on optimal
p depends critically on how the uncertainty of profit changes in
response to a change in price, or in symbols, on how 87T(p,u)/9p in
(228) behaves as a function of u . Results are readily obtainable if
8TT(p,u)/9p is either invariant or changing monotonically (either
ego
increasing or decreasing) with respect to u . For example, if it
is monotonically increasing and if p is the optimal price charged
584by the risk neutral firm, then it can be shown that
E{U' (tt) [8tt(p ,u)/8p]} < , which implies that the risk averse firm
will charge a lower price than the risk neutral firm. Similarly, if
37r(p,u)/8p is independent of u , changing the degree of risk aversion
will not cause the optimal price to change, while if 8ir(p,u)/9p is
monotonically decreasing with u , the risk averse firm charges a
higher price than the risk neutral firm. Since there are no a priori
grounds on which to base a conjecture on the sign of 3[9tt(p , u)/9p]/9u ,
the analysis is inconclusive. Thus, since changes in cost uncer-
tainty may or may not offset changes in total revenue uncertainty, it
is impossible to say just how the uncertainty of profit changes in
response to changes in price. As a consequence, the principle of
increasing uncertainty, which was invoked in the previous subsection
to draw definite conclusions regarding the effect of uncertainty on
the optimal output of quantity-setting firms, is alone insufficient
for deriving comparative conclusions for price-setting firms because
586
of the random nature of these firms' costs.
The distinguishing characteristics of Leland's model of
the quantity-setting firm under uncertainty are summarized in table
11-25.
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Table 11-25 Summary of Leland's Model
of the Price-Setting Firm
Class:














Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (213) , (227) in text)
maximize the expected utility of total profit
product demand relation (q = q(p,u));
implicitly factor supply and technological
conditions embodied in C(q)
level of fixed costs (F)
quantity of output (q) , price (p) , and total
profit (it)
price (p)
level of fixed costs (F) could be varied as
in the model of the quantity-setting firm
subsumed
allows for uncertainty and utilizes the time-
state-preference framework
characterization of the equilibrium position
of the firm and utilization of comparative
statics to determine the effects of uncertainty
on this equilibrium position
single period
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
unconstrained optimization (by substituting
(227) into (213))
d. Summary
The Leland model demonstrates that, in contrast to the
certainty model of traditional theory, the firm's selection of price
and quantity under uncertainty is generally not insensitive to changes
in fixed costs and the firm will, in general, behave somewhat differ-
ently according to whether it sets quantity or price (or both) prior
587
to observing market demand. In addition, due to risk aversion the
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quantity-setting firm will (if the principle of increasing uncer-
tainty holds) generally produce less under uncertainty than it would
under certainty, but whether the price-setting firm charges a higher
or lower price will depend on how the uncertainty of profit changes
as price changes.
The Leland models just discussed are single period models
of the single product firm. Neither the restriction to a single period
nor the restriction to a single product is a serious limitation,
however. Zabel has developed a multiperiod model of the single product
588
firm under uncertainty, and several models of the multiproduct
589firm under uncertainty, including models due to Dhrymes and Meyer,
have appeared in the literature. The Meyer model is set out in the
next subsection. By focusing their attention on the firm's pricing
and output decisions, the Leland models discussed above subsume first,
the firm's input decisions, and second, finance and the role of the
firm's shareholders. Holthausen and others have studied the impact
590
of uncertainty on the firm's input choices. Holthausen found that,
under risk aversion, the price-setting imperfect competitor employs
a less-than-efficient expected capital-labor ratio and that increasing
591
risk aversion tends to decrease the firm's capital stock. The
interaction between the stock market and the firm's production decisions
has also been studied recently. The final model outlined in this
section is a second model due to Leland that incorporates the stock
market.
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3. The Risk-Efficient Multiproduct Firm
In the previous subsection the firm produced a single output
and set either price or quantity, but not both, prior to observing
actual market demand. In this subsection the firm produces n goods
and determines the price and quantity of each to be supplied to the
market before actual demand is known. First, the basic model is
developed for uncorrelated demands, and then the model is adapted to
allow for correlations.
592
a. The Meyer Model
A firm produces n goods, the amounts of which are denoted
593
by q , q , ..., q . In each of the product markets the firm
enjoys a monopoly, so that the market demand curve for the i-th good,
which will be denoted by D = D (p. , . .
. , p , u.) , i = 1, . . . , n ,
is also the firm's demand curve for the i-th good, where D. is the
quantity demanded of the i-th good, p. is the market price of the
i-th good set by the firm, and u. is the state of nature within the
594
market for the i-th good. Given the prices p , ... , p ,
2 2
quantity demanded has mean E[D.] = D.* and variance E[(D. -D.*) ] = a. ,
both of which are assumed finite. For comparison with riskless
settings, the expected quantity certainty demand curve,
D * = E[D.(p. , ... , p ,u)] = h(p , ... , p ) , (232)
x li n 1 n
which is analogous to (230) for the Leland model, is used. It is




, q ,Q) , where Q represents capacity, is known with certainty.
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The use of the capacity variable Q needs further explana-
tion. In the peak-load pricing problem q. units of output, say
kilowatts of electricity, are sold each period. The firm (i.e. electric
power utility) has a fixed capacity of Q kilowatts per period, so
595that there are n production constraints, q. < Q , i = 1 , ...,n.
For the case of the discriminating monopolist, again say an electric
utility, but this time selling to n different groups of customers
n
596in one period, there is the production constraint Z q. _< Q .
1=1
In each case Q is a physical constraint on the number of units that
may be produced. This treatment of capacity differs from the more
conventional treatment of the firm in the short run in which the firm
is always free to increase output by using additional amounts of the
variable inputs and in which the law of diminishing returns ensures
that with fixed capital stock the short run cost curves eventually
597become progressively steeper as output is increased. This steep-
ening and the conventional MR = MC rule for profit maximization make
it unnecessary to consider explicitly physical constraints on capacity.
In many industries, such as electric power generation, marginal costs
may rise very slowly, or possibly even remain constant or decline as
598
capacity is approached, so that the physical constraint on capacity
must be stated explicitly. In keeping with Meyer's approach, the
599





where g is a continuously dif ferentiable function of the q.'s ,
which are, as usual, restricted to be nonnegative. When there is strict
inequality in (233) there is said to be 'spare capacity'.
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In addition to (233) and the nonnegativity constraints on
the p. 's , q.'s , and Q , there are n chance constraints that
i i
relate the quantity supplied of each good to the random quantity
demanded. In the certainty case the riskless constraint D. < q.i — ni
ensures that all demands are satisfied. For the case of the discrimin-
ating monopolist, at least, this also ensures that the market is in
equilibrium (i.e. quantity demanded = quantity supplied at the prevailing
price) when the monopolist is in equilibrium. But under uncertainty
such a constraint is not meaningful since the actual quantity demanded,
D , is a random variable. The most direct generalization of the
a 1,1 .... 600riskless constraint is
Prob {D. > q.} <_ e. , i = 1 , ... , n , (234)
which states that the probability that quantity demanded exceeds
quantity supplied cannot exceed e
.
,
where < e . < 1 . For the case
of the discriminating monopolist, the probabilistic constraint (234)
implies that, when the monopolist is in equilibrium, the market may
not be since quantity demanded can exceed quantity supplied (at the
prevailing price) . It will be simpler in what follows to be able to
work with the riskless equivalent of (234)
:
q. > D.* + N.a. , (235)Hi — i i i '
where N. is the number of standard deviations above the mean demand
l
just needed to satisfy (234)
.
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The objective of the firm's managers is to maximize the
602
total market value of the firm,
V = £ {e[tt] - R3a^} , (236)
where p is the riskless rate of interest, E [it] is expected total
profit, R is the market-determined price of risk, and 3cr gives
risk as the product of the standard deviation of the firm's total
profit, a , times the coefficient of correlation, 3 > relating the
firm's total profit to overall market returns (i.e. the returns on a
fin "\
portfolio made up of all firms' securities). In (236) total profit,
tt
,
can be expressed as
n
tt = Z p.D. - C(q. , ...
, q ,Q) , (237)
. ,11 1 n1=1
provided it is assumed that £. in (234) has been chosen small enough
so that the number of lost sales is insignificant. When e. is chosen
i
in this manner, the probability that the market for the i-th good will
be in disequilibrium when the firm is in equilibrium is made small.
If it is assumed that the demands for the different goods are uncorre-
lated, then, from (237), the standard deviation of total profit is
n
2 2 1/2




Substituting (237) and (238) into (236) and evaluating E[tt] in terms
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of E[D.] = D.* gives the new objective function
1
f n f n 2 2)l 1
V - I
J
EiP±V - cCq, , ... , qn ,Q) - *j* p± c. I (239)
To maximize (238) the firm must select optimal values for the p. 's
,
q. 's , and Q from among those values satisfying (232) , (234) , and
the nonnegativity constraints. The model of the firm can be formulated





maximize: V = -[ Z p.D.*-C(q_, ..., q ,Q) -Rg{ Z p. G. } ]
r ~ "i P . . 1 1 1 n .-11
subject to: q. > D * + N
±
, i = 1 , ... , n (240)
g(q 1 > ••• . qn ) i Q
p. >0, q.^0, i = 1 , . . . , n ; Q >_ .
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to (240)
are, in addition to (233) and (235), the following:
8L - dD.* n -
-\ ' dD.*






Fi 1 *i 1 pi dp
±
i = 1 , ... , n (241)
S7 - -if:- x !f: + ^ • ° • i = 1 n (2A2>
w = "if +x " ° (243)
These necessary conditions can be used collectively to characterize
the equilibrium position of the discriminating monopolist.
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Optimal capacity investment, Q , is characterized by
(243), which can be rewritten as follows:
x
- f | • <**>
The right-hand side of (244) is interpreted as the marginal cost of
capacity, capitalized at the riskless rate of interest, and the left-
hand side is interpreted as the 'risk-adjusted' quasi-rent on capacity,
measured as the instantaneous rate of change of the total market
value of the firm with respect to an increase in capacity. Thus,
condition (244) is just the familiar equilibrium condition equating
marginal value to marginal cost, this time applied to investment in
capacity under uncertainty.
The firm's optimal pricing policy is suggested by (241).






[MV - sh ~r^-] • 1 = 1 n - (245)K 1 IT
where MR.* = p. + D.* (dp./dD.*) is the equilibrium value of riskless
l l l l i
marginal revenue and O is given by (238) . The expression in
brackets is interpreted as risky marginal revenue, which is equal to
riskless marginal revenue plus a marginal risk adjustment,
dp R6p G 2
-
—=r =-=— . Equation (245) states that at optimality the Lagrange
dD * a
i it
multiplier y. gives the capitalized value of risky marginal revenue
for the i-th good. Note that since R
, p. , O. , and O^ are
all nonnegative in (245), while dp./dD * is negative and 8 may be
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either positive or negative (or zero) , the sign of 3 determines the
sign of the marginal risk adjustment. The significance of the sign
of 3 is discussed below.
Optimal production policy is defined by (242) . After
using (244) to substitute for X , equation (242) yields the equilibrium
condition





"9?" + F8Q^7 ' i= 1 , ... , n . (246)
The right-hand side of (246) is interpreted as capitalized marginal
1 9C
production cost, — -z—
,
plus capitalized marginal capacity cost,
—
-rr -s— , and the left-hand side, as in (245), is interpreted as
the capitalized value of risky marginal revenue. According to equation
(246), given optimal prices and capacity, the firm should continue
to expand the output of each good up to the point at which the capi-
talized value of risky marginal revenue just equals capitalized marginal
production cost plus capitalized marginal capacity cost.
How the existence of uncertainty affects the behavior of
the firm is largely determined by 3 . When the profits of the firm
are uncorrelated with overall market returns, so that 3 - , the
marginal risk adjustment term in (245) disappears and (245) and (246)
together yield the equilibrium condition under certainty,
"V - % + f-f:> i = 1 »• < 247 >
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Provided the firm chooses e small enough to ensure that D * is
the average quantity sold, the behavior of the firm is not otherwise
affected by the presence of uncertainty. This is not true when
3^0. If the firm's profits are positively correlated with overall
market returns (i.e. profits vary cyclically), then 3 > , risky
marginal revenue exceeds riskless marginal revenue at each level of
output, and it follows that, for given output levels q , the same
effective demand for capacity would require lower prices under uncer-
tainty than would be required under certainty. When profits are nega-
tively correlated with overall market returns (i.e. profits vary
countercyclically) , then 3 < and the opposite is true.
The next subsection generalizes the model just discussed
to permit nonzero correlations between demands. By way of summarizing
the discussion thus far, the distinguishing features of Meyer's
model of the firm when demands are uncorrelated are presented in
table 11-26.
b. The Problem of Correlation Between Demands
Thus far in the discussion it has been assumed that demands
are uncorrelated. This assumption permitted a in (238) to take
on a particularly simple form. To allow for nonzero correlations
between demands requires two fundamental changes in the model (240)
.
This subsection describes the needed changes.
First, the expression for a , the standard deviation of
the firm's total profit, in the valuation equation (239) must be modified.
The basic valuation equation is still (236) and total profits, tt , are
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Type of Model :
Solution Technique
modern traditional (see (240) in text)
maximize the total market value of the firm
market demand conditions (as embodied in
D. = D. (p , ..., p ,u )), probabilistic constraint
on proportion of unsatisfied demands (as embodied
in q >^ D, * + N^cr^) , and capacity constraint
(as embodied in g(q,>...,q ) £ Q) J and implicitly,
technological and factor supply conditions (as
embodied in C(q !»••• ,q
n
,Q))
maximum proportion of demands for each good
that go unsatisfied (£.) and hence the number
of standard deviations (N.) (of quantity supplied
above expected quantity demanded)
,
market price
of risk (R) , correlation coefficient (6) , and
the variance of quantity demanded for each good
(a. 2 )
total market value of the firm (V)
,
price of
each good (p.), quantity supplied of each good
(q.), capacity (Q) , and expected quantity
demanded of each good (D.*)
price of each good (p^) , quantity supplied
of each good (q
. ) , and capacity (Q)
subsumed
permits uncertainty and utilizes the mean-
variance framework
characterization of the equilibrium position
of the firm, while permitting one or more
product markets served by the firm to be in
disequilibrium
single period
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
classical Lagrange multipliers (or generalized
Lagrange multipliers if one or more inequality
constraints are to be permitted to be non-




still given by (237) , but when demands are correlated the standard
deviation of total profit is
f
n 11/2
^ "LV^l +2 .1 P±Pj°ij' ' (248)[i=l i>J J J i
where a = E[(D. -D.*) (D. -D.*)] is the covariance between
quantities demanded of the i-th and j-th goods.
Second, the character of random demand is more complex due
to the correlations. The optimum output levels cannot be determined
separately. The interactions among quantities demanded require that
the n separate constraints given by (234) be replaced by the constraint
Prob {D > q} < e , (249)
where D = (D , . . . , D ) is a random n-vector of quantities
demanded, q = (q.. , ... , q ) is a nonrandom n-vector of quantities
produced, and < e < 1 . Letting D* = (D * , ... , D *) and
assuming that Q, = E[(D-D*) (D-D*) ] is nonsingular and positive
definite, the constraint (249) may be expressed as
Prob {Q, (D-D*) > Q, (q - D*) } <_ £ , and if N is a n-vector of
nonnegative constants such that the constraint is satisfied with
Q, (q - D*) 2l N , then the constraint (249) can be reexpressed in the
equivalent riskless form
q > D* + ^ N . (250)
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Given these modifications, the model of the firm can be








- F* ViV- c(<i ' "' ' vQ)i=l
n ^




+ 2 Z p. p. a. .} ]
i=l i>i J J






P, > , q, > , i = 1 , ... , n ; Q > ,
— l — —
where S is the i-th element of the n-vector QtJ . Forming the
614
Lagrangian and differentiating would yield first order conditions
very similar to (241) - (243) . Indeed, (242) and (243) are unchanged
and (241) is only slightly changed as follows:
3L,
,
dD.* R6(p.0. 2 + Z P.,0..) dD.*
dp. p r i dp. l a l dp.
i = 1 , ... , n (252)
The presence of correlated demands does not affect the production and
investment decision rules, but it does affect the firm's pricing







t [MRi*~ W^ m * * a X "] 3 ^ }] (253)
i TT
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where MR * is once again interpreted as the riskless marginal revenue
and y is once again interpreted as the capitalized value of risky
marginal revenue. But whereas MR * is unchanged from (245), y
2 2has been modified by the replacement of p. (7. with p.cr + Z p.a,.
i i i l , v . j iii>3
to reflect the fact that the standard deviation of the firm's profit,
which is one component of risk, depends on the correlations between
demands
.
In a world of certainty the prices charged by a discriminating
monopolist must always exceed marginal production cost whenever demand
is less than perfectly elastic. This is no longer true under uncer-
tainty. The term in braces in (253) represents the marginal risk
contributed by the i-th group of customers. Since prices are nonnega-
tive, the marginal risk contribution can be negative when the correla-
tions a are sufficiently negative. If, as is normally assumed,
stock market investors are risk averse, then, for any given level of
expected profit, the total market value of the firm will be maximized
by selecting prices that minimize total risk. It follows that those
groups of customers for which the marginal risk contribution is nega-
tive will pay prices that are lower relative to marginal production
cost than groups of customers for which the marginal risk contribution
is nonnegative. Conceivably, the prices charged one or more groups
of customers could lie below marginal production cost — something that
f) 1 ft
could never happen in a riskless setting — and possibly even lie in
619
the range where riskless marginal revenue is negative. The reason
for this is that in a risky setting where investors are risk averse it
will be in the firm's economic interest to sacrifice some expected
368
profit whenever doing so will enable a reduction in overall risk
sufficient to increase the total market value of the firm.
For the multiproduct firm, then, there are two reasons
why a product might sell at a price below marginal production cost.
The first, strong complementarities among the products, exists whether
or not there is uncertainty. The second, a strong negative marginal
risk contribution, is a consequence of market equilibrium in a risk
averse stock market in an uncertain world.
To summarize the discussion of the Meyer model with nonzero
correlations between demands, the distinguishing characteristics of
the model are presented in table 11-27.
The model discussed in the next subsection takes a much
closer look at the link between the stock market and the firm's produc-
tion decisions. In particular, it will be found that in a risky envir-
onment the stock market value of the firm has a crucial direct impact
on the firm's output decision, and further, that the maximization of
the stock market value of the firm, which was assumed in the Meyer
model, does not in general lead to a Pareto optimal choice of outputs.
4. The Role of the Stock Market: Value Maximization Reconsidered
Earlier in this section it was found that when there is a com-
plete set of markets for contingent claims it is in the best interests
of every shareholder to have the firm's managers maximize the total
market va! ue of the firm. Each firm's time-state-contingent returns
are evaluated at the established market prices of time-state-contingent
claims, wl ich are equal to the respective marginal rates of substitution
for each shareholder, as indicated by the equilibrium conditions (201)
.
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Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (251) in text)
maximize the total market value of the firm
market demand conditions (as embodied in
D
i
= D.(p ,...,p ,1^)), probabilistic constraint
on proportion of unsatisfied demands (as
embodied in q > D.* + S ), and capacity
constraint (as embodied in g(q , . . . ,q ) <^ Q) j
and implicitly, technological and factor supply
conditions (as embodied in C(q. q ,Q))
n
maximum proportion of demands that go
unsatisfied (e) and hence the number of
'standard deviations' (N# ) ( f quantity supplied
above expected quantity demanded)
, market price
of risk (R) , correlation coefficient (6)
,
and variance-covariance matrix (fi)
total market value of the firm (V)
,
price of
each good (p.), quantity supplied of each good
(q.), capacity (Q) , and expected quantity
demanded of each good (D.*)
price of each good (p.), quantity supplied of
each good (q . ) , and capacity (Q)
subsumed
permits uncertainty and utilizes the mean-
variance framework
characterization of the equilibrium position
of the firm, while permitting one or more
product markets served by the firm to be in
disequilibrium
single period
static optimization (mathematical programming
problem)
classical Lagrange multipliers (or generalized
Lagrange multipliers if one or more constraints
are to be permitted to be nonbinding at optimality).
In such a world all shareholders would unanimously agree on the desira-
bility of any proposed action by the firm that promised to increase the
firm's total market value.
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When markets are incomplete, shareholders are no longer able
to insure against every contingency. Their marginal rates of substi-
tution lor time- state-contingent income claims may differ. Consequently,
shareholders may disagree on the desirability of a proposed action by
the firm because of the decision's effect on the time-state-distribu-
tion of returns. In particular, value maximization by the firm will
not in general be Pareto optimal for the firm's shareholders, and
the firm cannot evaluate proposed investments merely on the basis of
what effect they will have on the share price.
In the Leiand model discussed below it is shown that there can
still be stockholder unanimity with respect to the production and
investment decisions of the individual firm, independent of investors'
subjective probability distributions and the shapes of their utility
functions, provided that the alternative decisions open to the firm
would not alter the set of state-distributions of returns available
too
to individuals in the whole economy. It is also shown that in
general the output decisions favored by shareholders will not maximize
the stock market value of the firm.
Consider an economy in which there are N + 1 firms, indexed
624j=0,l,...,N. Each firm produces a single good and acts
c. <y c
as a quantity-setter, as described by Baron and Sandmo. The firm
acts as a price-taker, where price is dependent on the state of nature
6 . Cost functions are known with certainty, and the j-th firm's total
profit, i , is given by
TT = p
J (6) • q j - Cj (q
:
) , j = , 1 , ... , N , (254)
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where p and q are price and output, respectively, for the j-th
firm. Assume the zeroth firm faces a certain price, so that its
i cj~ -4 v o -o o „o, o. 626 _ , _.total profit is given by u = p • q -C(q). Each firm issues
shares, which represent claims to profits such that ownership of a
fraction s. of the total shares of the firm outstanding entitles
the i-th shareholder to total returns s ^ ir . Only equity financing
is considered, so that the total market value of the j-th firm's equity,
V-' , also represents the total market value of the firm.
Further assume there are M investors, indexed i = 1 , ... , M
Each investor can be described by the following three attributes:
(i) The i-th investor's current portfolio is represented by the
~~
/
— o — N.
,
— 1 . , ,
vector s. = (s. , ... , s. ) , where s. is the fractioni l ' l ' l
he owns of the i-th firm and Es. =1, j = , 1 , ... ,N.
i=l 1
(ii) The i-th investor has utility function U.(R.,0) , which is
unique up to a positive linear transformation and which gives
utility as a function of return R^ and the state of nature.
au (r ,ej








(iii) The i-th investor's subjective probability measure over the
states of nature is y. , and expectation with respect to p.
is denoted by E. .
l
Each investor is assumed to maximize expected utility, where utility
is given by (ii) . Given his current portfolio s. and arbitrary
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market values V = (V , V , . . . , V ) , the set of portfolios the








Z V3 (s. J -s 3 ) <_ 0} . (255)
j-o x
Nonsatiability implies that the only candidates for an optimal
portfolio will be those that lead to equality in (255) . Therefore,
the equilibrium market values and portfolios must satisfy
N
Z VJ (s 3 -s. 3 ) - , for all i . (256)
j-o x x
Define R. , the total return to a portfolio s. , as
N \ X
R. - Z tt s . , and using (256) to substitute for s. , the total
1 j-0
return to the i-th investor's portfolio becomes
N . . N .
R. = r Z V3 s. 3 + Z (tt J - rVJ )s. J , (257)i ij=0 j=l
where r E tt (q )/V , the rate of return ('dividend yield') on the
riskless security.




, together with the market values V = (V , . . . , V )
are said to constitute a financial equilibrium relative to the firms'




(i) Given q and V , for each investor, i , s. is optimal
in B(V,s.) ; that is, s is the solution to the problem:




According to (258), the portfolio s. is the one, selected
from among the individual's set of affordable portfolios
(i.e. B) , that maximizes his expected utility of total
portfolio return (i.e. R.). Possessing this portfolio, the
individual investor will be in equilibrium,
(ii) Given q , V equates the supply of and demand for each
security; that is,
M
£ s. J = 1
, j = , ... , N . (259)
i=l 1
According to (259) , the market values V must be equilibrium
market values, i.e. for each j, j = , ... , N , the
market value V must be such that the associated price of
each security (e.g. price of each share of common stock)
equates the supply of to the demand for the outstanding shares
of the j-th security.
The reason for fixing q in (i) and (ii) is that a change in q will
alter the distributions of profits perceived by investors. Therefore,
the financial equilibrium {s , ... , s ;V} is dependent on q .
Conditions (i) of financial equilibrium require that each
investor solve problem (258). Using (257), which was obtained by using
374
(256) to eliminate s. , to substitute for R. yields an unconstrained
i i
maximization probTem equivalent to (258). The necessary conditions







,e) {7Tj -rVj }] = ; j = 1 , ... , N ; (260)
i = 1 , ... , M .
Substituting for ir 3 using (254) permits (260) to be rewritten as







. r \o>q J -C J (q J ) -rV3 }] =0; j = l N; (261)
Combining equations (256), (259), and (260) (or (261)) produces a
system of (N + 1) (M + 1) equations in the (N + 1) (M + 1) unknowns
s. and V, i = 1 , ... , M ; j = , ... , N . The solution to
this system of equations provides the collection of individual port-
folios and the set of security prices that constitute a financial
equilibrium (which, it must be emphasized, is contingent upon the
firms' output decisions).
A vector of outputs q = (q , ... , q ) is said to constitute
a production equilibrium when outputs q are "in the stockholders'
interests" — in the sense that there does not exist some other vector
—
—o —N
of outputs q = (q , . . . , q ) at which all stockholders would be
better of- — when current portfolios and market values constitute a
629financial 3quilibrium relative to q . Thus, when production
equilibrium and financial equilibrium hold simultaneously, there is
no impetus for q , V , or any of the s. s to change. This notion
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of a production equilibrium differs from the notion of the equilibrium
level of output discussed previously in that the vector q results
from general equilibrium, whereas in the models discussed previously
each firm's optimal output level was determined in partial equilibrium
(i.e. for a particular firm with the prices, output levels, etc., of
all other firms held fixed)
.
One of the main results proved by Leland is the Unanimity
fit ^n
Theorem, which states that when firms function within a random
environment in accordance with (254) and when current portfolios and
market values are in financial equilibrium (given current production
o Ndecisions q=(q
,
... , q )), a firm's stockholders will vote
unanimously for (or against) small changes in output. In symbols,
3E.[U.(R,,6)]
i i ifor each firm k , the sign of r is the same for all
stockholders. One of the consequences of the Unanimity Theorem is
a characterization of the production equilibrium. Since the details
of the proof are provided in Leland 's paper, they will not be given
here. Rather, only the main line of argument will be sketched.
For the riskless firm:
8E [U.(R. ,6)] 9R111
= E.[U.'(R.,6) —3
,
-o i L i l ' o J '
dq 8q
where R. is given by (257). As q changes, so also will V ,
r , and s. . Using (260), s - s
±
,
and tt° = p~°q° - C°(q°)
,
the
rate of change of the i-th investor's expected utility with respect to
o
a change in q can be expressed as
8E. [U. (R. ,6)]111




where MCJ (q J ) = "-2. , j = , ... , N . But by the nonsatia-
dq 3
bility assumption, E.[U.'(R ,6)] s. is strictly positive for all
investors with s. > — i.e. for all stockholders of the riskless
i
firm. Then (262) has the sign of [p - MC(q )] for every one of






= E, [U.'(R. ,6) (pR (6) - MCTCq*)} s. K ] . (263)K 1X1 1
3q
k = 1 , ... , N
By using (261) to substitute for E,[U '(R.,6) • p
k
(9)] , (263) can










(\)+r^ - MCk (qk )] . (264)
8q
k X X X X
q
k
k = 1 , ... , N







MOk. kv ,ign of —^\ MC (q ) for
633 q
(264) will be the same as the s -g
every one of the firm's shareholders
The Unanimity Theorem leads to the following characterization
of production equilibrium, q = (q , ... , q ) . From (262) the
optimal output level for the riskless firm is the output level q
for which




which is just the familiar price equals marginal cost rule for
maximizing profit in perfectly competitive markets under certainty.
From (26 A) the optimal output level, q , for the k-th risky firm
is that which satisfies
cJ(
^V r"Jffl - »cj « j > • i- 1 n >
where VJ (q) has been written to emphasize the dependence of V3
on q . According to equation (266) , in order for the j-th risky firm
to be in equilibrium, the firm must choose q such that marginal
production cost, MC~'(q J ) , just equals the "total" average cost, which
cJ(qJ)
is the sum of average production costs, -?— , and an imputed average
rV^(q^) 634 q
capital cost, .^ . What (266) makes clear is that the risky
q
J
firm's output decision is dependent on financial factors (i.e. its
stock market value VJ (q ) ) as well as on real factors (i.e. production
costs). In the certainty case, as indicated by (265), these financial
factors are inconsequential. Under certainty, with perfect capital
markets, the firm's production decisions are separable from its
financial decisions, and Modigliani's and Miller's Proposition I
holds.
If firms set their output levels according to (265) and (266),
one may ask whether the equilibrium outputs q = (q , ... , q ) will,




3q j J -Jq = q
and the method of proof is to show that, in general,




, evaluating at q = qJ , and simplifying, leads to
the equation




3q j 8q j
(267)
+ ± [ E,{U,"(R,,e)(Tr j -rVj ) (3, j -^r + Z (TTk - rV*) —i- )}] = ,D
i
X X ± X
dqJ k^j 8q J
where D ~ E. {U. '(R. ,0) (t^ - rV^)
2
} < . Summing (267) over all M
M 9s j
individuals and noting that Z — = gives
i=l 8q J








=q j r Z ^- [E.{U. ' (R. ,6) }]
1=1 *
(268)
in which the nonsatiability assumption and D. < ensure that the
denominator is always negative, but in which the sign of the numerator
is, in general, indeterminate. Moreover, the numerator of (268) is,
in general, nonzero, which implies that value maximization by firms does
not lead to a Pareto optimal choice of outputs. If a firm were to
choose it. output level so as to maximize its market value, every share-
holder conld be made better off by an appropriate change in output away
*- -t, i -.4 J 638,639from the alue-maximizing q .
To summarize the discussion of Leland's model of the firm in the
context of stock market equilibrium, the distinguishing characteristics
of the model are presented in table 11-28.
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Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (256), (259) and (261)
in text)
maximize each shareholder's expected utility
const raiii t on affordable portfolios (as embodied
in B(V,s i )); implicitly, factor supply and
technological conditions (as embodied in C^ (q-0)
probability distribution of price for each firm
(pJ(8)) and investors' current portfolios (s^)
equilibrium collection of portfolios (s^) »
equilibrium set of market values (V)
,
equilibrium
output levels (q^) , and equilibrium expected
utility levels (E^U^R^S)]
)
equilibrium portfolio for each investor (s.)
and equilibrium output level for each firm (q^)
external financing (equity only) is permitted,
although in the model discussed in the text the
actual issuance of shares was subsumed in the
collection of current portfolios (s.)
permits uncertainty and utilizes the time-state-
preference framework
characterization of the equilibrium output
decision by each firm in the context of stock
market equilibrium
single period
system of (N + 1)(M+1) equations in (N + 1)(M+1)
unknowns for the characterization of financial
equilibrium; unconstrained optimization problem
for each firm for the characterization of
production equilibrium
unconstrained optimization (for each firm)
The significance of the Leland model lies in its integration of
the firm's production decisions into a model of stock market equilibrium
and its demonstration that, in general, maximizing the stock market (or
total market) value of the firm does not necessarily lead to production
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decisions that are optimal from the standpoint of the firm's shareholders
In contrast to the traditional models, which subsumed the role of
finance, Leland's model demonstrates the inextricability of production
decisions and the stock market when capital markets are incomplete.
Also, in contrast to the models discussed earlier in this paper that
simply assumed value maximizing behavior to be in the shareholders'
best interests, Leland's model shows that this simple criterion cannot
be relied on to ensure a Pareto optimal choice of outputs, unless certain
assumptions (e.g. perfect and complete capital markets) are satisfied.
L. CONTROL THEORY, DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION, AND CORPORATE GROWTH
According to the traditional theory of the firm, the environment
within which the typical firm operates is static and the decisions it
must make apply to only a single time period. In the traditional models
discussed above in sections B through E, the firm in the short run
engages in myopic profit maximization by simultaneously selecting and
instantaneously adopting the cost-minimizing mix of variable inputs and
the profit-maximizing mix of outputs. Over the long run the firm is
free to add to its capital stock and it does so to the extent that the
added capital leads to increased productive efficiency and greater long
run total profit. As in the short run, adjustments occur instantaneously.
Moreover, short run profit maximization is perfectly consistent with
long run profit maximization, so that intertemporal profit trade offs
do not appear in the model. Even in the reformulated version of the
neoclassiral model discussed above in section F, in which the firm is
assumed tc maximize the stock market value of its outstanding shares in
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the absence of uncertainty, the firm's selection of its optimal operating
policies is still in essence a single period optimization problem.
In many of the recently developed models, the firm is permitted to
grow, and the decision-making problem it faces involves setting its
operating policies so as to place it on the optimal growth path. But
often, as in the Marris and Baumol growth models of section G, the
Herendeed model of section I, and the Lintner model of section J,
the firm is assumed to grow in steady state, in which all quantities
(e.g. the capital stock, total profit, total revenue, the stock market
value of the firm, etc.) grow at the same rate and all ratios (e.g.
641profit rate, leverage ratio, retention ratio, etc.) remain constant.
By assuming steady state growth, economists have been able to express
their models of the firm as static optimization problems, which can be
solved either by applying the method of Lagrange multipliers or by
appealing to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, depending on the nature of the
642
constraints. In spite of the advantages due to this simplification
and Marris' s and Lintner 's defense of this approach in terms of the
firm's selection of optimal long run operating targets, the steady
state approach has been found wanting by many economists. To quote
644
Krouse:
[Studies that assume steady-state growth] consider only
the special equilibrium structure of corporate events where
the economic state of the firm is identical in every period
except by a constant scale factor, and all its decisions
and exogenous variables (for example, discount rates) are
required to be constant through time. Concomitantly, they
limit the models to comparative dynamics, which is not
useful for the analysis of the firm's decision rules or
states as exogenous variables change over time, but only
appropriate for the comparison of firms with different,
time-constant values of these variables.
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Steady state models are unable to explain the pattern of capital investment
over time in the presence of either the business cycle or factors that
might cause the growth rate of the firm to slow down as the firm matures.
To deal with such problems effectively, a dynamic optimization technique
645
is required.
This section presents several multiperiod models of the firm. Each
model is expressed in the form of an optimal control problem, in which
form the multiperiod equilibrium position (i.e. the equilibrium growth
path) of the firm can be characterized with the aid of either the classical
calculus of variations or the maximum principle. As pointed out in
chapter one of this paper, the maximum principle can be considered the
extension of the method of Lagrange multipliers to dynamic optimization.
Indeed, the costate variables of the maximum principle and the Lagrange
multipliers of static constrained optimization are interpreted similarly —
as shadow prices — with the difference being that, in the dynamic
optimization, the time path for each costate variable — rather than just




The first model discussed below is due to Jorgenson. In his model
Jorgenson reexpresses the neoclassical theory of the firm in terms of
a multiperiod framework. The second model discussed below, which is due
to Arrow, analyzes the firm's pattern of capital investment in the
presence of the business cycle. The third subsection describes two
approaches, one due to Wong, which utilizes the Jorgenson model, and
the other due to Leland, to reconciling the controversy concerning
whether fa-rms maximize total profit, the rate of growth, or some other
quantity. The final subsection explores a model developed by Krouse,
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which deals with the firm's financial decisions in the presence of
capital market imperfections and which employs the discrete version of
the maximum principle.
1. A Dynamic Version of the Neoclassical Theory:
The Jorgenson Model
The Jorgenson model is directly concerned with determining the
firm's optimal program of capital accumulation. In the model it is
assumed that the firm produces a single output, the amount of which is
denoted by Q(t)
,
using two inputs, one a variable input (say, labor),
the amount of which is denoted by L(t)
,
and the other a capital input,
the amount of which is denoted by K(t) . In each case the t in
parentheses denotes the variable's dependence on time. The firm's
gross investment is denoted by I(t) . The markets for the firm's
output, for labor, and for durable investment goods are assumed to be
perfectly competitive, so that the prices of output, labor, and




and q(t) , respectively,
vary as functions of time only. The net cash flow at time t ,
denoted by R(t)
,
is the difference between total revenue and total
cash outlays for labor services and for new investment goods,
R(t) = p(t) • Q(t) - w(t) • L(t) - q(t) • I(t) . (269)
The objective of the firm is to maximize its present value, which
Jorgenson expresses as the present value of the future cash flow stream,
which in turn is represented by the integral
V = / R(t)e rt dt , (270)
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where r is the rate of discount, which, for simplicity, is assumed
constant.
Present value is maximized subject to two constraints, one being
the standard neoclassical production function.
F(Q(t), L(t), K(t)) = , (271)
and the other being the expression for net investment, or the instan-
taneous rate of growth of the capital stock, as the difference between
gross investment and the rate of depreciation:
K(t) = I(t) - 6- K(t)
, (272)
c. c o
where 6 is some positive constant. It is assumed that the function
F in (271) has a full set of continuous second partial derivatives, and
further, that the marginal rate of technical substitution between inputs
and the marginal productivity of each input are all always positive.
In (272) the rate of depreciation at time t , 6 • K(t) , is proportional
to the capital stock at time t ; that is, it is assumed that depreciation
occurs at a constant proportional rate. Both (271) and (272) must hold
at each time t .
Collecting (270)-(272), the Jorgenson model of the firm is
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expressed as the following optimal control problem:
00
— rt
maximize: V = f R(t)e dt
{U,L,I}
sabject to: K(t) = I(t) - 6 K(t) , Vt
K(0) = K (273)
F(Q(t), L(t), K(t)) = , Vt
Q(t), L(t), K(t) > , Vt ,
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where K is the initial capital stock. Problem (273) can be solved
with the aid of the calculus of variations. The Lagrangian is
00
L, = / [Re~
rt
+ X(t) • F(Q,L,K) + y(t) • (K - I - 6 • K) ] dt , (274)
in which, for simplicity, the dependence of R, Q, L, K, K , and I
on t has been suppressed. For ease of exposition denote by f>(t)
the expression in brackets in (274) . Then the Euler necessary conditions







• f = ° (275)
-^ = -we"
rt




- y(t) = (277)
I"" IF^ - *<*> 'W +& -.(t)-^y(t) = (278)
Equations (275)- (278) can be used collectively to characterize the
multiperiod equilibrium position of the Jorgenson-type firm.
Combining (275) and (276) yields the familiar factor market
condition for profit maximization:
• f - • • < 279 >
According to (279) , the firm should hire additional amounts of the
variable input up to the point at which the marginal revenue product of
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the last unit hired just equals its price (i.e. the wage rate). The
difference between (279) and the similar condition (8) derived in
section B is that (279) must hold at every point in time over the
indefinite future, whereas (8) holds only for a single instant. As in
the single period case, (279) can be rewritten to yield the product






where (280) holds at every point in time, in contrast to (11) and (12)
in section B, which hold only for a single instant.
A result perfectly analogous to (279) may be obtained for
capital services if the quantity
i = q(r+6) - q , (281)
where the dot denotes differentiation with respect to time, is inter-
preted as the unit price of capital services (i.e. the 'cost of
capital'). * 657 From (277) y(t) = -qe~ rt . Differentiating with
respect to t gives — p(t) = qre - qe . Substituting for
y(t) and — u(t) in (278) gives
at
WfcN 8F x -rt -rt • -rt , . s 8F . -rt _A(t) ££ - 5qe - rqe + qe = A(t) -^ - l • e = .
(282)
Combining ^275) and (282) gives
p • f l • (283)
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which is analogous to (279), and which, in contrast to (14) in section
B, holds at every point in time. Further, combining (279) and (283)








It follows from (284) that, at each point in time, the marginal rate
of technical substitution between the inputs must equal the ratio of
the input prices.
Thus, in the Jorgenson model the firm maximizes its present
value by maximizing total profit at each point in time. This
aspect of the model represents a strength and at the same time a
weakness. On the plus side, the model demonstrates that the neo-
classical theory of the firm does not have to be confined to static
conditions and to single period decision-making. On the minus side,
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the model is barely dynamic. That is, the firm never has to make
any intertemporal profit trade offs; all it need do is to maximize
total profit at each point in time. Under the assumptions of certainty
and perfect markets, the myopic decision rules that lead to maximum
single period total profit are also intertemporally optimal for the
value maximizing firm. Moreover, in addition to the assumption of a
perfect market for capital goods, it is assumed that the quality of
the capital goods owned by the firm and the rate at which they
depreciate are independent of the age of the goods (i.e. there is no
technological obsolescence). Under these assumptions investment is
reversible, and the firm at any point in time is able to sell any or
all of its capital at the prevailing market price. In such a world,
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the rental price of capital services accurately reflects the interest
rate, the rate of depreciation, and the rate of change of the price
of capital goods, and consequently, the present value of the stream
of future rentals just equals the current price of capital goods, and
at the margin the firm is indifferent between renting and owning.
This is a rather special case, as the discussion of the Arrow model in
the next subsection will make clear.
To summarize this subsection, the main features of the Jorgenson
model are presented in table 11-29.













Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
modern traditional (see (273) in text)
maximize the stock market value of the firm
(expressed as the present value of the future
cash flow stream)
technological constraint (embodied in the pro-
duction function) and relationship between net
investment, gross investment, and depreciation
(K = I - 6K)
prices of output, labor, and investment goods
at each point in time (p(t), w(t)
, and q(t),
respectively) , initial capital stock (KQ )
,
market rate of discount (r) , and rate of
depreciation (<5)
rates of flow of output and labor services at
each point in time (Q(t) and L(t) respectively)
,
gross investment and capital stock at each
point in time (I(t) and K(t) , respectively),
cash flow at each point in time (R(t)), and
current stock market value of the firm (V)
streams of output, labor services, and gross
investment (Q(t) , L(t), and I(t) , respectively)
subsumed
assumes certainty
characterization of the multiperiod equilibrium
position of the firm (and in particular, the time
path of its capital stock)
multiperiod (continuous time)
dynamic optimization (optimal control problem)
classical calculus of variations
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2. Optimal Capital Accumulation When Investment is
Irreversible: The Arrow Model
In the Jorgenson model of the preceding subsection, investment
was costlessly reversible, and as a consequence, the firm's decision
as to how much capital to hold at any point in time was myopic — being
independent of future product demand, future improvements in technology,
etc. It followed from equations (281) and (283) that the firm should
hold just that stock of capital for which the marginal revenue product
of capital equals the cost of capital, where the latter is equal to the
short term interest rate plus the rate of depreciation less the rate of
appreciation of capital goods prices. Thus, only forecasts of near
term capital goods prices are needed. In this special case, investment
is reversible so that the firm can buy a unit of capital, derive its
marginal revenue product over some time span, and then sell the
undepreciated balance at the prevailing market price.
In the Jorgenson model the myopic optimal accumulation policy
implied by (283) depends crucially on the existence of a perfect
capital goods market, which enables the firm at any point in time to
buy or sell any quantity of capital goods at the established market
price. In the Arrow model discussed in this subsection, imperfec-
tions in the market for capital goods are introduced. Due to such
factors as installation costs, which must be added to the purchase
price, the purchase price may exceed the selling price (unless installa-
tion costs could somehow be recovered in the selling price )
,
and, due to such factors as specialization, the resale price may be
substantially below book value. Thus, once an investment has been
undertaken, the firm may not have the freedom to sell that is implied
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in the Jorgenson model — and in the extreme case developed by Arrow,
investment is irreversible in that, once the capital good has been
c.c.'i
purchased, it cannot be resold. The consequences of irreversibility
are that, at times when the firm might wish to sell capital goods at
the going price, it will not be able to do so, and that, at times
when current calculations indicate that additional investment would
be profitable, the firm may refrain from investing because it expects
that changing business conditions in the near term would have led it
to disinvest if it had been able to do so. This latter effect of
irreversibility, which might be interpreted as the firm's taking
into account the business cycle (and in particular, an impending
downswing in economic activity) , introduces a dynamic element not
present in the Jorgenson model.
In the Arrow model there is one type of capital good, the stock
of which at time t is denoted by K(t) . All other inputs are
variable. It is assumed that, given K(t) , the variable inputs are
combined to produce the outputs in such a way that total operating
profit, defined as total revenue less the cost of variable inputs
and denoted by P(K(t),t) , is maximized. The separate argument t
in P(K(t),t) reflects the fact that the functional relationship
between P and K may shift over time due to improvements in tech-
nology, changes in supply or demand conditions, etc. That is, the separate
argument t may be interpreted as a surrogate for technological change.
As usual, die marginal productivity of capital is assumed strictly
8P(K(t} t)
positive, do that P„ = — \v > » and it is assumed that there
a P(K(t^ t)
are diminishing returns to capital, so that P = \ ? < .m
9K
2
It is further assumed that the market for money capital is perfect,
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though interest rates may change over time (but in a known way) . Let
a(t) denote the factor to be applied to receipts at time t to
discount them back to time zero. Then the short term rate of interest
at time t
,
p(t) , is represented by
p(t) = - i(t)/a(t)
, (285)
where, as before, the dot indicates differentiation with respect to
fifth
time. Selecting capital goods to be the numeraire, the price of
capital goods is set equal to one, all other prices and interest rates
are expressed in terms of capital goods, and the interest rate p(t)
is the short term money rate of interest less the rate of appreciation
of capital goods prices.
Letting I(t) denote the rate of gross investment at time
t , Arrow's model of the firm is formulated as the following optimal
control problem:
oo
maximize: V = / a(t) [P(K(t),t) - I(t)] dt
{1(0} (286)




KO >0 , ¥t
where 6 and K are positive constants. The objective functional
in problem (286) represents the present value of the future flow
of cash, where the difference P(K(t),t) - I(t) is the cash flow (in
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terms of capital goods) at time t . The first two constraints in
(286) are the same as in the Jorgenson model, where 6 is once again the
constant percentage rate of depreciation. The third constraint in (286),
which states that gross investment at each point in time must be non-
negative, is the embodiment of the irreversibility of capital invest-
ment. According to (286), the objective of the firm is to select the
time pattern of gross investment, I(t) , that maximizes the present
value of the cash flow stream subject to the irreversibility of invest-
ment, I(t) >^ , and the restrictions that the time pattern of the
capital stock, K(t) , is determined by its initial value, K ,
and by the firm's investment policy.
As demonstrated by Arrow, the model (286) can be reformulated
as an equivalent model with 6=0. This reformulation has the
advantage of simplifying all subsequent calculations. The reformulated
model is:
00
maximize: V = / ot(t) [P(K(t),t) - I(t) ] dt
(Kt)} o (287)





I(t) > , V t
The solution to (287) can be characterized with the aid of Pontryagin's
maximum principle. The necessary conditions so obtained can be used
collectively to characterize the multiperiod equilibrium position of
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the value maximizing firm (and in particular, the time path of its
capital stock) when investment is irreversible.
Introducing the costate variable p(t) and forming the
Hamiltonian function gives
H(K,I,p,t) = a(t) [P(K(t),t) - I(t)] + p(t) • I(t) . (288)
The costate variable p(t) is interpreted as the shadow price of
capital at time t , and the Hamiltonian function H may be inter-
preted as the discounted value of investment at time t
,
which is
expressed as the sum of the initial impact on current cash flow
a(t) [P(K(t),t) -I(t)] plus the sum of discounted future benefits,
p(t) • Ift) (i.e. the value of a gift of I(t) at time t)
.
According to the maximum principle, I(t) is chosen so as to maximize
(288) subject to I(t) >^ , and p(t) evolves through time according




First, maximizing (288), define
(289)
q(t) = p(t) - a(t) (290)
and rewrite H as
H(K,I,p,t) = a(t) • P(K(t),t) + q(t) ' I(t) , (291)
39 A
from which the maximization of H subject to I >^ becomes trivial.
If q(t) < , \/t , then at optimality I(t) =0 , y t . The reason
for this is that q(t) , according to (290), expresses the difference
between the shadow price, or value in terms of future cash flow, of
capital goods discounted back to time zero and the market price of
capital goods (which was taken to be one in current year dollars)
discounted back to time zero. Thus, q(t) < 0<=>p(t) < a(t) , which
implies that the present value of cost exceeds the present value of
future benefits, and no new investment is undertaken.




, and at the margin the firm is
indifferent between investing and not investing. However, I(t) is
not indeterminate, but rather, is determined by additional considera-
tions discussed below. From (291), it would appear that q(t) could
also be positive. If q(t) were positive, there would be no optimum
for I(t) . From (290), p(t) > a(t) , so that the shadow price of
capital goods would exceed their cost, and it would pay the firm to
invest an infinite amount at time t . But since the costate variable
is assumed to be continuous, and since a is also, so is q(t)
,
which implies that q(t) is positive over an interval. Therefore,
infinite investment over an interval is called for, which is nonoptimal
since any policy that led to this result could be improved upon by a
f>f\Q
policy that increased investment earlier. Thus, the optimal invest-
ment policy must be such that
q(t) < ; if q(t) < , then I(t) = . (292)
395
Condition (292) might be thought of as the 'short run' optimum condition,
for, according to (292) , the appropriate course of action for the firm
is dependent on the comparison between p(t) and a(t) at time t .
Second, working with (289), taking the partial derivative of
(291) with respect to K enables (289) to be simplified to
p(t) = -a(t) • P
K , (293)
which can be rewritten as a(t) «P + p(t) = . Equation (293) states
K.
that the discounted current returns from a unit increase in the capital
stock, a(t) «P , plus the rate of change of the discounted shadow
K.
price of capital should be zero. Since (292) is specified in terms
of q(t) , it will prove convenient to express (293) and its solution
in terms of q(t) . From (290) and (293), q(t) = p(t) -a(t) =
a(t) [ -P - a(t)/a(t) ] , which from the definition of p in (285)
K.
becomes
q(t) = a(t) [p(t) - P
R
(K(t),t)] . (294)
The first-order differential equation (294) is solved easily by









/ a(t)-r(K,t) dt , (295)
t
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where r(K,t) E p(t) - P (K(t),t) . The solution to problem (287)
consists of the three functions of time I(t) , K(t) , and q(t)
jointly satisfying (292), (294), and the three constraints in (287).
Necessary condition (292) implies that in the optimal solution
to (287) are alternating periods of positive investment and zero invest-
ment. That is, the optimal time paths of q(t) and I(t) are such
ft T)
that free intervals, which are characterized by q(t) = and
I(t) > (i.e. by positive gross investment), alternate with blocked
intervals, which are characterized by q(t) < and I(t) = (i.e. by
zero gross investment)
.
In a free interval q(t) =0 , and hence q(t) = , throughout




(K(t),t) = p(t) . (296)
Note that equation (296) is really just the myopic investment decision
rule represented by equation (284)
.
Following Arrow, define the
capital stock established by the myopic policy, K*(t)
,
by the
equation P (K*(t),t) = p(t) . Under the assumption of diminishing
returns, equation (296) has a unique solution, so that K(t) = K*(t)
on the free interval. Thus, on a free interval the firm should expand
capacity in accordance with the myopic policy embodied in (296) . During
periods of capacity expansion the Arrow-type firm follows the same
investment decision rule as the Jorgenson-type firm.
During a blocked interval the explanation of the firm's invest-
ment behavior is somewhat more complicated. Consider any blocked
397
interval beginning at time t - t > and ending at time t = t < °°
Since t marks the end of one free interval and t, marks the
o 1
beginning of another, and since, as Arrow shows, neither K(t) nor
q(t) can have any jump discontinuities (except possibly at t = 0)
,
it follows that K(t ) = K*(t ) and q(t Q ) = ; K(t ) = K*(t ) and
q(t
x
) = ; and K*(t ) = K(t) = K*(t ) for all t in the blocked
interval. Since, by definition, q(t) < for all t on a blocked
interval, it follows from this fact together with (295) and the defini-
tion of r(K,t) that on any blocked interval (t ,t
n ) with t >
o l o
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),t] dt = -- (297)
t
t





/ a (t) • r[K*(t ),t] dt > for t < t < t (299)
t
Equation (297) and inequalities (298) and (299) characterize
the firm's investment behavior (or more accurately, its lack of invest-
ment) during the blocked interval and have the following interpretation.
If the firm were able to rent capital goods for some fixed time period
at a (possibly time-varying) cost of p(t) , then P - p = - r
would represent the firm's instantaneous rate of profit resulting
from the rental. Note that when markets are perfect and in equilibrium
398
purchasing a capital good and selling it at the end of the period is
perfectly equivalent to renting it for the entire period at the market
f.
TO
rate of interest p(t) , and further, that buying a capital good
and holding it until a point in time at which the firm would wish to
purchase a capital good is also equivalent to renting. Then, according
to (297), at the margin the firm is indifferent between renting and
not renting for the entire period (since the discounted value of the
'profit' stream is zero). According to (298), the firm would find it
profitable to rent a capital good from time t until some time
t < t
1
; but, since the firm has to buy instead of rent, and since it
can never sell the good (by the irreversibility assumption) nor does
it wish to hold it at time t
1
,
it eschews investment. According to
(299) , the firm would not wish to rent during any period beginning at
time t > t and ending at time t. , and therefore, neither does it
wish to purchase any capital goods during the blocked interval.
Figure 11-26 compares the investment behavior of an Arrow-type
firm with that of a Jorgenson-type firm under the assumption that,
except for the irreversibility of investment in the case of the
Arrow-type firm, the two firms and the market environments within which
each operates are identical. It is also assumed for simplicity that
the initial capital stock for each is zero and that for the Arrow-type
firm t = marks the beginning of a free interval. In Figure 11-26
K(t) is tne time path of the Arrow-type firm's capital stock and
K*(t) is the time path of the Jorgenson-type firm's capital stock.
Over the free intervals (a , c , and e) K(t) = K*(t) and the time
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Figure 11-26: The Time Pattern of the Capital Stock
in the Jorgenson and Arrow Models
remains constant, whereas K*(t) fluctuates. Because the Jorgenson-
type firm is able to disinvest by selling off capital it does not need,
it is able to continue investing beyond the point in time at which the
Arrow- type firm must cease investing. Due to the existence of perfect
markets for capital goods in the Jorgenson model, the Jorgenson- type
firm can sell off as much capital as it wants at the established market
price of capital, so that during slack periods the Jorgenson- type
firm can operate with K*(t) < K(t) .
The irreversibility of investment, then, prevents the Arrow-
type firm from investing at the beginning of a blocked interval and
then selling capital goods sometime before the interval ends — an
option that is available to the Jorgenson- type firm. In contrast to
400
the myopic Jorgenson-type firm, which is able to invest right up to
the end of a boom period and to disinvest quickly in the event of a
downswing in economic activity, the Arrow- type firm must plan ahead,
possibly reducing gross investment to zero before the end of a boom
6 79period if it believes the end of the boom period is imminent.
To summarize the discussion of the Arrow model, the main
features of the model are presented in table 11-30.













Type of M del :
Solution ''echnique :
modern traditional (see (287) in text)
maximize the stock market value of the firm
(expressed as the present value of the future
cash flow stream)
relationship between net investment and gross
investment (K = I , or in the original formulation
(286) , K = I - 6 *K) and nonnegativity of gross
investment (I
_> 0) ; implicitly, product demand,
factor supply, and technological conditions (as
embodied in P(K(t),t))
present value factor at each time t (a(t))
and initial capital stock (K ) (and in the initial
formulation (286) the rate of depreciation (6))
gross investment and capital stock at each time
t (I(t) and K(t) , respectively), total
operating profit at each time t (p) , and
current stock market value of the firm (V)
gross investment stream (I(t))
subsumed
assumes certainty
characterization of the multiperiod equilibrium
position of the firm (and in particular, the
time path of its capital stock) when investment
is irreversible
multiperiod (continuous time)
dynamic optimization (optimal control problem)
maximum principle (continuous version)
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3. Profit Maximization Versus Other Objectives:
Toward a Dynamic Reconciliation
The previous two subsections were primarily concerned with
capital theory, with the Jorgenson model describing the time pattern
of the capital stock when investment is reversible and the Arrow model
examining what happens when investment is irreversible. This subsection
explores a second application of optimal control theory to the theory
of the firm, namely, dynamic models that suggest that profit maximization
may not be as unworkable an assumption as the managerialists seem to
• 1- a 680have implied.
Two models are described in this subsection. The first, due
to Wong, represents a life cycle view of the firm. During the firm's
early years it maximizes its rate of growth until it reaches the most
efficient size. From this point in time onward the mature firm maxi-
mizes total profit and invests just enough to keep its capital stock
at its most efficient level. The second model, due to Leland, demon-
strates that profit maximization may be perfectly consistent with a
wide range of alternative goals because in a dynamic setting profits
play a crucial role in furthering the growth of the firm, which in
turn enhances the achievement of other long term goals. A third
ft ftl
possible reconciliation, which has been suggested by O.E. Williamson,
is that the firm's behavior may alternate between profit maximization
and utility maximization as changing conditions in the firm's environment
alternately tighten and loosen, respectively, the profit constraint.
a. The Wong Model
The objective of the firm is to maximize the stock market
value of the firm's equity, which is expressed as the present value
402
fift9
of the future dividend stream. In equation form the stock market
value of the firm's equity, V , is given by
V - / D(t) e rt dt , (300)
where D(t) is the rate at which dividends are paid at time t and
r is the discount rate, which for simplicity is assumed constant.
Dividends are paid to shareholders out of net receipts,
which are defined to be total revenue less the cost of all variable
inputs. For simplicity assume that product and factor markets are
perfectly competitive and that the firm produces a single output and
uses a single variable input. Denote the output price by p(t) and
the cost of the variable input (i.e. the 'wage rate') by w(t) . Net
receipts not paid out as dividends are used for gross investment in
capital, which is assumed to depreciate at a constant percentage rate 6
Total gross investment, I(t)
,
is given by
I(t) = p(t) • f(K(t),L(t)) - w(t) • L(t) - D(t)
, (301)
where f(K(t),L(t)) = Q(t) is the neoclassical production function
and K(t) and L(t) are the amounts of capital and of the variable
input, respectively, used in production. Net investment, —-r—
,
is equal to gross investment less depreciation,




Using (301) to substitute for I(t) in (302) and then
combining (300) and (302) leads to the following formulation of the
Wong model as an optimal control problem:
00
maximize: V = / D(t) e~ rt dt
{D,L}
(303)
subject to: K(t) = p(t) -f (K(t) ,L(t) ) - w(t) -L(t) - D(t) - 6 -K(t) , Vt
K(0) = K
Q
< D(t) < p(t)-f(K(t),L(t)) -w(t)-L(t)
, Vt
L(t) > , K(t) > , V t
where K once again denotes K differentiated with respect to time
and where the last three constraints require that the time path of the
capital stock begin at the initial level K , that the amount of
dividends distributed and the amount of labor used at each point in
time be nonnegative, and that the amount of dividends distributed never
exceeds net receipts. Note that all investment is financed internally
in problem (303) . Note also that problem (303) is a modified version
of the Jorgenson model (273) ; the additional constraint (301) in
problem (303) leads to a reduction from three to two in the number
of the firm's decision variables and also causes investment to be
f\ ftA
irreversible (as in the Arrow model)
.
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The optimal solution to problem (303) can be characterized
with the aid of the maximum principle. The Hamiltonian is
H(K(t),L(t),D(t),q(t),t) = D(t)-e"rt + q(t)-e~ rt [ p(t) -f (K( t) ,L( t) )
(304)
- w(t)-L(t) - D(t) - 6-K(t)]
,
— rt
where the costate variable has been written as q(t)e . The costate
variable for problem (303) can be interpreted as the shadow price of
capital, with q(t) representing the shadow price of a unit of capital
evaluated at time t in terms of future dividends and q(t)e
representing the shadow price of a unit of capital added at time t
in terms of the value of future dividends discounted back to time zero.
The following necessary conditions are used to characterize the firm's
optimal dividend and hiring policies:
H(K*(t),L*(t),D*(t),q(t),t) > H(K*(t),L(t),D(t),q(t),t) "j
I (305)
for all L(t) >_ and all D(t) such that
< D(t) < p(t) -f (K(t) ,L(t)) - w(t) -L(t)
K(t) = p(t).f(K(t),L(t)) -w(t)-L(t) - D(t) - 6-K(t) (306)
i-[qU)e- rt ] =
-f = -q(t)e- rt [p(t) |f- 6] (307)





L*(t), and D*(t) in (305) are the optimal capital
stock, the optimal hiring policy, and the optimal dividend policy,
respectively. Equation (306) is just the first constraint in (303).
The boundary condition for this differential equation is K(0) = K
o
Condition (305) signifies the maximization of the Hamilton-
ian with respect to L and D . Setting L(t) = L*(t) in (305)
and simplifying yields
D*(t) [1 - q(t)] > D(t)[l-q(t)] . (309)
(. Q r
From (309) it follows that
D*(t) = , if q > 1
D*(t) = p(t)-f(K*(t),L*(t)) - w(t)-L*(t)
,
if q < 1 }
D*(t) £ [0,p(t).f(K*(t),L*(t)) - w(t)-L*(t)] , if q = 1









which is the classical criterion for the optimal hiring of labor,
namely, that labor should be hired up to the point at which the marginal
revenue product of the last unit hired just equals the wage rate.
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Using (310) to substitute for D(t) , (306) becomes
'p(t)-f(K(t),L(t)) " w(t).L(t) - 6-K(t)
,
if q > 1
K(t) = <( - 6-K(t) , if q < 1 > (312)
p(t).f(K(t),L(t)) - w(t)-L(t) - D(t) - 6-K(t), if q = l,
Note that since q(t) measures the value of an additional unit of
capital in terms of future dividends, q > 1 implies that the benefits
to be derived from an additional unit of investment exceed the cash
outlay. Therefore, the entire amount of net receipts should be invested,
and no dividends should be paid in the current period. The opposite
happens when q < 1 . In that case the cash outlay for investment
exceeds the benefits in terms of future dividends that are derivable,
and so, gross investment should be zero and the firm should pay out the
entire amount of net receipts as dividends. The third possibility,
q = 1 , is of considerable interest and is discussed further below.
Turning next to equation (307), evaluating — [q(t)e ]
and solving for q(t) yields the following expression:
q(t) = - q(t) [p. 3f^'
L)
- (6 + r)] . (313)
Conditions (311), (312), and (313), together with (308), are the
necessary conditions for the time paths K*(t) , L*(t) , and D*(t)
to be optimal. Moreover, these conditions are also sufficient if
ft Q Q
the produc ion function f(K,L) is concave.
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To aid in the determination of the optimal time paths of
capital, labor, and dividends, a phase diagram showing the optimal
dynamic paths of q and K has been constructed from (312) and (313)





Figure 11-27: Optimal Dynamic Paths of q and K
690
It is clear from figure 11-27 that the optimal path of K and q is
„opt 691
the one converging to K Along this optimal path the firm's
dividend policy takes the following form, depending on the initial
692
capital stock K :r
o
,
D*(t) = < p(t)-f(K*(t),L*(t)) -w(t)-L*(t)
,
if K < K
o
opt












The capital stock K is called the long run desired stock of capital,
It is the firm's equilibrium stock of capital. According to (314)
,
opt
if K < K , the firm should not pay any dividends, but rather,
should use all net receipts for investment purposes, and thereby grow —
i.e. increase the capital stock — at the maximum rate consistent with
exclusive reliance on the internal financing of investment. If
K > K , the firm should pay out all net receipts as dividends and
not engage in any replacement investment. Thus, when K ^ K ,
the firm's optimal dividend and investment policies are those that
take its capital stock toward the long run desired stock of capital
K as rapidly as possible, i.e. along the heavy lines in figure
11-27. When K = K , the firm's capital stock is already at the
long run desired level, i.e. the firm has attained its equilibrium
capital stock, so that it should invest sufficient funds to maintain
its equilibrium capital stock K(t) = K and pay out the remainder
of net receipts as dividends. The policy implications of (314) are
illustrated in figure 11-28.
disinvest through depreciation
maintain long run desired
capital stock: zero net
investment
i: vest all net receipts
K
o
Figure 11-28: The Time Path of K*(t)
409
Of particular interest is the path of the capital stock
when K < K — i.e. the lower branch in figure 11-28. The optimal
path consists of the following two phases:
(i) The firm pays no dividends, and all net receipts are used
to purchase additional capital. This could be interpreted
as the 'growth maximization' phase. Anyone observing the
behavior of the firm during the 'growth maximization' phase
would find considerable support for the managerial models
of the firm and would be likely to interpret the firm's
objective as one of growth maximization, revenue




(ii) Once the equilibrium stock of capital K p has been
attained, net investment ceases. The firm invests just
enough to maintain K(t) = K and distributes the
remainder of net receipts as dividends. This phase could
be interpreted as the 'profit maximization' phase. Anyone
observing the behavior of the firm during the profit
maximization phase would find considerable support for the
traditional model of the firm and would be likely to
interpret the firm's objective as one of profit maximization,
dividend maximization, or share value maximization.
It should be noted that the optimal path just described has the turnpike
695
properties frequently discussed in the optimal growth theory literature.
Indeed, the profit maximization phase of the optimal path might be
called the 'dividend' turnpike and during this phase the firm might be
said to be operating at its 'golden stage 1 of production.
410
During the golden stage of production q(t) = , which
implies, by (313) , that
P • -^g^1 = 6 + r . (315)
Condition (315) is just condition (283) arising out of the Jorgenson
697
model. Both (283) and (315) imply that the firm should expand its
capital stock (or, if K > K , contract its capital stock) until
the marginal revenue product of the last unit 'hired' just equals the
cost of capital, 6 + r . This is, of course, the optimality condition
for long run profit maximization for the single period case discussed
in section B of this chapter.
The value of the Wong model lies in its suggested recon-
ciliation of the managerial theories with the traditional theory. The
model suggests that at any point in time there will be a mixture of
'managerial' firms — i.e. those that are expanding as rapidly as
possible toward their respective long run desired stocks of capital —
and 'traditional' firms — i.e. those that have reached their respective
long run desired stocks of capital.
The Wong model, viewed as a modification of the Jorgenson
model discussed above, is also of interest because of its more reasonable
treatment of capital accumulation. In the Jorgenson model the firm
could adjvst to K instantaneously, whereas in the Wong model the
ability of the firm to accumulate capital is restricted by its need to
699
generate lunds with which to purchase capital goods.
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The main limitation of the Wong model is its assumption
of an optimum firm size — the long run desired stock of capital — that
remains constant over time. Under this assumption one should find a
tendency for the growth rate of the firm to slow down as size increases,
at least for very large firms (unless, of course, this optimum size
is so great that very few firms have begun to approach it — in which
case, however, most firms should behave in a manner more consistent
with the managerial models than with the traditional models) . Though
the relationship between growth and size has been studied extensively,
the results of these studies in toto have been inconclusive. It
does appear, however, that empirical support for the optimum size
hypothesis and for the hypothesis that the growth rate of the firm
diminishes, at least for firms in the largest size classes, as size
increases is sufficiently weak as to bring into question the validity of
any model based on either of these hypotheses.
To summarize the discussion of the Wong model, the distin-
guishing features of the model are listed in table 11-31.
b. The Leland Model
A second approach to reconciling the objective of profit
maximization with alternative objectives, such as sales maximization,
702has been suggested by Leland. By considering the dynamic role of
profits, Leland has established conditions under which the firm's
optimal current policies converge to profit maximization as the firm's
planning horizon becomes infinite. Under the conditions set out by
Leland, current profit maximization is necessary and sufficient for
long run optimization with respect to alternative goals. ' The
412













Type of Model :
Solution echnique :
modern traditional (see (303) in text)
maximize the stock market value of the firm
(expressed as the present value of the future
dividend stream)
technological constraint (embodied in the produc-
tion function (Q(t) = f (K(t) ,L(t)) ; relationship
between net investment, gross investment, and
depreciation (K = p.f(K,L) -wL-D-6-K); and
constraint on dividend stream (0 < D < p.f(K,L) -w»L)
prices of output and labor at each point in time
(p(t) and w(t) , respectively) , initial
capital stock (K ) , market rate of discount
(r) , and rate of depreciation (6)
rates of flow of output and labor (Q(t) = f (K(t) ,L(t))
and L(t), respectively), gross investment and
capital stock at each point in time





dividends paid at each point
in time (D(t)), and current stock market value
of the firm (V)




characterization of the firm's operating and
dividend policies that lead to the attainment
of the equilibrium capital stock; at each
instant, given its capital stock, the firm
selects equilibrium operating policies, but
the firm is in multiperiod equilibrium if and
only if K = K ^
multiperiod (continuous time)
dynamic optimization (optimal control problem)
maximum principle (continuous version)
implication of this result is that, while firms may pursue objectives
other tha i profit maximization, the behavior they exhibit may not
differ much from profit maximizing behavior. Leland develops two
413
applications of his general result: a firm maximizing utility of
sales and profits and a firm maximizing profit per worker. Since
under standard neoclassical assumptions myopic behavior will be optimal
706
for the latter type of firm, only the utility maximizing firm is
discussed below.
The objective of the firm is to maximize the present value
of utility expressed as a function of profits and sales (e.g. managerial









where the firm's planning period extends from time t = to time
t = T (and T is called the planning horizon); K(t) is the firm's
capital stock at time t ; L denotes a vector of decision variables,
which includes those variables, such as labor and raw materials, that
are variable in the short run and whose levels L(t) the firm is able
to control throughout the planning period; tt is total profit and
S is total sales, each of which is a function of the capital stock,
the levels of the decision variables, and time; and r , which is
assumed constant, is the rate at which future utility levels are
discounted. For each period t the choices for the decision
variables must belong to A(t) = [0,L(t)j
,
where L(t) is the
vector of upper bounds on permissible values for the decision variables.
These upper bounds may be established either by physical constraints
or by institutional constraints, such as the need to maintain some
minimum level of profitability or some minimum valuation ratio.
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Net investment, K(t) , is a function of current profits,
the current capital stock, and time, with the inclusion of the time
variable allowing for the possibility that the functional relationship
between net investment on the one hand and current profits and the
708
current capital stock on the other may shift over time. At any
point in time, with the capital stock given, it is assumed that net
investment is an increasing function of current profits. In the
709
simplest case, all investment is financed internally and net
investment is directly proportional to current profits:
K(t) = m • 7T(K(t),L(t),t) , m > . (317)
The firm's capital stock evolves according to (317) , subject to the
initial condition, K(0) = K
o
If it is assumed that the total profit and total sales
functions are time invariant, then the model of the firm can be
formulated as the following optimal control problem:
T
maximize: / e" rt U[7T(K(t) ,L(t)) ,S(K(t) ,L(t)) ] dt
(L(t)eA(t)} o




7T = TT(K(t),L(t)) = p • f(K(t),L(t)) -w • L(t)-i • K(t) (319)
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and
S = S(K(t),L(t)) = p-f(K(t),L(t)) (320)
are total profit and total sales, respectively, and where price, p ,
the wage rate, w , and the cost of capital, i , are all assumed to
be constant through time. That is, product and factor markets are
assumed to be perfectly competitive, and since the profit and sales
functions are time invariant, the net investment function is also time
invariant. Following Leland, it is further assumed that (i) given
K , there exists an optimal policy function, L* (t) , which holds for
all t <_ T , where the subscript T denotes the function's dependence
on the planning horizon; (ii) given K(t)
,
there exists a unique
profit maximizing policy Lp (t) £ A(t) that is independent of the
planning horizon; and (iii) utility maximization and profit maximiza-
tion are alternative goals in that if, given K(t)
,
L (t) lies in
the interior of A(t)
,
then L (t) does not also maximize (J(tt,S)
for L(t) E A(t) .
It follows from the maximum principle that the optimal






(t),A(t),t) > H(K*(t),L(t),A(t),t) (321)
for all L(t) e A(t)






' 9¥ +m • X(t) * H} (323)
A(T) = , (324)
where the Hamiltonian is
H(K(t),L(t),A(t),t) = e" rt • U[7T(K(t),L(t))^(K(t),L(t))] (325)
+ A(t) • m ' 7T(K(t),L(t)) .
Let A* (t) denote the costate variable function that satisfies (323)
and (32 A) when the firm adopts the operating policies L* (t) .
Rather than solve conditions (321)-(324) explicitly for the
optimal path of current operating policies, L* (t)
,
what follows
will focus on the behavior of the firm at an arbitrary time t
(0 < t < T) . It will be shown that, as the planning horizon becomes
infinite, i.e. as T - t -»- °° , the firm's optimal current operating
policies will approach profit maximizing policies, i.e. L* (t) •* Lp (t)
From (321) , L* (t) maximizes the Hamiltonian (325)
.
Given the expressions for total profit and total sales, (319) and (320)
respectively, and assuming that L* (t) lies in the interior of
A(t)
,





9S (P -8T)} +m ' A T (t) '
(p • |£ - w) = , (326)
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8f
where — is evaluated at L* (t) . The profit maximizing policy
is just that given by the familiar optimality condition:
P ' II "
w =
° ' (327)
where rr is evaluated at LP (t) . For arbitrary t , if L (t)
oL
satisfying (327) is substituted into the left-hand side of (326) , the
!«-• • < i-*- * -rt 9U t 3f -rt 3U . _resulting expression simplifies to e . -r~- • p rr = e • -p-s- • w >
unless -Tr^r = . Thus, in general, L* (t) ^ LP (t) . In
general, (327) does not hold for L* (t) . Thus, dividing each side
3f
of (326) by m(p • 3=— w) and solving for A* (t) yields
oL T




The numerator of (328) is always finite. Therefore, if A* (t) were
to become infinitely large as the planning horizon became infinite,
then optimal current operating policies would approach profit maximizing
policies, and vice versa, or in symbols,










(t) *- LP (t)
,
where the second implication follows from the assumed uniqueness of
profit maximizing policies.
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The optimal value of the costate variable at time t
,
A*T (t) , measures the marginal value of capital stock in terms of
utility at time t . If the marginal value of capital stock becomes
large as the planning horizon becomes infinite, it will be in the
firm's best interests to sacrifice current performance (i.e. to accept
a somewhat lower current level of utility) in order to build up capital
stock. But since net investment is proportional to total profit, this
building up of the capital stock is accomplished by increasing profits,
so that in the short term the firm should not continue to expand sales
at the expense of total profit to the extent it would if the planning
horizon were shorter, but rather, should strive for greater total
profit. In the limiting case indicated by (329), A* (t) becomes
unboundedly large as the planning horizon becomes infinite, implying
that it is optimal to increase the capital stock as rapidly as possible,
and therefore, to maximize total profit.
It remains to be shown that lim A* (t) -» <» . From (323),
T-fr*»
the optimal path of the costate variable, A* (t) , must satisfy the
first order linear differential equation,
A*
T
(t) = -[e {^(p • — - 1} + —(p • —)}
+ m • A*
T
(t) • (p • || - i)]
= a • A*
T
(t) + 6 (330)
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(331)








P 3K " ^
a
-rt,3U , 9f lS dU , 3f.
If a < , the solution to (330) is given by




and, if a = , the solution is given by
A*
T
(t) = - 3(T - t) . (333)
3f
From (331), a < if and only if p -r- - i > since, by assumption,
3f
m > . Also from (331) , a = if and only if p -rrr - i = , or
<3K
9f
equivalently, p ' -r^r = i > . In either case, 3 < . Therefore,
a £ , or equivalently,
p H- i ' (334)
implies, by (332) and (333) and the fact that 6 < , that
lim A* (t) = oo . Note, however, that when a. > , A* (t) given
T-t-K»
g ?16
by (332) is again the solution to (330), but lim A* (t) = - - .
X-t-*»
a
Thus, as long as the marginal revenue product of capital exceeds the
cost of capital, i.e. as long as (334) holds, the marginal value of
A 20
capital stock will become unboundedly large as the planning horizon
becomes infinite, optimal current policy will converge to profit
maximization, and in the limit, the firm's equilibrium operating
policy will be that which leads to maximum total profit.
In the Leland model, the long run objectives of the firm
may be such that, in pursuing these objectives, the firm acts as a
profit maximizer in order to generate funds to permit it to grow as
rapidly as possible. The behavior of such a firm may be indistin-
guishable not only from profit maximizing behavior, but from growth
maximizing behavior as well. Moreover, if the utility function U
has a large number of arguments reflecting the wishes of various groups
718
within the firm as interpreted by top management, the firm's behavior
may also be indistinguishable from behavior that would be predicted
on the basis of behavioral models — the firm may not strive to maximize
any single quantity, but rather, strives to seek a balance among com-
peting alternatives and to maximize what may be thought of as 'collective
719
utility'. The essential point is that several different types of
behavior may be virtually indistinguishable, in theory as well as in
practice.
To summarize the discussion of Leland 's managerial model
of the firm, the distinguishing features of the model are presented
in table 11-32.
4. C timal Investment, Dividends, and Growth: The Krouse Model
One of the main advantages of modeling the growth of the firm
as an opt mal control problem, as demonstrated by the Wong and Leland
models of the preceding subsection, is that such models permit
421











managerial (see (318) in text)
maximize discounted utility (expressed as a
function of total profit and total sales)
total profit function (see (319) in text)
,
total sales function (see (320) in text)
,
and net investment function (K = n*7T(K,L))
price (p) , wage rate (w) , cost of capital (i)
,
discount rate (r) , and ratio of net investment
to total profit (m) — all of which are assumed
to remain constant over time — and initial
capital stock (K )
o
total profit, total sales, capital stock, and














Type of Model :
Solution Technique :
concerned with conditions under which optimal
current policy will converge to profit
maximization as the firm's long run equilibrium
operating policy (i.e. model considers the
stability of this long run equilibrium operating
policy)
multiperiod (continuous time)
dynamic optimization (optimal control problem)
maximum principle (continuous version)
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non-steady state growth. In the Krouse model discussed below, the
firm's optimal choice over time of investment and financing policies
is modeled as an optimal control problem, and the rate of growth of
dividends is free to vary over time. But unlike the continuous- time
models discussed earlier in this section, Krouse treats the firm within
422
a discrete- time framework. The application of Pontryagin's maximum
principle within the discrete- time context is, however, analogous
721
to its application within the continuous- time context.
As in the models discussed earlier in this section, in the
Krouse model the environment within which the firm operates is one of
certainty. But in contrast to these models, the Krouse model gives
explicit consideration to external financing of investment. In the
models discussed earlier in this section, capital markets were (at
least implicitly) assumed to be perfect. Since the firm's financial
policies are irrelevant under certainty when capital markets are
perfect, the restriction to internal financing does not affect the
conclusions derived from these models. In his model Krouse allows for
a specific form of capital market imperfection, and as a result, the
method the firm chooses to finance its investment is no longer irrelevant
to the firm's shareholders.
In his model Krouse permits external equity financing and
introduces equity market imperfections in the form of transactions
costs on new external equity issues. By permitting external equity
722
financing, " Krouse 's treatment of the firm's investment and financing
decisions is more general than the treatment provided in models such as
723
Marris's utility maximization model in which the restriction to
internal financing renders the firm's investment and dividend policies
inextrical .e. By introducing equity market imperfections in the form
of transactions costs on new external equity issues, Krouse is able
to demonstrate that, in general, the firm's choice of dividend policy
724
does af fee c its stock market value.
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More specifically, the Krouse model explores the intertemporal
dependencies that relate the firm's stock market value to its investment
and financing decisions. The objective of the firm is to maximize the
wealth position of the firm's initial (i.e. as of time zero) shareholders,
which is expressed as the present value of the future stream of dividends
paid to the firm's initial shareholders. The solution to the model
consists of programs of capital accumulation and financing that are
optimal from the standpoint of the firm's shareholders. The model
and its solution make clear that, while the firm's investment and
financing opportunities are distinct, the firm's investment and finance
decisions interact to determine earnings and dividend time sequences
that ultimately determine the firm's stock market value.
First, define the following variables:
D(t) = total dollar amount of dividends paid at time t .
D (t) = portion (in dollars) of dividends paid at time t
to shareholders of record at time T .
t
k(t) = n U/[l + r(i)]}
T=0
= present value of a dollar received at time t
,
where r(x) is the discount rate for period t .
X(t) = net earnings (i.e. net income less depreciation) of
the firm at time t .
I(t) = dollar amount of equity funds raised 'internally'
through retained earnings, when £ I(t) <^ X(t)
,
or through retained earnings together with a pre-
emptive rights offering, when I(t) > X(t) ; in
either case, involving zero transactions costs. It
424
follows from this definition that
I(t) = X(t) - D(t) , 725
E(t) = 'external' equity decision variable, representing
the total dollar amount of equity funds raised
through the sale of shares to the public, when
E(t) > , and indicating the total dollar amount
paid out to retire shares, when E(t) < ; in each
case, inclusive of transactions costs.
6(t) = the ratio at time t of the market price of an
equity share to its external issue price; <5(t) > 1
indicating shares issued at a premium, and
726
6(t) < 1 indicating shares issued at a discount.
V(t) = stock market value of the firm at the beginning of
period t to shareholders of record at that time.
Figure 11-29 depicts the timing of the firm's receipt of
earnings and its dividend and equity decisions for a representative
time period t . After the period's earnings, X(t) , have been
realized, the dividend decision, D(t)
,
and the internal and external
equity decisions, I(t) and E(t)
,
respectively, are all made at
the end of the period. The stock market value of the firm, V(t)
,
is established at the beginning of the period. Thus, external equity




t-l t t+l time
Figure 11-29: A Representative Time Period
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r
The stock market value of the firm at time t = , V(0)
,
or equivalently , the wealth position of the firm's initial shareholders,
is equal to the present value of the future stream of dividends paid
727
to the firm's initial shareholders,
V(0) = Z D (t) • k(t) . (335)
t=0
Since in practice D (t) is not easy to observe, it is more convenient
to reexpress (335) in terms of variables that are more readily observa-
ble. By separating each successive period from all later periods and
employing the identity D(t) = X(t) - I(t)
, (335) can be reexpressed
728
as
V(0) = E [X(t) - I(t) - 6(t) • E(t)] k(t) . (336)
t=0
The objective of the firm is to select time sequences I(t) and E(t)
that maximize (336) .
The ability of the firm to pay dividends is limited ultimately
by its ability to generate earnings. The time path of earnings, X(t)
,
is dependent on the firm's investment budget and mode of financing
at every point in time. Specifically, the change in earnings from
period t to period t + 1 is a function of three factors: the firm's
internal financing decision, I(t) ; the firm's external financing
decision, E(t) ; and the rate of earnings adjustment attributable
to technical progress, changes in the structure of product and/or
factor markets, or to any other changes in the firm's environment,
426
which are all embodied in some function A(t) . The change in earnings
is given by
AX(t) = X(t+1) - X(t) = A(t) (J)[I(t),E(t)] . (337)
The earnings-possibilities function <\> expresses the change in
earnings owing not only to the size of the firm's capital budget,
but also to the relative importance of the two sources of equity
729
finance. The relationship between the change in earnings and I(t)
and E(t) embodied in <$> assumes that each marginal dollar of invest-
ment expenditure is allocated optimally among both existing and potential
new markets; and that during each period the firm's capital stock is
1 A -• 11 73°employed optimally.
Putting together (336) and (337) , the Krouse model of the firm
is formulated as the following optimal control problem:
maximize: V(0) = Z [X(t) - I(t) - 6 (t) • E(t)] k(t)
(l(t),E(t)} t=0




where (f>(t) = <j>[I(t) ,E(t)] and where X is the given initial level of
earnings. The solution to problem (338) can be characterized with the
731
aid of the discrete version of the maximum principle. The Hamiltonian
for (338) Ls
H(X(t),I(t),E(t),A(t+l),t) = [X(t) -I(t) -6(t)-E(t)]k(t) (339)
+ A(t + 1) {A(t)-cKt)}
,
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where A(t + 1) is the costate variable for period t . By the maximum
principle, the optimal time paths I*(t) and E*(t) must satisfy the
732following conditions:
H(X*(t),I*(t),E*(t),A(t + l),t) > H(X*(t),I(t),E(t),A(t + l),t) (340)
AX(t) = |y = A(t) c{)(t) (341)
AA(t) = - || = - k(t) (342)
lim A(t) = (343)
7T}
From (342) and (343) it follows that JJ
A(t + 1) =
TJt+1 k(x) .
(344)
The costate variable A(t + 1) , which represents the shadow price of
an additional dollar of earnings measured in terms of the present
734
value of dividends paid to initial shareholders in period t
,
is equal to the sum of the discount factors, k(i) , for periods
t + 1 and beyond. Since k(x) represents the present value of a
dollar received at the end of period t , A(t + 1) given by (344) can
be interpreted as the present value of a perpetual annuity beginning
in period t + 1 . With this interpretation of A(t+1) , the Hamiltonian
(339) can be given a richer meaning. An increase in the amount of
equity finance raised in period t either by internal means or by




two opposing effects on the wealth position of initial shareholders:
(i) a depressing effect, measured by [X(t) -I(t) -6(t) • E(t)] • k(t)
,
due to the increased number of shares, and hence, the increased number
of claimants on the future pool of dividends, and (ii) an elevating
effect, measured by X(t + 1) { A(t) • <\>(t)} , due to the higher level
of earnings (which, by assumption, is permanent unless the firm decides
to disinvest) that makes possible an increase in the size of the dividend
pool. Condition (340), which calls for the maximization of the Hamiltonian in
each period with respect to I(t) and E(t) , requires that these effects
be balanced at the margin.
735
For I*(t) and E*(t) to maximize H it is necessary that
II
=
-k(t)+X(t+l) • A(t) • |iig- = (345)
f§ -
- k(t) • M(t)+ A(t + 1) • A(t) • H^- = , (346)
where M(t) = — . , N is called the 'marginal external issuedE(t)
^
.736 , ,,. . „, N A/ N r- k(l) 737 ,










Z(t) • ||ig- = M(t)
,
(348)
where (347) and (348) must hold for each period t . Conditions (347)
and (348) characterize the firm's equilibrium financial policies. Note
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that Z(t) in (347) and (348) is a function of the discount factors,
k(x)
,
for the current period and all future time periods. Thus, in
contrast to the equilibrium decision rules that arise out of the
Jorgenson model and similar models, the equilibrium decision rules
given by (347) and (348) are not myopic, but rather, take into account
future discount factors, which reflect the opportunity costs to the
firm's shareholders of having their funds tied up in the firm's
investment projects in future periods.
According to (347) , in order for the firm to be in equilibrium,
it should continue to raise additional equity funds through transaction
costless internal means up to the point at which the value at time t
of the resulting improvement in the future earnings stream, Z(t) • ~3.
/
. I ,
just equals the stock market value of the new shares issued (i.e. one
dollar at the margin). Similarly, according to (348), in order for the
firm to be in equilibrium, it should continue to raise additional equity
funds through external means up to the point at which the value at
time t of the resulting improvement in the future earnings stream




stock market value of the new shares issued. When adhered to, the
equilibrium conditions (347) and (348) act as safeguards on the wealth
positions of current shareholders by ensuring that the firm does not
raise so much new equity — and in the process issue so many new shares —
that the resulting earnings increase proves insufficient to justify the
current share price.
If, as assumed in the traditional models, market discount rates
are constant over time (i.e. r(t) = r , a positive constant, for all
t) , the firm's production function and operating environment are unchanging
430
(i.e. A(t) = 1), and equity markets are perfect, so that transactions
are costless, all new shares are issued at prevailing market share
prices (i.e. M(t) = 1), and Krouse's distinction between internal and
external equity issues vanishes, then conditions (347) and (348) reduce
to the classical investment criterion, namely, the firm should continue
to invest up to the point at which the marginal internal rate of
return, 3cp( t) /8B(t) , just equals the constant external market discount
rate, r , where B(t) = I(t) + E(t) is the aggregate amount of invest-
739
ment funds. Under these same restrictive conditions, the Miller-
Modigliani proposition on the irrelevancy of the firm's dividend policy
also holds — the stock market value of the firm is dependent on the
firm's investment plans (i.e. its operating decisions) only, and is
independent of the dividend per share it sets (i.e. its dividend
740
policy). However, relaxing these assumptions will, in general,
cause the firm's dividend policy to be of some consequence to the stock
741
market value of the firm's shares.
Krouse's model is noteworthy because of its general approach to
the firm's investment and financing decisions. External financing is
permitted, as are equity market imperfections, which render the firm's
investment and financing decisions interdependent. The solution to
the model generalizes the classical investment criterion and clearly
indicates the impact of future opportunity costs on the current invest-
ment deci ion by the firm. Though Krouse considers only equity finan-
742
cing, the analysis is easily extended to permit debt financing since
in a worl'' of certainty all methods of acquiring external finance —
743
e.g. equi y shares and debt — reduce to the same thing. The further
431
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extension to allow for uncertainty might, as Krouse suggests, prove
highly fruitful, although noone has yet done this.
To summarize the discussion in this subsection, the distinguishing
features of the Krouse model are presented in table 11-33 in terms of









Table 11-33 Summary of Krouse Model
modern traditional (see (338) in text)
maximize the stock market value of the firm
(expressed as the present value of the future
dividend stream)
change in earnings each period (Ax(t) = A(t) *())(t)) ;
implicitly, product demand, factor supply,
technological, and financial conditions
(embodied in <J>(t) = 4>[I(t) ,E(t)])
present value factor for each period (k(t)),
ratio of market price of an equity share to
its external issue price for each period (6(t)),
and initial level of earnings (X )
current stock market value of the firm (V(0))
and net earnings, funds raised internally, funds
raised externally, and dividends paid for each
period (X(t) ,I(t) ,E(t) , andD(t), respectively)






Type of Model :
Solution Technique:
external financing (equity only) permitted
assumes certainty
characterization of the equilibrium financial
policies (with respect to internal equity
issues versus external equity issues) of the
firm)
multiperiod (discrete time)
dynamic optimization (optimal control problem)
maximum principle (discrete version)
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M. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has presented a survey of mathematical models of the
firm. Thirty models (counting principal variations) representing a
variety of mathematical formulations were detailed, and the economic
implications of each model were carefully assessed. The models were
presented in more or less chronological order, which also happens to
correspond roughly to the order of increasing sophistication, in order
to give the reader a better feel for the evolution of mathematical
modeling in the theory of the firm.
Over the years, but particularly within the last decade, an almost
bewildering array of models of the firm has appeared in the economic
literature. This chapter has focused on those models that appear to
this writer to be most representative of the different theories of the
behavior of the firm and of the variety of mathematical structures
selected by economic modelers. In addition, the models discussed above
include those that have been cited most frequently by other writers in
subsequent journal articles and books. The traditional models, which
most writers, including this one, have taken as their point of departure,
are, of course, the most well-known models of the firm. They are dis-
cussed at length in introductory texts as well as in more advanced works.
But the Baumol, Marris , and O.E. Williamson models of section G, the
behavioral models of section H, the Vickers model of section I, the
Lintner model of section J, the Leland models of section K, and the
Jorgenson, Arrow, and Krouse models of section L — virtually all the
'modern' odels described in this chapter — are also very important.
All have stimulated further theoretical and empirical work and all
433
are generally recognized as significant contributions to the theory
of the firm.
The chapter's discussion of the more important mathematical models
of the firm has highlighted each model's essential features, and in
particular, how each model treated the objectives of the firm, the
role of financial considerations, uncertainty (or lack of it), the
nature of equilibrium, and time. By way of summary, tables 11-34 and
11-35 briefly characterize the distinguishing features of each of the
models included in this chapter. Table 11-34 classifies the models
according to the economic content of each, while table 11-35 charac-
terizes them on the basis of the mathematical form of each.
Table 11-34 classifies the models discussed in this chapter as
(i) traditional, (ii) managerial, (iii) behavioral, or (iv) modern
traditional, primarily on the basis of the model's objective function
(i.e. the firm's supposed objective). According to the traditional
models, the firm's objective is to maximize total profit. The models
are single period equilibrium models, the role of finance is ignored,
and uncertainty is absent.
Unlike the traditional models, which assume the firm functions
primarily for the benefit of the firm's owner-entrepreneurs, the mana-
gerial models assume the firm functions primarily for the benefit of
the firm's managers. Citing the supposed separation of ownership from
control, the managerialists argue that the firm seeks to maximize mana-
gerial utility, which different economists express as a function of
sales only or the rate of growth of sales only (Baumol) ; the steady
state rate of growth only or growth and the valuation ratio (Marris)
;
staff, emoluments, and discretionary profit (Williamson); the rate of
434
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growth of total assets (Herendeen) ; or both profit and sales (Leland)
.
Where profit or the market value of the firm is absent from the objective
function, it appears as a constraint; present and potential future owners
force the firm to maintain some minimum level of profitability (or market
value)
.
Like the traditional models, the managerial models (at least, the
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ones discussed in this chapter) abstract from uncertainty. But
unlike the traditional models, they generally treat finance explicitly
and permit external financing of investment, and further they generally
recognize the importance of growth to corporate managers and give the
firm a dynamic character (even if it is only of a steady state character)
.
Unlike the other three classes of models listed in table 11-34, the
behavioral models are not optimization models. These models are intended
as a supplement to, rather than as a substitute for, the traditional
models. Although profits are important to the firm, total profit is just
one of several goals, of which no one single goal is overriding. As
indicated in section H, a great many of the behavioral models have been
attempts to simulate the workings of real-world firms, and thus, these
models have tended to be firm-specific, rather than generalizations of
'typical' firm behavior like the other models in table 11-34.
The fourth class of models, the modern traditional models, have
been so named because they share the traditional model's view of the
firm as an economic entity that functions primarily for the benefit of
the firm's owners (rather than its managers) . But the modern traditional
models differ from the traditional models in at least one of the following
important respects:
The role of the stock market is introduced; since the 'owners'
of the firm do not own the firm's assets, but only the shares
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they hold, the objective of the firm becomes one of maximizing
the share price, the stock market value of the firm (expressed
alternatively in terms of the dividend stream, the net income
stream, or the cash flow stream — all of which lead to the
same result when certain conditions discussed in section I
are satisfied) , or the total market value of the firm.
Financial considerations are introduced explicitly into the
model (in the first version of the Vickers model, which retains
the objective of profit maximization, the short term financial
(i.e. working capital) needs of the firm are recognized.
The existence of uncertainty is recognized and incorporated
in one of two ways: via either the mean-variance framework
or the time-state-preference framework. In the Leland (modern
traditional) models the presence of uncertainty, coupled with
risk aversion on the part of investors (and managers) leads
to a unique formulation of the firm's objective function in
terms of expected utility.
- The firm is permitted to grow, though, in contrast to the
managerial models, the traditional objective of the firm
appropriately modified) is retained.
The modern traditional models are 'modern' , then, in the sense that
they permit one or more of the restrictive assumptions underlying all
the traditional models to be relaxed.
Table 11-35 reexamines the models of the firm in a different light,
focusing instead on the mathematical form of each. With the exception
of the behavioral models, which are normally of the simulation variety
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and of which only certain component submodels were discussed in section
H, each of the models was expressed in the form of either a mathematical
programming problem (i.e. a static form) or an optimal control problem
(i.e. a dynamic form). But within each of these problem types there
are a variety of specific forms, according to the nature of the con-
straint set, and in the case of the mathematical programming formula-
tion, according to whether the objective function and all the constraints
are linear.
The survey of the literature dealing with the theory of the firm
presented in this chapter has traced the evolution of that body of
economic theory. As indicated by the range of models discussed in
this chapter, the models of the firm that have been developed thus
far have explored the behavioral implications of a fairly broad range
of objectives — traditional, managerial, behavioral, and modern tradi-
tional. In the opinion of this writer, the major sources of satisfac-
tion to shareholders, to managers, and to members of other groups within
the firm are reflected in the variety of objective functions that have
appeared in the literature. Though one may find it advantageous from
a modeling standpoint to select a combination of specific objectives
different from those already proposed, the need to find a 'more realis-
tic' objective is not, in the opinion of this writer, likely to be one
of the potentially more fruitful areas for research within the theory
746
of the firm. Indeed, as suggested in several places in this chapter,
the behavioral implications of several different objectives may be
virtually indistinguishable (theoretically as well as empirically) due
to the cc tributions of profit toward meeting so many of the alternative
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A potentially more fruitful area for research within the theory of
the firm concerns the development of models of the firm under uncer-
tainty — models that would lead, hopefully, to a better understanding
of the relationship between the firm's operating decisions and its
financial decisions. The traditional models and most of the modern
revisions to the theory of the firm have assumed certainty and perfect
capital markets. In such an environment the firm's financial policies
are separable from its operating policies. Thus, financial considerations
can be subsumed within the model, or if the question of financing is
to be treated explicitly, new share issues can be treated like negative
dividends, and the firm can be treated as if it relied exclusively on
internal financing, without any loss of generality. However, as sug-
gested by the Krouse model, the firm's financial policies are not
irrelevant to shareholders when capital markets are imperfect. Also,
as suggested by Leland's model of the firm in the context of stock
market equilibrium, the firm's operating decisions are not separable
from its financial decisions (under uncertainty) if markets are incom-
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plete. With these notable exceptions, modeling efforts within the
theory of the firm have, in general, been focused on the firm's produc-
tion and investment decisions. In chapter four of this thesis the
relationship between the firm's optimal operating decisions - those
relating to production and investment - and its optimal financial
decisions - those involving its maintenance of cash balances, its
choice of capital structure, and its choice of dividend policy - are
examined more closely.
A second potentially fertile area for research within the theory of
the firm involves modeling the firm under uncertainty in a multiperiod
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context. The modern revisions to the theory of the firm have, in
general, either introduced uncertainty within a single period context
or else extended the certainty model to a multiperiod context, but have
not done both. One obstacle standing in the way of accomplishing this
extension (of models of the firm) to the behavior of the firm under
uncertainty over more than one period is the fact that, under uncer-
tainty, maximizing the stock market value of the firm is not equivalent
to maximizing shareholder utility, unless capital markets are both
perfect and complete. Hence, specifying the appropriate objective
function, at least in the case of the modern traditional models, appears
to involve a conceptual problem that is nontrivial. Similarly, the
multiperiod managerial models that have included growth as one of the
firm's objectives have restricted their attention to steady state growth,
probably due to the difficulty of explicitly allowing for non-steady
state growth as an objective. Moreover, the managerial models have,
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in general, abstracted from uncertainty. Thus, while much work has
been done both in studying the impact of uncertainty on the behavior
of the firm in the single period context and in studying the behavior
of the firm under certainty in a multiperiod context, the behavior of
the firm under uncertainty in a multiperiod context remains relatively
virgin territory for economic modelers. The basic theoretical model
developed in chapters three and four, as well as the representative
airframe builder model formulated in chapter seven, are both dynamic
and stochastic, in contrast to the models discussed in this chapter.
A third potentially productive area for research concerns the
internal organization of the firm and the impact that organizational
form and conflicts among the social groupings that comprise the firm
may have on the firm's performance (relative to its objective(s) )
.
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With the exception of the O.E. Williamson model, in which managers'
preferences for staff could affect overall operating efficiency, and
the behavioral models, which are mainly concerned with what goes on
inside the firm, the models discussed in this chapter treat the firm
like a black box, abstracting from what goes on inside the firm. With
few exceptions, the models of the firm to date have focused their
attention on external allocation questions - e.g. how much labor it
is optimal for the firm to hire and how much output it is optimal for
the firm to produce - to the exclusion of internal allocation questions
e.g. how should the firm's (limited) supply of money capital be
(optimally) allocated among its operating divisions. Yet, these
internal allocation questions may have important implications regarding
749
how efficiently the economy, as well as the firm, functions.
The role of organizational factors, and in particular, how the degree
of organizational slack may vary over the business cycle and how
decentralization may adversely affect internal control and X-ef f iciency
.
are explored below in chapter five.
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CHAPTER TWO FOOTNOTES
1. If one or more of the mathematical solution techniques listed in
table 11-35 are unfamiliar, the references given in footnotes 71
and 81 of chapter one will provide the necessary background.
2. See R. Frisch, "On the Notion of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium,"









ch. 9; and J.S. Chipman, "The nature
and meaning of equilibrium in economic theory," in D. Martindale,
ed. , Functionalism in the Social Sciences: The Strengths and
Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology, Economics, Political
Science and Sociology: A Symposium (American Academy of Political
and Social Science; 1965), pp. 35-64.
3. In traditional models a distinction is made between the short run,
in which the firm's capital stock is fixed, and the long run, in
which the capital stock is variable. Whether the time span involved
is the short run or the long run, the traditional model is still a
single period model — even though the firm's capital stock is
constant in the first case and variable in the second.
4. It is tempting to call single period models 'static' and multiperiod
models 'dynamic'. However, the steady state growth models are
multiperiod models in which all quantities grow at the same rate and
hence remain in fixed relation to one another until the equilibrium
is disturbed. For this reason such models can be formulated as
static optimization problems, as pointed out in chapter one.
Therefore, to avoid confusion, in this paper the terms static and
dynamic will be reserved for describing mathematical optimization
techniques.





6. See Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis , op. cit. , ch. 9.
An equilibrium is said to be stable if "a displacement from equilib-
rium is followed by a return to equilibrium." Ibid.
, pp. 261-262.
7. Marris, Theories of Corporate Growth , op. cit.
,
p. 13.
8. There is a fourth financial statement, the statement of changes in
financial position, that is a major source of financial information,
though, for the purposes of this chapter, only the information
provided in the three financial statements mentioned in the text
will be needed.
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9. A fuller discussion can be found in financial accounting textbooks,
such as Welsch and Anthony, op. cit. , ch. 3.
10. The financial statements illustrated in tables II-l, II-2, and II-3
are for typical manufacturing firms, since this is the type of
business firm with which the theory of the firm is concerned.
11. For this reason, the balance sheet is also called the 'statement
of financial position.
'
12. It should be pointed out that there are several methods accepted
by professional accountants for figuring depreciation and that the
particular method selected by a firm often depends on tax considera-
tions. For a comparative discussion of these methods see ibid.
,
ch. 9.
13. The characteristics of preferred stock are described in ibid.
,
ch. 12.
14. For this reason, the income statement is also called the 'profit
and loss statement.
'
15. This interest expense does not include dividends on preferred
stock, since such dividends are not deductible for tax purposes.
16. A synonym for 'profit' that is widely used in the business
literature is 'earnings.'
17. It is the author's conjecture that the balance sheet and income
statement, as provided by the accountant, would be identical to
those provided by the economist if the economy were in general
equilibrium and if, in addition, markets were perfect (see footnote
126 for a definition of a perfect market) and complete (see
footnote 430 and subsection la of section K for a definition and
discussion of the meaning of complete markets) and the firm rented
all its capital. One possible approach to demonstrating this result
would be first to hypothesize a disequilibrium situation and to
specify the accounting and economic balance sheets and income
statements and then to demonstrate the 'convergence' of the two
sets of financial statements as the economy approached general
equilibrium. It is recognized by the author that it might be
difficult to accomplish this without making the result dependent
on just how the initial disequilibrium was specified.
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18. Finance has no explicit role to play in the traditional models of
the firm since, in a world of certainty, profit maximization pro-
vides a complete description of the behavior of the firm. Indeed
traditional economic models of the firm are complete without
acknowledging the existence of the stock market. See H.E. Leland,
"Production Theory and the Stock Market," Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science (vol. 5, no. 1; Spring 1974), pp. 125-144.
Though finance is not treated explicitly in these models, it is
not ignored. Rather, it is subsumed within the general equilibrium
analysis of a market economy since, in general equilibrium, there
exist only those firms that are capable of financing their opera-
tions (with or without the stock market). See Arrow, The Firm in
General Equilibrium Theory , op. cit
.
, pp. 68-110.
19. Machlup, op. cit.
,
p. 9.
20. A useful survey of the literature dealing with the price behavior
of firms is provided in A. Silberston, "Price Behavior of Firms,"
Economic Journal (vol. 80; no. 319; September 1970), pp. 511-582.
21. See A. A. Walters, "Production and Cost Functions: An Econometric
Survey," Econometrica (vol. 31; no. 1-2; January-April 1963),
pp. 1-66, and D.W. Jorgenson, "The Theory of Investment Behavior,"
in R. Ferber, ed. , Determinants of Investment Behavior (Columbia
University Press; New York; 1967), pp. 133-135.
22. A now classic synthesis of the neoclassical (or traditional)
theory of the firm was provided by Samuelson. See P. A. Samuelson,
Foundations of Economic Analysis (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass.; 1947), chs. 3-4,8.
23. Economists often distinguish pure competition from perfect competi-
tion. Of the following five conditions, (i) through (iv) define
what is called pure competition and the addition of condition (v)
gives perfect competition. The difference between the two is that
'pure' refers to the market structure, whereas 'perfect' refers
to the nature of the information that is available to market
participants. For the purposes of this paper this distinction
is not of critical importance, though it should be remembered that
perfect competition requires that all five conditions hold. Con-
dition (v) is important because in the real world imperfect
information is one of the major sources of uncertainty.
24. The stock market and certain agricultural markets are often cited
as examples, but due to the increasing influence of large institu-
tional investors in the stock market and the keen cost competition
and widening role of cooperatives in agriculture, neither fits
the competitive model exactly.
25. W.J. Baumol, "Models of Economic Competition," in P. Langhoff, ed.,
Models, Measurement and Marketing (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.; 1965), pp. 143-168. An allocation of resources is said to
be 'Pareto optimal' "if production and distribution cannot be
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reorganized to increase the utility of one or more individuals
without decreasing the utility of others." See J.M. Henderson
and R.E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach
,
2nd ed. (McGraw-Hill; New York; 1971), ch. 7, for a mathematical
statement of the conditions required for Pareto optimality, and
in particular, p. 255, from which the quote was drawn.
26. Excellent mathematical expositions of the model of the firm under
perfect competition can be found in Henderson and Quandt, op. cit.
ch. 3, and in Intriligator, op. cit. , ch. 8. An equally good,
though geometric, presentation can be found in Herendeen, op. cit.
ch. 4.
27. Note that the MP curve intersects the AP curve at the
maximum point on the latter. This is easily proven. To find
the maximum value of AP set
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Then L • MP - Q = , or MP = f = AP . Similarly, if K
Li Lj la Li
were varied while L were held fixed, the same argument would
show that MP and AP could be replaced by MP and AP ,
respectively, and L could be replaced by K in figure IT-1.
28. A stronger assumption is that the production function is concave.
See footnote 30.
29. Some textbooks give the isoquants a shape different from that shown
in figure T.I-2 in order to show that, when one input is fixed
and the other is varied, eventually the law of diminishing marginal
productivity will cause the marginal productivity of the variable
input to become negative, in which case increased use of that
input will cause the level of output to fall. Since a rational
producer would stop adding amounts of the variable input once its
marginal productivity fell to zero, figure II-2 has been drawn
to show only the feasible region of production. An example of




30. In addition, it is normally assumed that the production function
is concave (and sometimes it is assumed to be strictly concave)
,
at least over some portion of the domain of the function, which














with strict inequalities holding when strict concavity is assumed.
It should be noted that (strict) concavity of the production
function implies (strict) convexity of the isoquants.
31. The basic reference is H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, "Nonlinear
Programming," in J. Neyman, ed. , Proceedings of the Second
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability
(University of California Press; Berkeley,; 1951), pp. 481-492.
The conditions can be found in any nonlinear programming text
and in most mathematical economics texts. See, for example,
Intriligator, op. cit.
,
ch. 4. The economic content of the
Kuhn-Tucker theorem, and more generally, the economic interpre-
tation of the dual to a nonlinear programming problem, are
discussed in M.L. Balinski and W.J. Baumol, "The Dual in Nonlinear
Programming and its Economic Interpretation," Review of Economic
Studies (vol. 35, no. 103; July 1968), pp. 237-256. For problems
(5) and (6) a simpler solution procedure is to assume L >
and K > , which is almost always the case, and solve these
problems as unconstrained problems.
32. Since only the case in which L > is of interest, in what
follows it is assumed that L > , i.e. that the firm hires some
labor.
33. Strictly speaking, equation (11) holds provided MP ^ . But
note from (8) that, if L
, p , and w are strictly positive,
then MP > . When the optimal amounts of the variable inputs
are used, it is generally the case that the marginal productivity
of each is strictly positive. An exception to this rule would be
the case in which the wage rate w were zero while the price
p were positive. From (8), MP = , and the firm would hire
labor until its marginal productivity fell to zero, i.e. with
given capital stock, the firm would maximize total output. How-
ever, in the context of a general equilibrium model of a market
economy, a zero price for any factor of production is highly
unlikely. Therefore, in what follows qualifications like
'provided MP ^ 0' will be added only when the conditions under-
lying the model make it necessary to consider explicitly the
possibility of the denominator being zero at optimality.
34. Problem (17) could also be solved with the aid of Lagrange
multipliers to obtain the same result.
35. This result is easily. demonstrated. Average total cost, AC
,
is given by AC = ——— , and its derivative is
AC = (Q-C'(Q) - C(Q))/Q 2 . Since Q 2 > , it follows that the
sign of AC' is determined by the sign of the numerator. Thus,
AC' <
wf3fn Q * C (Q) - C(Q) < , which is equivalent to
C'(Q) < — q » or MC < AC , and by the same argument, AC ' >
when MC ^ AC . Also, MC = AC when the latter is minimized.
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36. In order that the firm earn maximum profit, it is necessary that
p = SRMC = LRMC , for if p ^ SRMC , the firm can increase total
profit by changing the level of output, and if p ^ LRMC , it
can increase total profit by altering its scale of operations,
K . In order that it earn zero profit, it is necessary that
p = SRAC = LRAC (since price equals average revenue and zero
profit implies that average revenue equals average cost)
.
37. It is also normally assumed that the production function is written
so that its partial derivatives for all outputs are usually
positive and its partial derivatives for all inputs are usually
negative, and these same assumptions are made here.
38. Note that this is really the long run problem since none of the
inputs is fixed. For the short run problem, there would have to






) <_ b^ , i = 1 s ,
to reflect the s inputs that are in fixed supply. In solving
this larger problem, one additional Lagrange multiplier would have
to be introduced for each such constraint. An alternative exposi-
tion of the long run problem in terms of minimizing average total
cost yields the same basic results. See E. Silberberg,
"The Theory of the Firm in 'Long-Run' Equilibrium," American
Economic Review (vol. 64; no. 4; September 1974), pp. 734-741.
39. It is also required that q. _> , for all i , and that x. >_ ,
for a_ll j , in which case the nonnegativity constraints
"q"
_> and "x _> should be appended to problem (23). Solving
this larger problem would require the application of the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. This is unnecessary, however, if attention
is focused on nontrivial solutions (i.e. those in which all
variables are strictly positive at optimality) . It should be
noted that the possibility of a zero value for one or more decision
variables might have to be considered if the problem involves a
company or one of its divisions that might decide not to use an
input or not to produce an output — that it would, under different
conditions, use or produce, respectively — during the particular
period under consideration. For example, in the case of a seasonal
good, it might prove convenient to leave such an output in the
production function and to let the relevant decision variable
assume a zero value when the good is 'out of season.'
40. In the simple case of two outputs, the production function in
implicit form is F(q
,q ,x , . . . ,x ) = . When all inputs are
held fixed, the production function defines
a locus of output combinations called a
product transformation curve, the shape ^2
of which is bowed out from the origin,
as in the figure to the right. The reason
for this is that, when inputs are used
with maximum technical efficiency, more
of one output can be obtained only if
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some of the other is sacrificed. As long as factor proportions
are unequal for the two goods, obtaining more of q required
that successively larger amounts of q_ be sacrificed. The slope
of the tangent to the curve at any point is negative, and the
negative of this slope is called the rate of product transformation.
The macroeconomic analogue of the product transformation curve
is the production possibilities curve, and in introductory
economics textbooks this curve typically appears with guns in
place of q and butter in place of q , illustrating the
familiar guns vs. butter choice that confronts society.
41. The second order conditions for profit maximization require that














'" n+m , n+m " n+m
F, . . . F
1 'n+m
alternate in sign with the first determinant being positive,
1 < i < n : : m
;
where F. = 8F/8q.
l l
F . . = 2F/9x.
n+J J
and where the F.. are the second order partial derivatives of
ii
F. See HendersonJ and Quandt, op. cit.
,
pp. 96, 404-406. In
problems such as (23), the second order conditions are seldom
stated since only the first order conditions convey what is
generally considered useful economic information.
42. A. Hunter, Competition and the Law (Allen & Unwin; London; 1966),
ch. 2.
43. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper and
Row; New York; 1942), chs. 7-8. Schumpeter offers an elegant
argument against the acceptance of perfect competition as a goal
of government antitrust policy — an argument that is as relevant
today as it was when it was first presented.
44. See F.M. Scherer, "Market Structure and the Employment of Scien-
tists and Engineers," American Economic Review (vol. 57; no. 3;
June 1967), pp. 524-531, and W.S. Comanor, "Market Structure,
Product Differentiation, and Industrial Research," Quarterly
Journal of Economics (vol. 81; no. 4; November 1967), pp. 639-657.
45,
46,
Baumol, Models of Economic Competition
,
op. cit, 155,
The classic references for this topic are R. Dorfman, Application
of Linear Programming to the Theory of the Firm (University of
California Press; Berkeley; 1951); R. Dorfman, P. A. Samuelson,
and R.M. Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis (McGraw-
Hill; New York; 1958)' and K.E. Boulding and A.W. Spivey, eds„
Linear Programming and the Theory of the Firm (Macmillan; New York;
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1960). Two more recent texts are C. Kwang and Y. Wu, Mathematical
Programming and Economic Analysis of the Firm (International
Textbook Company; London; 1971) and D.C. Vandermeulen, Linear
Economic Theory (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1971),
both of which do an excellent job of explaining the mathematical
and economic relationship between the linear and nonlinear
formulations.
47. For a discussion of the more general case, in which there are n
outputs and a choice of processes for producing each, see
Vandermeulen, op. cit. , ch. 11.
48. The term profit is being used rather loosely here to mean what
the accountant calls 'contribution margin', which is the difference
between the price of the item and its variable costs. Since
price is taken as given under perfect competition and since unit
variable costs normally remain roughly constant over some range
of output, the assumption that c. is constant is reasonable.
In a practical problem, if the c.'s were not known with certainty,
then sensitivity analysis could be performed to deal with this
uncertainty.
49. The theory of linear programming, and in particular, the extreme
point theorem and its proof, can be found in G. Hadley, Linear
Programming (Addison-Wesley; Reading, Mass.; 1962).
50. There may be more than n-m q.'s at the zero level if the
solution to problem (31) is degenerate.
Indeed, it can be shown that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, when
applied to problems (31) and (32), yield the simplex optimality
conditions.
52. The notion of a process, or activity, is discussed in R. Dorfman,
"Mathematical, or 'Linear' Programming: A Nonmathematical
Exposition," American Economic Review (vol. 43; no. 5; December
1953), pp. 797-825.
53. To see this, note that, if process 1 is used to produce 5a
units of output and process 2 is used to produce 5(l-a)
units of output, where < a < 1 , then process 1 requires
3a units of K and a units of L while process 2 requires
2(l-a) units of K and 2(l-a) units of L . But since the
coordinates of point A are ( ) and the coordinates of B
are (~) , the input combination a(_) + (l-a)( ) lies on the line
segment joining A and B . The validity of this simple linear
relationship rests on the assumption that the processes are
operated independently, so that two or more processes can be used
simultaneously without any one process generating favorable or
unfavorable effects on any other.
459
54. The vertical line beginning at A and the horizontal line beginning
at C are technically part of the isoquant, though no rational
producer would ever use any of those input combinations since
in each case some amount of one of the inputs is being wasted.
Thus, the feasible region of production lies between the rays
extending from the origin through the points A and C .






57. The solution to the linear programming problem is integer-valued.
Were this not the case, integer programming could be employed
to obtain the optimal integer-valued solution. See R.S. Garfinkel
and G.L. Nemhauser, Integer Programming (Wiley; New York; 1972).
58. See W.J. Baumol and R.E. Quandt, "Dual Prices and Competition,"
in A.R. Oxenfgidt, ed. , Models of Markets (Columbia University
Press; New York; 1963), pp. 237-264.
59. The connection between 'monopoly power' and the term 'market
power' defined earlier is the following. A firm may be able to
influence the prices of its outputs or the prices it pays for its
inputs (or it may be able to influence both output prices and
input prices). Its ability to influence output prices is called
monopoly power; its ability to influence input prices will be
defined below (see footnote 63) as monopsony power; and monopoly
power and monopsony power are referred to collectively as market
power.
60. References for this section are Intriligator, op. cit.
, pp. 201-
205, and Henderson and Quandt, op. cit.
,
pp. 206-222, the latter
of which deals with related issues such as the discriminating
monopolist, who sells the same product at different prices in
different markets, and the multiple-plant monopolist, who must
decide how to allocate his production among his plants. It should
be noted that factor markets, as well as product markets, can,
in theory at least, be monopolistic, although this subsection is
concerned with monopoly in a product market, and specifically,
with the behavior of the single producer serving that market.
61. Note that (34), rather than the demand function (33), has been
graphed in figure II-8. That is, the coordinate axes have been
'reversed'. This is the convention economists have adopted in
order to be able to graph the demand function on the same set of
axes as the marginal cost and average cost functions, in both of
which quantity, q , is the independent variable.
62. The demand curve and the marginal revenue curve have the same
p-intercept when the demand function is linear. This follows from
the fact that f(q) is of the form p = a + bq, b<0, the total
revenue function is R(q) = p*q = (a + bq)-q = aq + bq2
,
and the
marginal revenue function is MR(q) = a + 2bq . Note that the
slope of MR is twice the slope of DD in absolute value.
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63. When a firm has some influence over its input prices it is said
to possess some degree of monopsony power, and if it is the sole
buyer of some input, the market for that input is said to be a
monopsony. In what follows it will be assumed that the monopolist
is the sole purchaser of each input, so that the price of each can
be expressed as a function of his output only. At the opposite
extreme, the factor markets are perfectly competitive so that the
price of each input is taken as given and r. is constant,
j = l,...,m . As a result, the optimality conditions for the case
in which factor markets are perfectly competitive would be somewhat
simpler in form than those presented below.
64. This is the long run problem since there are no restrictions placed
on resource availabilities. The short run problem is only slightly
more complicated, and so, is not treated separately here.
65. If the factor markets were perfectly competitive, then MC
.
would equal r. in equation (44). J
66. Indeed, (46) is the general rule for profit maximization. Under
perfect competition, P = MR and, therefore, (12) is equivalent
to (46).
67. If MC intersects MR in two places, then the optimum output is
determined by the point of intersection between MR and MC at
which the latter is rising. The easiest way to see this is to
view problem (40) as the composite of two problems, the first of
which provides a total cost function C(q) (as described in sub-
section 1 of this section) and the second of which involves the
unconstrained optimization problem: maximize tt = R(q) - C(q) .
The first order condition for this problem is R' (q) - C'(q) = ,
or MR = MC , and the second order condition is R"(q) - C"(q) < ,
or R"(q) < C"(q)
,
which is satisfied if MR is decreasing and
MC is increasing.




It should be noted that the development of a new product does not
necessarily confer monopoly status on its developer. Whether or
not it does depends on the extent to which existing products can
serve as substitutes for the new product. Note that in both
cases mentioned in the text a welfare argument is involved. In
the first case, the welfare issue concerns the question of whether
the improved productive efficiency that is possible under (regulated)
monopoly outweighs (in the sense of producing a higher level of
social welfare) the potential loss of operating efficiency that
results from the removal of effective competition in the firm's
product market. In the second case, the welfare issue concerns
the question of whether temporary monopoly, as conferred by patents
and copyrights, provides an incentive to innovate that causes
(social) benefits to be generated that exceed the (social) costs
associated with having temporarily just a single producer of the
new product.
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69. For example, see Galbraith, The New Industrial State ; op. cit.
,
pp. 181-183; Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance , op. cit. , ch. 2; and P. A. Samuelson, Economics
,
9th ed. (McGraw-Hill; New York; 1973), chs. 25-26.
70. See Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
,
op. cit. , ch. 20, and Steiner, op. cit. , ch. 7.
71. The classic reference is A. Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical
Principles of the Theory of Wealth (first published in 1838),
translated by N.T. Bacon (A.M. Kelley; New York; 1960), which
also represents one of the earliest applications of mathematics to
economics. A brief history of the development of duopoly theory is
given in J.R. Hicks, "Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The
Theory of Monopoly," Econometrica (vol. 3; January 1935), pp. 12-16.




72. This assumption requires that the factor markets be perfectly
competitive. If the firms are able to influence input prices
as well as output prices, then the problem must be reformulated
to take this into account. See Intriligator, op. cit.
,
pp. 205-208.
73. In the somewhat more general version of the model, in which input
prices are a function of the combined amounts used by the two
firms, there would also be a pair of conjectural variations for
each input, which would be given interpretations similar to the
interpretations given to dq„/dq and dq /dq_ .
74. Similarly, the second order conditions would be of the same form
as in the monopoly case, namely, that^at the optimum marginal
revenue must be increasing less rapidly than marginal cost.
75. See J.W. Friedman, "Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly,"
Review of Economic Studies (vol. 35; no. 3; July 1968), pp. 257-
272, and Intriligator, op. cit.
, pp. 208-210. See also the
additional references listed in footnote 87.


































- c = / q i q 2 3b
Zero conjectural variations are reflected in the fact that
dq /dq =0 in the calculation of dfT /dq
,
and dq /dq =
in the calculation of dTT~/dq
9
.
77. See J.W. Friedman, op. cit.
,
p. 259, for more on this point. A
recent paper that permits learning in the context of duopoly is
R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot,"An Analysis of Cooperation and
Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review (vol. 63;
no. 1; March 1973), pp. 24-37.
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78. J.W. Friedman, op. cit.
,
p. 259. See also W. Fellner, Competition
Among the Few (Alfred A. Knopf; New York; 1949), p. 57, for a
discussion of the contradiction implied by the behavioral assumption
of zero conjectural variations.
79. Ibid.
,
pp. 259-261. As Friedman points out, the Cournot model
shares a limitation common to all traditional models, namely, that
the individual firm is assumed to maximize single period profits.
In his paper Friedman makes the duopolist less — to use his words —
'short sighted' by having it maximize a discounted stream of
profits.
80. H. von Stackelberg, The Theory of the Market Economy , translated
by A.T. Peacock (Oxford University Press; New York; 1952).
81. For example, in the linear case if firm 2 is the leader and firm 1
is the follower, then
dTT /dq = a- b(q 1 +q„) - bq - c = q =
a-c
1' M. VM 1 ^V M l w M l 4b
d7T_/dq = a- b(q 1 +q.) - bq + ^bq_ - c = a-c2 2 2 2 2 j q2 - -^- ,













as compared with tt = tt = ——— - d under the Cournot solution,
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83. An alternative explanation of this situation is offered in the
next section with the aid of game theory. Stated briefly, this
situation illustrates the Prisoners' Dilemma game.
84. In the linear case considered above, conjectural variations in
the von Stackelberg analysis are either or
-h •
85. In the linear case, joint profit tt + tt can be maximized even
if the producers act independently of one another provided
dq./dq = dq /dq = 1 , that is, provided each producer believes
that its rival will match exactly its changes in output.
86. J.W. Friedman, op. cit.
,
pp. 259-261.
87. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, "Multiperiod Decision Models with
Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 84; no. 3; August 1970),
pp. 410-429, and J.W. Friedman, op. cit. , pp. 257-272, treat
duopoly as a multiperiod maximization problem. Cyert and DeGroot,
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pp. 24-37, extends the results of the two earlier
papers by permitting the duopolists to alter their behavior and
their strategies, in effect permitting duopolists to undergo a
learning process through time that leads to increased cooperation
and increased profits for both.
88. J.W. Friedman, op. cit.
,
p. 259, elaborates on this point.
89. J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenster, Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior
, 2nd ed (Princeton University Press; Princeton, N.J.;
1947). See also M. Shubik, Strategy and Market Structure
,
Competition, Oligopoly and the Theory of Games (Wiley; New York;
1959), which develops a theory of games of economic survival that
the author applies to oligopoly. A convenient summary of game
theory is given in Intriligator, op. cit.
,
ch. 6.
90. This result is known as the minimax theorem and can be proved
in several ways. See D. Gale, H.W. Kuhn, and A.W. Tucker,
"Linear Programming and the Theory of Games," in T.C. Koopmans
,
ed. , Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation
,
Cowles
Monograph 13 (Wiley; New York; 1951). The theorem requires that
players be rational in the sense that each tries to maximize the
expected value of its payoffs. Then under this assumption and the
two assumptions stated in the text, the minimax theorem asserts
that there is a solution in the sense that even if one player
knows beforehand that the other player will use its optimal
strategy — and even if it knows what that other player's optimal
strategy is — the first player cannot improve its position by
altering its strategy (in the case of mixed strategies, knowledge
of the other player's optimal probabilities would not help the
first player, though, of course, knowing which pure strategy was
going to be adopted on any one play might help the first player.
91. Two exceptions are the following: if the firms set market share as
the sole objective or if the firms engage in games of ruin with
the winner enjoying complete control of the market. Neither
situation appears to be common, however. See Scherer, Industrial




92. Strategies could also be specified in terms of output levels,
or, if the products were somehow differentiated, so that the
producers could charge different prices, the strategies could be
defined in terms of prices. These other approaches might require
that more than two strategies be specified.
93. The upper left-hand entry is the Cournot equilibrium and the
lower right-hand entry is the von Stackelberg disequilibrium.
The various expressions for each firm's profit level in each
situation are given in footnotes 81 and 82 above.
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94. This is not to imply that all nonzero-sum games lead to the
Prisoners' Dilemma. Rather, it is merely intended to show what
can happen in the context of a nonzero sum game, namely, that the
strategies the two players will adopt are not uniquely determined,
but depend on additional factors not included in the payoff matrix.
The connections between duopoly and the Prisoners' Dilemma are
described in more detail in F.T. Dolbear, et. al. , "Collusion in
the Prisoners' Dilemma: Number of Strategies," Journal of Conflict
Resolution (vol. 13; June 1969), pp. 252-261.
95. If they were able to agree to maximize joint total profit, then
they would earn combined profit of 8600 , and if this were
divided equally between them, each would receive 4300 . In the
linear case it is easy to show that this same result could be
achieved if each conjectural variation were equal to one.
96. Note that while minimax is an unbeatable strategy for zero-sum
games, it does not necessarily yield the optimal strategy in the
nonzero-sum context. In figure 11-10 the minimax strategy for
each firm is to act as a leader, which leads to lower profit for
both than could be achieved through cooperation.
97. In addition to direct evidence of cooperative behavior in the real
business world (for example, see D. McClintick, "Gypsum Trial
Shows How Price-Fix Plan Supposedly Operated," Wall Street Journal
(October 3, 1975)), there is some evidence based on simulated
oligopoly games played by humans that such a learning process does
take place and that over time the players adjust their behavior
toward the cooperative (i.e. joint profit maximizing) solution.
See D.H. Stern, "Some Notes on Oligopoly Theory and Experiments",
in M. Shubik, ed. , Essays in Mathematical Economics (Princeton
University Press; Princeton, N.J.; 1967), pp. 255-281.
98. As with these other analytical approaches, such as mathematical
programming, generally applicable characterizations have been
forthcoming only in the limiting cases of monopoly and perfect
competition. This is not meant to imply that on these grounds the
game theoretic approach should be eschewed. Not only has game
theory provided useful insights, but the work of Shubik and Dolbear
et. al. , as well as Marris (see Marris, The Modern Corporation and
Economic Theory
, op. cit.
, pp. 283-304), could lead to further
significant developments. Indeed, just the recognition that
behavioral strategies can vary under oligopoly, thereby requiring
a careful analysis of any particular oligopolistic situation before
outcomes can be predicted, is, in the opinion of this writer,
itself a significant step forward.






101. On the first point, while it is recognized that these firms
enjoy substantial power, this power is not without limits, as
the major aluminum producers were recently forced to recognize.
See "The price war in aluminum," Business Week (November 17,
1975) and J.W. Winski, "How a Long Price War Dragged On and
Hurt Chicago Food Chains," Wall Street Journal (July 19, 1976).
On the second point, there has been much debate as to whether
the short run reactions of rivals are taken into account or
whether producers are only concerned about long run implications.
Baumol argues that firms ignore the day-to-day behavior of rivals
and consider long run implications only. See W.J. Baumol,





writer agrees with Baumol for the reasons that are discussed
below in section H. Briefly, the time and expense that would be
required to consider rivals' reactions on a day-to-day basis
would be prohibitive, and such expense can only be justified on
major (long run) decisions such as launching a new product or
constructing a new plant.
102. The Cournot analysis is easily extended to n firms, n > 2
,
by first setting up the n profit equations, then by assuming
zero conjectural variations for all firms and differentiating
each profit equation with respect to each firm's level of output,
and finally by solving the resulting n equations in n
unknowns. For example, if there are n firms, each with cost
function given by (53) , and ifnthe market demand function is
linear as in (54), but with £ q. in place of q.-.+q. , then
the profit maximizing firms will each produce
q • = / "T^m units of output. Similarly, the von Stackelberg
^i (n+l)b , \. , ,
-i j v n canalysis could be generalized by allowing for
various combinations of leaders and followers.
103. One of the classic works in this regard is Fellner's model, which
followed along the lines originally suggested by E.H. Chamberlin,
who, though he did not fully develop a theory of oligopoly in his
classic The Theory of Monopolistic Competition
,
did recognize
and appreciate the role of oligopolistic interdependence and
who did suggest oligopoly as a separate significant type of
market structure. See E.H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic
Competition
,
8th ed. (Harvard University Press; Cambridge,
Mass.; 1962), ch. 3. Fellner suggests that an oligopolistic
group will attempt to maximize their joint profit, but that, due
to each oligopolist's unwillingness to surrender complete
sovereignty for the sake of joint profit maximization, the con-
flicting motives of group members will inhibit this collective
effort. Fellner, op. cit. The difficulty of maintaining collusive
agreements is also discussed in G.J. Stigler, "A Theory of
Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy (vol. 72; no. 1;
February 1964), pp. 44-61, reprinted under the same title in
G.J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Irwin; Homewood,
111.; 1968), ch. 5, in which the importance of the number of
buyers is brought out. Other noteworthy approaches to modeling
oligopolistic behavior include 'dominant firm' price leadership,
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in which the price leader alters the price when it judges the
climate to be right (see J.W. Markham, "The Nature and Signif-
icance of Price Leadership," American Economic Review (vol. 41;
no. 5; December 1951), pp. 891-905); 'barometric' price leader-
ship, in which the price leader adjusts price when it considers
the climate to be right and in which its competitors signal their
approval or disapproval by following or not following, respectively
(see G.J. Stigler, "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid
Prices," Journal of Political Economy (vol. 55; no. 5; October
1947), pp. 432-449, reprinted under the same title in G.J. Stigler,
The Organization of Industry
,
ch. 18); 'limit' pricing, in which
prices are set just low enough to discourage potential entrants
from entering the industry (see J.S. Bain, "A Note on Pricing in
Monopoly and Oligopoly," American Economic Review (vol. 39; no. 2;
March 1949), pp. 448-464, and P. Sylos-Labini, Oligopoly and
Technical Progress , rev. ed. (Harvard University Press; Cambridge,
Mass.; 1969)); and the independent maximization model, which is a
variant of the limit pricing model (see D.A. Worcester, Jr.,
Monopoly, Big Business and Welfare in the Post-war United States
(University of Washington Press; Seattle; 1967), pp. 83-105). In
addition, there are several game theoretic approaches, such as
M. Shubik, op. cit. , and an experimental games approach adopted
by Sherman. For the latter see R. Sherman, Oligopoly: An Empirical
Approach (D.C. Heath; Lexington, Mass.; 1972). To say that no
single model has gained universal acceptance would be more than
a mild understatement. Moreover, it is not clear whether one all-
encompassing model can ever be devised.
The kinked demand curve model treats the individual participant
in an oligopolistic industry in isolation. Several models that
purport to describe interfirm behavior should be noted. In
addition to the game theoretic approaches of Shubik, Marris, and
others (Shubik, op. cit.
,





pp. 283-304), Phillips and O.E.
Williamson model interfirm behavior in oligopolistic industries
around organizational as well as economic variables. See A.
Phillips, "A Theory of Interfirm Organization," Quarterly Journal
of Economics (vol. 74; no. 4; November 1960), pp. 602-613;
A. Phillips, "Policy Implications of the Theory of Interfirm
Organization," American Economic Review (vol. 51; no. 2; May 1961),
pp. 245-254; A. Phillips, Market Structure, Organization, and
Performance (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.; 1962);
and O.E. Williamson, "A Dynamic Theory of Interfirm Behavior,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 79; no. 4; November 1965),
pp. 579-607. Phillips treats a wider range of oligopolistic
behavior than Williamson, though within a static framework.
Williamson's model is dynamic and examines a widely observed pattern
of oligopolistic behavior, namely, alternating periods of collusive-
ness and competitiveness on the part of oligopolistic firms. See
also K.E. Boulding, "The Uses of Price Theory," in A.R. Oxenfeldt,
ed., Models of Markets (Columbia University Press; New York; 1963),
pp. 146-162; Fellner, op. cit. ; C. Kaysen, "A Dynamic Aspect of the
Monopoly Problem," Review of Economics and Statistics (vol. 31;





104. The first discussions of the kinked oligopoly demand curve
appeared in P.M. Sweezy, "Demand under Conditions of Oligopoly,"
Journal of Political Economy (vol. 47; no. 4; August 1939),
pp. 568-573, and R.L. Hall and C.J. Hitch, "Price Theory and
Business Behavior," Oxford Economic Papers (vol. 2; May 1939),
pp. 12-45. A more recent (and critical) discussion of the model
is provided by Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve , op. cit.
105. Let the equation of DD be p = a - b q and let the equation
of dd be p = a„ - b ? q , where the a.'s and b.'s are positive
and a > a~ and b > b„ .
_.
Then marginal revenue corresponding
to DD is given by 1^, = —{a - b q)q = a - 2b q , and
similarly, MR , = a„ - 2b„q . At q* , DD and dd intersect,
so that a - 5
1
q* = a~ - b„q* . Thus, at q* there is a jump










106. See R.M. Cyert, "Oligopoly Price Behavior and the Business Cycle,"
Journal of Political Economy (vol. 63; no. 1; February 1955),
pp. 41-51; and W.J. Yordon, "Industrial Concentration and Price
Flexibility in Inflation: Price Response Rates in Fourteen
Industries, 1947-1958," Review of Economics and Statistics (vol.
43; no. 3; August 1961), pp. 287-294. For supporting evidence
on the English experience, see R.R. Neild, Pricing and Employment
in the Trade Cycle , N.I.E.S.R. Occasional Paper 21 (Cambridge
University Press; Cambridge; 1963). For somewhat contradictory
results see A.D. Brownlie, "Some Econometrics of Price
Determination," Journal of Industrial Economics (vol. 13; no. 2;
March 1965), pp. 116-121.




441. While Stigler' s empirical results do not constitute a
general disproof of the kinked oligopoly demand curve theory,
they do imply that it cannot serve as a general theory of
oligopoly. See also Cohen and Cyert, op. cit.
,
p. 251, on this
point.
108. Two cases in which it might prove acceptable have been suggested
by Cohen and Cyert: (i) a new industry in its early stages of
development and (ii) an older industry in which new and previously
unrecognized rivals enter the market. In both cases existing
producers will have had little opportunity to learn about their
new competitors and how they are likely to react. Ibid.
,
pp. 251-253.
109. The theory of monopolistic competition has its genesis in the
works of Sraffa, Joan Robinson, and Chamberlin. See P. Sraffa,
"The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions," Economic
Journal (vol. 36; no. 144; December 1926), pp. 535-550. Sraffa's
work helped inspire Mrs. Robinson's The Economics of Imperfect
Competition
,
(Macmillan; London; 1933). The same year that Mrs.
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Robinson's book was published, E.H. Chamberlin published the
first edition of The Theory of Monopolistic Competition
,
op. cit.
The works of Mrs. Robinson and Chamberlin were responsible for
freeing the analysis of markets from the two extremes of monopoly
and perfect competition. Where Chamberlin' s work differed from
Mrs. Robinson's was the former's emphasis on product differen-
tiation and its important implications for public policy. See
E.H. Chamberlin, Towards A More General Theory of Value (Oxford
University Press; Oxford; 1957), ch. 5, for further discussion
on this issue, and J.S. Bain, "Chamberlin' s impact on microeconomic
theory," in R.E. Kuenne, ed. , Monopolistic Competition Theory:
Studies in Impact (Wiley; New York; 1967), pp. 147-176, for an
assessment of the importance of Chamberlin' s contribution. A
somewhat more critical view of Chamberlin' s model and its impli-
cations is presented in G.C. Archibald, "Chamberlin versus Chicago,"
Review of Economic Studies (vol. 29; October 1961), pp. 2-28.
The question of the optimality of product differentiation, and
conditions under which product differentiation can be regarded as
excessive (i.e. beyond the socially optimal degree of product
differentiation), are discussed in K. Lancaster, "Socially
Optimal Product Differentiation," American Economic Review (vol.
65; no. 4; September 1975), pp. 567-585.
110. As before, the second order condition requires that MC be
rising faster than MR at the optimum.
111. Since the n firms have, by assumption, identical revenue
functions and identical cost functions, they can be treated as
if they were identical, and each firm's pro rata share of overall
demand is 1/n .
112. The demand curves dd and DD in figure 11-12 are analogous to
dd and DD , respectively, in figure 11-11. The two sets of
curves are not identical, however, because of the different
behavioral assumptions underlying each figure.





114. G.J. Stigler, "Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect," in
G.J. Stigler, Five Lectures on Economic Problems (London School









116. Stigler, The Organization of Industry
,
p. 313.




118. See A. Henderson, "The Theory of Duopoly," Quarterly Journal of
Economics (vol. 68; no. 4; November 1954), p. 565. Though the
source is not current, its basic points, in the opinion of this
writer, are still valid.
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119. For example, see K.W. Rothschild, "Price Theory and Oligopoly,"
Economic Journal (vol. 57; no. 227; September 1947), Dp. 299-
320, and J. Lintner, Corporate Growth under Uncertainty
, pp. 172-
173.
120. Machlup, op. cit.
,
p. 23; and Silberston, op. cit.
,
pp. 530-533.
121. The rate of discount, p , measures the rate at which the firm is
willing to trade off a dollar of profit this period for profits
next period. As such, it is an interest rate, or equivalently,
the price of waiting (for future profits). More specifically,
according to formula (60) , a dollar of profit earned in any
period t has the same value to the firm as 1+p dollars of
profit earned in period t+1 , or equivalently, the firm is
willing to sacrifice one dollar of profit this period only if
by doing so it can increase next period's profit by (more than)
1+p dollars. A higher value for p implies a greater preference
for profit this period rather than next, i.e. the sacrificing
of profits this period requires the prospect of relatively greater
future profit the greater is the value of p .
122. If instead, continuous compounding (as opposed to annual compounding)
were used, then
oo oo oo 77
V = / tt e~
pt





again provided g < p ; and if g = , then V = tt /p . This
(continuous) model of security valuation was originally proposed
by Gordon and Shapiro. See M.J. Gordon and E. Shapiro, "Capital
Equipment Analysis: The Required Rate of Profit," Management
Science (vol. 3; no. 1; October 1956), pp. 102-110. Thus, in the
continuous case, formula (61) must be modified slightly, but
formula (62) holds exactly (with continuously compounded rates
in place of annually compounded ones).
123. In terms of formulae (61) and (62), this means that p > ; the
firm will give up one dollar of current period profit only if
offered the prospect of at least 1+p dollars of profit one
period from now.
124. The trade off depends, of course, on the value of p . A low
discount rate implies a relatively low time preference for
profit, i.e. the firm would be almost as happy with one dollar of
profit ten years from now as it would with one dollar of profit
today. A high discount rate implies a relatively high time
preference for profit, and in the extreme case of p = °° , the
firm would engage in short run (i.e. current period) profit
maximization. If, as Rothschild and Galbraith have suggested,
large firms are mainly interested in their long run survival
(see K.W. Rothschild, "Price Theory and Oligopoly," Economic




p. 171,), then ceteris paribus one would
expect larger firms to have lower discount rates than smaller
firms.
125. For this reason, what appears to be ' satisficing' behavior may
in actuality be perfectly consistent with long run profit
maximization. See Silberston, op. cit.
, pp. 530-533.
126. Capital markets are said to be perfect when (i) all assets and
goods are infinitely divisible; (ii) information is costless and
available on the same basis to everyone; (iii) there are no
brokerage fees or transactions costs of any kind; (iv) there are
no taxes; (v) all individuals pay the same price for any
particular asset; and (vi) no individual is wealthy enough and
no firm is large enough to influence the market price of any
asset. In perfect capital markets all firms and all individuals
act as price takers. See E.F. Fama and M.H. Miller, The Theory
of Finance (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York; 1972), p. 277,
or M.H. Miller and F. Modigliani, "Dividend Policy, Growth, and
the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business (vol. 34; no. 4;
October 1961), p. 412. As will be shown below in section K, the
irrelevancy of the debt-equity mix also requires that one addi-
tional condition be satisfied, namely, that the capital markets,
i.e. the markets for stocks, for bonds, and for other financial
securities, be complete with regard to the possible states of
nature in each future time period. The explanation of the exact
meaning of 'complete markets' is deferred to section K, where the
appropriate conceptual framework is developed.
127. Modigliani and Miller, op. cit.
,
pp. 261-296. Simpler expositions
can be found in Mossin, op. cit.
,
pp. 76-78, 86-89, and in G.C.
Philippatos, Financial Management: Theory and Techniques (Holden-
Day; San Francisco; 1973), pp. 292-296.
128. Modigliani and Miller divide firms into risk classes, and for
each firm, p in formula (62) is the discount rate appropriate






130. The importance of capital markets being in equilibrium in order
that formula (62) express the market value of the firm exactly
in terms of the discounted flow of future profits needs emphasis.
Formula (62) and the Modigliani and Miller results are equili-
brium results; that is, they hold in equilibrium (provided the
required assumptions are satisfied), but in disequilibrium there
is no longer any assurance that they will hold.
131. The reason for this qualification is that the total market value
of the firm will equal the discounted flow of profits as a con-
sequence of general equilibrium in the capital markets. In the
context of markets for the financial securities of all firms, the
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expression 'maximize the total market value of the firm' only
makes sense when either (i) the decisions of all other firms are
taken as given or (ii) the maximization takes place relative to
some index that reflects the market value of the shares of all
firms. Most of the models that are discussed below take the
first approach, i.e. they are partial equilibrium models. The
second approach is discussed in Leland, Production Theory and the
Stock Market , op. cit. , pp. 136-138.
132. A capital gain is realized when a share is sold for more than
the purchase price, while a capital loss results when the purchase
price exceeds the selling price. Investor interest in capital
gains is motivated by the differential tax treatment accorded
long term capital gains (long term implying that the asset was
held for at least nine months). However, due to the complexities
associated with tax considerations, in what follows the role of
income taxes will be ignored.
133. J. Lintner, "The Cost of Capital and Optimal Financing of
Corporate Growth," Journal of Finance (vol. 18; no. 2; May
1963), p. 292.
134. See footnote 126 for the definition of a perfect market. See
also Fama and Miller, op. cit.
,
pp. 176-187, 300-301. Of
necessity each firm must act as a price taker in the capital




pp. 154-155. In a world of uncertainty the objective of maximizing
the current market value of the firm must be modified. Lintner
suggests maximizing the expected current value of equity, given
(or relative to) the level of some stock market index (e.g.
Standard and Poor's or the Dow Jones Index). See J. Lintner,
"Optimal Dividends and Corporate Growth under Uncertainty,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 78; no. 1; February 1964),
pp. 49-50. This modification alone is insufficient, for as
Stiglitz, Jensen and Long, and Fama have shown, the stock market
generally does not produce a Pareto optimal allocation of invest-
ment under the assumption that all firms maximize market value.
See J. Stiglitz, "On the Optimality of the Stock Market Alloca-
tion of Investment," Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 86;
no. 1; February 1972), pp. 25-60; M. Jensen and J. Long, "Corporate
Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital
Markets," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
(vol. 3; no. 1; Spring 1972), pp. 151-174; E.F. Fama, "Perfect
Competition and Optimal Production Decisions under Uncertainty,"
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (vol. 3; no. 2;
Autumn 1972), pp. 509-530. Wilson used a variant of Stiglitz's
model to show that,unless certain assumptions are satisfied,
every stockholder would recommend production decisions that do
not maximize the market value of shares. See R. Wilson, "Comment
on J. Stiglitz, 'On the Optimality of Stock Market Allocation of
Investment'," Working Paper No. 8 (Institute for Mathematical
Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Stanford,
Calif.; 1972). LeRoy has shown that Stiglitz implicitly assumed
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an environment of monopolistic competition and Wilson and Leland
have shown that, in such an environment, if firms choose the
level of investment so that shareholder utility is maximized,
the resulting allocation of resources will be Pareto optimal from
the point of view of the shareholders, though stock market values
will not be maximized. See S.F. LeRoy, "Stock Market Optimality:
Comment", Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 90; no. 1;
February, 1976), pp. 150-155; Wilson, op. cit. ; and Leland,
op. cit.
, pp. 125-144. As Wilson and Leland conclude, "what
Stiglitz brings into question is not the Pareto optimality of
the stock market, but rather the value maximization criterion."
Ibid.
,
p. 137. Market value maximization implies a Pareto
optimal allocation of investment — in the sense that no subsequent
reallocation could make some share owner better off (i.e. increase
his expected utility) without making another worse off (i.e.
lowering someone else's expected utility) — provided there is
perfect competition, i.e. provided firms in the same industry
have perfectly correlated returns and provided each firm maxi-
mizes its relative value but considers the values of the other
firms as given. A stronger condition for the Pareto optimality
of the stock market allocation of investment is the requirement
that markets be complete. See K.J. Arrow, "The Role of Securities
in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing," Review of Economic
Studies (vol. 31; no. 86; April 1964), pp. 91-96; and G. Debreu,
The Theory of Value (Wiley; New York; 1959). Diamond, who assumed
a perfectly competitive environment in the sense described above,
showed that even if there are fewer firms than states of nature
(see section K below) , stock market value maximization leads to a
"constrained Pareto-optimal resource allocation." See P. A.
Diamond, "The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium
Model with Technological Uncertainty," American Economic Review
(vol. 57; no. 4; September 1967), pp. 759-776. The results
obtained by Diamond are consistent with those of Leland. See
Leland, op. cit. To summarize, then, stock market value maximi-
zation is consistent (i) with the utility maximization of share-
holders in a certain environment provided markets are perfect
and (ii) with the expected utility maximization of shareholders
(in the Pareto optimal sense defined above) in an uncertain
environment provided markets are perfect and complete (and it
is noted that, in light of the Leland and Diamond papers, the
requirement that markets be complete can be relaxed somewhat).
135. Note that the objective of maximizing the stock market value of
the firm is analogous to the static objective of profit maximiza-
tion in that both objective functions imply the optimization of
the economic position of the firm's owners. If the firm is run
by an entrepreneur who receives total profit as its income, then
maximizing total profit leads to maximum utility, provided of
course that its marginal utility of income is always positive.
In a dynamic context, the rational entrepreneur would, subject
to the qualifications discussed in the previous footnote, maximize
the total market value of the firm (i.e. the entrepreneur's current
wealth) . But where control and ownership are separate, optimizing the
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economic position of the owners involves maximizing the stock
market value of their shares (once again, subject to the
qualifications stated in the previous footnote) . See also
J. Mossin, "Security Pricing and Investment Criteria in Competi-
tive Markets," American Economic Review (vol. 59; no. 5;
December 1969), p. 749.





137. See for example Wong, op. cit.
,
or Krouse, op. cit. Vickers adopts
a similar objective function. In the Vickers's model the firm
optimizes the economic position of the owners of the firm by
maximizing the stock market value of the firm, which Vickers
expresses as the "capitalized value of the residual equity
income." See Vickers, op. cit.
, pp. 8, 162-169.
138. See Philippatos, op. cit.
,
ch. 13, for a discussion of some of
the existing share valuation formulas and Miller and Modigliani,
op. cit.
, pp. 415-421, for a discussion of some of the existing
approaches to determining the stock market value of the firm.
The valuation formulas are based on present value calculations
like those on which formulas (60), (61), and (62) are based.
For example, substituting the dividends that will accrue in the
future to shares currently outstanding for tt in formula (60)
and letting p be the appropriate discount rate, yields a
formula for the market value of a share in terms of the future
stream of dividends,
00 n
P - 2 ^-r , (*)
t=l (l+p) L
where P is the share price and D are the dividends accruing





if dividends per share are initially D and are growing at
rate g .
139. Miller and Modigliani showed that, in a certain world with perfect
capital markets, the discounted cash flow, the current earnings
plus investment opportunities, the stream of dividends, and the
stream of earnings approaches to share valuation, are all equiva-
lent and that all are derived from the fundamental principle of
share valuation (which characterizes general equilibrium in the
capital markets) that "the price of each share must be such that
the rate of return (dividends plus capital gains per dollar
invested) on every share will be the same throughout the market
over any given interval of time," provided of course that the
approaches are adopted correctly and that the extreme case of a
company being expected to never pay a dividend be excluded (for
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in that special case the stream of dividends approach yields
a share value of zero while the other approaches do not) . Ibid.
,
pp. 412-421. Hence some of these alternative formulations are
different in form only. To quote Myers on the subject of share
valuation: "Alternative forms ... are often seen ... Given a
little algebraic ingenuity, the possible formats are endless.
Consequently, it is pointless to say that any particular simpli-
fication is the correct way to represent present value." S.C.
Myers, "A Time-State-Preference Model of Security Valuation,"
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (vol. 3; no. 1;
March 1968), p. 20.
140. More generally, the two approaches are equivalent even when new
equity issues are permitted, provided that there is perfect
certainty and capital markets are perfect. This follows from
Miller's and Modigliani's proof that in such an environment the
firm's dividend policy is irrelevant. That is, given the firm's
investment policy, whether the firm generates the needed finance
internally or raises it externally through new equity issues is
immaterial, and maximizing the share price leads to the same
result as maximizing the market value of the firm's equity.
Ibid.
, pp. 412-415. It needs to be emphasized, however, that
only if markets are perfect will share owners be able to "correctly"
comprehend the meaning of new share issues, and only then can the
firm's method of raising finance with which to carry out the
investment policy be irrelevant. Since in a certain world the
distinction between debt and equity is irrelevant, the objective
of maximizing the total market value of the firm can be re-
expressed without loss of generality as maximizing the stock
market value of the firm. Ibid.
,
p. 412. When uncertainty is
introduced, stronger conditions, such as the existence of complete
markets, are needed. See Fama and Miller, op. cit.
,
pp. 178-181.
141. Some conditions under which various pairs of objectives are
interchangeable have been noted earlier in the subsection. To
see why conditions (i)-(iii) make the four objectives inter-
changeable, note that, by condition (i) , each term tt in the
numerator of formula (60) is independent of every other term. By
(ii) there is a single riskless interest rate at which all indi-
vidual companies and all individuals can borrow or lend freely.
Thus p = i = constant in formula (60). Therefore, maximizing
each tt individually is equivalent to maximizing V . By (iii)
the distinction between debt and equity is irrelevant (since
perfect certainty implies complete assurance on the part of every
investor as to each firm's future investment programs and future
profit levels) so that maximizing the stock market value of the
firm is formally equivalent to maximizing the total market value
of the firm. By (ii) and (iii) and the Miller-Modigliani theorem
on the irrelevance of the firm's dividend policy, maximizing the
share value is interchangeable with the other three objectives.
The interchangeability does not necessarily hold when uncertainty
is introduced, for uncer uncertainty the firm may, by holding down
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profit one period, reduce the variability in profit over time and
thereby reduce p sufficiently to cause V to rise. Even when
markets are complete, the interchangeability does not hold, since
the basic Modigliani-Miller proposition on the irrelevance of the
firm's capital structure implies that the stock market value of
the firm's equity is maximized only if debt is reduced to zero
(i.e. if the total market value of the firm, which equals the
market value of debt plus the market value of equity, is
constant, then the market value of equity is a maximum — equal to
the total market value of the firm — when the market value of
debt is zero).
142. Because of its simpler treatment of growth, the Lintner certainty
model is a static optimization model, in contrast to the model
of this subsection, which is a dynamic optimization model. The
model discussed below is similar in form to the first of two
certainty models presented by Lintner in his paper that appeared
in the Marris and Wood collection. See Lintner, Corporate Growth
under Uncertainty , op. cit.
,
pp. 181-183. The model discussed
below in the present subsection is also similar to, though
somewhat simpler in form than, the Jorgenson model discussed
below in section L.
143. In the model capital goods are treated as the numeraire. All
prices, including the interest rate r introduced below, are
expressed in terms of capital goods, rather than in terms of
money. By selecting capital goods to be numeraire, the price of
capital goods becomes, by definition, equal to one. Also, invest-
ment is measured in terms of capital goods directly, rather than
in terms of some dollar-denominated measure. In addition, since
the price of capital goods is constant (i.e. always equal to one),
the effect that changing capital goods prices might have on the
firm's investment decision can be subsumed within the model.
The effect of selecting some other good to be numeraire, and
permitting capital goods prices to fluctuate, is considered below
in the discussion of the Jorgenson model in section L.
144. That is, C[Q(t);K(t)] expresses actual cash outlays for the
variable inputs as a function of the rate of output, Q(t) .
Since the cost function excludes both depreciation and the
opportunity cost of capital, it does not represent true cost in
either the accounting sense (for that includes depreciation)
or the economic sense (for that includes both depreciation and
the opportunity cost of capital). These other costs are allowed
for elsewhere in the model.
145. This also requires that the number of shares outstanding remain
fixed over time. Otherwise, the current stock market value must
be expressed in terms of the flow of future dividends to the
shares held by shareholders of record at time zero. See C.G.
Krouse, On the Theory of Optimal Investment, Dividends, and
Growth in the Firm , op. cit.
,
pp. 271-272. Other methods of
valuation, namely, the discounted cash flow approach, the current
earnings plus future investment opportunities approach, and the
476
stream of earnings approach, are possible, but Miller and
Modigliani have shown that these other approaches are equivalent
to the stream of dividends approach employed in (65). See Miller
and Modigliani, op. cit.
, pp. 415-421.
146. Depreciation is the physical wearing out of the firm's capital
stock and is measured in terms of the numeraire (see footnote
143).
147. This simplifying assumption will not affect the results, for
Miller and Modigliani have shown that, in a certain world with
perfect capital markets, the firm's dividend policy, given its
investment policy, is irrelevant. Ibid.
, pp. 412-415. The
irrelevance of the firm's dividend policy is evidence of "the
general principle that there are no financial illusions in a
rational and perfect economic environment." Ibid.
,
p. 414.
In such an environment, values are determined by the firm's
investment policy (and the earning power of its assets) only.
148. The symbol I(t) in equation (66) represents the gross increment
to the firm's physical stock of capital. Since capital goods
have been taken to be the numeraire, the accounting identities
(63) , (64) , and (66) are all expressed in terms of units of
capital. Therefore, I(t)
,
which appears in (63) and (64) as
a financial flow and which appears in (66) as a physical flow,
is the same (in terms of both units of measurement and magnitude)
in all three equations due to the selection of capital goods as
the numeraire.
149. For simplicity, it is assumed that each of the decision variables
will be strictly postiive at each point in time along their
respective optimal trajectories.
150. See Intriligator, op. cit.
, pp. 306-325.
151. For example, see K.J. Arrow, "Optimal Capital Policy with
Irreversible Investment," in J.N. Wolfe, ed. , Value, Capital
and Growth (Aldine; Chicago; 1968), pp. 1-19.
152. Leland shows that, under certain conditions, the attainment of
objectives such as maximizing the utility of sales and profits
or maximizing profit per worker requires that the optimal current
policies converge to profit maximization. See H.E. Leland, "Why
Profit Maximization May Be A Better Assumption Than You Think,"
technical report no. 80 (Institute for Mathematical Studies in
the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Stanford, Calif.;
December 1972). Leland' s model is discussed further in section
L of this chapter.
153. Kuehn carried out a study in the United Kingdom to determine
whether firms are growth maximizers or profit maximizers and found
empirical support for the growth maximization hypothesis,
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particularly among firms that were actively engaged in the
takeover movement of the 1960 f s. See Kuehn, op. cit. Kuehn's
analysis does not prove, however, that growth maximization is
the universally adopted objective of modern corporate managers,
and it remains to be seen whether it can be proved that a single
objective applies universally.
154. A variation on this theme is that the behavior of the firm changes
as the firm matures. See Wong, op. cit.
, pp. 689-694.
155. In an uncertain environment, it is interpreted as expected
profit and p is the risk-adjusted rate of discount.
156. D.C. Mueller, "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers," Quarterly
Journal of Economics (vol. 83; no. 4; November 1969), p. 644.
157. D.C. Mueller, "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers: Reply,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 84; no. 4; November 1970),
p. 675.
158. R.A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation
,
2nd ed (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1961),
pp. 305-306.
159. For a discussion of the close relationship between the size of
the firm and the level of executive compensation see H.A. Simon,
"The Compensation of Executives," Sociometry (vol. 20; no. 1;
March 1957), pp. 32-35; Roberts, op. cit. ; and McGuire, et. al.
,
op. cit.
, pp. 753-761. Some companies have recently linked
executive bonus schemes directly to measures of growth. See,
"Is the Pepsi 'Generation' Getting Middle-Aged? ," Forbes
(September 15, 1975), p. 69.
160. Singh, op. cit.
,
pp. 38-43.
161. Galbraith, The New Industrial State , op. cit.
, pp. 80-82,
167-169, and 161. E. Filippi and G. Zanetti, "Exogenous and
Endogenous Factors in the Growth of Firms," in Marris and Wood,
op. cit.
, pp. 168-171. For a discussion of some of the problems
that confront small businesses see "Small Business: The maddening
struggle to survive," Business Week (June 30, 1975). Large size
is not, however, a guarantee of security, particularly when a
firm that is large in absolute terms is small relative to other
firms in the industry. For a discussion of the problems facing
Chrysler Corp. due to its relatively small size see W.M.
Bulkeley, "Chrysler's Riccardo Uses Tough Approach to Attack
Firm's Ills," Wall Street Journal (July 7, 1976).
162. A. Silberston, "Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice,"
Economic Journal (vol. 82; no. 325s; March 1972 (supplement)),
pp. 369-391; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cost Behavior
and Price Policy (Columbia University Press; New York; 1943);
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C.A. Smith, "Survey of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of
Scale," in National Bureau of Economic Research, Business
Concentration and Price Policy (Princeton University Press;
Princeton; 1955), pp. 213-230; and J.S. Bain, "Economies of
Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty
Manufacturing Industries," American Economic Review (vol. 44;
no. 1; March 1954), pp. 15-39. Generally, the empirical evi-
dence pertaining to economies of scale is mixed, implying that the
extent of economies of scale (both at the plant level and at the
firm level) vary considerably from one industry to another. For
a survey of the evidence, both pro and con, concerning economies
of scale see A. A. Walters, "Production, and Cost Functions:
An Econometric Survey," Econometrica (vol. 31; no. 1-2; January-
April 1963), pp. 1-66.
163. Galbraith, The New Industrial State , op. cit. , ch. 7.
164. J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism , rev. ed. (Houghton Mifflin;
Boston; 1957), chs. 9-10.
165. Marris, A Model of the 'Managerial' Enterprise , op. cit. ,
pp. 187-188.
166. W.J. Baumol, "On the Theory of Expansion of the Firm," American
Economic Review (vol. 52; no. 5; December 1962), p. 1085, and
Marris, Managerial Capitalism , op. cit. , pp. 101-102.
167. R.M. Cyert and K.D. George, "Competition, Growth, and Efficiency,"
Economic Journal (vol. 79; no. 313; March 1969), pp. 23-41. Of
course, if growth is too rapid, the reverse may happen. See
p. 72 and footnote 211.
168. Marris, Managerial Capitalism , op. cit. , ch. 4.
169. Wood, Economic Analysis of the Corporate Economy , op. cit. , p. 51.
170. Marris, Managerial Capitalism , op. cit. , ch. 2. Marris argues
that growth — the rate of change of size — rather than absolute
size, is the primary objective of professional managers.
171. Baumol has devised two models, one in which the firm maximizes
total revenue (i.e. size measured as total revenue) and one in
which the firm maximizes the rate of growth of sales. These
models are discussed in subsection 1 of this section and the
Marris model is discussed in subsection 2. Like Baumol and
Marris, Downie has also argued that the firm seeks to maximize
its rate of growth. See Downie, op. cit.
172. Monsen and Downs, op. cit.
,
pp. 226-227.
173. O.E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior
,
op. cit.
, pp. 1033-1036, and subsection 3 of this section.
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174. R.A. Gordon, "Short-Period Price Determination in Theory and
Practice," American Economic Review (vol. 38; no. 3; June 1948),
pp. 270-271.





176. A fuller discussion of the managerial models of the firm is
presented in J.R. Wildsmith, Managerial Theories of the Firm
(Dunellen; New York; 1974).
177. Baumol first described the essential features of his model in
W.J. Baumol, "On the Theory of Oligopoly," Economica (new series,
vol. 25; no. 99; August 1958), pp. 187-198. An expanded version
of the model is provided in W.J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value
and Growth , op. cit. , chs. 6-10.
178. Ibid.
, p. 46.
179. "New Spur for a Sluggish Giant," Business Week (March 17, 1975),
p. 50.





ch. 4. Only on major decisions, such as the construction
of a new plant or the launching of a new product, need the
reactions of rivals be explicitly considered.
182. If R(q) denotes total sales revenue, then revenue is maximized
where R' (q) = and R"(q) < . The statement in the text
refers to the first order condition. Further, R(q) = q*p(q) ,
where p(q) is the inverse of the, demand function, and
R' (q) = p(q) + q-p'(q) = p(l+-3- • -r^) . The price elasticity of
demand r\ , is defined by
n = _ £ . i±£L , Thus,
q dp
t
R' (q) = p(l-:r) and R' (q) = 0<^>n = 1 •
183. Note that the AC + tt /Q curve intersects DD at two points.
oSince marginal revenue is positive at both, the larger output
brings larger sales revenue, and thus Q_ is selected.
184. If AC + tt /Q were to lie above DD over the entire range of
output, then it would be impossible for the firm to satisfy the
profit constraint. That is, (p -AC(Q ))-Q < tt , where Q
leads to maximum total profit, and the firm's optimization
problem would not have a feasible solution. In such a case,
the best the firm could do would be to maximize total profit in
order to come as close as possible to tt . It should be noted
that, while it has been assumed in the text that the profit
constraint is binding at optimality, this need not be the case
when advertising expenditure is excluded from the model. This
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can be seen more clearly when the model of the firm is formu-
lated without advertising expenditure as the following mathematics?
programming problem:
maximize R(Q)
subject to R(Q) - C(Q) > TT
Q >
(*)
where Q is total output, and R(Q) and C(Q) are total
revenue and total cost, respectively. The Lagrangian for
problem (*) is L, = R(Q) + A(tt - [R(Q) - C(Q)] , and assuming
nontrivial Q at optimality, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that
must be satisfied by an optimal solution to (*) are the following:
j^- = R'(Q) - A(R'(Q) - C'(Q)) = (**)
(tt - [R(Q) - C«Q)])A = R(Q) - C(Q) > tt A < (***)
o — o —
It follows from (***) either that R(Q) - C(Q) = tt
,
in which
case the minimum profit constraint is binding, as discussed in
the text, or else that A = , in which case (**) implies
R' (Q) = . In this latter case, the minimum profit constraint
is not binding. In practical terms, the minimum required level
of total profit is low enough, and the firm's costs of production
are also 'low enough', that, by maximizing total revenue, the firm
is able to generate sufficient profits to satisfy the profit
constraint. However, as discussed below, if advertising expen-
diture is introduced into the model, and if it is assumed that
the marginal productivity of advertising expenditure is always
positive, then the minimum profit constraint must be binding at
optimality.
185. The rule for profit-maximizing advertising policy is derived easily
from the following model:
maximize: tt(Q,A) = R(Q,A) - C(Q) - A (*)
(Q,A)
where Q is total output, A is advertising expenditure,
tt is total profit, and C is total production cost. The
function R(Q,A) expresses total revenue as a function of both
the output level and the level of advertising expenditure. The
necessary conditions for an optimal solution to (*) are the
following:




X = ° ( *** }
A 81
Equation (**) is interpreted as the familiar marginal revenue
equals marginal cost rule for profit maximization, where marginal
revenue is determined with the advertising level held fixed.
Equation (***) is interpreted as the requirement that advertising
expenditure be increased, for given output level, up to the
point at which the addition to total revenue resulting from the
last dollar spent on advertising just equal one dollar — the
addition to total cost due to the increase in advertising expen-
diture. That is, (***) is also a marginal revenue equals marginal
cost rule, but applied to advertising expenditure rather than to
output level.
186. And, as demonstrated below, as long as the marginal productivity
of advertising expenditure is always positive, any such increase
in total profit above the required minimum will always be spent
on advertising (and thereby lead to increased total revenue and
to enhanced managerial utility)
.
187. The total revenue curve shifts upward from R (Q) to R~(Q)
in figure 11-15 due to the increase in total revenue earned at
each level of output, Q (one interpretation of this is that an
increase in advertising expenditure causes product demand to
increase so that any particular level of output can, due to the
increase in advertising expenditure, be sold at a higher unit
price) , and the total cost curve shifts upward from C (Q) to
C„(Q) by the full amount of the additional advertising
expenditure.
188. Note that 0_ < 0~
,
where the latter maximizes total revenue
(given the current level of advertising expenditure)
.
189. What follows is an expanded and generalized version of the
mathematical model of the firm provided in Baumol, Business
Behavior, Value and Growth , op. cit.
,
pp. 68-72. Specifically,
the model (73) permits the firm to exercise choice regarding
productive techniques and its input mix, thereby enabling several
of Baumol' s qualitative results to be demonstrated quantitatively.
190. The demand curve for the i-th good is of the form q. = D(p.,A.) ,
or f(q.,p.,A.) = q. - D(p.,A.) = . Since the demand curve is
downward-sloping, 3q./8p. ^ , and by the implicit function
theorem, the original demand relation can be solved for p. as
a function of q. and A. , so that total revenue, R. , is
given by R
±
= p* • q
±
= p^Cq^A^ • q
±
= ^(q^A^ .
191. The full statement of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions would include
Lagrange multipliers for the decision variables. As before, for
simplicity it is assumed that each of the decision variables
appears in the optimal solution at a positive level. Generalizing
to permit corner solutions is easy, and so, is not done here.
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192. Note that even though the sales maximizer is carrying production
beyond the most profitable level, it is still, according to (80)
and (81), going to expand production in the relatively most
profitable product lines using the relatively most profitable
input combinations
.
193. Ibid. , ch. 7.
194. Ibid.
, pp. 50-53.
195. See D. Needham, Economic Analysis and Industrial Structure
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston; New York; 1969), pp. 6-10, and
J.H. Williamson, "Profit, Growth and Sales Maximization,"
Economica (vol. 33; no. 129; February 1966), pp. 13-15.
196. Needham, op. cit.
, pp. 8-10.
197. G.K. Yarrow, "Managerial Utility Maximization under Uncertainty,"
Economica (vol. 40; no. 158; May 1973), pp. 160-164.










201. But, of course, if utility is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of total revenue, then the two formulations are equivalent
in terms of the firm's hypothesized performance, although
formulating the firm's objective function as total revenue,





203. It should be noted that Baumol 's two models are not equivalent,
nor is his growth maximization model a simple extension of his
single period sales maximization model. Due to the intertemporal
sales trade offs inherent in a growth maximization model, the
latter is not derivable from the former, although as Williamson
shows, the single period sales maximization model could be
derived from a multiperiod sales maximization model. See J.H.
Williamson, op. cit.
, pp. 13-14.
204. For simplicity, all flow variables are expressed 'per year',
rather than per time period of arbitrary length, as in the
original Baumol formulation.
205. Baumol actually defined I as the firm's "level of investment
as a per cent of the value of current capital assets (the
percentage rate of growth of the firm's money capital)." Baumol,
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Theory of Expansion of the Firm , op. cit.
,
p. 1086. This author
has interpreted Baumol's definition in terms of the conventional
economic definition of investment and capital assets, which were
given in section C of chapter one of this paper. Note that, in
terms of the firm's balance sheet given in table II-l, Baumol's
definition of I
,
as interpreted by this author, implies a
simplification of the assets side of the firm's balance sheet to
include just capital assets, i.e. fixed assets and inventories.
It should be emphasized that even under the author's interpretation
of Baumol's definition, the variable I still represents the
percentage rate of growth of the firm's money capital.
206. See table II-3.
207. Note that, because of the second constraint, any two variables
from the set {tt,D,E} could serve as decision variables. Note
also that the model could be expanded to take into account
decision variables such as output levels, advertising outlays,
etc., though as Baumol indicates, this is not critical to under-






209. As before, s < g is necessary in order that the integral converge.
210. The expansion costs term, C(q) , implicitly allows for the
immediate investment, I
, and also for all future related
costs necessary to support the growth of sales.
211. See J.H. Williamson, op. cit.
,




, pp. 200-202; and Penrose,
op. cit. , chs. 9 and 11.
212. Various other static results are obtainable from the model. See




213. According to the conventional definition of steady state growth,
it is only necessary that these quantities each grow at a constant
rate; it is not necessary that they all grow at the same constant
rate. Bannock, Baxter, and Rees, op. cit.
, pp. 386-387. Note that
the Baumol growth maximization model permits sales and the stock
of money capital to grow at different rates, although each growth
rate must remain, by assumption, constant through time. The Marris
model, which is discussed in the next subsection, makes the
assumption that all quantities grow at the same constant rate
(indeed, this is typically assumed in steady state growth models).
214. The linear homogeneity of the production function guarantees that
output and input levels all grow at the same rate. The constant
output price and constant input prices then ensure that total sales
and total profit grow at the same rate, which is also the rate at
which total retained earnings grow. If the amount of externally
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raised iinance grows at the same rate as retained earnings, then
total money capital (which is the sum of the amounts raised
externally and internally) must grow at the same rate, which, by
the foregoing, also is the rate at which sales grow.
215. Baumol presented the model (92) of the growth maximizing firm
without attempting to derive and interpret optimality conditions.
What follows is this author's attempt to characterize the equili-
brium rate of growth of sales of the growth maximizing firm, based
on a modified version of Baumol' s model.
216. The initial formulation of the model was presented first in
Marris, A Model of the 'Managerial' Enterprise
, op. cit. ,
pp. 185-209. An expanded version of the initial formulation of
the model subsequently appeared in Marris, Managerial Capitalism
,
op. cit.
, pp. 226-249. The second formulation of the model
initially appeared in ibid.
,
pp. 249-265. A subsequent statement




, pp. 1-36. The objective function referred to in
the text belongs to the second formulation.











219. For empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between the
valuation ratio and the probability of takeover see D.A. Kuehn,
"Stock Market Valuation and Acquisitions: An Empirical Test of
One Component of Managerial Utility," Journal of Industrial
Economics (vol. 17; no. 2; April 1969), pp. 132-144, and Kuehn,
Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm , op. cit. , ch. 3. In con-
trast, studies by Singh and Newbould found evidence that would
support only a very weak inverse relationship between the valuation
ratio and the probability of takeover, although Singh's results do
show that taken-over firms do tend to have a smaller valuation
ratio than non- taken-over firms. See Singh, op. cit.
,
ch. 3;
and G.D. Newbould, Management and Merger Activity (Guthstead;
Liverpool; 1970). Excessive growth was one of the major factors
that recently led a number of conglomerates into serious financial
difficulties, among them American Standard, Inc. ("How American
Standard cured its conglomeritis: A tough program to rid itself
of nonprof itable acquisitions is paying off," Business Week
(September 28, 1974)); Rucker Co. ("How Rucker cured its conglom-
erate fever," Business Week (April 7, 1975)); Gulf & Western
Industries, Inc. ("Bluhdorn the raider as elder statesman,"
Business Week (January 20, 1975)); Westinghouse Electric Corp.
(B.E. Calame and J.V. Conti, "Westinghouse Moves to Halt Old
Drains and Avoid New Ones," Wall Street Journal (March 7, 1975));
Republic Corp. ("Republic Corp.", Forbes (March 1, 1976)); and
the classic example, LTV "(Is There Life After Ling?" Forbes
(April 15, 1975)). Excessive growth is also at least partly
responsible for the recent W.T. Grant debacle ""Investigating the
collapse of W.T. Grant," Business Week (July 19, 1976)).
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220. Marris, Managerial Capitalism , op. cit
.
, pp. xvii-xviii.
In terms of the balance sheet illustrated in table II-l, the book
value of 'net equity assets' is equal to stockholders' equity
less the preferred stock portion of contributed capital. That is,
'net assets' is what was defined as 'equity' in section A of this
chapter. It represents that portion of the firm's assets — with
fixed assets valued at historic cost less depreciation — that are
attributable to the firm's common stockholders. Given this defini-
tion of net equity assets, the valuation ratio can be interpreted
as the ratio of the stock market valuation of the assets of the
firm attributable to the firm's common stockholders to the value
attached to those assets in the firm's balance sheet. It should
be noted that, if fixed assets were valued at replacement costs,
if the stock market and the markets for capital (goods) were
perfect, and if uncertainty were absent, then, as a consequence
of general equilibrium in these markets, the valuation ratios of
all (publically held) firms would be equal to one.





222. Marris, A Model of the 'Managerial 'Enterprise
,
op. cit. ; pp. 185-
209, and Marris, Managerial Capitalism , op. cit. , pp. 226-249.










pp. 185-209. The symbolism
used by Marris has been altered slightly — g is used in place
of C — in order that g represent the growth rate of the firm
throughout this entire subsection.
225. Ibid.
,
p. 192. See also the discussion in Marris, An Introduction
to Theories of Corporate Growth
, op. cit.
, pp. 11-15. Steady state
growth, which was assumed in the Baumol growth maximization model
just discussed, is also assumed in the models presented in J.H.
Williamson, op. cit. ; R.M. Solow, op. cit. ; J. Lintner, Optimum
or Maximum Corporate Growth under Uncertainty
,
op. cit. ; and
Yarrow, op. cit.
226. Penrose, op. cit.
,
pp. 212-214.
227. This assumption of steady state growth is, in the opinion of this
writer, an enormous simplification of the actual growth process,
but one that can be justified on analytical grounds. Clearly the
firm's growth rate is not constant over time; it is affected by,
among other factors, changing market conditions and the changing
quality of management. Assuming steady state growth is tantamount
to assuming that, if conditions external to the firm, its ability
to influence its environment, and its selection of operating
policies remain fixed, then the important quantifiable variables,
such as total sales, the market value of the firm, and reported
net income, would all grow at the same constant rate, and further,
key ratios, such as the retention ratio, the leverage ratio, and
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the profit rate, would remain constant. The assumption of steady
state growth is not untenable, however, and is probably best
thought of as the selection of a long run growth target. See
Marris, An Introduction to Theories of Corporate Growth
, op. cit.
,
pp. 12-13, and R. Marris, "Some New Results on Growth and Profita-
bility," in Marris and Wood, op. cit.
, pp. 422-427. By assuming
steady state growth, the model of the firm can be formulated as a
mathematical programming problem that can be solved with the aid
of static optimization techniques, whereas a more realistic
specification, with the growth rate variable, would require the
application of optimal control theory and dynamic optimization
techniques. The application of control theory to models of
corporate growth is discussed below in section L of this chapter.
228. 'Productive assets' , as defined by Marris, are equal to total
assets less 'liquid assets', which in turn are defined by Marris
to include cash in excess of the required minimum working balance,
(i.e. some portion of what is listed as cash in the balance
sheet in table II-l, is ' illiquid ' in the sense that it satisfies
the firm's recurring need for cash with which to make payments of




p. 192, and Marris, Managerial Capitalism , op. cit.
,
p. xvii. It should be noted that, in steady state, total assets,
productive assets, and liquid assets all grow at the same constant
rate, so that equation (103) is not affected by the presence of





229. J. Duesenberry, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior
(Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.; 1962), pp. 104-110.
For a discussion of some empirical evidence concerning the rela-
tionship between corporate growth and diversification see C.H.
Berry, Corporate Growth and Diversification (Princeton University
Press; Princeton, N.J.; 1975). Berry found a high degree of
association between corporate growth and the addition of new
products among the largest firms in the economy.
230. More than 70 percent of all new consumer brands fail. This
includes new products for which a profitable market fails to
develop as well as unsuccessful attempts by producers to break
into an established market by offering new brands. This second
type of failure generally occurs because the new brand lacks a
significant price or performance advantage over existing brands.
See J.H. Davidson, "Why Most New Consumer Brands Fail," Harvard
Business Review (March-April 1976), pp. 117-122.
231. See table II-2.
232. See tables II-l, II-2, and II-3.
233. In the second formulation of his model, Marris appeals to the work
of Miller, Modigliani, Lintner, and, J.H. Williamson to simplify the
model by assuming that all finance is generated internally, and
hence, that the constant a is simply the retention ratio. See
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footnotes 140 and 237. At a more practical level, in the real
world, where uncertainty exists and capital markets are imperfect,
large established firms typically rely on new equity issues for
only a small percentage of their expansion funds. Marris, A Model
of the 'Managerial' Enterprise , op. cit.
,
p. 199. In recent years
there has been a dearth of new equity issues, so that leaving
new equity issues out of the model is not as unrealistic as it
might first appear.
234. This terminology is Marris's. Equation (103) might also be
called more descriptively the ' rate-of-growth-of-the-supply-of-
finance' function. Following Marris, the shorter term will be
used throughout this subsection.
235. These costs of growth were discussed previously in connection
with the Baumol growth maximization model. See p . 2.2- \ and see also
footnote 211 for references. The ill effects of an excessive
rate of diversification can linger for a number of years. For
an interesting discussion of the problems confronting the food
processing industry see "The Hard Road of the Food Processors,"
Business Week (March 8, 1976). Most of the companies listed in
footnote 219 are suffering from similar problems.
236. See Marris, Theories of Corporate Growth , op. cit.
, pp. 17-23.
237. As in the earlier formulation, it is assumed that there are no
new equity shares issued. Thus, all finance is generated intern-
ally. Also as in the previous formulation, the firm grows in
steady state. Since Lintner and Williamson have shown that the
restriction to internal financing does not limit the set of
attainable steady state growth rates, as long as capital markets
are perfect, the assumptions of steady state growth and no external
financing of investment are compatible. See J. Lintner, "The
Cost of Capital and Optimal Financing of Corporate Growth,"
Journal of Finance (vol. 18; no. 2; May 1963), pp. 292-310;
J. Lintner, "Corporate Finance: Risk and Investment," in
R. Ferber, ed. , Determinants of Investment Behavior (Columbia
University Press; New York; 1967), pp. 215-254; and J.H. Williamson,
op. cit.
,
pp. 3, 6-7. Briefly, in a world of certainty with
perfect capital markets, the alternative of issuing new equity
shares does not enlarge the set of attainable steady state growth
rates.
238. Marris, Theories of Corporate Growth , op. cit.
,
p. 19.
239. Marris, Managerial Capitalism , op. cit. , ch. 6. A second approach
is suggested by Herendeen following J.H. Williamson. See
Herendeen, op. cit.
,
pp. 81-83, and J.H. Williamson, op. cit
.
,
pp. 9-13. This second approach assumes that the firm's profit rate
p is constant, whereas the approach given here does not.
240. Since increasing r causes the supply-of-finance curves in figure
11-17 to shift upward, the balanced growth curve must also shift







Ln chapter six of The E conomic Theory of 'Managerial' Capitalism
Harris argues that p'(g) > may hold for low rates of growth
if the firm is able to exploit its temporary monopoly position
Ln markets for new products that it has recently introduced. The
temporary monopoly enables the firm to keep prices and profit
nargins high — but only until new competitors enter the market
and force prices down. An example of this sort of phenomenon is
the market for pocket calculators. See "A calculator war at the
:op of the line," Business Week (July 19, 1976). As the firm's
growth rate increases, eventually the profit rate falls due to the
'enrose effect. Higher rates of growth lead to internal ineffi-
:iencies, and in particular, to a less efficient utilization of
the firm's capital. Evidence of this phenomenon is provided by
firms that are slowing their growth in order to increase their
arofit rates. See R.E. Winter, "More Firms Slow Drive For Growth,
3id To Lift Return On Investment," Wall Street Journal (December
L6, 1975). Allowing p'(g) > over some range is not essential,
;o in "An Introduction to Theories of Corporate Growth" Marris
issumes that p' (g) < for all g .
?o derive equation (108) , let N denote the number of shares
outstanding and let d denote the current dividend per share.
o
Valuing each share of stock in terms of the present value of the
future dividend stream, the market value of each share is equal
:o d /(i-g) , and thus V = N-d /(i-g) . But N*d equals the
sum paid out as dividends to shareholders, and thus, is equal to
>(l-r)K , which leads by substitution to (108). This result
follows directly from what Fama and Miller call the "equal rate
)f return principle" and what Miller and Modigliani call the
'fundamental principle of valuation." See Fama and Miller, op.
:it.
,
pp. 36-37, 92-94, and Miller and Modigliani, op. cit. ,
>p. 412, 422.
lote from (110) that if p(g) = g (and i 4- g) , then the valuation
atio is zero. From (103), g = p implies that r = 1 . If
:he firm tried to retain all profits, its valuation ratio would
:all to zero. Thus, a management that values its security will
;et r < 1 , so that g < p . Even if the firm were permitted
:o raise funds externally, g <_ p must still be true in the long
run. For if g > p for the typical firm, then each year there
.s a net flow of funds from shareholders to the firm, which implies
:hat shareholders on a net basis steadily increase their saving
rithout any prospect of future reward. Similarly, g _< i in a
;eneral equilibrium setting. The possibility that g can exceed
forever leads to the well-known "growth stock paradox", which
las no real economic significance since in a general equilibrium
letting i is a variable, and if g > i so that one or more
ihares did not have a finite value, then demand for that stock
rould necessarily cause v to rise until capital market equili-
irium had been restored. See Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.
,
». 421 (footnote 14).
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244. In actuality, however, firm's valuation ratios can fall below
one. During the recent recession several firms had valuation
ratios less than one but were not taken over, possibly because
of the rather dismal business outlook and the inability of
potential takeover raiders to raise the necessary funds —
either internally or externally — with which to finance the
acquisition.





246. Since there is no debt, equity assets are the same as productive
assets (if liquid assets are ignored), and D(g) represents
the dividend yield on the firm's equity assets. To see this,
note that p-g = (l-r)p = (l-r)pK/K = Nd /K .
247. The dividend yield expressed in terms of the share price is
d /[d /(i-g)] = i-g = 1/Y(g) . The quantity Y(g) - l/(i-g) is
the present value of an income stream that is initially 1
and is growing at rate g , with constant rate of discount
i > g . Note that d *Y(g) is the share price.
248. The percentage increase in the share price resulting from an
increase in g is equal to
dQ -Y(g) do
-Y(g) Y(g) '
the percentage increase in the present value function.





250. It is assumed that neither shareholders nor managers would ever
find it to their advantage to select a negative steady state
growth rate. Note that, if v' (g) < , for all g , condition
(112) is not satisfied unless v' (0) = . However, it is
reasonable to expect that in an expanding economy v' (g) >
for most firms.
251. This follows by substitution for v
,
using the constraint, into
the objective function in (111). The resulting problem is a
single variable unconstrained optimization problem. An alternative
approach would be to use the method of Lagrange multipliers, which
would be somewhat more cumbersome mathematically, but which would
yield additional economic information, through the value of the
Lagrange multiplier, concerning the value to the firm of a
relaxation of the valuation constraint.
252. Note that condition (114) is not altered if v' (g) < , for all
g , since the point of tangency must occur where v(g) is
downward-sloping.
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253. These conclusions are consistent with the models of J.H. Williamson,
Solow, and Lintner. See J.H. Williamson, op. cit. ; Solow, op. cit. ;
and Lintner, Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op. cit. Solow 's
analysis is noteworthy for two reasons: (i) his model determines
the initial scale of the firm as well as its growth rate and
(ii) he compares the behavior of growth maximizers with the
behavior of value maximizers in response to various external
stimuli, such as changes in factor prices and a change in the
corporate profits tax rate.
254. See Singh, op. cit.
,
p. 81. Singh finds that the empirical evi-
dence relating to the relationship between the firm's valuation
ratio and the probability of takeover supports the weak firm,
but not the strong firm, of the valuation ratio constraint. The
two models differ in that in (111) the probability of takeover
increases as v decreases, but in (115) the firm is almost bound
to be acquired if v falls below v . In problem (115) the
managerial indifference curves would not be like those in figure
11-18, but rather, would be L-shaped with a corner at v = v .
For v < v there would be only disutility, and managers would
strive all out to attain v . Once v.. had been reached,
utility could only be increased by achieving faster growth. In
short, there is a lexicographic ordering of the security and
growth objectives. Both Borch and Rosenberg have questioned the
appropriateness of lexicographic utility functions because such
functions rule out a smooth trade off between the primary objec-
tive (e.g. growth) and security (i.e. the valuation ratio). See
K.H. Borch, The Economics of Uncertainty (Princeton University
Press; Princeton, N.J.; 1968), ch. 2, and R. Rosenberg, "Profit
Constrained Revenue Maximization: Note," American Economic Review
(vol. 61; no. 1; March 1971), pp. 208-209.
255. It should be noted that the issue concerning just what constitutes
an empirical 'validation' and just what constitutes an empirical
'refutation' of an economic theory or of an economic model involves
conceptual as well as practical difficulties. See A.G. Papandreou,
Economics As A Science (Lippincott; New York; 1958). Unlike the
physical sciences, theories and models in economics are, in
general, not amenable to scientific testing under carefully con-
trolled conditions. Models that are tested empirically must often
be tested on the basis of historical data gathered for some other
purpose. Since a model is, by definition, an abstraction, it is
possible for two or more alternative models to be 'validated'
using the same set of data, possibly because the data base was
not broad enough to facilitate an adequate test of the theories,
or possibly because the alternative theories implied patterns of
behavior sufficiently similar that the statistical techniques
utilized in the test were not powerful enough to distinguish
between them. In addition, there is the conceptual problem
associated with 'accepting' any theory, namely, that a different
set of data — relating to a different population of, say, firms
or to a different period of time — might lead to 'rejection' of
the thoery. That is, there always remains the question concerning
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how 'general' the theory is. As the discussion in this section
indicates, these issues have been raised in connection with
empirical results offered in support of the managerial theories
(and in contradiction to the traditional theories).
256. D.A. Kuehn, Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm
,
op. cit.
Chapter six, which offers very strong support for the growth






257. Moreover, the manufacturing sectors of the American and British
economies are not so dissimilar, in the opinion of this writer,
as to prevent inferences concerning the behavior of American firms
from being drawn from Kuehn 's findings.
258. I. Friend and M. Puckett, "Dividends and Stock Prices," American
Economic Review (vol. 54; no. 5; September 1964), p. 657. There
is also evidence that large institutional investors recently
have been pressuring corporations to increase dividends and that
increased dividends have helped increase share prices. For
example, when Ford Motor Co. recently restored 20 cents of a
previous 80 cent cut in its dividend (per share) , its share price
rose eight percent in five trading days. See "Dividend-hungry
investors cry for more," Business Week (August 2, 1976).
259. Contrary evidence has been provided by Sorenson, whose study of
11 U.S. industries showed that management-controlled firms
actually had a lower (though not significantly lower at the .05
level) retention ratio than owner-controlled firms. See Sorenson,
op. cit.
, pp. 145-148.
260. S.R. Reid, Mergers, Managers, and the Economy (McGraw-Hill; New
York; 1968); S.R. Reid, "A Reply to the Weston/Mansinghka Criticisms
Dealing With Conglomerate Mergers," Journal of Finance (vol. 26;
no. 4; September 1971), pp. 937-946; and J. Bossons, K.J. Cohen,
and S.R. Reid, "Mergers for Whom — Managers or Stockholders," in
Economic Concentration , Part 5, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd
Session (U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C., 1966).
These studies conclude that the stockholders of firms that actively
engage in growth by acquisition earn lower than normal returns.
See also T.F. Hogarty, "The Profitability of Corporate Mergers,"
Journal of Business (vol. 43; no. 3; July 1970), pp. 317-327,
for a survey of empirical research of the profitability of mergers,
which concludes that, in general, mergers have a negative impact
on the profitability of acquiring firms and a neutral impact on
the profitability of the merged (i.e. acquiring and acquired
firms combined) firm. For contrary results see E.M. Kelly, The
Profitability of Growth through Mergers (Pennsylvania State
University Press; University Park; 1967), in which the author
concludes that active acquiring firms are neither more nor less
profitable than other comparable firms in the same industry, and
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G. Mandelker, "Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms,"
Journal of Financial Economics (vol. 1;
pp. 303-335, in which the author concludes that, when the returns
to shareholders are adjusted for risk, shareholders earn the
same epxected returns from an acquisition as they do from any
other investment or production activity involving similar risk.





Wood also describes the practical difficulties one would encounter
in trying to determine empirically the nature of the utility
function and the growth-valuation function so that the model could
be carefully tested against alternative models in order to inves-




262. M. Nerlove, "Factors Affecting Differences Among Rates of Return
on Investments in Individual Common Stocks," Review of Economics
and Statistics (vol. 50; no. 3; August 1968), p. 328.
263. In particular, when capital markets are imperfect, shareholders
are not, in general, indifferent between dividends and capital
gains. The share valuation formula adopted by Marris expresses
the share price in terms of the discounted stream of dividends.
But when capital markets are imperfect, the share valuation
formula adopted by Marris, and the alternative valuation proce-
dures suggested by Miller and Modigliani, are not necessarily
equivalent. See footnote 139. In view of the apparent imperfec-
tions in actual capital markets, there has been some disagreement
as to the appropriate share valuation formula. In particular,
there has been considerable disagreement as to the relative
significance of dividends and retained earnings in determining
share prices. See Friend and Puckett, op. cit. ; Nerlove, op. cit. ;
Miller and Modigliani, op. cit. ; M.J. Gordon, "Dividends, Earnings,
and Stock Prices," Review of Economics and Statistics (vol. 41;
no. 2; May 1959), pp. 99-105; J. Lintner, "Dividends, Earnings,
Leverage, Stock Prices and the Supply of Capital to Corporations,"
Review of Economics and Statistics (vol. 44; no. 3; August 1962),
pp. 243-269; and B. Graham, D.L. Dodd, and S. Cottle, Security
Analysis
, 4th ed. (McGraw-Hill; New York; 1962). Gordon and Graham
et al. , for example, argue that a dollar of dividends has four times
the impact of a dollar of retained earnings on share prices.
264. Yarrow, Managerial Utility Maximization under Uncertainty , op. cit. ,
pp. 164-170.
265. Ibid.
, pp. 158-160, 165.
266. It should be noted that the share valuation formula used by Marris
is identical to the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin valuation formula when
expected returns in the latter are interpreted as the discounted
stream of returns to each share (rather than as the current period
returns to each share, as is done in the single period context to
which the formula is normally applied). See W. Sharpe, "Capital
Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions
of rvisk," Journal of Finance (vol. 19; no. 3; September 1964),
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pp. 425-442; J. Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the
Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital
Budgets," Review of Economics and Statistics (vol. 5, no. 1;
February 1965), pp. 13-37; and J. Mossin, "Equilibrium in a Capital
Asset Market," Econometrica (vol. 34; no. 5; October 1966),
pp. 768-783. Their valuation model is of the form
v = H^ (*)
r
where V is the stock market value of the security, u is the
expected returns to each share, R is the market price of risk,
b is a measure of the riskiness of the security's returns (rela-
tive to some market-related index), and r is the riskless rate
of interest. [Note that this differs from Modigliani's and Miller's
valuation model in which the adjustment for risk is made in the
denominator of the valuation formula. Modigliani and Miller,
op. cit.
, pp. 267, 271. Under appropriate conditions the two
approaches to handling risk can be made equivalent. See, for





Sherman, The Economics of Industry
,
op. cit.
, pp. 112-114.] Under
certainty, risk is zero and V = u/r . But u is the returns to
each share, which consists of dividends plus capital gains, and
under the assumption of perfect capital markets, r is the unique
rate of interest. It follows then, from Miller's and Modigliani's
fundamental principle of valuation, that V = u/r with U inter-
preted as the discounted stream of returns to each share and
Marris's V (see equation (108) above) are the same. Equation (*)
suggests that, to modify the Marris model to allow for uncertainty,
the appropriate risk premium should be subtracted from the numerator
of the valuation formula [or given the comments in brackets above,
the discount rate in the denominator could be adjusted upward in
a suitable manner to reflect risk] . This might also be accomplished
by using the multiperiod version of the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin
valuation formula discussed in G.V.G. Stevens, "On the Impact of
Uncertainty on the Value and Investment of the Neoclassical Firm,"
American Economic Review (vol. 64; no. 3; June 1974), pp. 319-336.
267. A model incorporating such arguments in the managerial utility
function is discussed in the next subsection.
268. The issues involved in determining such a collective utility
function for management are the same as those that have been
discussed in connection with trying to specify a 'social welfare
function' for making collective decisions. See G.M. Heal, The
Theory of Economic Planning (North-Holland; Amsterdam; 1973),
ch. 2. In essence, the problem involves determining how to weight
the preferences of individuals — as embodied in each person's
utility function — so as to arrive at a social utility function.
269. A theory of the firm that reflects the sociological nature of
the firm is discussed below in section H of this chapter.
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270. This means that marginally profitable or unprofitable divisions
are shed, growth plans are shelved, and the company retrenches.
M. Bralove, "A&P to Close Third of Its Stores, Set $195 Million
Reserve," Wall Street Journal (March 14, 1975); R.E. Winter,
"Firms Drop Operations To Lower Their Costs and Preserve Capital,"
Wall Street Journal (March 17, 1975); P.F. Drucker, "Aftermath of
a Go-Go Decade," Wall Street Journal (March 25, 1975); and "Thinking
Small," Newsweek (June 2, 1975). Once the upswing has begun, the
emphasis switches back to growth. To quote Frank Beaudine,
president of the Chicago-based executive search firm of Eastman
& Beaudine, "Job searches a year ago were for cost-cutters. Now
[private companies] want someone to set up a new marketing program . .
.




271. A steady state growth model may also be criticized on three
other grounds. First, firms may find it to their advantage to
accept slower growth one period if that makes possible more rapid
growth the next (and possibly higher overall growth as a result)
or vice versa. Second, in reality, the firm's growth pattern may
follow a 'growth' curve, with larger size implying a slower
average growth rate. Marris recognizes these possiblities, but




p. 192. Third, as the firm expands, it
may reach a 'critical phase' in which internal reorganization is
needed before further expansion can take place efficiently.
See Filippi and Zanetti, op. cit.
, pp. 163-171. However, this
third point generally applies to small firms.
272. Williamson has provided several versions of his basic model. The
first to appear in the literature was presented in O.E. Williamson,
Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior
, op. cit.
, pp. 1032-
1057. This version reappeared as the "staff and emoluments model"
in O.E. Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior , op.
cit.
,
pp. 52-54. This subsection begins by describing this model,
in which managerial utility is a function of the following three
arguments: staff, managerial emoluments, and discretionary profit.
A somewhat simpler version of the model, in which staff expendi-
ture was defined to include managerial emoluments, appeared as the
"staff model" in ibid.
,
pp. 40-49, and as the "basic model" in




pp. 54-63. To facilitate a geometric interpretation of the
Williamson model, this second version is discussed later in the
subsection. It should be noted that, in addition to the formula-
tion of his basic model in The Economics of Discretionary Behavior
and in Corporate Control and Business Behavior , Williamson applies
the model to public utilities, though in a slightly different
fashion in each book. Since this subsection is only concerned
with Williamson's basic model, this particular application is not
explored here. Finally, Williamson has also developed a managerial
model that is similar to his basic model and that allows for the
existence of uncertainty. See O.E. Williamson, "A Dynamic Stochastic
Theory of Managerial Behavior," in A. Phillips and O.E. Williamson,
eds . . Prices: Issues in Theory, Practice, and Public Policy
(University of Pennsylvania Press; Philadelphia; 1967), pp. 11-31.
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273. In Corporate Control and Business Behavior , staff expenditure is
defined to include managerial emoluments, thereby reducing the
number of arguments in the managerial utility function from three
to two. This simplification implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between staff expenditures and managerial emoluments
is constant and equal to one, i.e. adding a dollar's worth of
staff expenditure has the same effect on managerial utility as
adding a dollar's worth of managerial emoluments.





275. Emoluments are economic rents. Associated with them are zero
productivites; that is, "they are not a return to entrepreneurial
capacity but rather result from the strategic advantage that the
management possesses in the distribution of the returns to monopoly





p. 1035. While it might appear that managers
would prefer to receive the cash equivalent of emoluments as
salary, according to Williamson this is not the case. Managers
find emoluments attractive for two reasons: there are tax advan-
tages to receiving income in kind (e.g. meals bought on an expense
account or company-provided limousine with chauffeur are not part
of the individual's taxable income, whereas the equivalent sum
as salary would be subject to personal income tax) and they are
also less visible than salary to shareholders and unions, and when
shareholders are dissatsified or unions are negotiating wages,
the level of executive salaries is frequently brought up during





p. 164. In practice, determining
what portion of executive compensation is discretionary would be
very difficult, which is one of the reasons Williamson later
lumped staff expenditures and emoluments together into a single
variable.
276. Williamson's reported profit, tt
,
corresponds to (though is not
equal identically to) net operating income in the income state-
ment illustrated in table II-2. According to (117), tt understates
net operating income to the extent of managerial emoluments, M
,
which serve to inflate administrative salaries as well as other
components of general and administrative expenses listed in the
income statement. Williamson's discretionary profit, tt
,
corresponds to (though, on account of tt , is not equal iden-
tically to) that portion of net income in excess of the required
minimum, tt
o
277. For simplicity it is assumed that there is a single output. The
demand function for this good can be expressed as P = P(Y,S)
,
where P is the price of the good. To appreciate the dependence
of P on S
,
recall that S includes advertising outlays.
Then R = P(Y,S)-Y = R(Y,S).
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278. This follows the approach adopted by Williamson. If corner
solutions are to be permitted, then the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
the inequality-constrained problem can be written down and solved.
At the corner solution, discretionary profit is zero. The Lagrange
multiplier measures the marginal utility of a reduction of one
unit (i.e. one dollar) in the profit constraint it
. The decision
variables must satisfy one of two sets of conditions. (i) 9U/9S = 9U/9M
= and A = 3u/9tt = - 9U/9tt
,
i.e. the firm's managers are
satiated with respect to staff and also with respect to emoluments,
which is probably a rare occurrence (and which is rendered
impossible by the usual assumption that all first partial deriva-
tives of the utility function are strictly positive, i.e. that
satiation is imoossible^ (ii) or 9R/9Y = dC/dY
,
3R/3S . j. . _1_
t(3g»^ )+x , . and 311/fti = Cl-t)[JL + X] ,
which are identical to (126)- (128) when A = . In this case,
the managers' freedom to trade off it for S or M is con-
strained. That is, if the firm is in equilibrium and the con-
straint if , > is binding, then any attempt to raise S or
M (or both) by reducing tt would cause not only the loss in
utility due to the reduction in tt but also the implied loss in
utility due to violation of the constraint. This secondary effect
is allowed for by adjusting 9U/9tt by A .
9TI 9TT 911
279. Equations (123)- (125) are also satisfied when -5— = ttt- = tt- = ,
,.,.-,. . . , , (-oTT do oM
which implies satiation with respect to each of d
the arguments of the managerial utility function. If satiation
is ruled out, then this solution is no longer possible.
280. Not shown in figure 11-20 are the positions of the profit maxi-
mizer's revenue and cost functions. Since the profit maximizer
would spend less on staff (S rather than S* in figure 11-19),
the demand and marginal revenue curves for a profit maximizer
would lie below those of the Williamson- type firm Oi.e. the
Williamson-type firm would spend an additional S*-S on staff
(including advertising), thereby causing its demand and marginal
revenue curves to lie to the right of the profit maximizer' s)
.
In addition, if nonadvertising staff expenditures are pushed
beyond the profit maximizing level, then, as long as these expen-
ditures (i.e. the additional staff hired) have a positive marginal
product, the Williamson- type firm's marginal production cost curve
will lie to the right of the profit-maximizer' s. Thus the effects
of the increases in advertising and nonadvertising staff expen-
ditures reinforce one another and cause the Williamson-type firm's
output to be higher than the short run profit maximizer' s.




p. 1052. While the empirical results are more than ten
years old, Williamson's conclusions remain valid. During the
recent recession the business literature — Business Week , Forbes ,
Fortune
,
the Wall Street Journal
,
etc. — abounded with articles
describing companys' efforts to cut discretionary spending of the
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type described by Williamson. For example, see "Charging less
to expense accounts," Business Week (January 27, 1975), and
G. Bronson, "Profit-Pinched Firms Extend Cost Cutting Down to
Paper Clips," Wall Street Journal (January 30, 1975). Profits
were so pinched at Playboy Enterprises Inc. that the company




283. Though retained earnings do not appear in his model, Williamson
is very much aware of their significance to managers. An impor-
tant influence in this regard is the extent of internal represen-
tation on the board of directors. Williamson's empirical results
imply that the higher the proportion of internal representation,
the higher the level of executive compensation and the higher the
earnings-retention ratio, which increases the amount of funds
"available to the management for the pursuit of expansionary
objectives, and the resulting investment, being based on a com-
bination of profit and expansionary goals, will exceed the amount
dictated by profit considerations alone." Ibid.
,
p. 1051. Thus,
the implications of the Williamson model are not inconsistent with
those of the Marris model, though the Marris model treats the
growth of the firm explicitly, whereas the Williamson model does
not.
284. J.H. Williamson, op. cit.
, pp. 3, 9-14. In the J.H. Williamson
model the firm sacrifices profit by pushing the growth rate
beyond the optimum, rather than by pushing the sales level beyond
the optimum. See also Needham, op. cit.
, pp. 6-8.
285. S. Peterson, "Corporate Control and Capitalism," Quarterly Journal
of Economics (vol. 79; no. 1; February 1965), pp. 1-24. This





286. See page 2}\2- of this chapter.
287. Solow, op. cit.
, pp. 341-342.
288. It is, however, an important question. For if non-profit-maximizing
behavior is "close" to profit-maximizing behavior, it may prove
simpler, as Machlup argues, to stick with the profit maximization






290. A study conducted by Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley found that owner-
controlled firms earned a significantly higher rate of return on
equity than manager-controlled firms. Subsequent studies by
Kamerschen, Larner, Elliott, Sorenson, and Kania and McKean found
no consistent differences in profitability or the returns to
shareholders between these two types of firms. A more recent
study by Stano supports Monsen et. al. A study by Palmer falls
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between the two extremes by showing that the extent of managerial
control affects profit rates only for firms that enjoy a high
degree of monopoly power. In addition, Stano's results indicate
that manager-controlled firms take greater risks, although the
opposite conclusion was reached in a study by McEachern. See
R.J. Monsen, J.S. Chiu, and D.E. Cooley, "The Effect of Separation
of Ownership and Control on the Performance of the Large Firm,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 82; no. 3; August 1968),
pp. 435-451; D.R. Kamerschen, "The Influence of Ownership and
Control on Profit Rates," American Economic Review (vol. 58;
no. 3; June 1968), pp. 432-447; Lamer, op. cit. , ch. 3; J.W.
Elliott, "Control, Size, Growth, and Financial Performance in
the Firm," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (vol.
7; no. 1; January 1972), pp. 1309-1320; R. Sorenson, "The Separation
of Ownership and Control and Firm Performance: An Empirical
Analysis," Southern Economic Journal (vol. 41; no. 1; July 1974),
pp. 145-148; J.J. Kania and J.R. McKean, "Ownership, Control, and
the Contemporary Corporation: A General Behavior Analysis,"
Kyklos (vol. 29; no. 2; 1976), pp. 272-291; M. Stano, "Monopoly
Power, Ownership Control, and Corporate Performance," Bell Journal
of Economics (vol. 7; no. 2; Autumn 1976), pp. 672-679; J. P. Palmer,
"The Profit-Performance Effects of the Separation of Ownership
from Control in Large U.S. Industrial Corporations," Bell Journal
of Economics and Management Science (vol. 4; no. 1; Spring 1973),
pp. 293-303; and W.A. McEachern, "Corporate Control and Risk,"
Economic Inquiry (vol. 14; no. 2; June 1976), pp. 270-278. In
summary, then, the empirical evidence to date is not conclusive
with regard to how sensitive the firm's profitability and the
rate of return earned by its shareholders are with respect to
the degree of managerial control.
291. The basic references are Cyert and March, op. cit. , Cohen and Cyert,
op. cit. , ch. 16; and Monsen and Downs, op. cit. A critical
appraisal of the behavioral theory, and in particular, the mark-
up pricing models of Cyert and March, is provided in Baumol and
Stewart, op. cit. An interesting discussion of the behavioral
theory in relation to the traditional and managerial theories can




, pp. 534-541. An attempt to achieve
a synthesis of the three theories is provided in A. Phillips,
"An Attempt to Synthesize Some Theories of the Firm," in Phillips
and Williamson, op. cit.
, pp. 32-44.
292. Cohen and Cyert, op. cit.
,
p. 330; and Baumol and Stewart, op. cit. ,
p. 118. This line of argument reflects the view that one of the
criteria by which a model should be judged is the empirical testa-
bility of its implications. See Papandreou, op. cit. , chs. 1,7.
293. Cyert and March, op. cit. , ch. 3, and Monsen and Downs, op. cit.
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294. Cyert and March, op. cit.
,
pp. 8-10; H.A. Simon, Administrative
Behavior
,
2nd ed. (Macmillan; New York; 1957), pp. xxiv-xxvi; and
H.A. Simon, "Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral
Science," American Economic Review (vol. 49; no. 3; June 1959),
pp. 262-265. See also H. Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency vs.
'X-Ef ficiency
'
," American Economic Review (vol. 56; no. 3; June
1966), pp. 406-409.
295. Cyert and March, op. cit.
, pp. 19-21; Cohen and Cyert, op. cit.
,
p. 330.
296. H.A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly
Journal of Economics (vol. 69; no. 1; February 1955), pp. 99-
118; Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral
Science , op. cit. ; Cyert and March, op. cit. ; and Cohen and Cyert,
op. cit.
297. Cyert and March, op. cit.
, pp. 1-3. As argued below, their
theories have not as yet achieved such general validity. For an
interesting discussion of some of the difficulties that the
behavioralist researchers have encountered see H.A. Simon, "New
Developments in the Theory of the Firm," American Economic Review
(vol. 52; no. 2; May 1962), pp. 1-15.
298. For example, the Cyert and March study of department store pricing,
which is discussed below. Cyert and March reported that some
department store mark-ups had been stable for nearly half a
century. See Cyert and March, op. cit.
,
p. 138.






p. 119. In testing the mark-up pricing models of Cyert
and March, Baumol and Stewart found that the rules of thumb did
change over time. In particular, mark-ups increased in response
to increasing costs, though the Cyert and March model "gives us
no clue as to the response in the values of its parameters to
such exogenous changes in the economic data, and this clearly
limits the analytic power of the construct." Ibid.
,
p. 133.












306. Cyert and March acknowledge that, in reality, there may be more
than five goals, but argue that the five goals they list are the
most representative and that listing additional goals would




307. By way of contrast, in the traditional theory of the firm, the
goal of the owners — maximum total profit — is the goal of the
firm. In the managerial models, the goal of the managers (whose
goals are either identical or else somehow incorporated into one
grand managerial utility function) is the goal of the firm. In
each case conformance to the single goal was purchased by payments
of wages to workers, interest to sources of capital, dividends to
stockholders, etc. The behavioral theory can be regarded as
more general in that it is consistent with these extreme cases
of one ascendant subcoalition, while also allowing for interactions
among the various competing interest groups. It should be noted
that the aggregation of the goals of the members of the coalition
into a set of corporate goals requires the adoption of a social
choice rule for this purpose and that the selection of a 'best'
social choice rule involves theoretical as well as practical
















308. The outcome of the goal-setting process can be illustrated with
the aid of a goal possibilities curve, such as the one in the
figure below (where the number of goals has been reduced to two
to permit geometric representation). The goal possibilities curve
shows for each level of
attainment of one goal,
the highest possible level
of attainment of the
other. The pair of
goals set through the
bargaining process may
lie anywhere on or
inside this curve, but
not outside it. If
subcoalition 1 were
ascendant, then it
would set the corporate
goal(s) , and the
resulting goal pair
would be represented
by A (i.e. the highest
possible performance
with respect to that
goal). Similarly, if
subcoalition 2 were ascendant, the goal pair would be represented by
B . If the preferences of the subcoalitions could be aggregated
into a grand utility function (see the preceding footnote) , such
as the one shown in the figure, collective utility would be maxi-
mized by adopting the pair of goals represented by C , and the
associated performance levels would represent ' satisf icing', rather than
maximizing (with respect to the goal(s) of any one subcoalition)
behavior. However, the outcome of the bargaining process depends
on the relative bargaining strengths of the subcoalitions, and






pair may lie somewhere else on the goal possibilities curve (e.g.
at D) , or possibly even inside the curve (e.g. at E) . In this
latter case the goal-setting process is said to be 'goal inefficient.'
309. This second example suggests a correspondence between organiza-
tional slack and the managerial emoluments and staff components
of Oliver Williamson's managerial model discussed in the previous
section.
310. Note the contrast with the traditional theory, in which it is
assumed that, for any given output level, the firm is producing
at minimum cost.







314. Cohen and Cyert, op. cit.
,
pp. 339-350.
315. For example, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. produces
35,000 different products. See "Minnesota Mining — A New Ball
Game?", Forbes (July 1, 1976), p. 34.
316. Cyert and March, op. cit. , ch. 7. See also W.J. Baumol and R.E.
Quandt, "Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect Decisions,"
American Economic Review (vol. 54; no. 2; March 1964), pp. 23-46,
and R.M. Cyert and M.I. Kamien, "Behavioral Rules and the Theory
of the Firm," in Phillips and Williamson, op. cit.
, pp. 1-10.





Since decision-making is not costless — the information needed to
make a decision must be gathered and processed — reliance on
simple rules of thumb can be seen as an attempt to minimize the
costs associated with the decision-making process. When a decision
is not crucial, the relatively inexpensive approximate solution
reached with the aid of some rule of thumb may be more cost effec-
tive than one obtained by means of a more costly optimizing proce-





p. 23, and S.G. Winter, Jr., "Satisf icing,
Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," Quarterly Journal of
Economics (vol. 85; no. 2; May 1971), p. 242.
318. Cyert and March, op. cit.
,
p. 102, and Herendeen, op. cit.
,
pp. 57-58. Indeed, in an uncertain world, mark-up pricing may
even be consistent with 'profit-maximizing' behavior. See
Sylos-Labini , op. cit.
,
pp. 26-32.




320. Cyert and March, op. cit. , pp. 138, 147. Cyert and March actually
used three pricing models: a mark-up model for normal items, a
sale-pricing model, and a mark-down model that was used by the
store for special sales or when inventory levels of some items
proved unsatisfactory. The mark-up model distinguished three
classes of goods: 'standard items', 'exclusive items' that were
not carried by competitors, and 'import items'. The test results
cited in the text refer to the mark-up model applied to 'standard
items', i.e. non-import items carried also by competitors. The
mark-up policy for these items is called a 40 percent mark-up by
Cyert and March; though it is not a 40 percent mark-up over
average variable cost, but rather, the mark-up represents 40
percent of the retail price (before rounding).
321. Baumol and Stewart, op. cit.
, pp. 124-127, 133.
322. This is not meant to imply that mark-up pricing, or more generally,
the use of rules of thumb, actually is perfectly consistent with
profit-maximizing behavior. Although most economists would argue
that it is not strictly consistent, conclusive empirical evidence
is lacking. Moreover, there exists some doubt as to whether it




323. Equation (134) requires that n > 1 , which will hold if the firm
is maximizing profit since MR = MC and MC > imply that
ri > 1 . See footnote 182.
324. Herendeen presents a somewhat more complex model that makes the
quantity of output sold a function of advertising outlays, the
mark-up, the state of demand, and the average price charged by
other firms. In his model, as in (134), the optimal mark-up is




The model (134) is one of the simplest of a great variety of
mark-up pricing models that have appeared in the literature. For
others see A.D.H. Kaplan, J.B. Dirlam, and R.F. Lanzillotti,
Pricing in Big Business — A Case Approach (Brookings Institution;
Washington, D.C.; 1958); W.A.H. Godley and W.D. Nordhaus, "Pricing
in the Trade Cycle," Economic Journal (vol. 82; no. 327; September
1972), pp. 853-882; and A.S. Eichner, "A Theory of the Determination
of the Mark-up under Oligopoly," Economic Journal (vol. 83; no.
332; December 1973), pp. 1184-1200. For evidence to the contrary —
that firms tend to follow marginalist principles in setting prices —
see J.S. Earley, "Marginal Policies of 'Excellently Managed'
Companies," American Economic Review (vol. 46; no. 1; March 1956),
pp. 44-70, which, unfortunately, is somewhat dated. Since, as (134)
implies, mark-up pricing and marginalist pricing are not wholly
inconsistent, statistical tests might be unable to distinguish
between the two approaches to pricing.
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327. See Silberston, op. cit.
,
p. 536, and Baumol and Stewart, op.
cit.
,
p. 133. Cyert and March were not unaware of this problem.
See Cyert and March, op. cit. , ch. 8. The comments in the text
are not meant to imply that a model cannot be considered a worthy
contribution to the theory of the firm unless it has been tested
empirically. Where the purpose of the model is to explain, rather
than to predict, as in the case of the behavioral models, setting
up an empirical test is inherently more difficult. There still
remains, however, a general feeling that "meaningful theory ... is
theory capable of being refuted by reference to empirical data."
Papandreou, op. cit.
,
p. 7. See also Samuelson, Foundations of
Economic Analysis , op. cit.
,
p. 4, and footnote 255 of this chapter.
328. Machlup, op. cit.
,
p. 26.
329. Baumol and Quandt, Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect Decisions
,
op. cit.
330. The obvious example is the recent improvements in the state of
inventory theory, which, when coupled with the enhanced data
handling capabilities provided by computer-based information
systems, have led to a major improvement in industry's inventory
management.
331. However, it could be argued that, if these models are viewed in
the context of a general equilibrium model of capital markets,
the role of external finance is subsumed. That is, the stock
market and the bond market will permit to come into existence
only those firms that are sufficiently attractive to potential
investors that the necessary funds can be raised through the
issuance of equity shares and bonds.
332. See section C of chapter one of this paper. In what follows the
terms 'money capital' and 'financial capital' are used synonomously.
The distinction between financial (or money) capital and real
capital is drawn nicely in Vickers, op. cit.
, pp. 105-106.
333. See Harcourt, op. cit.
,
especially, ch. 1.
334. The securities that are issued may take any one of several forms,
although those models of the firm that incorporate finance
typically consider the following two classes of securities:
(i) debt instruments (i.e. bonds, notes, and other fixed interest
securities) and (ii) equity instruments (i.e. common stock).
Note that bank loans are typically treated in the same manner as
bonds, rather than as a separate mode of financing.
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335. Leland, Production Theory and the Stock Market , op. cit.
,
p. 125.
See also Vickers, op. clt.
, pp. 108-109.
336. For example, Veblen, whose The Theory of Business Enterprise was
first published in 1904, recognized the importance of financial
capital, arguing that through borrowing the firm could increase
the rate of return on equity as long as the rate of return on
invested capital exceeded the rate of interest on the borrowed
funds. T. Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise (Mentor;
New York; 1958), ch. 3. See also 0. Lange, "The Place of Interest
in the Theory of Production," Review of Economic Studies (vol. 3;
June 1936), pp. 159-192; J. A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic
Development (Oxford University Press; Fair Lawn, N.J.; 1961),
ch. 3 [first published in 1911] ; and T. Scitovsky, Welfare and
Competition
,
rev. ed. (Allen & Unwin; London; 1971), ch. 9.
337. Vickers, op. cit.
, pp. 108-109.
338. See Leland, Production Theory and the Stock Market , op. cit.
,
p. 126, on this point.
339. See footnote 376 and the references listed therein.
340. See footnote 430 and subsection 1 of section K of this chapter.
341. See C.G. Krouse, "On the Theory of Optimal Investment, Dividends,
and Growth in the Firm," American Economic Review (vol. 63; no. 3;
June 1973), pp. 269-279; D. Durand, "The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment: Comment,"
American Economic Review (vol. 49; no. 4; September 1959),
pp. 639-655; R.C. Stapleton, "Taxes, the Cost of Capital and the
Theory of Investment," Economic Journal (vol. 82; no. 328;
December 1972), pp. 1273-1292; and A.J. Senchack, Jr., "The Firm's
Optimal Financial Decisions: An Integration of Corporate Financial
Theory Under Certainty," unpublished doctoral dissertation
(University of California; Los Angeles; 1973).
342. J. Hirshleifer, "Investment Decision Under Uncertainty: Applica-
tions of the State-Preference Approach," Quarterly Journal of
Economics (vol. 80; no. 2; May 1966), pp. 264-268; Hirshleifer,




ch. 9; Diamond, op.
cit. : and Leland, Production Theory and the Stock Market , op. cit.
A general discussion of the impact of uncertainty (when risk
aversion is present) can be found in J.J. McCall, "Probabilistic
Microeconomics," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
(vol. 2; no. 2; Autumn 1971), pp. 403-433.
343. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under
Conditions of Risk
, op. cit. ; Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets
and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and
Capital Budgets
,





344. Diamond, op. cit. ; Stiglitz, On the Optimality of the Stock
Market Allocation of Investment , op. cit. ; Jensen and Long, op.
cit. ; Fama, Perfect Competition and Optimal Production Decisions
under Uncertainty , op. cit. ; and Leland, Production Theory and
the Stock Market , op. cit. It should also be noted that a recent
paper by Stevens employs a revised version of the Sharpe-Lintner-
Mossin valuation equation to derive optimal investment and pro-
duction policies for the firm in a multiperiod setting. See
Stevens, op. cit.
345. See J.E. Walter, "Dividend Policies and Common Stock Prices,"
Journal of Finance (vol. 11; no. 1; March 1956), pp. 29-41;
J.E. Walter, "Dividend Policy: Its Influence on the Value of the
Enterprise," Journal of Finance (vol. 18; no. 2; May 1963), pp. 280-291;
Gordon and Shapiro, op. cit. ; M.J. Gordon, Dividends, Earnings, and
Stock Prices , op. cit. ; and M.J. Gordon, The Investment, Financing, and
Valuation of the Corporation (Irwin; Homewood, 111.; 1962). The
Gordon model has been criticized by Modigliani and Miller on the
grounds that the restriction to internal financing in the model makes
the firm's production (or investment) and dividend (or financing)
decisions indistinguishable. Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.
,
p. 425.






347. Senchack, op. cit.
, pp. 1-2.
348. E.M. Lerner and W.T. Carleton, "The Integration of Capital Budgeting
and Stock Valuation," American Economic Review (vol. 54; no. 5;
September 1964), pp. 683-702; and E.M. Lerner and W.T. Carleton,
A Theory of Financial Analysis (Harcourt, Brace & World; New
York; 1966).
349. B. Davis, "Investment and Rate of Return for the Regulated Firm,"
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (vol. 1; no. 2;
Autumn 1970), pp. 245-270; and B. Davis and D.J. Elzinga, "The
Solution of an Optimal Control Problem in Financial Modeling,"
Operations Research (vol. 19; no. 6; October 1971), pp. 1419-1433.
350. Krouse, op. cit. The Krouse model is discussed in section L of
this chapter. In an earlier paper Krouse developed a linear pro-
gramming model that permitted both debt and equity financing.
See C.G. Krouse, "Optimal Financing and Capital Structure Programs
for the Firm," Journal of Finance (vol. 27; no. 5; December 1972),
pp. 1057-1071. Charnes and others have also formulated linear pro-
gramming models with a view toward helping the firm solve its
financial and capital allocation problems. See A. Charnes, W.W.
Cooper, and M.H. Miller, "Application of Linear Programming to
Financial Budgeting and the Costing of Funds," Journal of Business
(vol. 32; no. 1; January 1959), pp. 20-46; and W.T. Carleton,
"Linear Programming and Capital Budgeting Models: A New Interpre-
tation," Journal of Finance (vol. 24; no. 5; December 1969),
pp. 825-833.
506
351. Senchack, op. cit.
352. The cost of capital may be defined as the current-market-value
weighted average cost of debt and equity capital. See H. Benishay,
"Variability in Earnings-Price Ratios of Corporate Equities,"
American Economic Review (vol. 51; no. 1; March 1961), pp. 81-
94; J.F. Weston, Managerial Finance (Holt, Rinehart & Winston;
New York; 1962); H. Bierman, Jr., Financial Policy Decisions
(Macmillan; London; 1970), ch. 5. Modigliani and Miller, The Cost
of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
, op.
cit. ; and F. Modigliani and M. Miller, '"The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment': Reply,"
American Economic Review (vol. 49; no. 4; September 1959), pp.
655-669. The cost of capital represents the "minimum rate of
return required for an investment to be advantageous to the stock-
holders." Ibid.
,
p. 659. There appears to be some disagreement
on this point. For example, Bierman argues that it is incorrect
to use the cost of capital to evaluate proposed investments.
Bierman, op. cit. , ch. 4. The source of disagreement is the
following. The cost of capital, as defined above, is an average
cost. The appropriate cost to use to evaluate a proposed invest-
ment — an increment to the firm's capital stock — is the margi-nal
cost of capital. Thus, using the average cost of capital is
correct only if the marginal cost is equal to the average cost,
which requires that the firm's current capital structure be
optimal (so that the average cost of capital is a minimum) and
that the increment to the capital stock be small enough that the
marginal cost of capital does not increase. It should be noted
that, in the case of certainty and perfect capital markets, as in the
traditional theory of the firm, every firm's cost of capital is
the prevailing market rate of interest. Thus, average cost of
capital = marginal cost of capital = constant, and the cost of
capital defined above can be used to evaluate proposed investments.
See Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance




p. 262. However, when
uncertainty exists, the cost of capital becomes more difficult
to define precisely and to measure. See Philippatos, op. cit.
,
chs. 8-9.
For example, see H.G. Guthmann and H.E. Dougall, Corporate Financial
Policy
,
3rd ed. (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1955);
E. Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management (Columbia University
Press; New York; 1963), pp. 92-99; and Philippatos, op. cit. ,
pp. 288-292.
354. Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment
,
op. cit. As will be noted below,
Modigliani' s and Miller' s result is dependent on a number of critical
assumptions they make. There are, of course, a number of inter-
mediate views, such as Durand's view that changes in the capital
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structure do not increase the overall level of risk, but merely
redistribute risk among the existing holders of the firm's securi-
ties. Hence, there is no leverage effect (though there is an
optimal debt-equity mix due to the existence of market imperfec-
tions. See D. Durand, "Costs of Debt and Equity Funds for Business;
Trends and Problems of Measurement," in Conference on Research in
Business Finance (National Bureau of Economic Research; New York;
1952), pp. 215-247, and Durand, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance, and the Theory of Investment: Comment
,
op. cit.
355. In this section no attempt will be made to cover what has become
a very extensive literature. Rather, the purpose of this section
is to consider the implications of Modigliani' s and Miller's impor-
tant work, which is often cited by economists building models of
the firm in order to justify some of their simplifying assumptions.
356. What follows is based on Philippatos, op. cit.
, pp. 288-292.
357. See Stapleton, op. cit. , on this point.
358. In this case there exists a range of optimal capital structures,
and within this range, modest changes in the firm's capital
structure will not alter the firm's market value. In the event
there is a lone stationary value, then at that point occurs the
firm's unique optimum capital structure.
359. The firm's cost of capital, C
,
is given by
C = aK, + (l-a)K ,d e
where a is the proportion of debt, K is the cost of debt
capital and Ke is the cost of equity capital. The market value




where tt is net income and C is the cost of capital, so that
V and C vary inversely.
360. Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment
,
op. cit. (and in particular p. 275).
361. See footnote 126 for the definition of a perfect capital market.
One type of market imperfection is due to corporate profit taxes,
the effect of which is discussed in F. Modigliani and M.H.
Miller, "Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A
Correction," American Economic Review (vol. 53; no. 3; June 1963),
pp. 433-443; and D.P. Baron, "Firm Valuation, Corporate Taxes,





p. 292. They do explicitly recognize, however, that there
may be other grounds, such as concern over terms that might be
imposed on managers' freedom of action by creditors were the firm
to increase its debt-equity mix, on which the firm might prefer
one form of financing over another. Ibid.
,
pp. 292-293.
363. For a detailed discussion of the Modigliani-Miller model, see
Fama and Miller, op. cit. , ch. 4.
364. One apparent limitation of the original development was Modigliani's
and Miller's assumption that firms could be divided into risk
classes, where two firms belong to the same risk class provided
the returns to the assets of each always occur in the same propor-
tion, e.g. Xj = AX-£ , where X.: and Xi are the returns to firms
j and i , respectively, and A is the constant of proportionality.
Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and
the Theory of Investment , op. cit. , p. 266, and Modigliani and
Miller,
'





p. 655. But Stiglitz later
showed that Modigliani's and Miller's result is not dependent on
their assumption of risk classes. J.E. Stiglitz, "A Re-Examination
of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem," American Economic Review (vol. 59;
no. 5; December 1969), pp. 784-793. Stiglitz has also generalized .
the Modigliani-Miller model further to a multiperiod setting. J.E.
Stiglitz, "On the Irrevelance of Corporate Financial Policy,"
American Economic Review (vol. 64; no. 6; December 1974),
pp. 851-866.
365. Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment , op. cit. , p. 268. See also Mossin,
Theory of Financial Markets , op. cit. , p. 87, on this point.
366. Ibid.
,
ch. 5, which also demonstrates that the Modigliani-Miller
result holds even when investor preferences are arbitrary and
when investor beliefs regarding future returns from securities are
heterogeneous; and D.P. Baron, "Default Risk and the Modigliani-
Miller Theorem: A Synthesis," American Economic Review (vol. 66;
no. 1; March 1976), pp. 204-212. It should be noted that Baron
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the, debt-equity mix even when default risk is present, but Hagen
disputes this earlier result. See D.P. Baron, "Default Risk,
Homemade Leverage, and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem," American
Economic Review (vol. 64; no. 1; March 1974), pp. 176-182; and
K.P. Hagen, "Default Risk, Homemade Leverage, and the Modigliani-
Miller Theorem: Note," American Economic Review (vol. 66; no. 1;
March 1976), pp. 199-203.
367. Baron, Default Risk and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem: A Synthesis
,
op. cit. ; Hirshleifer, Investment Decision Under Uncertainty:
Applications of the State-Preference Approach , op. cit. , pp.
264-268; and Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital, op. cit.
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pp. 263-264, 271-272. The importance of complete markets is
demonstrated below in section K of this chapter. It should be
noted that the above papers also demonstrate that the Modigliani-
Miller theorem fails to hold when markets are imperfect. See
also Mossin, Security Pricing and Investment Criteria in Competitive
Markets
,
op. cit. ; Lintner, The Cost of Capital and Optimal
Financing of Corporate Growth
,
op. cit. ; Lintner, Corporation
Finance; Risk and Investment
,
op. cit. , and Senchack, op. cit.




369. Mossin, Theory of Financial Markets , op. cit.
,
p. 78.
370. Robert M. Baylis, senior vice-president of First Boston Corp.,
quoted in "The Big Squeeze On U.S. Companies," Business Week
(September 22, 1975), p. 51. See also T.E. Fandell, "TWA Tries
to Restructure Its Heavy Debt In Effort to Avert Potential
Bankruptcy," Wall Street Journal (August 18, 1975).
371. F. Andrews, "Stock-Market Surge Beckons Firms Back To Equity
Financings After Long Hiatus," Wall Street Journal (February 23,
1976).
372. "Capital Crisis," Business Week (September 22, 1975).




pp. 272-273, for discussion on this point.
374. Bierman, op. cit.
,
p. 134. Of course, this avoids the question of
how significant an impact the firm's capital structure has on its
cost of capital. Even according to the traditional view, there
may be a range of capital structures over which the impact is
insignificant. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence to date is
not conclusive. See Philippatos, op. cit.
, ch. 10 (particularly
appendix A)
.
375. F. Modigliani and M.H. Miller, 'The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment'; Reply , op. cit.
, pp.
655-669; and Miller and Modigliani, op. cit. See also Fama and
Miller, op. cit.
, pp. 78-85.
376. Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.
,
pp. 414, 430. Putting this result
together with their earlier result leads to the implication that,
under certain conditions, the firm's investment policy and its
financial policies are separable; that is, given the firm's invest-
ment policy, how the firm chooses to finance that investment —
new debt issue (i.e. borrowing), new equity issue, retained earnings,
or some combination of these — will not affect either the cost
of capital or the total market value of the firm. See also






p. 295, on this point. It should be noted that,
though Miller and Modigliani speak only of the firm's investment
policy as being given, they are also assuming that the firm's
production policy (and hence, the firm's operating policies,
which include both the investment and the production policies)
is given. See Fama and Miller, op. cit.
, pp. 80-81, or Mossin,
Theory of Financial Markets , op. cit.
,
p. 141, for more on this
point.
377. What follows is based on Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.
,
pp. 412-414.
378. The firm's dividend policy is also irrelevant under uncertainty,
provided capital markets are complete. See M. Rubinstein, "The
Irrelevancy of Dividned Policy in an Arrow-Debreu Economy,"
Journal of Finance (vol. 31; no. 4; September 1976), pp. 1229-
1230, for a proof of the irrelevancy of the firm's dividend
policy when financial markets are perfect and complete.
379. This is what Miller and Modigliani call 'the fundamental principle
of valuation.' Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.
,
p. 412. Note
that, since (136) must hold for the securities of all firms, it is
not necessary to use subscripts to distinguish among firms.
380. Conceivably the firm's dividend policy could also affect V(t)
indirectly through V(t+1) if the current dividend distribution
served to convey what would otherwise be unavailble information
concerning future dividend policy. Miller and Modigliani initially
assumed the firm's future dividend policy was known, although they
explicitly recognized the informational content of dividends.
Ibid.
,
pp. 413, 430. See also "Chrysler Declares 15-Cent Payout,
First in lh Years," Wall Street Journal (August 6, 1976).
381. Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.
,





p. 141, on this point.
382. Note that from equation (139)
D(t) - m(t+l)-p(t+l) = X(t) - I(t) (*)
holds identically. Each side of (*) gives an expression for net
dividends. That is, under the assumptions of certainty and
perfect capital markets, the receipts from new share issues can
be interpreted as negative dividend flows, i.e. a dollar raised
through a new equity issue 'cancels out' an additional dollar
paid out as dividends in the follwing sense. Given the firm's
investment policy, an additional dollar of dividends requires that
an additional dollar be raised through a new equity issue, and
the opposing effects of these actions on the firm's share value
cancel each other out. This is the reason the firm's dividend
policy is irrelevant.
511
383. In an uncertain world the additional assumption of complete
markets is needed in order that individuals be free to achieve
their most desired patterns of claims through the market place
(the reasoning here is perfectly analogous to that involved in
establishing the indeterminancy of the debt-equity mix, i.e. in
effect, the existence of complete markets for contingent claims
reduces everything to the certainty case). Rubinstein, The
Irrelevancy of Dividend Policy in an Arrow-Debreu Economy , op.
cit.
384. Note that this independence does not follow from the frequently





where v is the share price, d is the initial dividend payout,
i is the constant rate of interest, g is the constant steady
state rate of growth, and all growth is financed internally. In
this case the firm's investment and dividend policies are inex-
tricably bound together. Letting r denote the constant retention
ratio, p the rate of profit, K the initial capital stock, and
N the number of shares outstanding, the share value can be







. (r) = _P£(iz£l
,
N(i-g) Z
which equals zero only if i = p . Thus, changes in dividend policy
(reflected in changes in r) are irrelevant only if the internal
rate of return on investment, p , equals the market rate of
interest, i
,
for then investors would be indifferent between
the firm's investing a sum at rate of return p or distributing
an equal sum to them which they could invest at rate i = p .
385. Since its investment policy is not affected, nor will its growth
possibilities be influenced. See Lintner, The Cost of Capital
and Optimal Financing of Corporate Growth , op. cit.
,
p. 303.
386. Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.
,
p. 414.




pp. 55-66; Gordon, Dividends, Earnings and Stock Prices ,
op. cit. ; Lintner, Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices and
the Supply of Capital to Corporations
,
op. cit. ; and E.F. Brigham
and M.J. Gordon, "Leverage, Dividend Policy, and the Cost of
Capital," Journal of Finance (vol. 23; no. 1; March 1968),
pp. 85-103. For empirical evidence indicating that investors'
relative preferences for dividends as opposed to retained earnings
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may be less in growth than in non-growth industries, see Friend
and Puckett, op. cit. Recently shareholders have been pressuring
companies to raise dividends. For example, see "Wall Street:
Back to Dividends," Newsweek (August 16, 1976).
388. See Lintner, The Cost of Capital and Optimal Financing of Corporate





pp. 230-231; J.R. Meyer and E. Kuh, The
Investment Decision (Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1957).
See also J.V. Conti, "More Companies Cut or Omit Dividends As
Earnings Decline," Wall Street Journal (May 16, 1975).
389. See Lintner, Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment , op. cit. ;
and for empirical evidence see P. Dhrymes and M. Kurz, "Investment,
Dividend, and External Finance Behavior of Firms," in R. Ferber,
ed. , Determinants of Investment Behavior (Columbia University
Press; New York; 1967), pp. 427-467.
390. Ibid, offers supporting empirical evidence.
391. Reinforcing the effects of the above factors is the possibility
that security-minded corporate managers may favor retained
earnings in order to reduce the chances of financial ruin. See
K.H. Borch, The Economics of Uncertainty (Princeton University
Press; Princeton; 1968).
392. E.F. Fama, "The Empirical Relationships Between the Dividend and
Investment Decisions of Firms," American Economic Review (vol. 64;
no. 3; June 1974), pp. 304-318. This disagreement as to the
relevance of the firm's dividend policy — with each side marshaling
empirical support for its position — is indicative of the diffi-
culties arising out of the economist's inability to design controlled
scientific experiments to test propositions. See footnote 255.
393. Vickers, The Theory of the Firm ; and D. Vickers, "The Cost of
Capital and the Structure of the Firm," Journal of Finance
(vol. 25; no. 1; March 1970), pp. 35-46.
394. Business risk is measured by the coefficient of variation of
net operating income and financial risk is measured by the coeffi-
cient of variation of net income, where net operating income
equals revenue minus operating costs (and thus business risk
reflects decisions made with regard to the assets side of the
firm's balance sheet) and net income is net operating income less
interest on debt capital and corporate taxes(and thus financial
risk mainly reflects decisions made with regard to the liabilities
side by the balance sheet). See tables II-l and II-2 in section
A. It is financial risk that measures the degree of risk in the
owners' economic position. See Vickers, The Theory of the Firm
,
op. cit. , chs. 3-4. See also J.C. Van Home, Financial Management
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and Policy , 2nd ed. (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.;
1971), chs. 3,7, and P. A. Tinsley, "Capital Structure, Precautionary
Balances, and Valuation of the Firm: The Problem of Financial
Risk," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (vol. 5;
no. 2; March 1970), pp. 33-62.
395. This enables Vickers to express the interest rate on debt and
the capitalization rate on equity each as a function of leverage
only (or when the amount of equity is fixed, as a function of




pp. 64-69, 133-137, 162-167.
396. Turnovsky considered the effects of changing business risk, but
treated business risk as exogenously determined. Arzac generalized
further by deriving a criterion for investment decisions under
general uncertainty when business risk is controllable. See
S.J. Turnovsky, "Financial Structure and the Theory of Production,"
Journal of Finance (vol. 25; no. 5; December 1970), pp. 1061-
1080, and Arzac, op. cit. In contrast to Vickers, Arzac must
make the interest rate on debt and the capitalization rate on
equity each a function of output as well as of the amounts of
debt and equity. Ibid.
,
p. 1229.
397. In reality, one or both types of risk may vary systematically
with either the size of the company or with the degree of manage-
ment control. See J. P. Palmer, "The Profit Variability Effects
of the Managerial Enterprise," Western Economic Journal (vol. 11;
no. 2; June 1973), pp. 228-231.
398. In this paper the terms risk and uncertainty are used synonomously
to mean what Frank Knight defines as risk. See subsection 7
of section C of chapter one of this paper.
399. See Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital , op. cit. ,
chs. 8-10.
400. See footnote 394.
401. Vickers, The Theory of the Firm , op. cit. , chs. 6-10.
402. Following Vickers, taxes are ignored, there is a single output and




404. According to this definition of r
,
the different debt securities
the firm may have issued have been combined into a single composite
security and r is the interest rate on this security, computed
as the weighted average of the interest rates on the different debt
securities comprising the composite security.
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405. Ibid. , chs. 5,7. The net working capital requirement, g(Q) ,
reflects the required investment in current operating assets by
the firm, e.g. inventories of raw materials, semi-finished goods,
and finished goods, trade credit extended, receivables awaiting
collection, etc. See table II-l in section A. These requirements
are directly related to the level of output. The coefficients
a and 3 reflect money capital requirements directly related
to the amounts used of the inputs, e.g. for labor there is a
money capital requirement when workers are hired and paid before
a project has been completed (i.e. the output sold) and for real
capital there is also a money capital requirement in that each
unit of X_ requires the investment in fixed assets of 3 dollars
of money capital.
406. The units of measurement employed in (141) deserve comment. X
is a flow variable and is expressed in units (of current factor)
per period. Its direct unit cost, e.g. the wage rate when X
1
represents labor, is expressed in dollars per unit (of current
input), so that w X also measures a flow. X , on the other
hand, is a stock variable and is measured in capacity units
(e.g. the capital stock measured in constant dollars). Ibid.
,
ch. 7. Its direct unit cost w~ is expressed in percentage
terms, so that w X measures a flow. Similarly, r(D) is
measured in percentage terms and D is a stock variable, so
that r(D)*D measures a flow. The objective function in (141)
is, then, a flow equation. The constraint in (141) is a stock
inequality. Both E and D represent stocks of money capital,
as shown in the firm's balance sheet (see table II-l). The
function g(Q) gives the stock of money capital required to
support a flow of Q units of output per period, while ot
gives the stock of money capital required to support each unit
flow of X and 3 gives the stock of money capital required
to support each (physical) unit of productive capacity, X_ .
407. These conditions follow from taking the appropriate first partial




















where the Lagrange multiplier A measures the effect on net
income of varying the equity capital availability. If the amount
of equity capital available should exceed the firm's needs, then
of course A = .
408. Ibid.
,
p. 162. The interpretation of the Lagrange multiplier is
made difficult because of the form of the constraint in (141).
The right-hand side is not constant, only the amount of equity,
E , is constant. The interpretation becomes more difficult yet
when both E and D are permitted to vary. See C.R. Jones and
J.D. Finnerty, "Structural Planning under Controllable Business
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Risk: Comment," unpublished paper (Naval Postgraduate School;
Monterey, Calif.; November 1976). Thus, it is necessary to
exercise care in interpreting A . To develop the correct inter-
pretation, note first that tt in (141) represents 'net income 1
whereas p(Q)f(X ,X ) - w X - w X represents 'net operating
income'. See table II-2. Denote net income by tt . Taking the
total differential of the money capital constraint (but holding
E constant) gives
8 ' (Q) [M~ ^1 + M~ dX 2 ] + adXl + BdX 2 = dD ' ( *°
Then taking the total differential of the net operating income
equation yields
d\ = MR(Q)^ dXl + l^ dX2 ] " VX1 " W 2dX2
= [MR(Q) ||- - w1]dX1 + [MR(Q) ||- - w 2 ]dX2
= A[g' (Q) ||- + a]dXi + A[g' (Q)||- + S]dX2 , (**)
where the last equality follows by substitution using (142) and




Proceeding along more conventional lines, the money capital





- D = E
,
where E is constant, and it can be shown that A = dTr/dE .
To see this, write the total differential of the money capital
constraint (letting E vary) as follows:











[g'(Q) |~ + a]dX
1
+ [g'(Q) ||- + g]dX2 - dD = dE . (***)
Then taking the total differential of the net income equation yields:




















where the last equality follows by substitution using (142)
,
(143)




This interpretation of A as the instantaneous rate of change
of the optimal value of the objective function (maximum net
operating income) with respect to the constraint (the amount of
equity capital) agrees with the more conventional interpretation
of the Lagrange multiplier.
Thus, A can be interpreted as the marginal contribution of
debt capital to net operating income or as the marginal contribu-
tion of equity capital to net income (which is equal to the
marginal contribution of equity capital to net operating income)
.
The distinction between net income and net operating income is
important because the marginal contribution of debt capital to
net income is, by (144), equal to zero at the optimum. Thus,
Vickers's marginal profit productivity of money capital, (Vickers,
The Theory of the Firm , op. cit
.
,
p. 162) is unambiguous only if
interpreted in terms of net operating income. The distinction
between equity capital and money capital is important here too,
for it is not money capital that is in limited supply, but rather,
it is equity capital that is scarce.
409. See footnote 408. It should be noted that, since the amount of
debt capital is optimal, given the current amount of equity
capital, any increase in money capital would have to be equity
capital (if tt is to increase). Thus, the appropriate price of
money capital is A . Note that X = dir/dE has the same units
as r (percent per period) , i.e. A represents an imputed
interest rate. Vickers calls A the 'marginal profit productivity 1
of money capital. Ibid.
,
p. 153. The use of 'productivity' has
been eschewed here because money capital per se is nonproductive
since it is not a factor of production.
410. For purposes of comparison with the conventional neoclassical
model, see equations (14). In the development of (14) it was
assumed that price is constant, so that p = MR(Q) , where the
equilibrium condition requires that the use of each factor be
increased until the marginal revenue product of that factor just
equals its marginal cost w. .
411. See equation (16). Note that the conventional result holds when
there is no equity capital constraint (i.e. when A = ).
412. For the single-output-two-input firm under discussion, the
expansion path is the locus of points at each of which the marginal
rate of technical substitution (i.e. the negative of the slope of
an isoquant in the figure below) is equal to the ratio of factor
prices (i.e. the negative of the slope of an isocost line in the
figure below)
. Since at optimality the input mix must be such that
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the marginal rate of technical substitution equals the ratio of
input prices, the rational entrepreneur will select only input
combinations that lie on the expansion path EP in the figure
below.
, expansion path



















and A # , the common slope of the isocost lines
w
When | # —3 w
2
changes, thereby altering the firm's expansion path. This causes
the equilibrium input combinations employed by the firm as it
expands its output to change.
413. Note also that, if factor prices are defined to include the
appropriate cost of money capital, the Vickers model becomes the
neoclassical model. That is, if the price of money capital A is
known by the firm, and if the unit price of X
1
is w + Aa and
hthe unit price of X„ is
can be reformulated as the mathematical programming problem:
w~ + A3, then the model of the firm






where A*g(Q) measures the cost of meeting the firm's net working
capital requirements. Differentiating first with respect to X.
and then with respect to X„ leads to two equations that can be
manipulated to yield the equilibrium conditions (146)-(150). Thus,
the Vickers model yields results consistent with those of the
neoclassical model, provided the marginal cost of each factor is
properly defined, although the Vickers model has an important
advantage in that it determines the firm's (imputed) marginal cost
of money capital, A .
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414. Ibid. , chs. 9-10.
415. The Lagrangian for problem (151) is the following:
L
A
= pW [ P (Q) ' f(Xi'X 2 ) " wlXi " W2X 2 " r(D) * D]





where A' is used in place of A to distinguish the Lagrange
multiplier for problem (151) from the Lagrange multiplier for
problem (141) .
416. Vickers calls A 1 the 'marginal value productivity of money
capital'. Ibid.
,
p. 164. As in the case of A , the use of
'productivity' has been eschewed here since money capital is non-
productive. See footnote 409. Actually, A' measures the
marginal value of equity capital, dV/dE , since it is equity that
is scarce. The argument required to show this is the same as that
used in footnote 408. Similarly, it can be shown that A'
measures the marginal value of debt capital in terms of the
capitalized value of net operating income.
417. To further generalize the Vickers model in the manner suggested
by Arzac, both the average rate of interest on debt and the
owners' capitalization rate can be made functions of output, q ,
the debt level, D , and the amount of equity capital, E ;
that is, r(q,D,E) and p(q,D,E) , respectively, where q is
subject to random disturbances. Then V-E is maximized with
respect to the inputs, X. , and the amounts of debt and equity,
D and E , respectively, subject to the money capital constraint.
Arzac, op. cit.
418. This section is based on the growth model described in Herendeen,
op. cit.
, pp. 113-119. Herendeen's symbolism has been changed
slightly in order that it be made consistent with the symbolism
used throughout this paper.
419. As indicated in section A of this chapter, the 'book value' of
an item is the value at which the item is listed in the firm's
balance sheet. The book values of equity, debt, and total assets
are the amounts listed on the firm's balance sheet and bear no
direct relationship to the market values of these items. See
section A and table II-l. For example, the book value of equity
is equal to the book value of total assets less the book value of
total debt. The market value of equity is the stock market value
of the firm's outstanding shares and reflects the market's
assessment of the firm's future prospects as well as its assess-
ment of how well the firm's assets are currently being employed,
and is therefore unlikely to equal the book value of equity.
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420. Herendeen measured net income as income before taxes but after
deducting interest on debt. Ibid.
,
p. 113. Hence, his definition
of net income falls somewhere between what are conventionally
defined as 'net operating income' and 'net income'. See section
A and table II-2.
421. The leverage ratio is the ratio of the book value of debt to the
book value of equity. Vickers and Turnovsky also measure the
leverage ratio in terms of book values (rather than in terms of
market values). Vickers, The Theory of the Firm , op. cit.
,
p. 41,
and Turnovsky, op. cit.
,
p. 1065. The reason for using book
values rather than market values is briefly the following:
(i) the book value of debt represents a contractual obligation
to the firm's creditors, and similarly, the book value of equity
represents a quasi-contractual obligation to the firm's shareholders,
whereas the market values of debt and equity represent the current
market appraisals of these obligations, and (ii) in setting its
financial policy, the firm can choose a ratio of book debt to
book equity, but it cannot select a ratio of market (or book) debt
to market equity since the market values reflect the market's
appraisal of the firm's operating decisions as well as of its
financial policy. See Herendeen, op. cit.
, pp. 125-126.
422. As in the Vickers model, the different debt securities the firm
may have issued are aggregated into a single composite debt
security and i is the interest rate on this composite security,
computed as the weighted average of the interest rates on the
different debt securities comprising the composite security.
423. Herendeen actually defined the interest rate as a function of
leverage and the firm's risk class, and he defined the owners'
capitalization rate as a function of leverage, risk class, the
dividend rate, and the state of the equity market. In specifying
the model, however, he took the firm's risk class and dividend
rate and the state of the equity market as given, so that the
interest rate and the owners' capitalization rate each varied as




, p. 127, footnote 17.
426. Note that under the assumptions of certainty and perfect markets,
it follows that, when the economy is in general equilibrium,
p = i(L) = e .
427. To see this, note that, when all net income is reinvested, the
rate of growth of equity, dE/E , is equal to the rate of return
on equity since dE = tt and dE/E = tt/E = e . Since, by defini-
tion, L = D/E , it follows that D = LE and dD = LdE for
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given L . The rate of growth of total assets is given by
g = (dE + dD)/(E + D)
= (dE + LdE)/(E + LE)
= dE/E = e .
428. Net dividend payments are equal to the total dollar value of
dividends paid less the total dollar receipts from new equity
issues, i.e., receipts from new equity issues are treated as
negative dividends. This is the same treatment given the pro-
ceeds of new equity issues in subsection 1 of this section.
429. The argument is the same as that used in footnote 427 to show
that g = e , but with tt in place of tt and e in place
of e .
430. These costs of growth were discussed above in section G in
connection with the Baumol growth maximization and Marris
models. See pages 72 and 80 of this chapter, and in partic-
ular, footnote 211 for references. These costs may be referred
to as the 'real' costs of growth in order to distinguish them







433. See tables II-2 and II-3.
434. Once again, this can be shown directly by following the line of
argument given in footnote 427 and by recognizing that
dE = tt - B .
r
435. As in the Vickers model, total production costs include the cost
of labor and raw materials and the cost of depreciation, obso-
lescence, and maintenance of real capital exclusive of interest
on debt.
436. The variable S includes only those selling costs necessary to
maintain current profitability p with zero growth. Additional
selling outlays — those that promote growth — are included in B .
437. The terminology used is that of Herendeen. Ibid.
,
p. 116. Though
this terminology is a bit awkward, the author has decided not to
change it. It should be emphasized, however, that the 'rate 1
is computed with respect to the book value of total assets, A
,
rather than with respect to time.
438. This treatment of revenue, production costs, and selling outlays
differs from the conventional treatment only in that these varia-




439. Since growth by diversification is permitted, the firm may
produce more than one output, in which case Y could be an
aggregate measure of output given in constant dollars. Since the
demand curve for each good will be downward-sloping (ruling out
the possibility of perfectly competitive markets) , it is still
reasonable to assume that 9 r/9y^ < , i.e. that 'weighted'
marginal revenue is declining.
440. As y increases, Y grows faster than A , that is, output
expands relative to capacity (i.e. total assets). For the case of
a single output, r = r(y,s) is analogous to the single period
relationship between total revenue on the one hand and total
output and total advertising expenditure on the other, as in the
Baumol sales maximization model (73) . The only difference is
that r
, y , and s are normalized (by the book, value of
total assets) variables. Utilizing this analogy, 9r/9y >
and 9 r/9y < are interpreted to mean that the marginal rate
of revenue in terms of the rate of output is positive and falling,
respectively, and 9r/9s > and 9 r/9s < are interpreted
to mean that the marginal rate of revenue in terms of the rate
of selling outlays is positive and falling, respectively. Simi-
larly, c(y) is analogous to the single period total cost function
and dc/dy > and d c/dy^ < are interpreted to mean that the
marginal rate of cost is positive and rising. That is, the signs
of the derivatives are the same as they would be if r
, y ,
s , and c represented non-normalized variables in a single
period model. It should be noted that the reason for the normaliza-
tion is that the Herendeen model is a steady state growth model.
Revenue, output, selling outlays, and total cost are permitted to
grow over time, though, as a percentage of total assets, each
remains fixed over time.
441. Gordon, The Investment, Financing, and Valuation of the Corporation
,





p. 18; and Herendeen, op. cit.
,
p. 115. Note
that (167) holds as an equilibrium condition under the assumptions
of certainty and perfect capital markets. See footnotes 139,
140, and 242.
442. Merely dividing each side of equation (167) by E yields the
equation v = k/(p-g) , where the argument L has been suppressed.
The reason for treating new equity issues simply as negative
dividends may be demonstrated with the aid of this expression
for v . Let k
1
be the dividend rate in the absence of new
equity issues expressed as the ratio of the market value of new





With new equity issues the growth equation (162) becomes





which may be solved for k. to yield
k
1
= (l-t)e - g/(l-b) + n . (**)
The rate of growth of dividends per share when there are new
issues is no longer g , but is g, = g - n/v , where n/v
gives the percentage increase in the number of shares outstanding.
Then (*) may be written as
m (l-t)e - g/(l-b) + n
p - (g - n/v)
which may be solved for v to obtain
=




P - g P - g '
(***)
where equation (**) was used to substitute k - n for
(l-t)e - g/(l-b) . In equation (***) k - n is the net dividend
rate k appearing in equations (161), (162), and (163) above
and equation (168) below. Also note that, using equation (160),
v can be reexpressed as follows:
v =
(l-t)[L(p- 1(D) +p] - g/(l-b)
P - g
In footnote 423 it was stated that p generally depends on the
net dividend rate k . Note in equation (****) that, if
9p/8k « , the valuation ratio is independent of the firm's
dividend policy. This was also the case in the Marris growth
model. See Marris, An Introduction to Theories of Corporate
Growth
, op. cit. , pp. 22-23. However, unlike the Marris growth
model, the presence of L in (****) indicates that the firm's
financial policy — as reflected in its selection of an optimal
leverage ratio L* — does matter. Note in addition that even
if 9p/9k ^ , expressing the share value as the present value
of the future flow of dividends and treating new equity issues
as negative dividends has the effect of making current shareholders
indifferent between equity funds raised through retained earnings
and those raised through new equity issues. This would not be
the case if there were transactions costs associated with new
issues or if current shareholders failed to fully comprehend the
implications of the firm's policies (i.e. if capital markets
were not perfect)
.
443. The requirement v = v is not stated explicitly by Herendeen
in Herendeen, op. cit.
,
ch. 7, where the model is developed.
Yet it seems implicit in his treatment of equation (168) as the
'valuation constraint.'
444. Like (167), from which this condition follows, the expression for
p(L) characterizes equilibrium under the assumptions stated in
footnote 441. Otherwise, like (167), it holds only as a definition,
523





ch. 8. As demonstrated in subsection 1 of this section,
the firm's dividend policy would not matter to shareholders if
the future were known with certainty and capital markets were
perfect. The meaning of 9p/8k < is simply that shareholders
prefer some portion of their yield in the form of dividends,
rather than in the form of future, less certain capital gains,
and that, beyond some point, further reductions in the net divi-
dend rate will cause the capitalization rate, p , to increase.
See also Gordon, The Investment, Financing, and Valuation of the
Corporation , op. cit
.
, pp. 55-66. Hence, the modification of
the model suggested by this writer — letting k become a decision
variable — permits the requirement that capital markets be perfect
to be relaxed.
447. It is assumed for simplicity that conditions in the product and
financial markets are such that when v > v it is still
profitable for the firm to increase its growth rate. Then at
optimality v = v must hold. For somewhat greater generality,
the constraint in (169) could be rewritten with v in place of
v and the constraint v ^ v could be added. For an intuitive
argument as to why v should decline as g increases see footnote
454 below.
448. The Lagrangian is
L
x
= (l-b)[(l-t){(L+l)[r(y,s)-c(y)-s] - i(L) -L> - k]
+ A{(l-b)[(l-t){(L+l)[r(y,s)-c(y)-s] - i(L) .L>-k]-p(L,k)+j4
o
449. The first part of this result was also obtained by J.H. Williamson.
See J.H. Williamson, op. cit.
, pp. 11-12.
450. By the same argument employed in footnote 408, it can be shown that
v
, ^




* denotes the variable's equilibrium (i.e. optimal) value. The
Lagrange multiplier A is interpreted as the instantaneous rate
of change of the optimal growth rate of total assets with respect
to the optimal dividend yield. Thus, the product A dp
measures the cost of a change in the leverage 1+A dL
ratio in terms of the change in the growth rate necessary to ensure
that v = v remains satisfied (where the change in g induced




451. Recall that equation (160) states that e is identical to
L(p - i(L)) + p , so that
_ _ p _ _ L _ 1(L) .
Rearranging terms in (177) and making the appropriate substitution
leads to (178)
.
452. This can be seen clearly when the objective function in (169)
is rewritten as
g(y,s,L) = (l-b)[(l-t)e(y,s,L) - k] .
453. Note the contrast with the unconstrained case where maximum
growth is achieved by setting k = , i.e. by not paying any
dividends, or if dividends are paid to current shareholders,
then by raising an equivalent sum through new equity issues (or
possibly, by paying dividends to existing shareholders by means
of a new share distribution) . Comparing the constrained with the
unconstrained case also reveals that, since (174) and (175) hold
even in the absence of the valuation constraint, the valuation
constraint in (169) affects only the firm's financial policy,
i.e. its selection of L and k
,
but not its selection of y
and s . In footnote 447 it was pointed out that raising g tends
to lower v , so that the firm would, in equilibrium, find its
valuation ratio at the lower bound, v = v . This can be argued
as follows: (i) provided p > i , raising g by adjusting
leverage only, requires that L be increased, which eventually
could be expected to cause p to rise faster than g , and hence,
eventually to cause v to fall; thereafter, increases in L
would cause v to fall steadily until finally v = v ; and
(ii) raising g by adjusting dividend policy only requires that
k be decreased, which causes the numerator in the expression for
v to fall; p and g both increase, so that the denominator
in the expression for v may also decrease if g increases
faster than p . However, one would expect that eventually p
would increase faster than g , and that sometime before this
point had been reached, p-g would begin to decrease more slowly
than v . Thereafter, v would decrease steadily until finally
v = v . Note that the above arguments imply that dg*/dv ^0 ,
and hence, that 2
k* dv —
o
454. In the event capital markets were assumed to be perfect, the
Marris managerial utility maximization model and the Herendeen
managerial utility maximization model would be virtually identi-
cal, with the only difference being Herendeen 's more detailed
expression for the firm's rate of growth. In particular, under
the assumptions of certainty and perfect capital markets, the
firm's financial policies are irrelevant, so that both models
would give the role of finance equal treatment.
525
455. See section F earlier in this chapter for a general discussion
of this class of models.




457. Ibid. , ch. 8.
458. This section is based on the following three papers written by
Lintner: J. Lintner, "The Cost of Capital and Optimal Financing
of Corporate Growth," Journal of Finance (vol. 18; no. 2; May
1963), pp. 292-310; J. Lintner, "Optimal Dividends and Corporate
Growth under Uncertainty," Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol.
78; no. 1; February 1964), pp. 49-95; and J. Lintner, "Optimum
or Maximum Corporate Growth under Uncertainty," in Marris and
Wood, op. cit.
, pp. 172-241. However, the discussion draws most
heavily from the third paper.
459. In fairness to Marris, he does, in light of Lintner 's treatment
of uncertainty, suggest how the effects of uncertainty can be
incorporated in his own model. See Marris, Theories of Corporate
Growth, op. cit.






460. Lintner, Maximum Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op. cit. ,
p. 194, and Lintner, Optimal Dividends and Corporate Growth
under Uncertainty , op. cit. , p. 68. The certainty equivalent
of a random dividend receipt is defined by Lintner to be "that
single value which, if certain, would be equivalent in the decision-
maker's mind to the uncertain prospect represented by the full
distribution of the random element." Ibid.
,
p. 68. For example,
in terms of figure 1-1 (see chapter one of this paper) , the
certainty equivalent of the risk-return combination represented
by the point B is the point C since the latter point represents
the same (expected) utility level as B, but with zero risk (and
under risk aversion this decrease in risk is accompanied by a
sacrifice of a portion of expected return, so that y < u )
.
C B
461. More specifically, the firm maximizes the current equilibrium
stock market value of its equity, where the stock market is
assumed to be perfectly competitive, investors are risk averse,
investors' assessments of returns from shareholding are assumed
to be lognormally distributed, and, for the case in which uncer-
tainties increase with futurity, it is further assumed that the
movement of share prices follows a random walk. Lintner,




Empirical support for the lognormality assumption is provided in
J. Lintner, "Equilibrium in a Random Walk and Lognormal Securities
Market," Discussion Paper No. 235 (Harvard Institute of Economic
Research, Harvard University; Cambridge, Mass.; July 1972), and
in R.C. Blattberg and N.J. Gonedes , "A Comparison of the Stable
and Student Distributions as Statistical Models for Stock Prices,"
526
Journal of Business (vol. 47; no. 2; April 1974), pp. 244-280.
The random walk hypothesis also seems justified in light of the
amount of empirical evidence that has been accumulated in support
of it. For example, see C.W. Granger and 0. Morgenstern, "Spectral
Analysis of New York Stock Market Prices," Kyklos (vol. 16; no. 1;
1963), pp. 1-27; P.H. Cootner, ed., The Random Character of Stock
Market Prices (MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass.; 1964); E.F. Fama, "The
Behavior of Stock Market Prices," Journal of Business (vol. 38;
no. 1; January 1965), pp. 34-105; and E.F. Fama, "Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal
of Finance (vol. 25; no. 2; May 1970), pp. 383-417.
462. The results obtained by Lintner are consistent with those
obtained by Marris , John Williamson, and Herendeen, all of
which were discussed earlier in this paper.





, p. 190. That is, the expected growth rate is a function
of the retention ratio and of the basic risk variable. The
point is that a variable reflecting risk belongs to the set of
decision variables. In the special case of certainty there is






467. For example, firms appear to set target payout ratios, and the
target payout ratio for a firm — based on the expected long run
average profitability of investments — often remains reasonably
stable over a considerable period of time. See J. Lintner,
"Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained
Earnings, and Taxes," American Economic Review (vol. 46; no. 2;
May 1956), pp. 97-113; E.F. Fama and H. Babiak, "Dividend Policy:
An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the American Statistical
Association (vol. 63; no. 324; December 1968), pp. 1132-1161;
and J. A. Brit tain, Corporate Dividend Policy (Brookings Institution;
Washington, D.C.; 1966) . In addition, firms in many
industries appear to work toward target debt-equity ratios, with
a firm deviating from its own target ratio only temporarily
and only when justified by conditions in the financial markets.
See Donaldson, op. cit.
468. This section is based on Lintner, The Cost of Capital and Optimal
Financing of Corporate Growth , op. cit. , pp. 297-304; Lintner,
Optimal Dividends and Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op.
cit.





469. This is Fama* 3 and Miller's 'equal rate of return principle.'
See footnote 242 for references.
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470. The restriction to internal financing does not alter the results
provided there is certainty and capital markets are perfect. In
the first version of his certainty model Lintner did permit new
equity issues. As demonstrated in section I in connection with
the Herendeen model, the receipts from new share issues are
tantamount to negative dividends provided the stock market is





471. The retention ratio, r , is the proportion of net income not
paid out in the form of dividends. In terms of table II-3,
r is the ratio of retained earnings to net income. Equivalently,
the models presented below could be expressed in terms of the
payout ratio, x = 1-r , which is the proportion of net income
paid out in dividends. See, for example, ibid.
,
p. 301. It
should be noted that, in the initial development of the certainty
model in the 19 71 paper, r is defined differently as the pro-
portion of gross revenue not available for dividends and x
in equation (181) , below represents current gross revenue per
share. Lintner' s conclusions still follow, however, when r
represents the retention ratio in its conventional sense, for
as he notes, the two approaches are equivalent as long as r
is "suitably denominated." Lintner, Maximum Corporate Growth
under Uncertainty , op. cit. , pp. 184-186.
472. Net income (or 'total profit') divided by the number of shares
outstanding.
473. This equation corresponds to equation (108) , which gives the
market value of the firm's equity. Letting N denote the number
of shares outstanding, the exact correspondence is given by
pK = N.X and P = V/N . In (181), as in (108), it is assumed
that g < i so that the indefinite integral exists. It should
be noted that, if new equity issues are permitted, equation
(181) is only slightly modified, becoming
(l-r)X
P, i - (g-n)





475. This interpretation of (l-r)dg/dr is Lintner's. Ibid.
,
p. 186.
476. When the value maximizing firm is in equilibrium, i.e. growing
along its equilibrium steady state growth path, the inequalities
in (183) become equalities. Since it is shown below that in
equilibrium dg/dr equals the current earnings yield on a share
of stock, (183) written as an equality merely states that ? when
the firm is in equilibrium, the equal rate of return principle
must hold. Hence, the economic interpretation of the characterization
528
of disequilibrium provided by the inequality (183) is somewhat
richer than the interpretation of (182)
.
477. The remainder of the discussion follows Lintner, Maximum Corporate
Growth under Uncertainty , op, cit.
, pp. 187-19 7. In the two
earlier papers indicated in footnote 468 Lintner first defined
the profit rate as a random variable, and then expressed the
variance of the growth rate in terms of the variance of the
profit rate. Since his later approach is somewhat simpler, it
is the one followed here. See Lintner, The Cost of Capital and
Optimal Financing of Corporate Growth , op. cit. , pp. 305-306,
and Lintner, Optimal Dividends and Corporate Growth under
Uncertainty , op. cit. , pp. 66-67. It should be noted that the
probability distribution of growth rates is subjective in the
sense that it is based on management's assessment of the future.
The reason for requiring fixed duration is, of course, that
comparisons are only meaningful when the length of the interval
is fixed (though the particular length is irrelevant)
.
478. It is the stationarity of the probability distribution, and in
particular, the constancy of the variance, that constitutes
'stable uncertainty'. In the next subsection the variance will
increase with futurity, and that version of the model will be
said to involve 'increasing uncertainty'.
- 2
479. It is understood that g and O are both functions of the
length of the time interval over which growth is measured.
That is, the mean and variance should be expressed as "g(T)
and a 2 ) t where T is the period over which growth is
measured. For simplicity, it is assumed that the length of
the interval has already been specified, so that T may be
suppressed.
480. For any variable X with initial value X and with exponen-
tial growth rate g , the distribution of which is stationary
over time, the value of the variable t periods into the future
is
t
X = X e
1=1
t o
where g is the actual growth rate during the i-th period
and where it has been assumed for simplicity that each time
period is of unit length (i.e. x = 1). Then
t
In X = In X + I g. .
t o . ,°ii=l
Since the g. 's are normally distributed, since the sum of any
finite number of independent normally distributed random varia-
bles is normally distributed, and since adding a constant will
not affect the normality, it follows that In X is normally
distributed.
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481. The model is a continuous time model. The use of the term
'period' is meant merely to indicate that the time unit
(which must be specified in order for the distribution of g
to be specified) may be chosen arbitrarily.
482. It is not necessary that investors' expectations be homogeneous;
the same conclusions are drawn if investors' assessments are
permitted to differ. See Lintner, Equilibrium in a Random Walk
and Lognormal Securities Market , op. cit. See also J. A. Ohlson
and W.T. Ziemba, "Portfolio Selection in a Lognormal Market
When the Investor Has a Power Utility Function," Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis (vol. 11; no. 1; March 19 76),
pp. 57-71.
483. The utility function is of the firm U(x) = -(x)
, where
a > measures the degree of risk aversion and where x is
the uncertain return. Ibid.
, pp. 69-70. See also J. Tinbergen,
"The Optimum Rate of Saving," Economic Journal (vol. 66; no.
264; December 1956), pp. 603-609.
484. See footnote 126.
485. For the derivation of equation (185) see Lintner, Maximum




and section B of the appendix.
486. Ibid.
, p. 229. In the portfolio selection problem that under-
lies the determination of the equilibrium vector of stock prices,
each investor maximizes its expected utility of end-of-period
wealth subject to a constraint expressed in terms of its initial
wealth endowment. The general equilibrium model set up to
solve this problem generates a shadow price for each such wealth
constraint, and co is the weighted average of these shadow
prices, where the weight associated with each investor is equal
to the fraction of the market's total wealth in the hands of the
individual investor divided by the elasticity of that investor's
utility function (i.e. its degree of risk aversion as embodied
in the constant a — see footnote 483)
.
487. Ibid.
, pp. 192-193, 196, 229.
488. Ibid.
,






489. Lintner, Maximum Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op. cit
.
,
pp. 194, 232. The function f(o ) is a weighted sum of the
covariances of the firm's share price with other share prices.
490. Note that this term may be negative (so that -af(a ) is
positive) when the price of the stock moves in a countercyclical
pattern with regard to the market average. This raises g and
thereby increases the share price P . The reason for this is
530
that countercyclical stocks have the effect of reducing the overall
variability of returns — i.e. portfolio risk — when included in a
portfolio. When investors are risk averse, the contribution to
risk reduction causes investors to bid up the share price.
A91. Yet another interpretation of (185) is possible. Since
_ 2
co - g = oo - (g- aco - af(a ))
= [cj + aca + af (a
. . ) ] - g ,
g iJ
the expression in brackets can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted
discount factor (or interest rate) , where gj is the riskless
discount factor and aCOg^ + af(a^.) is the 'risk premium'. Then
the current share price P is equal to the present value of the
future dividend stream, where the appropriate discount rate is the
risk-adjusted one.
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which imply that f is a concave function.
493. The efficient set possesses the following properties:
(a) for all feasible policy mixes with the same g and
only the one with minimum o 2 is admitted;
(b)
(c)
for all feasible policy mixes with the same Or, and
g
only the one with maximum g is admitted; and
for all feasible policy mixes with the same g and
only the one with minimum r is admitted.
Thus, in figure 11-23 the shaded area consists of feasible policy
mixes, but those lying to the right of and below the solid line do





496. It follows from the concavity of g (see footnote 492) that these
conditions are also sufficient for a global maximum.
531
2
49 7. See figure 11-23. At all points above the a» axis the slope
of the contour, 9g/9(Jg 2 = 9g/9v
,
is finite. Only where the
efficient contour touches the axis (g = and R a minimum)
might the slope become infinite.
498. In fact, it is clear th_at (19 3) reduces to (183) when all uncertainty
is removed, for then g = g , 9g/9r = 9g/9r , g = g = g , and
therefore, co = i . This correspondence between co and i
justifies calling w the 'riskless rate of interest' in the
uncertainty case.
499. See subsection 7 of section C of chapter one of this paper, and
in particular, figure 1-1.
500. Lintner argues that "the best dividend payout x* will vary
inversely — and the best retention ratio will vary directly — with
the level of the risks being borne by the firm." Ibid.
,
p. 197.
Lintner's statement appears inconsistent with his finding that "the
optimal dividend payout ratio x* will be higher (and the best
retention ratio r* will be lower) [under uncertainty] than under
certainty." Ibid.
,
p. 197. In the opinion of this writer, Lintner's
second statement is correct and his first statement is backwards.
501. Under uncertainty a growth maximizer would maximize the expected
rate of growth.




504. The discussion follows ibid .
,
pp. 203-213. An earlier version of
the increasing uncertainty model (but with the disturbances built
directly into the profit rate rather than directly into the growth
rate, as in the later version) can be found in Lintner, Optimal
Dividends and Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op. cit ,
pp. 76-91.
505. Lintner, Maximum Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op. cit. ,
pp. 203-204.
506. Bv this assumption the sequence of assessed future growth rates










, p. 208. It should be noted that all but (v) carry over









, pp. 211-212. That is, (191) still holds when au
2
is
independent of the firm's decisions (which makes sense intuitively
because setting a^ equal to any particular value, say au^ = ,
as in the 'stable uncertainty' case, will not affect the firm's
choice of vQ ) . But making au dependent on v will affect
the firm's selection of v
,
and when the firm is in equilibrium
(in the second case considered by Lintner), 9g°/3v = 8g"/8v - aC >







516. See Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital , op. cit. , ch. 10.
517. The time-state-preference approach was developed by Arrow and has
been extended by Debreu and Hirshleifer. See K.J. Arrow, "The Role
of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing," Review of
Economic Studies (vol. 31; no. 86; April 1964), pp. 91-96; G. Debreu,
The Theory of Value (Wiley; New York; 1959); J. Hirshleifer,
"Efficient Allocation of Capital in an Uncertain World," American
Economic Review (vol. 54; no. 3; May 1964), pp. 77-85; J. Hirshleifer,
"Investment Decision Under Uncertainty: Choice-Theoretic Approaches,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 79; no. 4; November 1960),
pp. 509-536; and J. Hirshleifer, "Investment Decision Under
Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 80; no. 2; May 1966),
pp. 252-277. Related work includes Diamond, op. cit. ; Myers, op. cit. ;
and Leland, Production Theory and the Stock Market , op. cit. The
mean-variance and time-state-preference approaches to the portfolio
selection problem are compared in both Hirshleifer, Investment
Decision Under Uncertainty: Choice-Theoretic Approaches , op. cit. ,
and in Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital , op. cit.
The latter also summarizes the important results contained in the
three Hirshleifer papers cited earlier in this footnote.
518. Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment
,
op. cit.
519. The notion of a state of nature is somewhat imprecise. A state of
nature is some configuration of the individual decision-maker's
choice environment. Yet, just how the set of distinct possible
states is to be specified is unclear. Because there does not exist
a natural, generally agreed-upon, and manageably small set of state
definitions readily applicable to the real world, it would be very
difficult to test empirically a time-state-preference model, and as





p. 277, on this point. Nevertheless,
it is typically assumed that a finite set of distinct possible states





521. Strictly speaking, the complex entitlement is called an asset, and
assets that are tradable are called securities. Ibid.
,
p. 216.
For the limited purposes of this brief introduction, this distinction
is not important.
522. In this subsection the role of the firm, i.e. production, is
abstracted from in order to focus the discussion on pure exchange.
Once the basic time-state-preference framework has been presented,
the form will be brought into the discussion.
523. What follows is based on ibid.
, pp. 231-235, 244-248, and Hirshleifer,




524. Continuing the previous examples, state a might represent war and
state b peace, or state a might represent prosperity and state b
depression.
525. The justification for this shape is provided by Hirshleifer. Ibid.
,
pp. 525-526. Put simply, a concave shape would imply that, when
utility is maximized subject to a wealth constraint, such as that
embodied in the line W in figure II-25(a) , a corner solution
would result . But since a corner solution would imply that the
individual had staked literally everything on the occurrence of a
particular state (and absolute impoverishment if the other state
obtained)
, concavity must be rejected as a possible shape. Though
other shapes somewhere between the extremes of convexity and
concavity are not excluded by this argument, it can be shown that,
under the von Neumann-Morgens tern postulates of rational choice,
there exists a unique preference-scaling function v(c) for
contingent incomes c that holds over all possible states and that,
if v(c) is a concave function (indicative of risk aversion) , the
indifference curves in figure 11-25 must be convex to the origin.
Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital , op. cit.
,
pp. 218-221, 233-234. It should be noted that Hirshleifer 's
argument requires the use of a cardinal measure of utility.
Recently, Mishan has suggested an approach that would remove this
restriction. See E.J. Mishan, "Choices Involving Risk: Simple
Steps Toward an Ordinalist Analysis," Economic Journal (vol. 86;
no. 344; December 1976), pp. 759-777.
526. As in the ordinary case, the convex shape of each isoquant is
interpreted economically to mean that the individual has a diminishing
marginal rate of substitution of one type of claim for the other.
That is, along any isoquant, as contingent claims Ci are
substituted for contingent claims c^
, as for example when the
individual's pair of contingent claims ( cla> c lb) moves from point
A to point B in figure II-25(a) , say through an exchange of claims
with some other individual, the rate at which he is willing to
534
sacrifice additional amounts of c^ in return for additional
amounts of c^a (i.e. - dc^/dc^a ) diminishes as c^a increases
(and as ciD decreases)
.
527. For example, y might be thought of as the individual's current
stock of liquid assets (e.g. cash) and y^a and y^ might be
thought of as the future returns to be received from investments
to which the individual is unalterably committed, where the exact
amount to be received is dependent on the future state of nature
(e.g. war versus peace).
528. See footnote 126 for a precise definition of a perfect market.
529. A market for contingent claims is complete provided there are
securities sufficient in number and characteristics to permit
individuals to carry out exchanges among all the objects of choice
that enter their individual preference functions. A mathematical
interpretation of this concept might be helpful. Denote a security
X by X = ( xo> xla» xlb^ > wnere the x's denote flows of the
generalized commodity at different dates and in different states.
In order that the market for contingent claims be complete, it is
necessary and sufficient that at least three securities exist such
that the associated three- component vectors span E-* . Any three
vectors that form a basis will do, and the simplest of these is the
natural basis (see the next footnote)
.
530. These securities are called elementary securities and correspond to
the natural basis for E 3 . Note that X^ = (3,2,1) , X2 = (1,0,4) ,
and X3 = (0,3,0) would also make the market for contingent claims
complete since, for any feasible desired consumption set
(c , c^a ,C"Lb) , it is possible to find amounts of these securities,










i.e. such that the most desired consumption set can be achieved
through exchange. If only two securities exist, say X-^ and X2 ,
then some consumption sets, such as (2,2,2) , are unobtainable.
In this case the market for contingent claims is said to be
incomplete.
531. Then <J>]_a represents the amount of c that must be sacrificed
to obtain a unit claim to consumption at time t = 1 if and only if
state a obtains, and <$>., is interpreted similarly.
lb
532. For c fixed, equation (198) corresponds to the line W in
figure II-25(a) . Equation (198) also corresponds to the "budget
line" in the traditional analysis of the consumer's budget allocation
problem.
535
533. An economy consists of a number of individuals, each of whom
solves a problem of the form (199). The exact form of the
utility function may vary from one individual to another, although,
by the perfect markets assumption, each individual faces (and takes
as given) the prices (f)^a and (J)^ . Indeed, problem (199), when
solved for all individuals simultaneously subject to the conserva-
tion relations, yields the general equilibrium prices (fi^a an^
(}>lb (although, it should be emphasized, these are not absolute
prices, but are only relative prices in terms of c ).
534. Conditions (201) are perfectly analogous to the equilibrium
conditions in the three-good-single period-certainty case, namely,
that the consumer will allocate his budget in such a way that,
when he is in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution
between each pair of goods must equal the ratio of the market
prices of those goods (recall that $ =1 since c has been
chosen to serve as the numeraire)
.
535. I. Fisher, The Theory of Interest (Macmillan; New York; 1930;
reprinted, Augustus M. Kelley, 1955), and Hirshleifer, Investment






536. If any individual engages in production on his own, say farming,
such a situation is formally equivalent to one in which that
individual is the sole owner of a firm that produces the good in
question. In other words, the use of the term "firm" is meant
to include all forms of productive organization.
537. Note that the form in which the production function is expressed
implies that there may be technological uncertainty. That is, if
the states of nature are defined in terms of different states of
technology (e.g., in the two-state case, according to whether or
not a major invention coupled with innovation takes place), q 1
could denote production in one state of technology while q ,
could denote production in the other.
538. That is, the investment opportunity set for each investor when
every firm maximizes its equilibrium market value includes the
investor's opportunity set (under equilibrium market prices) that
would exist if one or more firms deviated from value maximization.
539. When markets are incomplete, the set of available securities fails
to provide a set of consumption sets that forms a basis for En
(in this case E-* ) . As a result, trading in contingent claims is
severely restricted and a single unambiguous market-determined
value W for each firm does not exist, i.e. it is impossible to
obtain a net present certainty-equivalent value for each stream of
contingent claims, and the above analysis breaks down. See






540. These equilibrium conditions are analogous to the equilibrium
conditions (25), (26), and (27) obtained above in section B for
the single period case under certainty.
541. In the pure exchange and the production and exchange models just
considered, there was just one future period. For extensions of
the time-state-preference approach to more than one future period,
see Myers, op. cit. , and J.H. Dreze and F. Modigliani, "Epargne
et consommationen avenir a le atoire," Cahiers du seminaire
d'econometrie (1966). Neither of these permits trading in any but
the current period. For a recent multiperiod model that does
allow trading to take place in intermediate periods, see A. Kraus
and R.H. Litzenberger, "Market Equilibrium in a Multiperiod State
Preference Model with Logarithmic Utility," Journal of Finance
(vol. 30; no. 5; December 1975), pp. 1213-1227.
542. See footnote 126 and subsection 1 of section I.






544. It is assumed here that the firm raises all funds externally.
While actual firms do raise a substantial portion of their invest-
ment funds internally, here it is assumed that all earning are
fully distributed to shareholders, who then decide how to allocate
these funds among firms.
545. In effect, the firm is liquidated at the end of the period and
bondholders receive principal plus interest and shareholders
receive the value of their shares plus dividends.
546. One potential source of confusion concerning equations (208) should
be noted. Shares are generally viewed as riskier, and hence less
desirable, than bonds since, in the event of bankruptcy, the
bondholders have first claim on the firm's assets, whereas the
shareholders are residual claimants only. Thus, it might be
thought that e^a is "riskier" than d^a , and hence, that e^a
should sell at a lower price than d±a . But this "risk" has





< dQ (l + r) , where r is the rate of interest on
bonds, then d±a = q^a and e-j a = . In other words, conditional
upon the occurrence of the states a and b , the returns dja ,
d,, , e. , and e,. all become certainties,lb la lb
A fuller discussion than the one provided here is given in ibid.
,
pp. 264, 271-272, which also includes a numerical example to
illustrate that the financing decision is of consequence to the
market value of the firm when markets are incomplete.
548. A fuller discussion of the effects of market imperfections can be
found in Hirshleifer, Investment Decision Under Uncertainty:
Applications of the State-Preference Approach, op. cit.
,
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pp. 267-268. More specifically, it has been shown that the
question of the firm's optimal capital structure is not
irrelevant when (i) investors incur transactions costs when
trading securities (W.J. Baumol and B. Malkiel, "The Firm's
Optimal Debt-Equity Combination and the Cost of Capital,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 91; no. 4; November 1967),
pp. 547-578); (ii) securities markets are partially segmented and
debt is traded in a separate market where investors are either
more pessimistic about the firm or more risk averse than equity
holders (J.E. Stiglitz, "Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of
Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-Overs," Bell Journal of
Economics and Mangagement Science (vol. 3; no. 2; Autumn 1972),
pp. 458-482, and M. Rubinstein, "Corporate Financial Policy in
Segmented Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
(vol. 8; no. 5; December 1973), pp. 749-761); (iii) corporations
can borrow at a lower rate of interest than can investors
(Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment , op. cit. ) ; and (iv) the probability
of bankruptcy is nonzero and there are costs associated with
bankruptcy and reorganization (H. Bierman, Jr., and J. Thomas,
"Ruin Considerations and Debt Issuance," Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis (vol. 7; no. 1; January 1972), pp. 1361-1378;
A. Kraus and R.H. Litzenberger , "A State-Preference Model of
Optimal Financial Leverage," Journal of Finance (vol. 28; no. 4;
September 1973), pp. 911-922; A. Robichek and S. Myers, "Problems
in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure," Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis (vol. 1; no. 2; June 1966), pp. 1-35;
V.L. Smith, "Corporate Financial Theory under Uncertainty,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 84; no. 3; August 1970),
pp. 451-471; V.L. Smith, "Default Risk, Scale, and the Homemade
Leverage Theorem," American Economic Review (vol. 62; no. 1; March
1972), pp. 66-76; and J.H. Scott, Jr., "A Theory of Optimal Capital
Structure," Bell Journal of Economics (vol. 7; no. 1; Spring 1976),
pp. 33-54).
549. Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment , op. cit. , pp. 268-271.
550. The literature is extensive. The more often cited papers include
the following: D.P. Baron, "Price Uncertainty, Utility, and
Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition," International Economic
Review (vol. 11; no. 3; October 1970), pp. 463-480; D.P. Baron,
"Demand Uncertainty in Imperfect Competition," International
Economic Review (vol. 12; no. 2; June 1971), pp. 196-208;
P.J. Dhrymes, "On the Theory of the Monopolistic Multiproduct Firm
under Uncertainty," International Economic Review (vol. 5; no. 3;
September 1964), pp. 239-257; J.H. Dreze and J.J. Gabszewicz,
"Demand Fluctuations, Capacity Utilization and Prices," Operations
Research Verfahren (vol. 3; 1967), pp. 119-141; E. Sheshinski and
J.H. Dreze, "Demand Fluctuations, Capacity Utilization, and Costs,"
American Economic Review (vol. 66; no. 5; December 1976),
pp. 731-742; H.E. Leland, "Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain
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Demand," American Economic Review (vol. 62; no. 3; June 1972),
pp. 278-291; J.J. McCall, "Competitive Production for Constant
Risk Utility Functions," Review of Economic Studies (vol. 34;
no. 4; October 1967), pp. 417-420; E.S. Mills, "Uncertainty and
Price Theory," Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 73; no. 1;
February 1959), pp. 116-130; R.R. Nelson, "Uncertainty, Prediction,
and Competitive Equilibrium," Quarterly Journal of Economics
(vol. 75; no. 1; February 1961), pp. 41-62; W.Y. Oi, "The Desira-
bility of Price Instability under Perfect Competition,"
Econometrica (vol. 29; no. 1; January 1961), pp. 58-64; A. Sandmo,
"On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty,"
American Economic Review (vol. 61; no. 1; March 1971), pp. 65-73;
C.A. Tisdell, The Theory of Price Uncertainty, Production, and
Profit (Princeton University Press; Princeton, N.J.; 1968);
E. Zabel, "A Dynamic Model of the Competitive Firm," International
Economic Review (vol. 8; no. 2; June 1967), pp. 194-208; and
E. Zabel, "Monopoly and Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies
(vol. 37; no. 2; April 1970), pp. 205-220. A summary of the
contents of most of these papers is given in Baron, Price
Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition
,
op. cit. This subsection is concerned primarily with the model
presented in the Leland paper.
551. See, for example, Dhrymes, op. cit. , Dreze and Gabszewicz, op. cit.
,
Mills, op. cit. , Sandmo, op. cit. , Tisdell, op. cit. , and Zabel,
Monopoly and Uncertainty , op. cit.
552. See, for example, Dreze and Gabszewicz, op. cit. , Tisdell,
op. cit. , and Zabel, A Dynamic Model of the Competitive Firm ,
op. cit.
553. Either the notion that risk average investors control the firm or
the notion that "security" is one of management's goals may be
invoked to justify a risk averse utility function for the firm.
554. See, for example, Dhrymes, op. cit.
,
and Sandmo, op. cit.
555. This still leaves open the question of whose utility is being
maximized: the utility of managers or the utility of shareholders.
Even if this issue could be resolved, there still remains the
question of whose utility is being maximized when individuals within
the dominant group have different utility functions, for Arrow has
shown that there does not exist a social choice rule for aggregating
individual preferences that possesses all the properties one would
like such a rule to possess. See K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and
Individual Values , 2nd ed. (Wiley; New York; 1963). Moreover, it
is not clear just how the requirements should be weakened so that
an acceptable rule may be obtained. For a discussion of these
points see Heal, op. cit.
,
ch. 2. One way around the problem is
to assume, as Sandmo suggests, that decisions are made either by
a single individual or by a small group of individuals whose
preferences are sufficiently similar to permit the existence of




556. Actually, there are three different quantity variables: quantity
demanded, quantity produced, and quantity supplied to the market.
Following Leland, it will be assumed that the product market is
in equilibrium and that there are no advantages to inventory
holding, so that all three quantities are equal and may be
represented by a single variable, q .
557. That is, firms are usually treated as quantity setters, rather
than as price setters. See, for example, Baron, Price Uncertainty,
Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition
,
op. cit. ;
Dhrymes, op. cit. ; Nelson, op. cit. ; Oi, op. cit. ; and Sandmo,
op. cit. Two exceptions to this statement are Dreze and
Gabszewicz, op. cit. , in which quantity demanded is a random
variable and firms reach their output decisions after observing
market demand; and Mills, op. cit.
,
in which the firm sets both
price and quantity of output and in which shortages or surpluses
develop when quantity demanded does not equal quantity supplied.
558. Baron, Demand Uncertainty in Imperfect Competition , op. cit.
,
also contrasts these modes of behavior. Baron's treatment of
uncertainty differs from Leland' s in that Baron begins by assuming
that price and quantity are jointly random, whereas Leland makes
the demand relation random and dependent on the state of nature
that obtains when the firm tries to sell its output. However,
each ends up working with conditional probability distributions,
where the distribution of price (quantity) is conditional upon
the value for quantity (price) selected by the firm.




560. An obvious example of this type of firm is an agricultural firm.
It should be rioted that the perfectly competitive firm facing a
random price independent of its output level is but a special case
of the firm considered in this subsection.
561. Assuming the attitude of the firm (i.e. of its shareholders or of
its managers or of some other group whose utility is embodied in
U ) toward risk never changes, risk aversion is implied by
U"(tt) < ; risk neutrality is implied by U"(tt) = ; and risk
preference is implied by U"(tt) > .
562. Ibid.
, p. 281. A fuller discussion of the sufficiency condition
is provided in H.E. Leland, "On the Existence of Optimal Policies
under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory (vol. 4; no. 1;
February 1972), pp. 35-44.
563. Leland, Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand , op. cit. ,
p. 281.
564. It is the demand curve that would result if the firm knew with





p. 279. The principle of increasing uncertainty states
that, as total expected revenue increases (due to changes in
either p or q ), the 'riskiness', or dispersion of the
probability distribution, of total revenue also increases.
Leland shows that the principle of increasing uncertainty is
equivalent to the requirements that:
(i) sign E[MR(q,u)] = sign 9 [MR(q,u)] /9u
when the firm is a quantity-setter; and
(ii) sign E[MR(p,u)] = sign 9 [MR(p,u)] /9u
when the firm is a price-setter.
566. See footnote 553.
567. This result is a generalization of results obtained by other
economists, such as Baron and Sandmo, for the purely competitive
case. See Baron, Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry
Equilibrium in Pure Competition , op. cit. , and Sandmo, op. cit.
568. Assuming that, in the case of an increase in fixed costs, the
increase did not cause the firm to go bankrupt (in which case
the firm's output level would fall to zero).
569. The analysis of the effect on the behavior of the firm of a change
in fixed costs is similar to the analysis of the effect of a
change in initial wealth on risky investment in portfolio theory.
In both cases the effect depends not only on the degree of risk
aversion, but also on the change in the degree of risk aversion
as profit (or initial wealth) increases. See, for example,
K.J. Arrow, Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing (Yojo
Johnssonin Saatio; Helsinki; 1965).
570. The measure of absolute risk aversion used by Leland — and
throughout much of the financial literature as well — is that
attributable to Pratt. The measure is -U" (tt)/U' (it) ; and
decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that d [-U" (tt)/U' (tt)] /dTT <
See J.W. Pratt, "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large,"
Econometrica (vol. 32; no. 1-2; January-April 1964), pp. 122-136.
571. Leland, Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand , op. cit. ,
p. 283. Briefly, the argument is the following. To find the
effect on q of a small change dF in fixed costs, form the
total differential of (215) to obtain:
D dq - E{[MR(q ,u) - MC(q )]U"(tt)} dF = ,
3. ex
where D = 9 [E{ (MR - MC)U' (it) }] /9q at q = q , which must be
negative due to (216). Solving for dq/dF gives
dq/dF = E[(MR-MC)U"(tt)]/D . (*)
Since D < , dq/dF is opposite in sign from the numerator in
(*) , which in turn can be shown to be opposite in sign from
d [-U" (tt)/U' (tt) ] /dTT . Hence, decreasing absolute risk aversion
implies dq/dF < , so that output decreases if fixed costs
increase.
541
572. Recall that the principle of increasing uncertainty implies that
the level of risk falls as expected total revenue falls. As long
as expected marginal revenue is positive, the fall in the level
of output will lead to a reduction in expected total revenue, and







575. See footnotes 570 and 571.
576. Ibid.
,
p. 284. The terminology employed to describe the two
effects is motivated by the analogy that can be drawn between the
effect of a change in a on optimal q and the "substitution"
and "income" effects of a change in market price on quantity
demanded in traditional price theory.
577. This corresponds to the Giffen good of traditional price theory —
a rather special case in which an increase in the price of the
good leads to an increase in quantity demanded.
578. An obvious example of this type of behavior is provided by firms
in the electric power industry.
579. Mills, op. cit
.
; Leland, Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand
,
op. cit.
, pp. 286-288; R.A. Meyer, "Monopoly Pricing and Capacity
Choice Under Uncertainty," American Economic Review (vol. 65; no. 3;
June 1975), pp. 326-337; and R.A. Meyer, "Risk-Efficient Monopoly
Pricing for the Multiproduct Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics
(vol. 90; no. 3; August 1976), pp. 461-474. The model presented
in the second Meyer paper is discussed in the next subsection.
580. It is still assumed that the total variable cost function C(q)
is known with certainty. However, whereas the quantity-setting
firm knew exactly where on the total variable cost curve its
output-total variable cost combination would be once it had set
its output level, the price-setting firm does not know where on
this curve its output-total variable cost combination will lie
because output is random. Hence, the shape of the total variable
cost curve is likely to have an important bearing on how the
existence of uncertainty affects the firm's selection of optimal
price.
581. Risk neutrality implies U' (it) = k , for all Tr for some constant
k . Constant marginal cost implies C'[q(p,u)] = M , for all q
for some constant M . The necessary condition for an optimum
becomes
k E{q(p,u) + p[3q(p,u)/8p] - M[3q (p,u) /9p] } = ,
which, by using (230), can be rewritten as




can be found such that
» (*)
which, from (231) is satisfied when p = p . Thus, the intro-
duction of uncertainty has no effect on optimal p —provided
the firm is risk neutral and marginal cost is constant.
582. It can be shown that, if marginal cost is rising at a nondecreasing
rate [C"(q) > , C"' (q) > 0] , the risk neutral firm will charge
a higher price in the presence of uncertainty than it would under
certainty, and that the opposite is true when marginal cost is
falling at a nonincreasing rate [C"(q) < , C IM (q) <_ 0]
Ibid.
,
p. 285, and H.E. Leland, "Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain
Demand," technical report no. 24 (Institute for Mathematical Studies
in the Social Sciences; Stanford University; Stanford, Calif.;
January 1970).
583. Leland, Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand (1972), op. cit. ,
p. 285.
584. The partial derivative 97r(p,u)/9p monotonically increasing with u
implies that, for p = p , a value
E[9tt(p ,u)/9p] = 97T(p ,u )/9pn n n
and also that, for u > u ,
n
9tt(P ,u)/9p > 9iT(p ,u )/9p . (**)n n n
Risk aversion implies that, for u > u ,
n
U'[TT(p ,U )] > U'[TT(P ,U)] , (***)
n n n
so that, for u > u ,
n
[U'[7T(p ,u )] - U'[tt(p ,u)]]{9tt(P ,u)/9p - 9tt(P ,u )/9p} > .
n n n n n n
This last inequality also holds for u < u , since both (**) and
(***) are reversed when u < u , so that the expected value of
the expression on the left must be positive. Taking the expectation




585. If 97T(p,u)/9p is not even monotonic — and there do not appear
to be any strong reasons to expect that it should be — the foregoing
analysis becomes even more unsettled.
586. Leland also demonstrates that this statement is equally valid for
the analysis of the effect on optimal price of a change in the
price-setting firm's fixed costs. Ibid.
,
p. 286.
587. Baron, Demand Uncertainty in Imperfect Competition , op. cit. ,
reaches the same conclusion, though by a somewhat different approach.
See footnote 558.
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588. Zabel, Monopoly and Uncertainty , op. cit. While more general
in its treatment of time than the Leland model, the Zabel model
is somewhat less general in that it assumes the multiplicative
form of random demand and also assumes risk neutrality. Both the
Zabel model and the Leland model are single period models, but
recently Zabel has generalized his model to permit any finite
number of time periods. E. Zabel, "Multiperiod Monopoly under
Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory (vol. 5; no. 3;
November 1972), pp. 524-536.
589. Dhrymes, op. cit. ; Meyer, Monopoly Pricing and Capacity Choice
Under Uncertainty
,
op. cit. ; and Meyer, Risk-Efficient Monopoly
Pricing for the Multiproduct Firm , op. cit. Like the Leland model,
these models are static.
590. D.M. Holthausen, "Input Choices and Uncertain Demand," American
Economic Review (vol. 66; no. 1; March 1976), pp. 94-103;
R.N. Batra and A. Ullah, "Competitive Firm and the Theory of
Input Demand under Price Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy
(vol. 82; no. 3; May/June 1974), pp. 537-548; and R. Hartman,
"Factor Demand with Output Price Uncertainty," American Economic
Review (vol. 66; no. 4; September 1976), pp. 675-681.
591. Holthausen, op. cit.
,
p. 102.
592. This subsection is based on Meyer, Risk-Efficient Monopoly Pricing
for the Multiproduct Firm , op. cit . In some cases the symbolism
adopted by Meyer has been changed in order to make it consistent
with the notation used throughout this paper.
593. In developing his model, Meyer had two particular types of problems
in mind, one single period and the other multiperiod, but in both
of which the firm produces a single good. In the single period
setting, the firm acts as a discriminating monopolist, and the
products are distinguished on the basis of the n different
markets in which they are sold. So, for example, q^ is the amount
produced for the i-th market which is distinct from the amount q.
produced for the j-th market when i ^ j . Ibid. , pp. 461-462.
See also Henderson and Quandt, op. cit.
, pp. 170-172. In the
multiperiod setting, the prices, outputs, and demands are arrayed
over time, and the products are distinguished on the basis of the
n different time periods in which they are sold. So, for example,
an amount q^ is produced the first period, an amount q2 the
second, and so on. Meyer, Risk-Efficient Monopoly Pricing for the
Multiproduct Firm , op. cit. , pp. 461-462. This corresponds to the
well-known peak-load pricing model. See O.E. Williamson, "Peak-
Load Pricing and Optimal Capacity under Indivisibility Constraints,"
American Economic Review (vol. 56; no. 4; September 1966),
pp. 810-827, and O.E. Williamson, "Peak-Load Pricing: Some
Further Remarks," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
(vol. 5; no. 1; Spring 1974), pp. 223-228. In other words, the
544
prefix 'multi' in multiproduct results from distinguishing
commodities on the basis of date and place of sale, as for
example, an electric power company selling electricity at different
prices to various domestic and commercial users or selling at
different prices at different times of the day (e.g. 'peak' and
'off-peak' prices). Rather than merely repeat Meyer's development,
what follows generalizes the discriminating monopolist version of
Meyer's model to permit the firm to produce as many as n distinct
goods. This necessitates a reformulation of one of the original
constraints, but does not otherwise alter the model or its
interpretation.
594. Note that the demand curves defined here represent the logical
extension of Leland's demand curve (212) to the multiproduct case.








597. See section B of this chapter.
598. See O.E. Williamson, Peak-Load Pricing and Optimal Capacity under
Indivisibility Constraints
, op. cit.
599. In the discriminating monopolist version of Meyer's model,
g(q..,...,q ) in equation (233) is of the form
n
g(q ,...,q ) = Z q. . Equation (233) is more general. For
i=l
example, a firm might produce two distinct goods, selling one good
in m markets and the other in n - m markets (where < m < n ) ,
or the firm might produce n distinct goods.




p. 463. This treatment of risk differs somewhat from
the expected utility approach of the previous subsection. Under
the expected utility formulation, only those aspects of risk borne
by the firm (or more specifically, by that individual or group
whose expected utility is being maximized) are incorporated in the
model. Thus, there is an implied shifting of the risk burden to
consumers and to suppliers of inputs (i.e. labor) built into such
models. The constraint (234) alleviates at least part of this
problem by allowing for consumer risk — the probability that the
number of units demanded will exceed the number of units supplied,
so that some portion of total demand goes unsatisfied. As Meyer
suggests, welfare considerations could help determine the optimal







p. 465. That is, given e^ and the probability distribu-
tion for D-^
, Ni is the smallest number such that
ProMD. > q. [ < £. &=} Prob <— — > — —\ < Z.
[ i
H
x/ - i { CJ. a± /
- i
<=3 q. > D.* + N.a.
l — l 11
Note that under either of two conditions N. can be obtained as
a function of £. only. First, if the probability distribution
of D^ is approximately normal, N^ can be estimated independently
of the parameters of the distribution. Second, for an arbitrary
probability distribution for D^
,
Chebyshev's inequality may be
invoked to determine an upper bound on N^ independently of the
probability distribution. See E. Parzen, Modern Probability Theory
and Its Applications (Wiley; New York; 1960), pp. 226-227.




p. 462. This is just the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin equation
for the equilibrium market value of the firm under uncertainty.
See Sharpe, op. cit. ; Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and
the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital
Budgets , op. cit. ; and Mossin, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset
Market
,
op. cit. Equation (236) arises out of a mean-variance
model of risky choice under uncertainty. The placement of such
a model in this section, which deals with the time-state-preference
model of risky choice under uncertainty, might seem puzzling.
Actually, the mean-variance framework can be regarded as a special
case of the time-state-preference framework. Hirshleifer,
Investment, Interest, and Capital , op. cit. , pp. 308-310. In
addition, as already pointed out, the Meyer paper's approach is
similar to that of the Leland paper discussed in the previous
subsection.
603. Note the contrast between the valuation equation (236) and the
valuation equation in problem (151) of the Vickers model. In (151)
allowance is made for risk by adjusting the rate of discount,
whereas in (236) the rate of discount p is riskless, and allowance
is made for risk by adjusting the numerator. The expression in
braces in (236) can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of
expected total profit, much in the spirit of John Lintner'
s
valuation equation (185) , which expresses the stock market value
of the firm as the present value of the certainty equivalents of
the dividend stream. As suggested in footnote 491, these two
approaches to dealing with uncertainty — adjusting the denominator
by forming a risk-adjusted discount rate or adjusting the numerator
by forming the certainty equivalent of expected returns — are
equivalent (provided, of course, the adjustments are made correctly).
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p. 464, especially footnote 9.
605. The Lagrangian is
n
L, = V + X[Q - g(q ...,q )] + Z y . (q . - D.* - N.Q.) .
A 1 n . , i l l ii1=1
The necessary conditions (241)- (243) follow from the assumption
that each of the decision variables appears in the optimal solution
at a positive level. It is interesting to consider, however, the
short run problem in which Q is fixed and in which (233) might
be satisfied as a strict inequality. Again assume that all prices
and output levels are positive at optimality and that (235) is
again satisfied at optimality as an equality. Then, in addition
to (233), (235), (241), and (242), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
an optimum require that the constraints
A[Q - g(q ...,q )] = , g(q 1 ,...,qri ) < Q , A :> (*)in in — —
be added. Since, in the short run, capacity is fixed, Q is no
longer a decision variable, and (243) disappears. The significance
of the conditions (*) is considered below in footnote 609.
For the peak-load pricing problem, the necessary conditions take
a slightly different form. The constraint g(q ,...,q ) <_ Q in
problem (240) must be replaced by the set of constraints
q. < Q , i = l,...,n , and, as a consequence, a set of n Lagrange
multipliers X.
,









- A + y. = , i = 1, . .
.
,n
+ E A. =
8Q p 8Q i=1 i
Since the analysis of the peak-load pricing problem is discussed
at length by Meyer, and since the equilibrium conditions are similar
in interpretation and form to (244)- (246) given below, the peak-load
pricing problem will not be considered further here.
606. The risk adjustment here is determined by the stock market
since A is expressed in terms of V
,
which in turn depends
on the market-determined price of risk, R .
607. Riskless marginal revenue MR.* is evaluated along the expected
quantity certainty demand curve (232) at the optimal (risky)
price.
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608. The terminology is Meyer's. Ibid.
,
p. 466. It would be more
descriptive to refer to the expression in brackets in (245)
as tiAJ>k.-a.djuAt<ld marginal revenue, though Meyer's terminology
will continue to be used.
609. This is, of course, perfectly analogous to the equilibrium
condition under certainty that requires that, given optimal
prices and capacity, the firm should continue to expand the
output of each good up to the point at which marginal revenue
just equals the sum of marginal production cost and marginal
capacity cost. For the short run problem considered in footnote
499: when there is spare capacity, g(q ,...,q ) < Q , and






or marginal revenue equals marginal production cost. When there
is spare capacity, its marginal cost is zero, and capacity
considerations do not affect the firm's pricing and output
decisions.
610. The interpretation of equation (247) is given in the preceding
footnote. Once £
.
has been made sufficiently small, the effect
of 3=0 is to shield the firm's total market value from any
further effects of uncertainty. As a result, the firm's optimal
investment, pricing, and production decision rules are the same
as they would be in the absence of uncertainty. Put slightly
differently, according to the valuation equation (239), the
stock market evaluates the riskiness of a firm's profit stream
in relation to overall market returns, and when a firm's profits
and overall market returns are uncorrelated, the stock market
values the firm's shares as it would a riskless investment
since, in principle, a portfolio made up of a sufficiently large
number of such securities would enable its holder to diversify
away virtually all risk, and in the limit, would enable him
to eliminate risk entirely.
611. That is, the relevant demand curve for comparison with the
certainty case is the expected quantity certainty demand curve
given by (232). When the firm maximizes its total market value
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which is like (239) with 3=0 and q. in place of D.* .
In (*) q. = D.* = h(p ,...,p ) given oy (232) . That is,
quantity demanded equals quantity sold with certainty. In
(239) D.* represents quantity sold only approximately (and
the approximation is close only if £. is chosen to be suffi-
ciently small). Adding the capacity constraint (233), forming
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the Lagrangian, and differentiating, yields optimal decision
rules for the certainty case that are identical with (244) and
(247), thus bearing out the statements made in the text and in
the preceding footnote concerning the implication of 3=0.
Note also that, even though expected quantity sold is the same
regardless of the existence of uncertainty, achieving this
requires that £ . be made small, which implies that the expected
quantity of output will exceed expected quantity sold by an
amount E[q.] - D.* = q. - D.* = N.a. , regardless of the value
i l x l i
of 3 • Hence, even when 3=0, it cannot be said that the
presence of uncertainty has absolutely no effect on the firm's
behavior.
612. So that vector-matrix multiplication is defined, D
, q , and
D* must be n by 1 vectors. They have been written hori-
zontally to save space. The matrix Q, is the variance-covariance
matrix and its dimension is n by n .
613. Note that when demands are uncorrelated, ft is a diagonal
matrix, and (250) reduces to the n constraints
q. > D.* + N.a. , i = 1,. . . ,n ,l—i 11
as in the special case considered in the previous subsection.
614. The Lagrangian is
n
L = V + A[Q - g(q lf ...,q )] + Z U. (q. - D * S.) ,
a i n .-ill l1=1
which is the same as the Lagrangian in footnote 605 except that
V is of a somewhat different form and S. appears in place of
N.a.
,
with each change necessitated by the generalization
permitting nonzero correlations between demands.
615. If 3=0 in (253), the necessary conditions for an optimal
solution to problem (251) simplify, as before, to the optimality
conditions under certainty. In particular, relation (247) would
again hold.
616. In the more general case of the multiproduct firm considered
above, this statement is false. When there are strong comple-
mentarities among the goods produced by the multiproduct firm,
the firm may find it profitable to sell one or more goods at
a price below marginal production cost (i.e. as a 'loss leader').
For example, when the firm produces razors and razor blades,
the firm may find it profitable to give away the razors so that
it can increase the demand for its razor blades and thereby
increase its total profit. The argument given below also applies
to such firms, but is stated in terms of the discriminating
monopolist in order to demonstrate more clearly that under
uncertainty there is an additional justification for selling
at a price below marginal production cost.
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617. As Meyer suggests, this defines sets of risk-efficient prices
which are analogous to risk-efficient sets of securities in
portfolio theory. Ibid.
,
p. 471. A set of prices is risk-
efficient if it minimizes risk for a given level of expected
total profit, just as a portfolio of securities lies on the
efficiency frontier if it minimizes risk for any given level of






618. This suggests that, under risk, optimal pricing is more dependent
on the customer's risk-class than on the price elasticity of
demand, which plays such a critical role in the riskless setting.




p. 470. See also Henderson and Quandt, op. cit.
,
pp. 215-216, for a discussion of the optimal pricing rule for the
discriminating monopolist in a riskless setting, namely, that the
ratio of the market prices charged any two groups of customers
should be dependent on the two price elasticities, n. and ru
,









619. This is analogous to the percentage yield for a security lying
below the riskless rate of interest when that security's returns
are sufficiently negatively correlated with the returns of the
other securities in the portfolio. See Mossin, Theory of
Financial Markets , op. cit. , ch. 4.
620. Several papers have assumed that firms maximize their stock market
value, and upon finding that the allocation of investment is not
Pareto optimal, have suggested that the stock market is not
Pareto optimal. See J.E. Stiglitz, On the Optimality of the Stock
Market Allocation of Investment , op. cit. ; M. Jensen and J. Long,
Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in
the Capital Markets
, op. cit. ; and E.F. Fama, Perfect Competition
and Optimal Production Decisions under Uncertainty , op. cit. What
these papers really bring into question, however, is the presumption
of value maximization, rather than the optimality of stock markets.
See R. Wilson, Comment on J. Stiglitz, 'On the Optimality of Stock
Market Allocation of Investment' , op. cit. , and S.F. LeRoy, Stock
Market Optimality: Comment , op. cit.
621. Using a variant of Stiglitz's model, Wilson shows that stockholders
would unanimously recommend production decisions that do not
maximize the firm's total market value. R. Wilson, Comment on
J. Stiglitz, 'On the Optimality of Stock Market Allocation of
Investment' , op. cit.
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622. The Leland model is a generalization of a model due to Diamond.
See Diamond, op. cit. In the Leland and Diamond models, unanimity
is assured by the assumption that the technology of the firm
is such that every alternative open to the firm would not alter
the set of available state-distributions of returns. The question
of unanimity of shareholder preferences is further explored and
more general conditions leading to shareholder unanimity are
developed in R.C. Merton and M.G. Subrahmanyam, "The Optimality
of a Competitive Stock Market," Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science (vol. 5; no. 1; Spring 1974), pp. 145-170;
S. Ekern and R. Wilson, "On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy
with Incomplete Markets," Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science (vol. 5; no. 1; Spring 1974), pp. 171-180; R. Radner,
"A Note on Unanimity of Stockholders' Preferences Among Alterna-
tive Production Plans: A Reformulation of the Ekern-Wilson
Model," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (vol. 5;
no. 1; Spring 1974), pp. 181-184; S. Ekern, "On the Theory of
the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets: An Addendum,"
Bell Journal of Economics (vol. 6; no. 1; Spring 1975), pp. 388-
393; and R. Forsythe, "On the Theory of the Firm under Uncer-
tainty," Social Science Working Paper No. 90 (California
Institute of Technology; Pasadena, Calif.; July 1975).
623. The Leland model employs a time-state-preference framework is
demonstrating this result. In a similar manner, Long employs a
mean-variance framework to show that maximizing the stock
market value of the firm does not imply that shareholder welfare
has been maximized. J. Long, "Wealth, Welfare, and the Price
of Risk," Journal of Finance (vol. 27; no. 2; May 1972),
pp. 419-433.
624. The remainder of this subsection discusses the model of the firm
under uncertainty presented in Leland, Production Theory and the
Stock Market , op. cit.
625. Baron, Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in
Pure Competition , op. cit. , and Sandmo, op. cit. The model of
the firm under either pure or perfect competition can be treated
as a special case of the model of the quantity-setting firm
developed by Leland, which was discussed above in subsection
2b of this section.
626. This has the effect of making the zeroth firm's securities
riskless. As noted by Leland, the same effect could be achieved
by assuming the existence of a riskless bond paying a fixed rate
of interest.
627. Leland, Production Theory and the Stock Market , op. cit. ,
p. 130.
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628. Note that since r = tt (q ) /v the system of equations is
homogeneous of degree zero in v > so that only relative prices
can be determined. By selecting the securities of the zeroth
firm as numeraire, v = 1 and all other security prices are
normalized in terms of the zeroth firm's share price. Then r










632. In (257) r = tt (q ) , since v = 1 , and s. = s. , which
must hold at the financial equilibrium. l l
633. The importance of this result, as Leland suggests, is that it
depends only on observable variables, i.e. cost functions and
current market values. Ibid.
,
p. 133.
634. Note that even though (262) and (263) are similar in form, one
cannot use (263) to derive a marginal cost pricing rule analo-
gous to (265). The reason is simply that, since price
p (9) is random (and dependent on the state of nature 9),
the firm cannot equate p (9) and MC (q ) . Under uncertainty
both profit maximization and "p = MC" are meaningless.
635. However, Leland does show that, when all firms operate within
a competitive environment, facing the same random price and
having identical strictly convex cost functions, the firm will
maximize its stock market value relative to the market value
of other firms by selecting q = q unanimously supported by
the firm's shareholders. Ibid.
, pp. 137-138.
636. This is a straightforward generalization of Leland' s result.
Leland considers the simple case in which there is only one
risky firm in addition to the riskless firm. Ibid.
, pp. 136-
137. The derivation of (267), which permits the number of
risky firms to be arbitrary, is as follows. Differentiating
(260) with respect to q and evaluating at q = q gives
1 A i . /s
.
E{U.'(R.,9)[ ^r- r ^\] } + E {tj. "(R. ,9) (tt J - rVj )
dqJ 9qJ
N ~k . N . _ ~k , j N . , 9s k
[r E —r s . + Z s . (-r —r) + s —r+ I (tt -rV ) rj i
k=19q :l 1 k=l 1 3qJ
X
dqJ k=l 9qJ
- E{U.'(R.,9)}(r ^r) (*)
9q
J
i ~i i dTTj
N k -k 8S i
+ E.{u."(R.,9)(Trl
-rv




since in equilibrium s. = s. for all k and
. 11
dTT3
E{U.'(R.,6) —r) = . Defining D. E E





and dividing each side of (*) by D. gives equation (267) in
the text. Note that D. < since, by assumption,




-rVJ ] > .
637. For the case of one risky firm (considered by Leland), the
expression ~^ k












p. 136. In this special case it can be shown that for









638. This result seems paradoxical for two reasons. First, a higher
share value would appear to make all shareholders better off
since it would increase their wealth. Second, unless the firm
maximizes its share value, someone else will take over the firm,
adopt policies that lead to maximum share value, and sell out
at a sure profit. However, as Leland argues, both lines of
reasoning are incorrect. Ibid.
,
p. 127. To illustrate why,
assume there are N identical investors each holding S shares
in the firm. Two possible demand
curves for the individual investor
are shown in the figure to the
right. Under policy (1) the
demand curve for shares is D D
and the equilibrium share
price is p , while under
policy (2) the demand curve
is D D and the equilibrium
share price is p„. Under
policy (2) the share price, and
hence the total stock market
value of the firm, is greater.
But the shareholders would be
number of shares
Figure
better off under policy (1) since the total value investors attach
to their shares — measured as the sum of current market value
and consumers' surplus, i.e. the area under the demand curve
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between s = and s = S — is greater under policy (1).
Also, if someone were to buy up all the firm's shares, he would





buy up the shares he would have to bid up the price as the
number of shares not in his possession decreased). But changing
to policy (2) and then selling the shares would yield him an
amount no greater than the area under D D — an amount less
than he originally paid for the shares. Thus, both of the
arguments that appear to support value maximization are incorrect,
Value maximization need not maximize (total) shareholder welfare.
Note that what is involved here is just the well-known paradox
of value.
639. If securities markets were perfect and complete, then
3q
J
= for all firms, and the firms could achieve
q =q a Pareto optimal choice of outputs by maximizing
the firm's market value. Rather than attempting
to show this using equation (268), it might be simpler to use an
arbitrage argument of the type suggested by Leland. Ibid.
,
p. 133, footnote 22.
640. As well as several other models, some of which are noted in
footnote 225.
641. An exception to this statement is the Baumol growth maximization
model, in which sales and the firm's quantity of money capital
were permitted to grow at different (though constant) rates.
See footnote 213.
642. Therefore, what is really a dynamic (i.e. multiperiod) problem
from an economic standpoint can be solved by employing static
(in the mathematical sense) optimization techniques.
643. Marris, Theories of Corporate Growth , op. cit .
,
pp. 12-13,
and Lintner, Maximum Corporate Growth under Uncertainty , op. cit.
,
pp. 174-176.
644. Krouse, On the Theory of Optimal Investment, Dividends, and




p. 269. Krouse' s model is discussed
below in subsection 4.
645. The first effect — the impact of the business cycle on the firm's
capital investment — can be explained by the Arrow model, which
is discussed below in subsection 2, and the second effect — a
declining growth rate as the firm matures — can be explained by
the Wong model which is discussed below in subsection 3.
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646. The basic references for the calculus of variations are G.A.
Bliss, Lectures on the Calculus of Variations (University of
Chicago Press; Chicago; 1946); I.M. Gelfand and S.V. Fomin,
Calculus of Variations
,
trans, by R.A. Silverman (Prentice-Hall;
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963); and M.R. Hestenes, Calculus of
Variations and Optimal Control Theory (Wiley; New York; 1966).
A particularly good reference for economists is G. Hadley and
M.C. Kemp, Variational Methods in Economics (North-Holland;
Amsterdam; 1971). The basic references for the maximum princi-
ple are L.S. Pontryagin, V.G. Boltyanskii, R.V. Gamkrelidze,
and E.F. Mishchenko, The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes
,
trans, by K.N. Trirogoff (Wiley Interscience; New York; 1962);
M. Athans and P.L. Falb, Optimal Control (McGraw-Hill; New
York; 1966); Hestenes, op. cit. ; and E.B. Lee and L. Markus,
Foundations of Optimal Control Theory (Wiley; New York; 1967).
Less mathematically sophisticated approaches to the calculus of
variations and optimal control theory that emphasize economic
applications include Intriligator, op. cit.
, chs. 12,14;
Takayama, op. cit. , chs. 5,8; and A. Bensoussan, E.G. Hurst,
Jr., and B. Naslund, Management Applications of Modern Control
Theory (North-Holland; Amsterdam; 1974), which is particularly
noteworthy in that it covers stochastic control theory as well
as deterministic control theory.
647. The interpretation of the costate variables is discussed at
length in Intriligator, op. cit.
,
pp. 351-353; M. Albouy and
A. Breton, "Interpretation Economique du Principe du Maximum,"
Revenue Francaise de Recherche Operationnelle (vol. 14; 1968);
and R. Dorfman, "An Economic Interpretation of Optimal Control
Theory," American Economic Review (vol. 59; no. 5; December
1969), pp. 817-831.
648. In addition to models of the firm, several other economic and
management applications of optimal control theory have been
suggested. For two surveys see A. P. Jacquemin and J. Thisse,
"Strategy of the firm and market structure: an application of





pp. 61-84, and Bensoussan, Hurst,
and Naslund, op. cit.
This subsection is based on Jorgenson, op. cit.
,
pp. 140-147.
650. Thus, Q(t) is the rate at which output is produced at time
t , L(t) is the rate at which labor services are applied
to production at time t , etc.
651. Note that the price of capital goods is permitted to vary.
That is, unlike the multiperiod model of the firm discussed
in section F in which capital goods were selected as the
numeraire, in the Jorgenson model some other good (possibly
money) serves as the numeraire.
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652. Note that, according to (271), the production function — the
technological relationship between output and inputs — remains
constant over time. In the next subsection a model that permits
technological progress (by making t itself a separate argument
of the production function) is discussed. In addition, note that
in (271) K(t) represents the physical stock of capital at time
t
,
whereas Q(t) and L(t) represent instantaneous rates of
flow of output and labor services, respectively, at time t .
Shephard and Fare have explored the conceptual difficulties
inherent in specifying the production function implicitly as in
(271). See Shephard, op. cit. , and Shephard and Fare, op. cit.
653. The constant 6 in (272) is intended to measure depreciation in
physical units (i.e. in the same units in which physical capital
is measured) per unit of time. Thus, 6 must convert from stock
units (in which K is measured) into flow units (in which K and
I are measured). Note, however, that if K(t) in the production
function (271) were interpreted as a flow of capital services
(e.g. machine hours per period) so that Q , L , and K all
represent flows, then K(t) on the right-hand side of (272) would
also measure this flow of capital services. But K on the left-
hand side of (272) must represent a physical stock of capital.
Thus, in this case the constant 6 would also have to reflect the
conversion from one flow unit (e.g. machine hours per unit time
period) to another (e.g. machines per unit time period) in order
for the units of measurement in (272) to be in agreement.
654. Note that it is not necessary to list K as a separate decision
variable, because, given the initial capital stock, K
,
specifying
the investment stream I(t) automatically specifies the capital
stock at each point in time, K(t)
,
because of (272).
655. In setting out the necessary conditions it has been assumed that,
at optimality, Q , L , I , and K are strictly positive for all t
656. The justification for giving i this interpretation is the
following, which is based on the relationship between the price of
capital goods and the price of capital services. Jorgenson,
op. cit.
, pp. 143-144. For a unit investment in capital goods at
time s , the flow of capital services received between time t (>s)




If i(t) is the unit price of capital services at time t , then
the discounted price is i(t)«e_rt and the present value of the
stream of capital services (*) is given by
i(t)--". e
- 6(t - s)
dt .
If the unit price of capital goods at time s is q(s) , then the




If capital markets are perfect, as Jorgenson assumes, then the
present value of the unit investment at time s must equal the
present value of the future flow of capital services, so that
oo
-rs
, N r . ,. -rt -o(t-s) .e q(s) = / i(t)-e -e dt
,
s
or upon solving for the unit price of investment goods,
oo




By differentiating (**) with respect to s , an expression for the
unit price of capital services implicit in (**) can be obtained:
q(s) = [r + 6]q(s) - i(s)
,
or
i = q(r+ 6) - q ,
which is just equation (281). It should be noted that, if problem
(273) is restated so that the objective of the firm is to maximize
the present value of the future profit stream, i.e. / P(t)e dt
where P(t) = p(t)-Q(t) - w(t)-L(t) - i(t)-K(t) is total profit in
the economic sense, then the solution is identical to the solution
obtained from (275)- (278) together with the contraints in (273).
Ibid.
, pp. 144-145. That is, the cost of capital, i(t) , is the
same as the price of a unit of capital, i
, introduced in section B.
Also, as pionted out in section F, when there is certainty and
markets are perfect, maximizing economic profit in the single period
sense is equivalent first, to maximizing the present value of the
profit stream, and second, to maximizing the present value of the
cash flow stream.
657. Equation (281) might be interpreted more easily if rewritten as
i/q = r + 6 - q/q . (*)
Equation (*) reexpresses the cost of capital as an interest
rate. According to (*) , the cost of capital is equal to the
discount rate (which is equal to the market rate of interest
under perfect markets), r
?
(the opportunity cost associated
with utilizing the capital in production), plus the rate of
depreciation, 6" (the rate at which physical capital wears out
through use) , minus the percentage rate of change of capital
goods prices (the percentage rate at which the market value of
capital goods (relative to the numeraire) appreciates). In
other words, the owner of a unit of capital must be compensated
for the opportunity cost of his capital, r
,
and for the
depreciation of the unit of capital through use, 6
,
but if
capital goods prices are rising (relative to the numeraire)
,
these costs are at least partially offset by the percentage
increase in the market value of the undepreciated balance.
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658. In this regard the Jorgenson model is in agreement with the
simple value maximization model discussed in section F.
Indeed, with capital goods as numeraire, q = 1 , q = ,
and (283) reduces to (72).
659. For more on this point see J. Tobin, "Comment," in Ferber, op.
cit.
, pp. 156-160. Also, because of the assumptions of certainty
and perfect capital markets, the firm's financial policies are
irrelevant. A model somewhat similar to the Jorgenson model,
but one that allows for the risk of default, has been devised by
Inselbag. See I. Inselbag, "Financing Decisions and the Theory
of the Firm," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
(vol. 8; no. 5; December 1973), pp. 763-776. Inselbag introduces
uncertainty into the model by allowing for the possibility of
bankruptcy and by making the implicit cost of debt an increasing
function of both the firm's leverage ratio and the amount borrowed.
Ibid.
,
p. 768. This treatment of the cost of debt parallels
Vicker's approach. See section I of this chapter. Because of
this treatment of uncertainty and because Inselbag employs a
deterministic objective functional (like Jorgenson' s, but with
dividends, D(t)
,
in place of net cash flow, R(t)), the Inselbag
model is essentially a deterministic model (which, like the
Jorgenson model, is easily solved with the aid of the classical
calculus of variations).
660. By dividing each side of equation (281) by q , the expression
for the cost of capital becomes
i
- r + 6 - 4 . (*)q q
where i/q is the cost of capital expressed as a percentage of
the price of capital goods (i.e. as an interest rate), r is the
short term rate of interest, 6 is the rate of depreciation, and
q/q is the percentage rate of change of capital goods prices.
Dividing each side of (283) by q gives
(**)
q 3K q
in which p/q expresses the price of output in terms of the
price of capital goods. Using (*) to substitute for i/q and
defining p' = p/q , (**) becomes
P' "g| = i/q = r + 6 - q/q ,
which is the equilibrium condition stated in the text and which
is one of the standard equations of neoclassical capital theory.
See, for example, K.J. Arrow, "Optimal Capital Policy, the Cost
of Capital, and Myopic Decision Rules," Annals of the Institute
of Statistical Mathematics (vol. 16; 1964), pp. 21-30, or S.A.
Marglin, Approaches to Dynamic Investment Planning (North-Holland;
Amsterdam; 1963). See also M. Nerlove and K.J. Arrow, "Optimal
Advertising Policy Under Dynamic Conditions," Economica (vol. 29;
no. 114; May 1962), pp. 129-142, which derives results that are
formally equivalent, but for advertising, rather than capital, policy,
558
661. The remainder of this subsection is based on the model developed
in Arrow, Optimal Capital Policy with Irreversible Investment
,
op. cit.
, pp. 1-19. The model is a generalization of several
earlier studies of the firm's optimal capital policy over time
conducted by Arrow and others, among them K.J. Arrow, M.
Beckmann, and S. Karl in, "The Optimal Expansion of the Capacity
of a Firm," In K.J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and H. Scarf, eds., Studies
in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production (Stanford
University Press; Stanford, Calif.; 1958), ch. 7; K.J. Arrow,
"Optimal Capital Adjustment," in K.J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and
H. Scarf, eds. , Studies in Applied Probability and Management
Science (Stanford University Press; Stanford, Calif.; 1962),
ch. 1; and Arrow, Optimal Capital Policy, the Cost of Capital
,
and Myopic Decision Rules , op. cit.
662. Note that these costs could be recovered if the market for
capital goods were perfect.







665. As a second possibility, the firm may postpone investment
because it expects technological improvements to be made in the
very near future that will cause the capital goods (e.g.
machines) currently available to become technologically obsolete.
666. To see why (285) holds, note that if the short term rate of
interest at each time t is p(t) , then a sum R(t) received
at time t has present value
- / p(s)ds
V = R(t) e °
which, by the definition of a(t) , is also given by




a(t) = e ° , (*)
and differentiating each side of (*) with respect to t gives
t
- / p(s)ds
a(t) = -p(t) e ° = -p(t)-a(t)
,
from which (285) immediately follows. For the special case in
which p(t) E p , a constant, for all t , a(t) = e
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667. Ibid.
, pp. 5-6. Define the following variables:
x(t) = K(t)e6t y(t) = I(t)e6t
3(t) = a(t)e"6t P*(x,t) = e <St P(xe" 5t ,t) .
Then
and
x = (K + 6K)e6t = I(t)e6t = y
3(t)[p*(x,t)-y(t)] = a(t)[P(k(t),t) - I(t)]











Substituting a for 6 , P for P* , I for y , and K








670. Since p(t) is measured in terms of the change in the present
value of the cash flow stream (i.e. the objective functional
in (287)) with respect to a unit change in the capital stock,
equation (293) is really just the familiar condition that capital
should be accumulated up to the point at which the improvement
in the present value of the cash flow stream due to the addi-
tional returns resulting from a unit increase in the capital
stock just equals the fall in the present value of the cash flow
stream due to the fall in p(t) induced by the increase in the
capital stock — i.e. until 'marginal benefit' just equals
'marginal cost', where each is expressed in terms of the present
value of the cash flow stream.
671. The initial value of q(t) — namely, q(0) — has not been
specified. However, it must be such that the necessary condi-
tions can all be satisfied simultaneously, and in particular, it
must be chosen small enough that q(t) _< for all t > .





673. See footnotes 660 and 678.
674. Ibid.
, p. 9.
675. Where the two differ, however, is during periods when capacity
is not expanding.
676. For technical reasons, the analysis of blocked intervals for
which t = or for which t becomes infinite, or both,
o
must be carried out separately, although the results obtained
are similar to those obtained for the case t > and t < °° .






678. Recall that money capital markets have been assumed perfect,
and further, that p(t) is expressed in terms of capital goods
prices and the rate of depreciation is zero, so that p(t) is
the cost of capital (expressed as an interest rate).
679. The irreversibility of investment may also mean that, at the
time a recession ends, firms find that they have substantial
excess capacity, so that increases in investment spending will
lag behind the upturn in the level of economic activity. See,
for example, D.P. Garino, "Firms Like Monsanto Give Capital
Projects Tough Second Looks," Wall Street Journal (December
30, 1976).
680. See section G of this chapter.





682. This subsection is based on Wong, op. cit.
,
pp. 689-694. A
similar model is presented in Takayama, op. cit.
, pp. 688-697.
683. This is more easily appreciated by referring to the typical
firm's statement of retained earnings illustrated in table
II-3. In (301), p(t)-f (K(t),L(t)) - w(t)-L(t) corresponds
to net income, D(t) corresponds to dividends paid, and I(t)
corresponds to retained earnings (under the implicit assumption
that all retained earnings are reinvested).
More importantly, the constraint on investment (301) restricts
the speed of adjustment of the firm's capital stock to the
desired capital stock. In the Jorgenson model the firm can
adjust its capital stock to the most desired level instantaneously,
i.e. investment is reversible. Note that (301) together with the
constraint D(t) < p(t) • f (K(t) ,L(t) ) - w(t)-L(t) imply that
I(t) 2l . That is, investment is irreversible. The maximum
rate at which the firm's capital stock can be reduced is the
rate of depreciation.
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685. The derivation of (310) follows. When q > 1 , 1-q < ,
so that dividing each side of (309) by 1-q reverses the sense
of the inequality, giving D*(t) j£ D(t) , which implies
D*(t) = , the minimum permissible value. When q < 1
,
dividing each side of (309) by 1-q preserves the sense of the
inequality, giving D*(t)
_> D(t) , which implies
D*(t) = p(t)-f (K*(t),L*(t)) - w(t)«L*(t)
,
the maximum permissible
value. When q = 1 , 1-q = , so that division by 1-q is
impossible. For q = 1 , the optimal dividend policy must be
determined by further considerations, which are set out below.
686. As usual, it is assumed that L*(t) > . If the constraint






as in condition (7) in section B of this
chapter, so that it does not pay the firm to hire any labor.
687. The condition (308) may be thought of as the ' transversality
condition' for the infinite horizon problem. Difficulties
associated with extending the transversality condition to the
infinite horizon case are discussed briefly in Takayama, op.
cit.
,
pp. 623-625, and more fully in K.J. Arrow, "Applications
of Control Theory to Economic Growth," in G.B. Dantzig and
A.F. Veinott Jr., eds., Mathematics of the Decision Sciences
,
Part 2 (American Mathematical Society; Providence, R.I.; 1968),
pp. 85-119.
688. For a discussion of sufficiency see O.L. Mangasarian, "Sufficient
Conditions for the Optimal Control of Nonlinear Systems,"
SIAM Journal of Control (vol. 4; no. 1; February 1966),
pp. 139-152.
689. From (312), if q > 1 , then K = implies that
p(t)-f(K(t),L(t))-w(t)-L(t)-6-K(t) = . (*)
If L(t) in (*) satisfies (311) and if the production function
f(K,L) is concave, then (*) is solved by a unique level of the
capital stock, K' in figure 11-27. From (313), q =
implies that
P '
3fg' L) - 6 + r . (**)
If L(t) is (**) satisfies (311) and if the production function
f(K.L) is concave, then (**) is solved by a unique level of the
capital stock, K in figure 11-27.
690. In the figure the arrows indicate the direction of change of
q and K , depending on the sign of q , the sign of K ,
and whether q is less than, equal to, or greater than one.
For example, at point A, q > and q < 1 , so that
K = -6'K < . Therefore, q is increasing and K is
decreasing, so that (K,q) moves in the northwest direction.
At point B, q < , and q > 1 , so that K > , and therefore,
(K,q) moves in the southeast direction.
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691. Actually there are three possible paths: (i) K and q
converging to zero, (ii) q(t) -+ 00 with
8f (K T ^
q(t) = q(t)[(6+r)-p ^—] , and (iii) K converging
to Kopt and q converging ot one. Along path (i) the firm
eventually goes out of business. Along path (ii) necessary
condition (308) is violated. Hence, only path (iii) could be
optimal for a viable firm.
692. The justification for the third condition is the following.
If K = KoPt
,
then K =
. From (302), I(t) = S-K(t)
,
and tnen from (301),
D*(t) = p(t)-f(K*(t),L*(t)) -w(t)-L*(t) - <5-K*(t) .
693. Wong, op. cit.
,
p. 692. It should be noted, however, that the
managerial models could not, in general, be used to replicate
this phase exactly. In particular, the multiperiod managerial
models, such as the Marris model, typically involve some sort
of valuation constraint that prevents the firm's retention




695. For example, see R. Radner, "Paths of Economic Growth that are
Optimal with Regard only to Final States: A Turnpike Theorem,"
Review of Economic Studies (vol. 28; February 1961), pp. 98-
104; D. Cass, "Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital
Accumulation," Review of Economic Studies (vol. 32; no. 91;
July 1965), pp. 233-240; and S.J. Turnovsky, "Turnpike Theorems
and Efficient Economic Growth," in E. Burmeister and A.R.
Dobell, Mathematical Theories of Economic Growth (Macmillan;
New York; 1970), ch. 10.
696. Wong, op. cit.
,
p. 691.
697. In Wong's version of the model, as in the Arrow model, capital
goods are taken to be the numeraire, so that in (281) q = 1
and q = . Thus, i = r + 6 , so that (283) is identical to
(315).
698. The existence of what are commonly known as 'mature industries'
and 'growth industries' would appear to lend at least partial
support to Wong's thesis. For example, see "New Leaders in
Semiconductors," Business Week (March 1, 1976), which describes
the fast growth of new companies in a rapidly expanding industry,
and "LTV: Weak growth in mature industries," Business Week
(April 5, 1976), which describes the problems confronting a firm
whose major product lines are in mature industries. But in these
cases, the growth of the firm is most heavily influenced by
demand factors, rather than by the cost factors implied in the
Wong model. As Marris and Wood argue, the existence of constant
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or increasing returns to scale implies that there is nothing
"to prevent an individual firm from growing continuously and
indefinitely." Marris and Wood, op. cit.
,
p. xvii. Of course,
this does not mean that firms will always continue to grow. Due
either to the maturity of traditional markets and an unwillingness
to diversify or to an increased relative preference for profits
rather than growth, a firm's growth rate may fall, and concomitantly,
its profitability may improve — causing the firm to exhibit behavior
consistent with the Wong model — even though there is no optimum
size, KPVt
,
that causes it to behave in this manner. See, for
example, "His Master's New Voice," Newsweek (November 17, 1975),
p. 81, which describes RCA Corp. as "a mature, not a growth,
company," and "Bringing Order to a Billion-Dollar Empire," Business
Week (September 8, 1975), which describes a shift in management's
preferences away from growth and toward increasing profits.
699. However, as noted earlier in this subsection, in the Wong model
investment is irreversible (i.e. capital goods cannot be sold),
which represents the antithesis of the instantaneous downward
adjustments in the size of the firm's capital stock that are
possible in the Jorgenson model. Ideally, one would hope for a
more realistic treatment of capital decumulation — one that falls
somewhere between these two extremes.
700. See Eatwell, op. cit. , and the discussion of this point in section D
of chapter one. In addition, the evidence supporting the existence
of either constant or increasing returns to scale in manufacturing
industries also casts considerable doubt on the existence of
optimum firm sizes. For example, see J. Johnston, Statistical Cost
Analysis (McGraw-Hill; New York; 1960), and A. A. Walters, op. cit.
For results of an earlier comprehensive study generally supportive
of decreasing average cost for large firms in heavy manufacturing
industries, see National Bureau of Economic Research, Cost Behavior
and Price Policy
,
op. cit. Similar results have been obtained in
studies of manufacturing industries in other countries. For
example, see C.F. Pratten, Economies of Scale in Manufacturing
Industries (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1971), and
A. Silberston, Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice , op. cit .
701. Once again, a warning on the interpretation of empirical evidence
in economics appears in order. The empirical 'proof' that, in
general, returns to scale are constant or increasing is conditional
on the data used in these various empirical tests. It is possible
that firms have not yet reached the scale of operations beyond which
returns to scale would decrease. If this were the case, empirical
tests would not indicate the existence of decreasing returns to
scale. (Whether or not this is actually true is a moot point — one
that will be settled only if firms become large enough that
diminishing returns to scale set in.)
702. This subsection is based on H.E. Leland, "Why Profit Maximization
May Be A Better Assumption Than You Think," technical report no. 80
(Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford
University; Stanford, Calif.; December 1972).
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703. In particular, see the corollary to Theorem I. Ibid.
, pp. 7-8.
704. Leland is not the only economist who has recognized that profit
maximization may be consistent with other goals. Edith Penrose
has also argued that profit maximization, though in the long run,
rather than in the short run, may be consistent with growth
maximization: "managers of firms wish to maximize long-run
profits. .. [since] to increase total long-run profits of the
enterprise. .. [is] equivalent to increasing the long-run rate of
growth. Penrose, op. cit.
, pp. 29-30.






706. In particular, the production function f(K,L) is linear
homogeneous and product markets are perfectly competitive. Ibid.
,
p. 21.
707. In the more general formulation of his model, Leland expressed the
objective functional as
T
/ F[K(t),L(t),t] dt , (*)
without restrictions on how the future is discounted. Ibid.
,
p. 4.
708. In the general formulation of the model,
K(t) = l[Tr{K(t),L(t),t},K(t),t]
where Leland uses P in place of tt . Ibid.
, p. 5. As in the
Arrow model, the separate argument t can be interpreted as a
surrogate for technical progress.
709. Leland does show, however, that many of the basic results he
establishes still hold when external finance is permitted. Ibid.
,
appendix B.
710. Note that the extreme cases U(tt,S) = it and U(tt,s) = S
correspond to pure profit maximization and to pure sales maximiza-
tion, respectively.
711. For example, total profit, tt , in (318) is a composite function of
time. In contrast to (317) where time t is an argument of the
profit function, thereby implying that the functional relationship
between tt and its arguments K and L may shift over time, time
affects total profit, and hence net investment, only indirectly —
through its impact on K and L — in (318). Thus,^ K may change
over time, but the functional relationship between K and its
arguments K and L will not change over time in (318).
Ibid., p. 5.
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713. The inequality e -r-^- -w > follows from the assumption
of nonsatiability , -^k > (i.e. more sales are always preferred
-rt
to less), and the fact that e > and w > (i.e. in
general, labor is not a free good).
714. Since the left-hand side of (326) is positive when evaluated at
Ia (t) , it may be concluded that a utility maximizing firm, where
utility is a function of total profit and total sales, will, in
general, produce more output than a pure profit maximizer. This
result is in agreement with the results obtained from the Baumol
sales maximization model, which was discussed in section G of this
chapter. The more interesting question, however, is 'how different'
the policies of these two types of firms are.
715. Leland establishes a more general result for arbitrary objective
function F[K(t) ,L(t) , tj] — see footnote 707 — and for a more
general net investment function. Ibid.
, pp. 7-8. He also goes on
to establish two simple tests for convergence of optimal current
operating policies to profit maximization. Ibid.
, pp. 14-17.
716. In this case A*.p(t) approaches a finite limit as the planning
horizon becomes infinite, but as long as $ < , A*^.(t) is an
increasing function of T-t , implying, as Leland suggests, that
optimal current policy moves closer to profit maximization, even
though profit maximization is not reached in the limit. Ibid.
,
pp. 8-9.
717. A somewhat weaker necessary condition for A*^(t) to become
unboundedly large would result if the model (318) were modified
to permit tt, S, and K to depend directly on t , as in (317).
Then the functional relationships embodied in (318) could be made
to shift outward over time and a condition analogous to (334) could
hold as a result of these shifting relationships, rather than
because of the (stronger) requirement that the shape of the time
invariant functional relationship tt(K,L) be such that (334) holds
for all K attainable through internally financed investment.
718. In the model (318) U may be thought of as top management's utility
function, where the inclusion of the profit argument reflects the
wishes of the financial executives and shareholders and the
inclusion of the sales argument reflects the wishes of the production
and marketing staffs.
719. In view of the issues raised in the literature dealing with social
welfare functions and social choice rules, it is recognized that
the notion of a 'collective utility' function is somewhat imprecise.
For example, see Heal, op. cit.
,
ch. 2. It is this writer's opinion
that one way around these criticisms is to let this utility function
be formed by top management, say the chairman of the board of
directors (without any claim being made as to the ' optimality ' or
even the 'desirability' of this procedure).
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720. This subsection is based on C.G. Krouse, "On the Theory of Optimal
Investment, Dividends, and Growth in the Firm," American Economic
Review (vol. 63; no. 3; June 1973), pp. 269-279.
721. See S. Katz, "A Discrete Version of Pontryagin's Maximum Principle,"
Journal of Electronics and Control (vol. 13; no. 2; August 1962),
pp. 179-184, and H. Halkin, "A Maximum Principle of the Pontryagin
Type for Systems Described by Nonlinear Difference Equations,"
SIAM Journal of Control (vol. 4; no. 1; February 1966), pp. 90-111.
See also Takayama, op. cit.
,
pp. 468-485; and Bensoussan, Hurst,
and Naslund, op. cit.
, pp. 27-30.
722. Krouse distinguishes between 'external' equity financing, in which
shares are sold to the public and in which transactions costs
are incurred, and 'internal' equity financing, in which shares are
sold through a preemptive rights offering to existing shareholders
in a manner that does not involve transactions costs. Thus,
internal equity financing is tantamount to paying 'negative
dividends'. Krouse, On the Theory of Optimal Investment, Dividends,




p. 271. Krouse considers only
equity financing, i.e. the firm issues no debt. The extension of
Krouse' s results by permitting debt financing has been accomplished
by Senchack, op. cit.
723. See section G of this chapter.
724. See the discussion in section I of this chapter of Miller's and
Modigliani's proposition concerning the irrelevance of the firm's
dividend policy, and in particular, the remarks concerning the
critically important assumption of perfect equity markets.
725. In words, equity funds raised internally are equivalent to negative
dividends.
726. Expectations or information assymmetry between existing shareholders
and potential shareholders is held to account when 6(t) ^ 1 .
Krouse, On the Theory of Optimal Investment, Dividends, and
Growth in the Firm , op. cit. , p. 271.
727. This includes, of course, dividends for the initial period, which
are paid at the end of that period.
728. The derivation of (336) from (335) follows. Separating the
initial period from later periods, (335) becomes
oo
V(0) = k(0)-D(0) + k(0) Z D (t)'k(t) , (*)
t=l °
where k(t) discounts back to the beginning of period 1 (in
contrast to k(t) , which discounts to the beginning of period ).
Since any new equity shares issued during period are issued
ex dividends, the entire dividend payout of the initial period is
received by initial shareholders, so that D (0) = D(0) . However,
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in later periods the initial shareholders receive only a pro rata
portion of the total dividends paid. In particular, they receive
a portion 1 - 6 (0) •E(0)/V(1) of the dividends paid to shareholders
of record at the beginning of period 1 . For example, if the
current market share price is $80 , the issue price is $100
,
100 shares are outstanding, and 10 new shares are issued, then
6(0) = 4/5 , E(0) = $1000 , and V(l) = 8800 , so that
1 - 6(0)-E(0)/V(l) = 10/11
,
which is the proportion of the firm's
outstanding shares owned by initial shareholders.
Thus, (*) may be rewritten as
V(0) = k(0){D(0) + [1 - 6(0)-E(0)/V(l)] 1 D (t)-k(t)} , (**)
t=l
where the sum represents the present value of dividends paid to
shareholders of record at time 1 (i.e. at the beginning of period 1 ),
and this sum multiplied by the term in brackets gives the portion of
this sum paid to initial shareholders. But, by definition,
00
V(l) = £ D (t)-k(t) , so that (**) may be rewritten as
t=l
oo
V(0) = k(0)[D(0) - 6(0)-E(0)] + Z D (t)-k(t) . (***)
t=l




etc., and by using the identity D(t) = X(t) - I(t) to
substitute for D(t)
,
(***) is transformed into (336).
729. In particular, note the difference between
<J>
[I (t) ,E(t)] in (337)
and the alternative form, (}>[I(t) + E(t)] , which allows only for
the size of the firm's capital budget. By distinguishing between
the two sources of finance, the former can be made to reflect fully
the transactions costs associated with external equity financing.
It is assumed that 4>[0,0] = ; that <j) has a full set of
continuous second partial derivatives; and that, beyond some point,
the firm experiences diminishing returns to investment.
730. Ibid.
, pp. 272-273. Of somewhat less importance, it is also
assumed that the new level of earnings could be maintained throughout
all future time periods provided net investment were nonnegative in
each future time period. That is, any level of earnings, once
attained, can be maintained simply by making gross investment
sufficient to offset depreciation. Should depreciation exceed gross
investment, disinvestment occurs and 'negative' retained earnings
(i.e. total dividends paid exceed earnings) may result.
731. See footnote 721 for references.
732. The necessary conditions set out below are written somewhat
differently from the way they are presented in Krouse. Ibid.
,
pp. 274-275. This is done in order to bring out more clearly the
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analogy that exists between the continuous and the discrete
versions of the maximum principle (under the appropriate assumptions)
This difference is, however, one of form only, and the solution to
the model obtained here is identical to the solution furnished by
Krouse.
733. The derivation of (344) follows. Using (342) to write expressions
for AA(t+l), AA(t+2), ... ,AA(t+n-l)
, and then summing, yields,
A(t+2) - A(t+1) = -k(t+l)
A(t+3) - A(t+2) = -k(t+2)
A(t+4) - A(t+3) =
-k(t+3)
A(t+n) - A(t+n-l) =
-k(t+n-l)
t+n-1
A(t+n) - A(t+1) = - Z k(x) (*)
T=t+1
Taking the limit of each side of (*) as n -+ °° and then applying
(343) yields
oo




which is equvalent to (344). The infinite series in (**) converges,
provided the discount rate each period is strictly positive, because




series Z (TZ-) » where r is the greatest lower bound for
T=t+1
the set (r(t+l), r(t+2), ... , r(t+n), ...}
734. That is, A(t+1) is measured in terms of the units in which the
term D (t)*k(t) in (335) is denominated,
o
735. These conditions are also sufficient for a unique maximum to the
optimal control problem (338) if H is strictly concave. Strict
concavity can be attained by imposing the appropriate restrictions
on (J)(t) and M(t) .
736. Ibid.
,
p. 275. The product 6(t)'E(t) represents the incremental
stock market value of the firm when an amount E(t) is raised
through an external equity issue (assuming E(t) > ). The
partial derivative M(t) measures the instantaneous rate of change








+ r(t+1) [1 + r(t+1)] [1 + r ( t+2 >]
represents the value as of the beginning of period t of a
perpetual annutiy beginning that period. Thus Z(t) is equivalent
in value to a perpetual annuity beginning in period t that pays
an amount A(t) per period (forever).
738. Note that since the structure of 4> takes into account transactions
costs on external equity issues, the necessary condition (348) also
takes these costs into account. In particular, if 6(t) = 1
and if the transactions costs associated with any external issue
are strictly positive, then E(t) =0
,
i.e. external sources of
equity will not be tapped. For external equity financing to be
employed, conditions (347) and (348) require that, over some range
of E(t)
,
the marginal external issue market value be less than
the marginal contribution of an external issue to investable funds
(i.e. E(t) less transactions costs). Ibid.
,
p. 277. To see this,
let J represent externally acquired funds net of transactions
n,,
3<t> 9<j) 9j j , , _. .. . 8<j> _ 9<J) „
costs. Then -~±- = -77-7 • -^= and, by definition, tt- - ir=r . From
oL oJ oh 5., > oJ dl
(347) and (348), at optimality M(t) = ^ . . , i.e. it is necessary
that the marginal external issue market value just equal the
marginal contribution of an external issue to investable funds.
739. To see why this is true, note that, under the assumptions just
stated, Z(t) becomes
z(t) = z [-M = ±
t=l \l + rl r
Since, by assumption, A(t) = M(t) = 1 and I and E are
indistinguishable, (347) and (348) become simply
I a^t) m . nr 3<t>(t) =







742. This extension is carried out in Senchack, op. cit.
743. See Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital , op. cit.
,
p. 261,
on this point. The argument is, in essence, that the distinction
between debt and equity really becomes important only when there is
uncertainty because then the difference in the relative riskiness
of the two types of securities is what distinguishes them.
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745. For a reformulation of the managerial theories in terms of
managerial utility maximization under uncertainty, see G.K. Yarrow,
Managerial Utility Maximization under Uncertainty
, op. cit. Also,
O.E. Williamson has modified his basic managerial model of the
firm to incorporate uncertainty. See O.E. Williamson, A Dynamic




746. See subsection 4 of section G, subsection 3 of section H, and
subsection 3 of section L.
747. The Vickers and Herendeen models discussed in section I also
explore the relationship between the firm's operating decisions
and its financial decisions. However, by making the average rate
of interest and the owners' capitalization rate functions of the
level of debt (Vickers) and the leverage ratio (Herendeen), they
assume (rather than demonstrate) that a significant relationship
exists. That is, the Vickers and Herendeen models abstract from
the factors, i.e. market imperfections and the incompleteness of
markets, that may cause the interest rate and the owners'
capitalization rate to vary in the manner they suggest.
748. However, Yarrow has shown how to extend Baumol's sales maximization
model and Marris's utility maximization model to permit uncertainty.
Yarrow, Managerial Utility Maximization under Uncertainty , op. cit.
749. Leibenstein, op. cit.
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III. THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FIRM OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
A. INTRODUCTION1
2The traditional theory of the firm postulates that the
firm functions primarily for the economic benefit of its owners.
Depending on the treatments given time and uncertainty, the
objective function in traditional models has been formulated
3
variously in terms of maximizing total profit; the current
4 5
stock market value of the firm; the current share price;
the total market value of the firm; the expected utility
7 8
of total profit; or expected shareholder utility. An
alternative view of the objectives of the firm has been put
forward by the managerialists. Citing the apparent separation
9
of ownership from control in large corporations, they argue
that corporate managers are able to pursue their own objec-
tives to the detriment of the owners' objectives. In the
managerial models of the firm, the objective function has
been formulated variously in terms of maximizing total revenue;
the steady state rate of growth of the firm; managerial
utility expressed as a function of the steady state growth
12
rate and the valuation ratio; managerial utility expressed
as a function of staff, managerial emoluments, and discretionary
13profit; or the discounted value of managerial utility
14
expressed as a function of total profit and total sales.
572
An extensive literature has accumulated as a result of
managerial criticisms of the traditional theory and attempts
by proponents of the two views to defend their positions with
15
empirical evidence. With some exceptions, the debate has
tended to focus attention on the differences between traditional
firms and managerial firms, with the implication - either
stated or implied - that firms always behave either one way
(e.g. always maximizing profit) or the other (e.g. always
maximizing growth). One such exception is a paper by
O.E. Williamson that suggests that the state of the firm's
immediate environment may condition the firm's behavior and
cause it to alternate between periods of profit maximization
17
and periods of managerial utility maximization. More recently,
Solow has suggested that both types of firms would be expected
to exhibit very similar responses to many forms of external
18
stimuli, and Leland has stated conditions under which the
optimal current operating policies of a managerial firm would
converge to profit maximization as the firm's long run equilibrium
19
operating policy. A somewhat different approach to reconciling
the traditional and managerial theories is due to Wong, whose
model suggests that growth maximization and profit maximization
20
may correspond to different phases in the firm's life cycle.
In the opinion of this writer, the Williamson, Solow, Leland,
and Wong studies suggest that, even at a theoretical level,
the line of demarcation between traditional firms and managerial
firms may be poorly marked.
In addition to the traditional and managerial theories
21
of the firm, there are the behavioral theories, which also
suggest to this writer that the behavior of actual firms over
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time may at times appear more consistent with the traditional
models and may at other times appear more consistent with the
managerial models. According to the behavioral view, the
firm does not seek to maximize any single objective. The
firm sets various goals that are mutually satisfactory to the
different social groupings that comprise the firm, and the
actual behavior of the firm may change over time as a result
of power shifts among the groupings that bring about a realignment
of the firm's goals. For example, during certain periods
the firm may appear to pursue traditional objectives as it
sells off unprofitable divisions and reduces staffs and managerial
emoluments in an effort to raise profitability. During
other periods it may appear to pursue managerial objectives
as it actively seeks out other firms to take over and increases
advertising and promotional expenditures dramatically in order
to increase sales. The behavioral theories explain such
changes in behavior in terms of factors internal to the firm.
An alternative explanation is that changes in the firm's operating
environment are responsible.
One of the main differences between the traditional and
managerial models of the firm on the one hand and the behavioral
models on the other is that the former are more concerned
with modeling phenomena external to the firm - e.g. modeling
the firm's choice of price and output level subject to given
market demand conditions and a given market structure or modeling
the growth of the firm subject to a stock market-imposed
valuation constraint - while the behavioral models are mainly
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concerned with modeling phenomena internal to the firm -
e.g. modeling the actual decision-making processes of firms.
The modeling requirements in the two cases differ. In the
first case, if only external phenomena were of interest, a
profit maximization model might serve as a reasonable 'if ...
then' type of model to test, say, the impact of a change in
the corporate profit tax rate on the behavior of the firm,
even if actual firms do not try to maximize profit (or stock
22
market value). In the second case, if only internal phenomena
were of interest, a more detailed, and possibly even firm-
specific, model, such as a model of the sociological process
at work within the firm, might be needed. In this thesis,
chapters three and four are mainly concerned with external
phenomena - the business cycle in chapter three and the financial
markets in chapter four - while chapter five is mainly concerned
with internal phenomena - specifically, internal resource
allocation.
It is this writer's belief that actual firms do have multiple
objectives and that the relative weights attached to these
objectives vary over time, depending largely on the state
of the firm's immediate operating environment. One strongly
influential factor is the state of demand for the firm's products,
23
and in particular, the state of the business cycle.
During the upswing overall demand is increasing and
24individual markets are expanding. Sales and profits
25increase and the outlook for investment is relatively favorable.
i
Firms grow internally by expanding sales of existing products
and by introducing and developing markets for new products,
and they grow externally by taking over other firms.
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During the downswing, however, overall demand is falling and
individual markets are contracting. Profits fall and the outlook
27for investment is relatively unfavorable. Plans for introducing
28
new products or for capital spending may be postponed.
Rather than actively seeking takeover candidates, firms may
try to sell off unprofitable or marginally profitable subsidiary
29
companies. During the upswing firms tend to be more growth-
30
oriented - indeed, they often feel they must grow in order
to protect their market shares - while during the downswing
31they tend to be more profit-oriented. In recent years the
business literature has contained many stories of companies
that grew very rapidly by acquisition during the economic
upsurge of the 1960s and that were forced to sell off many
32
of their acquisitions during the recession of the early 1970s.
In the opinion of this writer, the impact of the business
cycle on the behavior of the firm needs to be explored.
There have been several papers that have either dealt explicitly
with some facet of the firm's behavior over the business
33
cycle or explored a pattern of behavior that could be interpreted
34in terms of the business cycle. In addition, other studies
35have dealt with the dynamics of demand and of costs, while
others have explored the dynamics of the firm's inventory
policy. A third set of studies has explored the impact
37
of uncertainty on the behavior of the firm. But no one
has yet provided an integrated model - managerial or otherwise -
of the behavior of the firm over the business cycle.
The purpose of this chapter and the two that follow is
to develop such a model. In the first stage of the model's
development, which is presented in this chapter, financial
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considerations are subsumed within the model. Attention is
focused on real (as opposed to financial) factors that affect
the behavior of the firm. In chapter four the role of finance
is introduced into the model and in chapter five the role
of factors internal to the firm, such as the internal allocation
of physical capital and human capital and internal planning
and control, are brought into the model.
The major purpose of this chapter is to explain how changes
in the level of demand over the business cycle may, by alternatively
loosening and tightening the constraints on managerial discretion,
cause the observed pattern of the firm's behavior to (appear
at least to) alternate between 'profit maximization' (i.e.
the mode of behavior postulated in the traditional models)
and 'growth maximization' (i.e. the mode of behavior conjectured
in the managerial models). A model of the firm is developed
in sections B and C, first for the certainty case and then
for the uncertainty case. The behavior of the firm over the
business cycle is explored in sections D and E, first for
the simple case of two possible states of the firm's operating
I
environment and then for the more general case.
B. THE MODEL UNDER CERTAINTY
1. The Objectives of the Firm
The debate between the traditionalists and the manager-
ialists has focused on the different objectives of shareholders
(or loosely, the 'owners') and managers and the extent to
which the supposed separation of ownership from control in
large corporations has permitted professional managers to
577
i
pursue their own objectives to the detriment of the objectives
of the firm's shareholders. In contrast, the behavioralists
have argued that, in general, the firm does not pursue the
goals of one social grouping to the mutual exclusion of the
goals of the other social groupings that comprise the firm.
In this subsection it is conjectured that the firm does not
pursue exclusively the objectives of either shareholders or
managers, but rather, that it seeks to maximize the collective
utility of shareholders and managers, as interpreted by the
38
corporate board of directors. This collective utility is
embodied in a multivariate utility function, the arguments
of which reflect the sources of shareholder as well as managerial
satisfaction
.
In this thesis it is assumed that corporate managers
derive utility, or satisfaction, from three main sources.
39The first source is total revenue, which is denoted by R(t).
Total revenue is a direct source of satisfaction to managers
directly involved with sales and an indirect source of satis-
faction to all other managers because, ceteris paribus, greater
size means larger salaries, greater promotional opportunities,
40
etc. The second source is managerial emoluments, which are
41denoted by M(t). Managerial emoluments, which are defined
here in the O.E. Williamson sense to include managerial salaries
and perquisites in excess of the opportunity cost of
the managers receiving them, are a source of satisfaction
to managers directly because of the utility derived from direct
compensation and also indirectly because they contribute to
42
the status and prestige of managers. The third source is
43growth, which will be allowed for in the model developed
below. Growth is valued directly because it lends the impression
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that the firm is 'progressive' and indirectly because it creates
more opportunities for the internal promotion of lower and
44
middle level managers.
In this thesis it is also assumed that shareholders
derive utility from two main sources. The first source is
45the dividends they receive, which add to their immediate income.
Hereafter total dividends paid are denoted by D(t). The second
source is the earning power of the firm's capital assets, which
affects the dividends shareholders can expect to receive in the
future (if they continue to hold their shares) and the price per
46
share they can expect to receive when they sell their shares.
While dividends are not generally regarded as a source
of direct satisfaction to managers, nor are they necessarily
47 48
a source of disutility. Managers are held to value security.
In a publicly held company that security depends on the attitude
of shareholders, who could vote out management at the annual
meeting or sell their shares to a takeover raider if they
49
are dissatisfied with the policies of current management.
Higher dividends, to the extent that they increase shareholder
satisfaction directly or else lead to an increase in the share
50price and thereby improve shareholder satisfaction, can
indirectly benefit managers by making their position relatively
51
more secure.
Having described the sources of shareholder and managerial
satisfaction, the objective function of the model of the firm
developed in the next subsection may now be formulated. In
this thesis it is assumed that the firm has a finite planning
horizon T periods into the future, where time is measured
continuously in units of arbitrary length (e.g. periods = years).
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In the certainty model without finance, which is developed
in the next subsection, the firm is assumed to select operating
policies that maximize the discounted utility over the planning
period (t = o to t = T) plus the discounted utility of the
firm's capital stock at the planning horizon,
T
/ U (R(t), D(t), M(t))e" rt dt + U (K(T))e"rT
, (1)
o »
where K(T) denotes the firm's capital stock at the planning
horizon and where r is the collective time rate of discount,
< r < 1, which is assumed constant (at least over the planning
period). In the certainty version of the model, if capital
markets are assumed to be perfect, then r can be taken to be
the exogenously determined market rate of interest. In the
uncertainty versions, in which there may be bonds with different
rates of interest, r can be taken to be the board of directors'
(collective) subjective time rate of discount (determined
as of time t = 0). In subsection 2, which immediately follows
this subsection, the model of the firm is formulated under
the assumption that the firm seeks to maximize (1) subject
to certain constraints specified in that subsection. The
purpose of the remainder of this subsection is to explain
the interpretation of (1) and to indicate how (1) is to be
modified when uncertainty is permitted.
The utility functions U and U in (1) are interpreted
1 2
52
as collective utility functions. The meaning of such functions
53deserves comment. As proved by Arrow, there does not,
in general, exist a social choice rule - a process by which




scaling - that exhibits transitivity and the four other
55properties generally considered desirable. However, the
smaller is the number of individuals whose preferences are
being aggregated and the more closely in agreement are these
individuals' preferences regarding corporate priorities, the
more likely it is that an acceptable social choice rule could
U * A 56be found.
It should be emphasized that the models developed in
this thesis are planning models. Accordingly, the firm is
assumed to set its operating policies at time t = o for the
57time period spanning t = o to t = T. Since all decisions
are made at time t = o, it is reasonable to assume that the
functional forms U and U do not vary with t within each
1 2
J
planning problem. The functional forms are set at time t = o
when the planning operation is carried out. The functional
58forms E and U may change in a real time sense, however,
1 2
as the firm repeats the planning cycle, sets a new time t = o,
and reformulates the planning problem.
59Following Sandmo , it is assumed that within the firm
there is a relatively small group of key decision makers whose
preferences are sufficiently similar as to justify aggregating
their preferences into a collective utility function. Specifically,
it may be argued that the corporate board of directors, which
includes members of top management and which is elected by
60the shareholders, sets corporate policy. Continuing this
line of argument, it is the board of directors who, in setting
corporate policy, interpret the wishes of shareholders and
of managers at all levels and who, in setting corporate dividend
and investment policies, at least implicitly make trade offs
of the kind embodied in U and U in (1). In the remainder
1 2
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of this thesis, U and U are interpreted as corporate utility
1 2
functions that reflect the trade offs between shareholder objec-
tives and managerial objectives, as determined by the corporate
board of directors.
The interpretation of U in (1) in terms of the sources
i
of shareholder and managerial satisfaction is straightforward.
The interpretation of U is less clear, and so is discussed
2
further here. As stated above, it is assumed that managers
derive utility from the growth of their firm. Given any
initial size of the capital stock, K(0), and the terminal
size of the capital stock, K(T), the average compound rate
of growth (per period), g, of the firm is given by
g = lo«Ttf(F)] " 1 > (2)
where log™ denotes the logarithm to the base T. Since
K(0) is fixed, by assumption, and since logT is a monotonically
increasing function of K(T)/K(0), any preference ordering over
K(T) yields a preference ordering over the average growth
rate g. Hence, managers' desires for growth can be (and here-
after are assumed to be) embodied in U . In addition, the
2
terminal capital stock is also a source of satisfaction to
shareholders. If the firm's shareholders are interested in
having the firm remain a functioning enterprise beyond the
planning horizon, then they will associate a positive utility
level with a nonzero terminal capital stock. It is assumed,
then, that U embodies both managers' desires for growth
2
and shareholders' desires for post-planning horizon dividends.
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Before concluding this subsection at least some mention
should be made of the objectives of the firm under uncertainty
and as to how (1) will have to be modified when uncertainty
is permitted. As modeled in section C of this chapter, under
uncertainty R(t) and D(t) in (1) become random variables.
Therefore, the level of utility (though not the function itself)
U also becomes random. It is generally accepted that individuals,
62
and in particular, shareholders and managers, are risk averse.
If it is assumed that U is consistent with the von Neumann-
i
Morgenstern 'postulates of rational choice', then the appropriate
modification of (1) is the following:
T
/ E{ U (R(t), D(t), M(t))}e"rt dt + U (K(T))e"rT
, (3)
l 2
where E denotes mathematical expectation (taken over possible
states of the firm's environment) and the tilde over R and
D denotes a random variable. Provided U is concave in R
i
and D, the risk aversion of shareholders and managers will
64be taken into account. In section C of this chapter the model
of the firm will be formulated under the assumption that the
firm seeks to maximize (3) subject to certain constraints
specified in that section.
In concluding this subsection, it should be noted that
the treatment of the firm's objectives just described shares
something in common with the traditional, managerial, and
behavioral views of the firm. Both (1) and (3) reflect shareholder
as well as managerial sources of satisfaction. But by incorporating
both types of sources, (1) and (3) differ from the traditional
and managerial models that include either one or the other
583
but not both. The advantage of (1) and (3) is that trade
offs between shareholder and managerial sources of satisfaction
can be explored. In addition, the inclusion of objectives
of both shareholders and managers is suggestive of the behavioral
approach. Where (1) and (3) differ from the behavioral approach
is in first, the assumption of stable (over the planning period)
65functional forms U and U
,
and second, the assumption
1 2
of maximizing behavior on the part of the firm.
2. The Model
The preceding subsection described the objective
functional (1) of the certainty model to be formulated in this
subsection. To complete the certainty model it is necessary
to specify the constraint set, the decision variables, and
exogenously determined variables.
It is assumed that the firm uses two inputs, capital
and labor, the amounts of which are denoted by K(t) and L(t),
respectively, to produce a single output, the amount of which
is denoted by Q(t). The technological relationship between
the amounts of the inputs applied to production and the maximum
quantity of output obtainable is embodied in the firm's production
function
,
Q(t) = f(K(t), L(t))
,
(4)
which is assumed to have a full set of continuous second partial
etc.
derivatives. Both product and factor markets are assumed
to be perfectly competitive, so that the firm takes the price
of output, the price of labor, and the price of capital goods,
all of which are strictly positive at each time t, as given.
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These prices at time t are denoted by p(t), w(t), and q(t),
respectively, where all prices are expressed in terms of some
arbitrarily selected numeraire good.
The variable K(t) measures the firm's physical stock
of capital at time t. The variable I(t) denotes the firm's
gross investment at time t, i.e. the rate at which its physical
stock of capital is augmented before allowing for depreciation.
It is assumed that physical capital wears out at a constant
percentage rate 6, so that net investment, the net rate at
which the firm's physical stock of capital is augmented,
satisfies the identity
K(t) = I(t) - S-K(t)
, (5)
where the dot denotes differentiation with respect to time.
At each time t the firm earns sales revenue of p(t)»Q(t)
and incurs a cost of labor of w(t)*L(t). In addition, the
firm pays out a sum M(t) for managerial emoluments. These
are payments to managers in excess of their opportunity cost.
In determining the firm's net income, allowance must also
be made for taxes and for depreciation, which is a noncash
outlay that is deductible for tax purposes. It is assumed
that the firm pays an exogenously determined proportional tax
rate t, where < x < 1, and that the depreciation expense
68
is figured for tax purposes on a replacement cost basis.
A typical firm's income statement constructed under the above
assumptions is shown in table III-l. Net income, w(t), is
69
equal to
7T(t) = (1-T){p(t)-Q(t) - w(t)-L(t) - M(t) - q(t)-[ 6-K(t)] } . (6)
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It is assumed that the firm must generate sufficient net income
to meet some exogenously determined minimum required net income
level, 7T . That is, Tr(t) in (6) must satisfy
TT(t) > 7TQ , (7)
where it is assumed that tt is the same for each time t. The
o
minimum net income level tt is assumed to be determined by
financial factors that in this chapter are subsumed within
the model, such as the need to generate sufficient funds to pay some
unspecified minimum level of dividends.
It should be noted that tt serves as a modeling device
that is intended to take into account the existence of financial
factors that can influence the firm's behavior. This frequently
71
used device has the limitation that it obscures the separate
influences of individual financial factors, as well as their
interaction. While such a modeling device is, in the opinion
of this writer, adequate for building a model that is intended
to demonstrate the systematic variation in the behavior of the
firm in response to changes in its operating environment (i.e.
the business cycle), its shortcomings become apparent when
an attempt is made to model the interaction between the firm's
operating decisions and these financial factors. For this reason,
the next chapter modifies the model developed in this chapter
to permit the firm's financial decisions to be examined more
closely
.
Through its operations the firm generates cash, which
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Since depreciation is a noncash expense, total cash generated
is equal to net income plus the amount of depreciation expense,
^(t) + q(t ) •[ 6 »K(t )] . Since under complete certainty (including
certainty with regard to the timing and size of all future
transactions) the firm would have no use for cash other than
72
what was used to pay dividends or to purchase capital goods,
the following identity between sources of cash and uses of
cash must always be satisfied:
7i(t) + q(t)- [6-K(t) ] = D(t) + q(t)-I(t) . (8)
The derivation of this identity is illustrated in table III-2.
The identity (8) can be reexpressed to yield the following
expression for total dividends paid at time t:
D(t) = ir(t) - q(t)-[I(t) - 6-K(t) ] . (9)
Note that D(t) in (9) is dependent on the tax rate since
7i(t) is net of tax. Note that when M(t) = and t = (9)
simplifies to Jorgenson ' s expression for net cash flow (equation
(269) in chapter two).
Collecting (1), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (9), the model
of the firm is expressed as the following optimal control
problem:
588
maximize / u (R( t ) ,D(t ) ,M(t ) )e rtdt +U(K(T))e"rT
{L(t),I(t),M(t)} ° l
subject to Q(t) = f(K(t),L(t))
,
< t < T
K(t) = I(t) - S-K(t)
,




TT(t) = (1-T){p(t)-Q(t) - w(t)-L(t) - M(t)
- q(t)«[6-K(t)]} ^ 7T Q , < t < T
D(t) = TT(t) - q(t)-[I(t) - 6-K(t)]
,
< t < T
L(t)
,
K(t), Q(t), M(t) > , < t < T
where K(0) is the firm's initial capital stock, which is assumed
given. In words, the optimal control problem (10) states
that the objective of the firm is to select the time paths
of labor, L(t), investment, I(t), and managerial emoluments,
M(t), that maximize discounted collective utility over the
time period extending to the firm's planning horizon T, subject
to a technological constraint, a net investment constraint
(identity), a minimum profitability constraint, and a dividend
payout constraint (identity).
The important role that profits play in the model (10)
should be noted. Net income is constrained to satisfy some
exogenously determined minimum level tt Yet, beyond this
minimum, additional profits contribute to collective utility
by permitting the firm to pay additional dividends. In other
words, the relationship between profits and the sources of
managerial utility is not lexicographic - as was the case in
the managerial models discussed in section G of chapter two -
but rather, there is a smooth trade off between profits and
73the managerial objectives that is implied in the form of
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The next subsection explores the implications of the
model (10) for the behavior of the firm under certainty.
3. The Firm's Optimal Operating Policies under Certainty
The implications of the model of the firm (10) formulated
in the previous subsection can be explored with the aid of
Pontryagin's maximum principle. First, use the first and
fourth constraints in (1) to reformulate the model as the following
optimal control problem:
T
maximize /Q U [p(t ) • f (K(t ) , L(t ) ) ; (1-x) {p(t
)
• f (K( t ) , L(t )
)
{L(t),I(t),M(t)} *
- w(t)-L(t) - M(t)} + T-q(t)-[6-K(t)l - q(t)-I(t);
M(t)] e"rt dt + U (K(T))e"rT
2
subject to K(t) = I(t) - 6-K(t) , < t < T , K(0) given
(1 - T ){p(t)-f(K(t), L(t)) - w(t)-L(t) - M(t)
-q(t)-[6-K(t)]} >_ tt
o ,
< t < T
L(t), K(t), M(t) > , < t < T
The Hamiltonian for the optimal control problem (11) is
H[K, L, I, M, X, t] = U [ ] e"
rt
+ X(t)[l(t) - 6-K(t)] , (12)
where U [ ] stands for the function U in the objective
functional of problem (11) and where the argument t of the
functions K, L, I, M, and A has been omitted for notational
convenience. In (12) X denotes the costate variable. At
each time t, < t £ T, the value of the costate variable A(t)
measures the shadow price of capital in terms of the discounted
value of collective utility.
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(11)
The Hamiltonian (12) for each time t represents the
sum of the discounted collective utility of revenue earned
and dividends and managerial emoluments received at time t,
-rt
U [ ]e , and the discounted collective utility of an increase
in the capital stock at time t, \(t)[I(t) - 6*K(t)] . As in
section L of chapter two, the Hamiltonian embodies the inter-
temporal trade off that confronts the firm at each time t.
74The firm can increase revenue, dividends, and managerial
emoluments and thereby reach a higher level of current utility,
or it can accept lower revenue and pay lower dividends and
managerial emoluments in order to be able to increase further
the size of the capital stock, which will make possible higher
revenue, dividend payments, and managerial emoluments in future
time periods.
In the model of the firm (11) there are two constraints
on the firm's capital stock at each time t that require special
treatment. The nonnegativity constraint on capital at each
time t and the constraint on profits at each time t constrain
the values that may be assumed by the state variable K(t)
in the optimal control problem formulation of the model.
However, in order for the firm to remain viable, its capital
stock must be strictly positive at each time t. Therefore,
the nonnegativity constraint on K(t) will not be considered
75here explicitly, although it is noted that if it were included,
it would be treated in the same manner mathematically as the
minimum profit constraint. Allowing for the minimum profit
constraint requires that a generalized version of the maximum
principle - analogous to the extension of Lagrange multipliers
to static optimization problems containing inequality constraints
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be employed. For this purpose define the "multiplier"
y (t) and form the Lagrangian (or generalized Hamiltonian)
L[K, L, I, M, A, y , t] =
y i
H[ K, L, I, M, A, t] + U
i
(t).[(l-x){p(t)-f(K(t),L(t)) (13)
- w(t)-L(t) - M(t) - q(t).[6-K(t)]} - tt
q ] ,
where the subscript y of the Lagrangian is used to distinguish
the Lagrangian from the time path of labor, L(t).
In order that the time paths L*(t), I*(t), and M*(t)
provide an optimal solution to problem (11), it is necessary
77that they satisfy the following conditions:
(L*(t), I*(t), M*(t)} maximize H(K, L, I, M, A, t)
subject to the minimum net income constraint (14)
and the nonnegativity constraints in (11), < t < T
K(t) = I*(t) - 6-K(t), < t < T, K(0) given (15)
i. (t>--£, *.(T) = %^p e - (16)
Since (15) merely repeats the net investment constraint, it
only needs to be noted that its presence among the necessary
conditions requires that the optimal investment time path, I(t)*,
satisfy this first order differential equation with boundary
condition. The two remaining necessary conditions do require
interpretation.
The necessary condition (14) requires that the time
paths L(t), I(t), and M(t) be selected so as to balance at
each time t the immediate impact on collective utility and
the impact on future collective utility levels of a marginal
593
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change in the value of each of these policy variables.
It is noted that in order for the firm to remain viable, the
amount of labor used will be strictly positive at each time
t, <_ t <_ T. Hence, the possibility that L(t) = is not
economically interesting, and the nonnegativity constraint on
L(t) is not treated explicitly in the discussion below. However,
the possibility that M(t) = 0, which would result if the firm
were to behave like a short run profit maximizer, is economically
interesting, and hence, is considered explicitly in the discussion
below.
To begin, define the Lagrange multiplier y and modify
2
the Lagrangian (13) to take into account the nonnegativity
79
constraint, M(t)
_> 0. This gives
L t = H(K, L, I, M, A, t) + y [ ( 1-t ) {p( t ) • f (K(t ) , L(t))y > L i
- w(t)-L(t) - M(t) - q(t).[5.K(t)]} - ttq] +U2 [M(t)] ,
where a problem of the type (17) must be solved for each time
t in order to satisfy necessary condition (14) and where
it is understood that, since H is expressed in terms of a
present value, y, and y contain implicitly discount factors
1 2
-rt
of the form e in order that L , be expressed in the same
y , t
units as H.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions necessary for an optimal
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To interpret the necessary conditions (18) - (22), four cases
are considered below, depending on whether y and y are zero
1 2
or positive. To ease the exposition, it is noted that y and
i
y do not appear in (19). Hence, (19) must be satisfied in
2
each of the four cases. Condition (19) requires that, in order
for the firm to be in equilibrium, the following condition




The costate variable A(t) is interpreted as the shadow price
of physical capital, expressed in terms of discounted collective
-rt
utility. The ratio A(t)/(3U /3D)e can be interpreted as
the firm's (internal) marginal rate of substitution between
physical capital and dividends. The right-hand side of (23)
is the price of capital goods, which is also the market-determined
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(i.e. external) rate at which capital goods and dividends can
be traded off. According to (23) the firm should continue
to invest in physical capital (i.e. purchase capital goods)
up to the point at which its marginal rate of substitution
between physical capital and dividends just equals the price
of capital goods - at which point the internal and external
trade offs between physical capital and dividends will be equated.
It should be noted that (23) is analogous to equation (277)
of chapter two that arose out of the Jorgenson model, with
the difference being that values are measured in (23) in terms
of discounted collective utility, while in (277) of chapter
two they are measured in terms of the stock market value of
the firm (i.e. discounted cash flow).
The four cases are the following:
case (i): y = u =0.
1 2
In this case neither the minimum profit constraint
nor the managerial emoluments nonnegativity constraint are
necessarily binding at optimality. Conditions (18) and (20)
simplify to the following:
3U 3U
" P 4f + stt^I-tXp-tt - w) = (24)3R ^ 9L 3D v /K * 3L
3U 3U
m-T) + —L = . (25)3D v J 3M
If it is assumed that the firm can never be satiated with
respect to revenue, dividends, or managerial emoluments, then
3 U 3U 3U
~
>
> 5T7^~ > > anc* tct" > . Since p and w are both8R '3D ' """ 3M
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positive and since < t < 1
,
condition (24) can be satisfied
only if
< p-|£ < w . (26)
As was pointed out in section B of chapter two, a short run
profit maximizer would continue to hire labor up to the point
at which the marginal revenue product of the last unit employed
just equals its wage. As in the case of Baumol's sales maximizer,
the firm modeled in (11) will, according to (26), continue
to hire labor beyond this point, so that if in equilibrium
y = u = , then the wage rate will exceed the marginal revenue
1 2
product of labor. This implies that the firm modeled in (11),
like the Baumol sales maximizer of subsection 1 of section G
in chapter two, will produce more output and earn greater sales
revenue than a short run profit maximizer. Another way to
see this same result is to convert (26), which characterizes
equilibrium in terms of the market for labor, into the equivalent
expression that characterizes equilibrium in terms of the product
market
,
P « JlfdL > (2?)





,* r , exceeds price ( = marginal revenue underO I / O Li
perfect competition). Since in equilibrium the marginal returns
80
to labor will be diminishing, (27) implies that the firm
modeled in (11) will produce more output than a short run
profit maximizer.
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Both (26) and (27) continue to hold in cases (ii) - (iv)
discussed below. For this reason, the important results
(26) and (27) are stated as the following lemma.
Lemma III-l
When the firm modeled in (11) is in equilibrium,









where Q* is the equilibrium output level for the firm in (11)




Condition (25) implies that if in equilibrium u = u =
1 2
then the firm's marginal rate of substitution between dividends
and managerial emoluments must equal one minus the tax rate,
or in symbols,
3U1/M
- (1 - T)3U /3D u ; '
i
(28)
which is similar in form to O.E. Williamson's equilibrium
condition for the optimal amounts of discretionary profit
and managerial emoluments (see equation (128) of chapter two.)
The main difference between (28) and Williamson's result
is that (28) reflects a collective utility trade off, whereas
Williamson's result reflects a purely managerial trade off.
In (28) the ratio ,,* '. ~ D is interpreted as the rate at which
i
the board of directors perceives that managerial emoluments
and dividends can be traded off within the collective utility
function, i.e. it is a subjective rate of trade of f, whereas
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(1 - t) represents the objective rate at which one can be
traded off for the other within the firm's income statement
According to (28) the two rates of trade off must be equal
at each point in time for the firm to be in equilibrium,
case (ii): y = , y >0.
1 2
In this case the managerial emoluments nonnegativity
constraint is necessarily binding, whereas the minimum profit
constraint is not necessarily binding, at optimality. Condition
(18) simplifies to (24), which is interpreted in case (i).
Since y > , it follows from (22) that M = . That is,
managerial emoluments are zero. It follows that
aw
9U 9U
|5 = { a^(l-T)(-l) + ^}e-rt < . (29)
According to (29) the Hamiltonian is a constrained maximum
with respect to M. Due to its relatively high preference
for paying dividends, the firm would like to reduce managerial
emoluments (i.e. cut salaries) further, but is constrained
from doing so by the fact that, in a perfectly competitive
market for executive talent, any further cut in salaries (i.e. M < 0)
would induce managers to leave the firm. Also from (20),
8U /3M 8U /8M + y e rt
7TT73D < ' 3U /3D
2 U " O , (30)
1 1
since y > 0. The interpretation of (30) is that the marginal
2
rate of substitution between dividends and managerial emoluments
is less than (1 - t), the rate at which they can be traded off
81
within the firm's income statement. As a result of (29)
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and (30) the firm eschews paying managerial emoluments, and
instead, pays higher dividends (after paying the increase
in taxes). One possible explanation for this result is that
the board of directors has responded to shareholders' demands
for higher dividends and lower managerial salaries by raising
dividends at the expense of emoluments. Another possible
explanation is that the firm has been threatened with a takeover,
and that top management has responded to this threat to its
own security by increasing dividends and decreasing managerial
salaries by the maximum tolerable amount (in the sense that
the new salary levels will not cause a mass exodus from the
ranks of management). In either case, the implicit ranking
of objectives is such that dividends rank ahead of managerial
emoluments at the margin,
case (iii): u > . u = .
1 2
In this case the minimum profit constraint is necessarily
binding, whereas the managerial emoluments nonnegativity constraint
is not necessarily binding, at optimality. Condition (18)







><p-!i - W>K + 3d1 e
"rt
] " ° • <
31 >
Since all terms in (31) must be positive, with the possible
8 f
exception of (P'^rr - w), it follows that, in order for (31)
to be satisfied, condition (26), and by implication, condition
(27), must hold. As in cases (i) and (ii), the firm produces
more output and earns greater sales revenue than a short run
profit maximizer would. The difference between cases (i)
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(or (ii)) and (iii) is that the minimum profit constraint is
S fbinding in the latter. From (18), u > and p-ttt - w <
l a L
imply that
3 TJ 3 U
If
= { ^ p-fr + 5b1-< 1-t )<p-|i - w» e
~rt
> ° • < 32 >
According to (32) the Hamiltonian is a constrained maximum
with respect to L. The firm could reach a higher level of discounted
utility if it could increase its use of labor (and thereby
increase its sales revenue). But, as in the Baumol sales
82
maximization model, this would necessitate lower profits
3 f(since P'^y - w < and since, under diminishing returns,
3 f|-=- is falling), which would violate the minimum profit constraint.
Li
The implication of (32) is that the profit constraint restricts
83
the firm's choice of output level. As demonstrated later
in this section, whether or not the minimum profit constraint
is binding has other important policy implications as well.
Turning next to condition (20), since u > and
< t < 1, it follows from (20) that
8U 3U|«= { -(l-T)lBl. + ^}e"rt > . (33)
According to (33) the Hamiltonian is a constrained maximum
with respect to M, in this case because attempts to pay higher
managerial emoluments would cause the minimum profit constraint
to be violated. Thus, in this case there exists an implicit
ranking of objectives at the margin according to which profits
(and thereby dividends) rank ahead of both managerial
emoluments and total revenue.
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case (iv): u > , y >0.
1 2
In this case both the minimum profit constraint and
the managerial emoluments nonnegativity constraint are necessarily
binding at optimality. Condition (18) can be reexpressed as
g f(31), which leads to (32). As in case (iii), < P'-^r < w
and also the Hamiltonian is a constrained maximum with respect
to L (the interpretation of which was given under case (iii)).
Condition (20), however, is more difficult to interpret than
in cases (i) - (iii) since both u > and y > . Since
1 2
< t < 1 , it follows from (20) that




-~tj is given in (29) and (33) and where the sign of
3H
-rr? in (34) depends on the relative values of the ratio ofdm
implicit prices, u /u , which is determined internally, and
2 1
one minus the tax rate, 1 - t , which is determined externally.
r) H
Therefore, the sign of -r-jj is determined by the relationship
between the implicit internal trade off between net income
u
and managerial emoluments, as measured at the margin by —-
,
i
and the externally imposed trade off between these variables,
y air
as measured by 1 - x . If — < (1 - x) in (34), then
-|g >
i
as in case (iii), and the firm could increase the discounted
value of collective utility by increasing emoluments, though
at the cost of violating the minimum profit constraint. If
y
— > (1 - t) in (34), then
-^r < as in case (ii), and the
y ' 9M
l
firm could increase the discounted value of collective utility
if it were able to pay negative managerial emoluments (i.e. lower
managerial salaries). Since both constraints are binding,
602
the firm is unable to alter M, regardless of the sign of H
.
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Note that, as in cases (ii) and (iii), at optimality there exists
an implicit ranking of objectives at the margin according
to which dividends rank ahead of managerial emoluments, and
further, as in case (iii), there exists an implicit ranking
of objectives at the margin according to which dividends rank
ahead of revenue.
In the above four cases reference was made to implicit
rankings of objectives at the margin when the firm is in
equilibrium. These results are summarized and proved as the
following theorem:
Theorem III-l
If the individual firm modeled in (11) is in multiperiod
equilibrium, then at each time t, <_ t <_ T , at which the
inequality
(p-yr - W)
-^ < 1 (35)
P
*8L
holds the firm will prefer:
(a) a marginal increase in dividends (net income) to a marginal
increase in managerial emoluments;
(b) a marginal increase in dividends (net income) to a marginal
increase in total sales revenue;
(c) a marginal increase in managerial emoluments to a marginal
increase in total sales revenue;
where relative preferences are determined ordinally according
to the relative marginal utilities of total sales revenue,
dividends, and managerial emoluments.
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Remark 1









The ratio on the left-hand side of (35) and (36) is interpreted
as follows. The denominator is interpreted as the marginal
revenue product of labor. The difference between the marginal
revenue product and the wage (i.e. the marginal cost of labor)
is interpreted as labor's marginal contribution to pretax income
The ratio on the left-hand side of (35) and (36) is interpreted
as the negative of the ratio of labor's marginal contribution
to pretax income to labor's marginal revenue product. Accordingly,
inequality (35) can be interpreted as requiring that, when
the firm is in equilibrium, the marginal decrement to pretax
income resulting from the application of an additional unit
of labor not exceed in absolute value the marginal revenue
product of labor.
Remark 2
In the unconstrained case, the relative preferences
are reflected in the pure marginal utilities, -^-^
, ^± ,
and -w-1 . However, when the minimum profit constraint is
binding, additional net income that is used to pay dividends
also causes the constraint to become nonbinding. Hence, when
this constraint is binding a marginal increase in net income





and an indirect impact in terms of rendering the constraint
nonbinding. Since this latter effect in the current period
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rt 85
is measured by y e , when the minimum profit constraint
1
9 U
is binding the adjusted marginal utility
-j^- + y e must
be used. Similarly, when the nonnegativity constraint on
managerial emoluments is binding, the appropriate measure
3U
of marginal utility is the adjusted one, Trrp + y er
Proof of Theorem III-l
The proof proceeds by reconsidering the four cases.
3 U 3 U 3 U
case (i ) : From (25), -jrrp = (1-t) j^~ < -^^- , so that (a)
3U
- (p-|x ~ w) 3U 9Uis satisfied. From (24), ^L = ^ (1-t) j^- < ^L ,
P
*3L
so that (b) is satisfied. Using (25) to substitute for
3Uj 3U - (p.|| - w) 3U 3U
TD-C 1" 1 ) in < 24 > yields 3R
1 =
37 3M^ < 3M^ '
P
*3L
3U 3U 3U g6
so that (c) is satisfied. Hence, ^^- < vrr- < j^- .
3U 3U 3U




< (1-t) ^- < -^- ,
so that (a) is satisfied. Since (18) simplifies to (24),
3 U 3U
r- < ^pT- follows as in case (i), and (b) is satisfied3R 3D 9U
Using (30) to substitute for -^-(1-t) in (24) yields
3 D - (p-|f - w) 3U 3U




(c) is satisfied. Hence, -ttj^- <
-^p + y e <
~^D~ '
3U _ ( P .|l - W ) _ au
p-
3L " w '
_, r i A .. rt
case (iii): From (31), ^- = ^-jj (1-t) [ j^y- + ye ]
3L
3U





L = (1 "T)C 1^ + >\ e ] < Id- + u ! e • so that < a >
3D
is satisfied. Using (20) to substitute for (1-t) [-5^- + u ert ]




(c) is satisfied. Hence, -^—- < -.- 1 <
-ttft" + u e
r
dR dM 3D 1
case (iv)
:
As in case (iii), (31) holds so that (b) is satisfied.
From (20), ^ - u^ = (1-x) [^ + y^] < ^ + ^eTt ,
3U t
so that (a) is satisfied. Substituting for (1-t) [ ~ * + y e ]
oL) 1




Hence, -^ < -^ + ^e* < -^ + ^e . Q.E.D.
In view of the fact that 3U is ordinal in nature,
3U 3U 1 3U
the marginal utilities -* , -^rp , and -~-j=p could not be
observed directly. However, marginal rates of substitution,
such as the marginal rate of substitution between dividends
3U /3D
and managerial emoluments, _ TT 1 , „„ , which measure the rate
i du / am
at which measurable quantities are traded off, are, in theory
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at least, observable. Hence, theorem III-l could be restated
equivalently in terms of observable rates of trade off:
(a) the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and
total sales revenue exceeds the marginal rate of substitution
between managerial emoluments and total sales revenue
3U /3D + y e rt 3U /3M + y ert
v 3U /3R 3U /3R } '
1 1
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(b) the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and
managerial emoluments exceeds the marginal rate of substitution
between total sales revenue and managerial emoluments
3U /3D + y ert 9U / 9R
(i.e. —l l r > l r ).
3U /3M + y ert 3U /3M + y ert
1 2 1 2
(c) the marginal rate of substitution between managerial
emoluments and dividends exceeds the marginal rate of
substitution between total sales revenue and dividends
3U /3M + y ert 3U / 9R
(i.e. 1 2- T > > r ).
3U /3D + y ert 3U / 9 D + y e
rt11 11
Similarly, the four corollaries and theorem III-2 stated below
can also be restated equivalently in terms of marginal rates
of substitution.
By following the proof of theorem III-l, and reversing
the appropriate inequalities, the following corollaries are
easily proved:
Corollary III-l-l
If the individual firm modeled in (11) is in multiperiod





- <P'3L - W)
, ±
1 - t 3fp, 3L
holds the firm will exhibit marginal preferences (a) and (b)




If the individual firm modeled in (11) is in multiperiod
equilibrium, then at each time t, £ t < T , at which the
inequality
Jl~
W1 > 1 (37)
P
*9L
holds the firm will exhibit marginal preference (a) stated
in theorem III-l, but marginal preferences (b) and (c) will
be reversed.
Corollary III-1-3
If the inequality in (35) is replaced by an equality, then
at each time t, <_ t £ T , at which the equality holds the
firm will exhibit marginal preferences (a) and (b) stated in
theorem III-l, but (c) will become an indifference relation
(i.e. the firm will be indifferent between a marginal increase




If the inequality in (37) is replaced by an equality, then
at each time t, £ t _< T , at which the equality holds the
firm will exhibit marginal preference (a) in theorem III-l,
but (b) will become an indifference relation and (c) will be
reversed.
Theorem III-l and its four corollaries can be summarized
in the following theorem, which establishes the firm's equilibrium
hierarchy of objectives at each time t, < t £ T .
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Theorem I I 1-2
When the individual firm modeled in (11) is in multiperiod
equilibrium, the firm will always prefer a marginal increase
in dividends (net income) to a marginal increase in managerial
emoluments. Denote by x ^ y the preference relation 'y is
preferred to x' and by x^y the indifference relation, and
let R, D, and M denote a marginal increase in total sales
revenue, dividends, and managerial emoluments, respectively.
Then at each time t the firm in equilibrium will exhibit one
of the following five hierarchies of objectives at the margin,
depending on the relative value of labor's marginal decrement
to pretax income (- (P*"gT - w)):
(i) R 4 M 4 D , if - (p. H;
- w) <
p. H;
(ii) R~M -< D , if - (p. || - w) = p-||
(iii) M ^ R < D , if p.ff < - (p4| - w) < (r-L-.)p.f!
(iv) M <( R~D , if - (p. || - w) = (r4-T )p.||
( V ) m i d -t r , if (3—rr)p-|r < - (p-ff - w >
Proof
Hierarchy (i) is a restatement of theorem III-l.
Similarly, hierarchies (ii) - (v) are restatements of corollary
III-1-3, corollary III-l-l, corollary III-1-4, and corollary
III-1-2, respectively. This proves the second part of the
theorem. The first part follows since M -A D in each of the
five cases. Q.E.D
Both parts of theorem III-2 reflect the important role
played by corporate taxes in the model (11). In particular,
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managerial emoluments are a tax deductible expense, whereas
dividends are paid out of net income. Thus, a dollar decrease
in the amount of managerial emoluments, which increases pretax
income by one dollar, permits an increase of only (1 - t)
dollars in dividends, with the remaining t dollars being paid
in taxes. Thus, the existence of corporate taxes modifies
the rate at which dividends and managerial emoluments can be
traded off within the firm's income statement. This modification
takes the form of a bias in favor of (tax deductible) managerial
emoluments. Therefore, when the firm is in equilibrium, a
marginal increase in dividends will be preferred to a marginal
increase in managerial emoluments, though the existence of a
positive corporate tax rate will inhibit the firm from paying
higher dividends in line with this relative preference.
To interpret the second part of theorem III-2, first
S f
note that P^rr can be interpreted as labor's marginal revenue
product; that (P»^y - w) can be interpreted as labor's marginal
decrement to pretax income; and that (1 - T )(P*"5T" ~ w )
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can be interpreted as labor's marginal decrement to net income.
In (i) - (iii) in theorem III-2 the direction of the preference
relation between R and M is determined by the relationship
8 fbetween labor's marginal revenue product, P'tt , which determines
how increasing the labor input will affect total sales revenue,
and the absolute value of labor's marginal decrement to pretax
8 fincome, - (p«-^t~ _ w ) > which determines how increasing the
labor input will force managerial emoluments to decrease in
order to keep dividends constant. With a nonzero wage rate,
the rate of trade off between total sales revenue and managerial
610
emoluments within the firm's income statement may be greater
than, less than, or equal to one, which gives rise to the three
possible preference relations between R and M stated in theorem
III-2. So, for example, if the behavior of the marginal revenue
8f r>"fproduct of labor is such that - (p*-^- - w) < p.-£=- holds in
dl_i oLi
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equilibrium, then an increase in the labor input would lead
to an increase in total sales revenue that exceeds in absolute
value the corresponding decrement to managerial emoluments.
As a result, —^ > ^-^ (in the unconstrained case at least),
but the firm cannot decrease revenue and increase managerial
emoluments because of the asymmetrical effect these changes
would have on the firm's income statement.
In (iii) - (v) in theorem III-2 the direction of the
preference relation between R and D is determined by the relation-
ship between the absolute value of labor's marginal decrement
a fto net income, - (1 - t KP'fy" ~ w )> which determines how increasing
the labor input will affect net income and dividends, and
labor's marginal revenue product, P'yr • With a positive
wage rate and a positive tax rate, total sales revenue and
dividends cannot be traded off one-for-one within the firm's
income statement. The actual rate of trade off may be greater
than, less than, or equal to one, which gives rise to the
three possible preference relations between R and D stated
in theorem I I 1-2.
The foregoing results were all based on an analysis
of the implications of the necessary condition (14) for the
equilibrium time paths for labor, investment, and managerial
emoluments. The remainder of this subsection explores the
implications of necessary condition (16) for the optimal time
path of the firm's capital stock.
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Necessary condition (16) consists of a first order
differential equation with boundary condition. The latter
requires that when capital grows along its optimal time path
the value of the costate variable at the planning horizon
must equal the discounted (to the present) marginal collective
utility of the terminal capital stock, K(T). As long as
9 U (K(T))
—
r, l-frns > , the firm places a positive value on having
nonzero terminal capital stock, and in equilibrium, K(T) > .
Note, however, that if U (K(T)) = , then in equilibrium
2
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A*(T) > and A*(T)-K(T) = . Thus, it is possible that
along its equilibrium time path the capital stock would approach
zero as t -* T . That is, if terminal capital stock were not
a direct source of utility, the firm might find it to its
advantage to exhaust its capital stock by time T. By assuming
that managers value growth and that stockholders value an
ongoing enterprise, this possibility has been ruled out.
To characterize the solution to the first order differential
8L
equation in (16), first evaluate - t^- , where L is given by
a is. ]A
(13). This yields
8L 9U .- 8U ,,- .
X = _ H. = _ \( L. D . -2JL + L.[(i_ T ). D .£i + t.q.61 )e9K u 9R p 8K 9D L ^ x; p 8K l q J ;
(38)
- X6 + u • (i_ T ){p.M _ q-6}] .
To simplify the exposition, the case in which the minimum
profit constraint is not binding (i.e.u = 0) is considered
i
first. Next, solve (19) for A(t) and differentiate with
612






L [-r.q.e + q-e ] . (39)
Using (19) to substitute for A and (39) to substitute for
A in (38) yields, after simplifying by multiplying through
by e
3U 3U 9U(J o u o u
_L C _r . q + q] = _ [( __L.p.|| + i [(1 .T)p .3|
dV
+ x-q-6 ])-6-q . ^J- ] .
Rearranging terms yields
8f df 8U / 8R
q [r + (1-T )6] - q = P-^(I-t) + p-^( JJJ^J^) (40)
Note that when t = the expression on the left-hand side of
(40) becomes Jorgenson's expression for the firm's cost of
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capital. Note also that since depreciation is a tax deductible
expense, (l-x)6q represents the cost of depreciation figured net
of tax. Hence, the left-hand side of (40), which below is
denoted by i, represents the firm's cost of capital when there
are taxes and when depreciation is figured on a replacement
cost basis. Note further that p'g-^(l-T) on the right-hand
side of (40) represents the marginal revenue product of
capital, once again figured net of tax. Hence, the traditional
(i.e. long run profit maximizing or value maximizing) firm
would expand its capital stock up to the point at which,
i = p-ffa - o (4i)
«1 *}
i.e. up to the point at which the marginal revenue product
of capital (net of tax) just equals its marginal cost (net
of tax). But since p, 9U /9R , and 9U /9D are positive by
1 i
assumption, and since i > (which must hold in general
equilibrium, unless capital is a free good) implies, by
(40), that ~ > , it follows from (40) that
< P-||(1 - x) < i . (42)
According to (42) the firm modeled in (11) will tend to employ
'too much' capital at each point in time in the sense that
it will employ more capital than a short run profit maximizing
firm would. Just how much more capital it would employ than




3U 3U aR au an 9U
in (40) at time t. Note that -5—L = -^- %* + _L IE + _i |" .v/
9tt 9R 9tt 3D9tt 9M9tt
If in equilibrium tt > tt
,
then tt— = 7^— = , and since
o ' 3tt 9tt
9D 3U. 3U.
(9) gives t— = 1 , it follows that ,, ' = ^—- when y = .to 9tt ' 9D 9tt 1
3U, /3R
The ratio r, TT = .-_. in (43) can be interpreted as the collectivedU / aU
1
marginal rate of substitution between total sales revenue and
net income, and (43) can be interpreted as the net income equivalen"
(in terms of collective utility) of a marginal change in sales
revenue. Hence, the right-hand side of (40) can be interpreted
as the adjusted marginal revenue product of capital, where
the adjustment reflects the direct contribution of a change
in total sales revenue to collective utility. According to
(40) the firm modeled in (11) will expand its capital stock
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at each time t to the point at which the adjusted marginal




Together (26) and (42) imply that a firm of the type
modeled in (11) would tend to employ too much (in comparison
to a short run profit maximizer) of both inputs. Moreover,
it is easily seen from (42) that if the Baumol-type sales maximizer
were placed in a multiperiod setting it too would tend to
employ too much capital in the sense described above. Note
that the marginal revenue product of capital could equal
the marginal cost of capital for a firm of either the Baumol
sales maximization type or the type modeled in (11) only
if the firm were to become satiated with respect to total
3U




some level of sales.
Putting together (24) and (40) enables the firm's
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which agrees with Jorgenson's characterization of the traditional
98firm's expansion path when t = . Moreover, it follows
3 f
from (41) and the necessary condition P'j^, = w for the traditional
firm's optimal employment of labor that (44) also characterizes
the traditional firm's expansion path when there are proportional
profit taxes. Hence, the firm modeled in (11) has the same
expansion path as a traditional firm when its minimum profit
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constraint is not binding. Even though the firm modeled in (11)
exhibits a preference for revenue and managerial emoluments,
each at the expense of profits, it still selects the most profit-
able combination of input levels with which to produce each
level of output, provided the profit constraint is not binding.
For each time t at which the minimum profit constraint
is binding, the firm's expansion path will deviate from that
of the traditional firm, unless the condition stated in the
next theorem is satisfied.
Theorem III-3
For each time t, £ t £ T , at which the minimum profit constraint
is not binding when the firm modeled in (11) is in equilibrium,
the firm's expansion path will coincide with the expansion
path of the traditional firm. For each time t, <_ t <_ T
,
at which the profit constraint is binding, the expansion path
of the firm modeled in (11) will coincide with the expansion
path of the traditional firm only if the rate of discount equals
the percentage rate of increase of capital goods prices.
Proof
The first statement in the theorem was proved in developing
(44). To prove the second part of the theorem it is necessary
to show that tt^ = * — when r = q 'q , where r is the rate8K 1 - x w ^
of discount and q 'q is the percentage rate of increase of capital
goods prices.
It follows from (18) that
9f (l-x)w( 3U /9D + y e
rt
)




Combining (38) and (39) yields
9f i( 3U /3D) + (1-T)q6y e
rt
TjF = zrr . (46)
(l-T)p(8U /3D + y ert ) + p(3U /3R)







3K 3f/3L (1_T)W(3U /3D + y ert )
-
.
(3U /3D) + (l- T )(q6/i) y ert
= t=- '-' [ l l 1 (47)W (3U /3D) + y erX
i l
which equals -z only if
^ 1-T w J
(1 - x)(q6/i) = 1 . (48)
But (48) is equivalent to (1 - x)q6 = i = rq + (1 - x)q6 - q ,
so that (48) is equivalent to rq = q , or r = q'q , which
was to be proved. Q.E.D
Theorem III-3 may seem counterintuitive since along
the traditional firm's expansion path long run total cost
is minimized for each level of output. If the profit constraint
were binding, then surely the firm could reduce costs, and
thereby increase profits, by altering its input mix until
it attained the mix that lay on the traditional firm's expansion
path. However, as theorem III-3 states, this is not the case
unless r = q 'q . The apparent contradiction lies in the crucial
distinction made in section C of chapter one between profit
in the economic sense - associated with which is the notion
of economic cost that underlies the expansion path - and profit
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in the accounting sense of net income - which underlies the
minimum (accounting) profit constraint in (11). Theorem III-3
implies that when the constraint on accounting profit is not
binding, it is optimal for the firm to select the same input
mixes as a maximizer of economic profit. However, when the
constraint on accounting profit is binding, the firm's interest
shifts from the overall cost of capital to the cost of depreciation,
(1 -x)q6 , the only component of the cost of capital that has
an immediate impact on net income, and this will cause the
firm's input mix to differ from that of a profit (in the economic
sense) maximizer - unless r = 'q
,
in which case i = (1 -t )q6
99 10(
and the economic and accounting costs of capital are the same. '
This subsection has described the formulation of the
basic model under certainty and has examined its properties.
The next subsection presents several comparative dynamics results,
which indicate the sensitivity of the optimal trajectories of
the firm's operating policy variables and its capital stock
to changes in each of several parameters. In the following
section the basic model is extended to allow for uncertainty.
4. Comparative Dynamics and Comparative Statics Results
In the development of the model under certainty in
the previous subsection, the following eight parameters were
treated as exogenously determined constants: the tax rate (t )
;
the minimum net income level (it ); the discount rate (r);
the rate of depreciation (6); and the price of capital goods (q),
the rate of change of capital goods prices (q), the wage rate (w)
and the price of output (p) at each time t. Note that, by
implication, the firm's cost of capital, i=q[r+(l- t)6 ] - q
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was also treated as exogenously determined. The purpose of
this subsection is to determine how changes in these parameters
would affect the firm's behavior at each point in time (i.e.
comparative statics) and the time paths of labor, investment,
managerial emoluments, and the capital stock (i.e. comparative
dynamics). Rather than let i vary directly, it will prove
more instructive to vary x, r, 6, q, and q separately.
a. The Tax Rate
Two different effects of a change in the tax
rate are considered here. The first is its effect on the
equilibrium time paths of dividends, total revenue and managerial
emoluments. The second is its effect on the firm's optimal
input mix at each point in time, and by implication, the time
paths of labor and capital.
From (18),
8U
rt af 8U af
- < air + V X 1 " T)( P'!l " w) = ii^e-lr • (49 >
If the minimum profit constraint is not binding, then y = .
1
If the tax rate increases, the firm finds itself out of equilibrium
and (49) becomes
3U ~ f 9U ~ f
^d- T ) (p.fi -») < V p -Ii • (50)
To restore equilibrium the firm will expand output and hence
total revenue and its use of labor, since this will, under
the assumptions of diminishing returns and diminishing marginal
3 U
utility, cause -=-l and |£ to fall. But by (26), p.|f - w < ,3K d-Li o*->
3 f
so that expanding output causes - (P'-jjl ~ w ) to increase
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and net income to fall. If dividends are cut, then under the
9U
assumption of diminishing marginal utility, ,.* increases.
o JJ
This continues - with total revenue rising relative to total
dividends - until equilibrium, i.e. equality in (50), is restored.
Similarly, it can be shown using (20) that when the profit
constraint is not binding, a rise in the tax rate will tend
to cause managerial emoluments to rise relative to dividends.
Moreover, these effects are reversed when the tax rate decreases.
Putting (18) and (20) together, a change in the tax rate will
not affect the relative mix of revenue and managerial emoluments.
When the profit constraint is binding, however,
the effect of a tax change in either direction may be reversed.
If the profit constraint is binding, then y > in (49).
But if the tax rate is increased, then the minimum profit constrain -
is no longer satisfied, and u
,
which measures the value of
i
a relaxation in the minimum profit constraint, will tend to
dy
increase. If —r^ is sufficiently large, thendi J
- < S- + vrt ><i - T ><P'!r - w > > t^-p-Ie • (51)
so that total revenue will fall (rather than rise) relative
to dividends. A similar result holds for managerial emoluments.
The practical explanation for the foregoing results
is that, when the profit constraint is not binding, an increase
in the tax rate makes it relatively more expensive for the firm
to pay dividends, since =—-— dollars is paid in taxes for
each dollar paid as dividends. It thus becomes relatively
cheaper in terms of the impact of alternative operating policies
on collective utility to increase revenue and managerial emoluments
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at the expense of dividends (although clearly the redistribution
of utility does involve a loss of collective welfare), particularly
if managers are large shareholders. However, when the profit
constraint is binding, an increase in the tax rate causes
the minimum profit constraint to become violated. To increase
net income the firm will have to decrease either revenue or
managerial emoluments (or both). Thus, while it is cheaper
in terms of pure tax considerations to increase revenue and
managerial emoluments, it is not cheaper when one adds in
the cost implicit in violating the minimum profit constraint.
A second effect that a change in the tax rate
may have on the firm is to cause a change in the firm's equilibrium
capital-labor input mix. First, if the minimum profit constraint
is not binding, then from (44) and the definition of i,
di^K ; dx L K l - t ; w J w (1 - T)2 ' K °* }
Then from (52),
|p(|i){|}0 depending on r{|} | . (53)
The implications of (53) are illustrated in figure III-l.
A change in the tax rate affects both i and (1 - x )w in (44).
When the rate of discount exceeds the percentage rate of increase
in the price of capital goods, a rise in the tax rate causes
(1 - x)w , the wage rate net of tax, to fall more than i,
the cost of capital net of tax. The firm reacts by substituting
the relatively cheaper for the relatively more expensive input,
i.e. labor for capital, and the firm's expansion path shifts
upward in figure III-l. The reverse occurs when r < q/ q .
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When r = q'q the effects on the wage rate and the cost of
capital, both net of tax, are offsetting, and the expansion
path does not shift. Since (44) also characterizes the expansion
path of the traditional firm, a change in the tax rate would
have the same impact on the traditional firm's expansion path.
shift upward when r > —
q
1 - T W
shift downward when r < q
Figure III-l Shift of the Firm's Expansion
Path Due to a Change in the
Tax Rate (t )
When the minimum profit constraint is binding,




rt , H _ x ,rt igj^Cqr-q) [ -^- + ye - (l-x)e
^T rt ,
w(l-x) 2 ( j^ + y e V
di (54)
Since the denominator in (54) is always positive, the sign
of -3—(-rr?) depends on the sign of the numerator. If the termdi 9K
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;in brackets in the numerator of (54) is positive, then 5— (irfe)
has the same sign as qr - q , which is identical to the unconstrained
case summarized in (53). But note that when -«—L is sufficiently
large, the effects are reversed. A rise in the tax rate would,
in this case, cause the firm to use relatively less labor and
relatively more capital (i.e. the shifts illustrated in figure
III-l are reversed, with the expansion path shifting downward
q/ dy
when r > 'q and x is increased). When -3
—
L is small, the
expansion path shifts in the same direction as in the unconstrained
case, though by a smaller amount. In this sense, the firm
tends to use relatively too much capital due to the effects
of the constraint on net income.
The effects of a change in the tax rate, then,
102depend on whether the profit constraint is binding. When
the constraint is not binding, a rise in the tax rate tends
to cause revenue and managerial emoluments to rise relative
to dividends and tends to cause labor to be substituted for
capital when r > ^'q or capital to be substituted for labor
when r < ^'q . When the profit constraint is binding, these
effects are less pronounced, and may in some cases be reversed.
b. The Minimum Net Income Level
By inspection of (11) it is clear that a rise
in 7rn has no impact on the firm's operating policies unless
the minimum profit constraint is binding or is caused to
become binding. If the constraint is binding, then u > 0,
and intuitively one would expect the effect of an increase
in 7T to be the same as the effect of an increase in t when
o
the constraint is binding and yi is large. From (18) and
(20) it follows that the firm will tend to reduce total revenue
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and managerial emoluments in order to raise net income and
restore equilibrium. In addition, from (47),
3U dy
e— [ (l-x)as i]_^_ rt r ,- ,qs
, ~ T 1 3D dir
<&> = <i^>£ —air : < 55 >d-rr v 3K y v l-x'w 9U
o , i rt N 2




From (55), the sign of 7njf-("gj?) is the same as the sign of the
o
term in brackets. But from the definition of i,
(1 - t)5-{^}1 depending on r{^-}^ . (56)
From (56), a rise in the minimum acceptable level of net income
will cause the firm's expansion path to shift upward (downward)
when the rate of discount is less than (greater than) the
percentage rate of increase of the price of capital goods.
Comparing (56) with (53) it can be seen that an
increase in tt has the opposite effect on the input mix from
the pure effect (profit constraint not binding) of an increase
in the tax rate. This enables a clearer explanation to be
provided for the effect of an increase in the tax rate when
the profit constraint is binding. In that case, the effect
of a tax increase is the composite of two effects. The first
is a pure price-related effect, which causes revenue and
managerial emoluments to be substituted for dividends and labor
to be substituted for capital (when r > q). The second
is a constraint-related effect , which is due to the fact that
an increase in t when the constraint is binding is tantamount
to an increase in tt and which operates in the opposite direction
to the pure price-related effect. Depending on the relative
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strengths of the two effects, total revenue and managerial
emoluments could actually decrease relative to dividends and
capital could actually be substituted for labor (when r > q 'q).
The effect of an increase in the minimum net income
level, then, is to cause total revenue and managerial emoluments
to decrease relative to dividends and capital to be substituted
)or w
when r < q/ <
for labo hen r > q/ q and labor to be substituted for capital
c. The Discount Rate
A change in the discount rate has two effects that
reinforce one another. An increase in the discount rate raises
the firm's cost of capital, i, and also causes future utility
levels to be discounted more heavily. Each of these effects
induces the firm to pay higher dividends and managerial emoluments
and to earn higher revenue in the present at the expense of
investment (i.e. increments to the firm's capital stock that
pay returns in future periods).
From (47)
SU 8U . "
L [ L + ,. e (l-r(r- q/ o)) 1
tjf + vS )2
d 3 L
If y =0, then clearly -5— (-^) > , and the expansion path
1 ar 3 -ft-
shifts upward in figure III-l as the firm substitutes labor
d 3 L
for the now relatively more expensive capital. But ^t(t^) > °
even when y > . To see this, note that q 'q >-l since prices
1
—
can never fall by more than 100 percent. Since < r < 1
it follows that 1 - r(r - q ' q) > - 1 and that the term in
brackets in (57) is negative only if
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r > q/ q and 3 U /3d < H ert . (58)
Since (58) holds only under exceptional circumstances - since
it implies by (47) that the firm's expansion path is negatively
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sloped - it follows that the term in brackets in (57) is
normally positive, and hence that -*— (-jr?) > . Thus, except
104under exceptional circumstances, the expansion path shifts
upward due to an increase in r, whether or not the profit
constraint is binding.
In addition, from (23),
, 3U
dr (t)
= W" q( t )*(" r ) e - -r-X(t) < . (59)
Thus, an increase in the discount rate reduces the shadow price
of capital, i.e. the value of an additional unit of capital
in terms of collective utility. This causes the time path
of the firm's capital stock to shift downward, as illustrated
in figure III-2. A decrease in the discount rate would, of
course, have the opposite effect. It may be observed that,
ceteris paribus, the alternative time paths tend to diverge
when the capital stock is increasing and tend to converge
when it is decreasing.
A change in the discount rate, then, affects
the time path of the firm's capital stock. If the discount
rate increases, the firm tends to substitute labor for capital












Figure III-2 Effect of a Change in the Discount Rate
on the Time Path of the Capital Stock
d. The Rate of Depreciation, the Price of Capital
Goods, and the Rate of Change of the Price of
Capital Goods
An increase in the rate of depreciation (6) or
in the price of capital goods (q) causes the firm's cost of
capital at any point in time to increase. An increase in
the rate of increase of capital goods prices has the opposite
effect. By differentiating (47) individually with respect
to 6, q, and q it is easily shown that an increase in the
rate of depreciation, an increase in the price of capital
goods, and a decrease in the rate of increase of the price
of capital goods will, by increasing the cost of capital,
cause the firm to substitute labor for capital. Opposite
changes in these three factors cause capital to be substituted
for labor. Moreover, changes in these factors affect the
firm modeled in (11) in the same manner as they affect the
traditional firm.
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e. The Wage Rate and the Price of Output
A change in the wage rate, i.e. the price of labor,
has two effects. From (18), an increase in the wage rate
will cause labor usage and output to fall, and this effect
will be more pronounced when the minimum profit constraint
is binding. In addition, from (47), an increase in the wage
rate will cause the firm's expansion path to shift downward
(see figure III-l) as the firm substitutes capital for the
now relatively more expensive labor. Both effects are also
observed in the case of the traditional firm.
A change in the price of output also has two effects.
An increase in price has an immediate impact on total revenue,
causing it to increase. From (18) and (20), the firm will
also tend to increase dividends and managerial emoluments.
When the profit constraint is not binding, there is no impact
on the firm's expansion path. If, however, the profit constraint
had been binding before the price increase, then, it can be
shown by differentiating (47) that when r f ^'q the firm will
substitute labor for capital and shift back onto the traditional
firm's expansion path. If the profit constraint is not binding
in the new equilibrium for the firm, then its capital-labor
ratio will satisfy the equation of the traditional firm's
expansion path.
Thus, a change in the wage rate affects the firm
modeled in (11) in the same manner as such a change would
affect the traditional firm, but this is not true of the effect
of a price change unless the profit constraint was not binding
prior to the price increase.
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5. Derivation of a Hicks-Slutsky-Type Equation
In the previous subsection it was argued that the
effect of a change in the tax rate x on the behavior of the
firm depends on whether or not the net income constraint is
binding. When the constraint is not binding there is a substitution
effect. A rise in the tax rate leads to an increase in revenue
and managerial emoluments relative to dividends. When the
profit constraint is binding, this effect may be reversed.
The purpose of this subsection is to explain the overall effect
of a tax change as the resolution of two effects, one a
'substitution effect' and the other an 'income effect',
which are analogous to the substitution and income effects of
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a price change in consumer theory. This result is proved
as the following theorem.
Theorem I I 1-4
If the utility function U and the production function f are
i
both strictly concave, then the effect of a change in the
tax rate t on the equilibrium level of total sales revenue
when the profit constraint is binding can be expressed as the
resolution of two effects, one of which is positive (i.e.
a 'substitution effect') and the other of which is negative
(i.e. an 'income effect'). Moreover, when both total sales
revenue and managerial emoluments are permitted to vary, the
effect of a change in t on total sales revenue is the resolution
of three effects, the first two being the (pure) substitution
and income effects already indicated, plus a cross substitution




The method of proof is to derive a Hicks-Slutsky-
type equation for 'a T , the instantaneous rate of change
of the labor input with respect to the tax rate. This is
accomplished for arbitrary time t with the capital stock K
held fixed. The equation for 9 ^x will then imply the desired
expression for ' 3x .
The Hicks-Slutsky-type equation is derived for the
optimization problem:
maximize H(K, L, I, M, A, t)
{L, I, M}
subject to 7r(t) = (l-T){p«f(K, L) - wL - M
- q.[ 6-K]- tt
o
which is necessary condition (14) for an optimal solution
to (11) under the assumptions that the profit constraint is
binding and the nonnegativity constraints are not. Problem





the derivation of the Hicks-Slutsky-type equation it is assumed
allocation problem with tt in the role of 'income
that the level of investment, I, in (60) is fixed. This is
107done for ease of exposition, and does not affect the result
qualitatively
.
Proof of Theorem I I 1-4
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to
(60) when I is held fixed are, in addition to the constraint
in (60), (18) and (20) with y set equal to zero:
(1 - T){p-f(K, L) - wL - M - q-6-K} - tt q = (61)
{ !\. p .91 + !L, ( i -T)(p.31 - w)}e-rt < 18)1 3R P 9L 3D KX MP 9L ; '





- yi (l - x) = (20)
Define the bordered Hessian matrix H by
H 5
8 S/3L













where g(L, M) = (1 - x){p«f(K, L) - wL - M - q»<5*K} .
The elements of H are shown in table III-3. It is easily
shown that
det H = - (1 - t) 2 {
3U .2. 3 2 U
i.p.i_i + L(p . -)







Ld " T) P . 3
z f rt 3 2 f
+ u e (1 - T)p.





*3L " W) }e ° '
3
2 U
<since the strict concavity of U and f imply that
3
2 U 2 * 3R Z
<
, and < , and hence, that each term within
3M 2 3L 2
the braces in (62) is strictly negative. But det H f implies
by the implicit function theorem that equations (61), (18),
and (20) can be used to obtain functions
y
!
= y / T ' Tro ) L = L(T ' 7T o ) M = M(T ' Tr o )
that are continuously dif ferentiable for all (t, it ) in some
neighborhood of (t, tt ) and that satisfy
y = y (T, IT ) L = L(T, TT ) M = M(T, TT ) ,
1 1 o o o
where the carat denotes the optimal values satisfying (61),
(18), and (20). Treating u , L, and M each as a function of
x and tt and partially differentiating (61), (18), and (20)
o
with respect to x leads to the matrix equation
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L e" rt + y )
(63)
Note that p-f(K, L) - wL - M - q-6-K = y^
( tt^t- e + y )(p»ttt- - w) by a and - ( -^-^3D
1 e_rt
1 -|l ( ^
Denote
-rt
and rewrite (63) as
+ y ) by 3
i








+ a + 6 !
I
(64)
where a < by lemma III-l and B < also. Since H is nonsingular
in some neighborhood of (t, tt ), (64) can be solved for the
partial derivatives of y , L, and M with respect to t :
1











where H denotes the inverse of the matrix H in table III-3
.
To facilitate the interpretation of (65), an alternative expression
-1 f 1 )is obtained for H j . . This is done by partially dif ferentiati
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22 det H H
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=
-(1-T) 2 (p.|l- w)
*6 det~H
To prove the first part of the theorem, eliminate
the effect of a change in managerial emoluments by setting
M
^9t =
. Then 3 = by (63). Setting 6=0 and substituting
for a and H 2 o in (68) gives
3L
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It follows from (66) that 8L/ 3tt = H"* < 108 and hence
71
o 9Lthat yi^ glT" < . It follows from lemma III-l and (62) that
o
9 U
To prove the second part of the theorem, substitute
for a, 3, H~ 22 and H~ 23 in (68) to obtain
8L % 9L , 8U ! -rt w 9f Nr - (l-x) 2 n
97 " 1=7 3i" + ( ZTT e + V<P"5E " W) t det H J
+ (^ + y )
(1-T) (p^- W)
8D x [ dim ]
(70)
It follows from lemma III-l and (62) that
9U
, * \ 2 / 3f \
/ L + „ >> (1-T)^(p- Tr - w)(3D u
'
}
c aidr ]< ° • «- E - D
The main results provided by theorem I I 1-4 are equations
(69) and (70). Equation (69) expresses the change in the
amount of the labor input employed, and by implication the
change in total sales revenue (in the same direction since
8 f /
' 9L > for a rational producer), as the sum of two effects.
The first, -z -r—
,
can be interpreted as an 'income effect'
' 1-T 9tt ' *
o
and measures the impact of the implicit increase in tt (i.e.
the 'tightening' of the constraint) that results from an increase
in x . From (61), the effect of such an increase is to cause
L, and hence total sales revenue, to fall. This is analogous
to the income effect of an increase in price on the quantity
109demanded of a normal good in consumer theory.
The second term in (69) (and in (70) as well) can
be interpreted as a substitution effect. In the previous
635
subsection it was noted that if the profit constraint were
not binding, then an increase in the tax rate would cause total
sales revenue to increase relative to dividends as relatively
cheaper sales revenue is 'substituted for' relatively more
expensive (in terms of collective utility) dividends. But
this is just what is implied by (^fp e
r
+ y Kp.^vy- - w) x
- (1-t ) 2
[
—
det H ^ ^ ~ an increase in T tending to cause L, and hence
total sales revenue, to increase. This is analogous to the
substitution effect of a price change in consumer demand theory.




) + (—) (71}
3t ^3tt ; ^3t ; tt . . ^
o , o = constant .
t = constant
Equation (70) indicates that there is a third effect
at work, in addition to the above two, when both total sales
revenue and managerial emoluments are permitted to vary.
The firm is able to substitute sales revenue for managerial
emoluments and vice versa. This effect might be interpreted
as a 'cross substitution effect' on total sales revenue to
distinguish it from the 'price substitution' effect between
dividends and total sales revenue. Since (61) implies that




this cross substitution effect to be negative. This is the
case since, as shown in the proof of theorem III-4,
3U / * \ 2 / oi \




1 < . Putting this effect90
!
L det H J
together with those embodied in (71), equation (70) can be
636
expressed generically as:
aT " ( 8F- }
+ (FF } _ + +
+ ( 8M> < 72 >
° TEconstant ^constant T = constant
MEconstant MEconstant "^-constant .
Results similar to those just obtained for the effect
of a change in t on total sales revenue can also be obtained
for managerial emoluments. These are stated as the following
corollary to theorem III-4.
Corollary III-4-1
If the utility function U and the production function f are
1
both strictly concave, then the effect of a change in the
tax rate t on the equilibrium level of managerial emoluments
when the profit constraint is binding can be expressed as the
resolution of two effects, one of which is positive (i.e. a
'substitution effect') and the other of which is negative
(i.e. an 'income effect'). Moreover, when both managerial
emoluments and total sales revenue are permitted to vary,
the effect of a change in t on managerial emoluments is the
resolution of three effects, the first two being the (pure)
substitution and income effects already indicated, plus a
cross substitution effect between managerial emoluments and
total sales revenue that is negative.
Proof
From (67),






32 and substitute the resulting
expressions
and the expressions for a and 3 into (73) to obtain equations
analogous to (69) (when a = 0) and (70). Q.E.D
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The interpretation of corollary III-4-1 is similar to the
interpretation of theorem III-4, and equations analogous
to (71) and (72) could be developed from the theorem.
This subsection has extended a basic result from
consumer theory, the Hicks-Slutsky equation, to the theory
of the firm. This result is important for at least four
reasons. First, it demonstrates analytically the importance
of whether or not the profit constraint is binding to the
effect of a change in the tax rate on total sales revenue.
An increase in the tax rate may increase or decrease sales
revenue, depending on whether or not the profit constraint
is binding, which has important implications for tax policy.
Second, the possibility that an increase in the tax rate can
lead to an increase in sales revenue reverses one of the major
predictions of Baumol's sales maximization model. Third,
the derivation of the Hicks-Slutsky-type equations (69) and
(70) demonstrate results suggested and illustrated geometrically
by Yarrow, and in addition, indicate the existence of cross
substitution effects between alternative managerial objectives
112
not considered in Yarrow's analysis. Fourth, theorem III-4
suggests how to extend the Hicks-Slutsky equation from the
analysis of single period consumer behavior to the analysis
of the firm in a multiperiod setting. In particular, the
derivation of the Hicks-Slutsky-type equation in the multiperiod
setting should proceed from the maximization of the Hamiltonian.
Theorem III-4 was concerned with the effect on the
behavior of the firm of a change in the tax rate x. It should
be noted that the same technique employed in the proof of
theorem III-4 could be used to analyze the effects of changes
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.in other parameters, such as the price of output, p, and the
wage rate, w. For this reason the importance of theorem III-4
extends beyond the parametric analysis concerning the effect
of changes in t .
6. Section Summary
This section developed the model of the firm under
certainty and derived the important properties and policy
implications of the model. The firm was modeled in (11) as
a maximizer of discounted collective utility over a finite
planning horizon, where collective utility reflected managerial
sources of satisfaction - sales revenue, managerial emoluments,
and growth as well as a source of shareholder satisfaction -
dividends - and where the maximization took place subject
to a minimum net income constraint. It was shown that such
a firm would tend to use more labor, and hence produce more
output, than a short run profit maximizer (lemma III-l).
In addition, it was shown that the equilibrium operating policies
selected by the firm could be used to characterize an implicit
ranking at the margin of the sales revenue, dividends, and
managerial emoluments objectives (theorems III-l and III-2
plus corollaries).
It was further shown that the extent of managerial
discretion, as reflected in whether or not the profit constraint
is binding, has important implications for the behavior of
the firm. When the profit constraint is not binding, the
expansion path of the firm modeled in (11) will coincide with
the traditional firm's expansion path, but when the profit
constraint is binding, the expansion paths will coincide only
if the rate of discount is equal to the percentage rate of
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increase of the price of capital goods (theorem III-3). An
increase in the tax rate may lead to either a decrease or an
increase in output, sales revenue, and managerial emoluments,
depending mainly on whether the profit constraint is or is not
binding. It was shown that when the profit constraint is binding,
the effect of a change in the tax rate on the behavior of the
firm can be interpreted as the resolution of three effects, which
are embodied in the Hicks-Slutsky-type equation developed for the
dynamic optimization model (11) (theorem III-4)
The model (11) developed in this section assumes that
the firm produces a single good under conditions of certainty
and under conditions of perfect competition in product and
factor markets. The extension of the model to permit uncertainty
is carried out in the next section. The extension to permit
imperfect competition in product or factor markets (or both)
is straightforward and does not affect any of the qualitative
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results obtained in this section. The extension of the
114
model to the multiproduct firm is also straightforward.
C. THE MODEL UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The purpose of this section is to extend the model of the
collective utility maximizing firm (11) developed in the
previous section to incorporate uncertainty. The uncertainty
version of the model will be used in section E of this
chapter to study the behavior of the firm over the business cycle.
1. The Model
In this section it is again assumed that the firm produces
a single good that it sells in a perfectly competitive market.
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The firm is a quantity-setter of the Sandmo-Leland type,
setting the quantity of output to be produced prior to observing
market price, which is assumed random and functionally dependent
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on the state of nature, G^
,
prevailing at time t. Assume that
for every t e [0, T] , 9 has distribution function F (0 ) for
which a probability density function exists. Further assume
that the probability distribution is time invariant so that the
subscript t may be dropped and that the states of nature are
defined in such a way that dp/d6 > 0, i.e. a higher value for 6
corresponds to a higher price p (and hence, to a more favorable
state of the firm's operating environment).
Expressing price as a function of time, p(t), the family
of random variables (p(t), <_ t <_ T} forms a continuous parameter
stochastic process. Assume that this process has independent
increments. This assumption, and possibly stronger assumptions,
are needed to rule out pathological cases for which the model set
out below would fail to have a feasible solution.
Since price is random, so is net income. Therefore, the
minimum net income constraint (7) must be modified. Assume that
the firm selects its operating policies each period such that the
probability that net income will be greater than or equal to tt
is at least e, where e is a positive constant, < e < 1. The
constraint (7) becomes
P[ir(t) = (l-T){p(6)-f(K(t), L(t)) - w(t)-L(t)
- M(t) - q(t)«[6-K(t)]} > 7tq ] > e > , (74)
< t < T
,
where it is determined exogenously and where it is assumed
that e is also determined exogenously as of time t = 0. One
possible interpretation of e is that it reflects the board
of directors' perception of the threat of an unfriendly takeover
attempt, with the likelihood of such an attempt inversely
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related to the value of e . Given management's aversion to
unfriendly takeover bids, the attitudes of potential takeover
raiders (i.e. how they would react to different net income
levels), as perceived by top management, determine e .
Rather than work directly with the probabilistic constraint
it will prove more convenient to use the distribution of p,
which is assumed known, to convert (74) into an equivalent
deterministic constraint. To accomplish this, note that with
the capital stock treated as fixed at time t, fr(t) in (74)
is a function of L, M, and . Fix L and rewrite (74) as
P{p(6)«f(K, L) - M > -^- 77 + q- [ 6-K ] + wL } > e .
— 1-T O (75)
Since the left-hand side of the inequality inside the braces
is a monotonically decreasing function of M, while the right-
hand side is fixed (in terms of L and K) by assumption, the
known distribution p(6.) implies a maximum value for managerial
emoluments, M(L, K, tt
,
e), where the arguments L, K, tt
and e indicate the dependence of this maximum value on the
amount of labor, the size of the capital stock, and also on
tt and e . It is easily seen from (75) that
8M/8tt < and 8M/9e < . (76)
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It can be shown that for L sufficiently large,
8M/8L < . (77)
The interpretation of (76) is that an increase in the ex post
minimum net income level, tt , or an increase in the fear
' o '
of takeover leading to an increase in e each leads to a decrease
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in the maximum permissible level of managerial emoluments.
Similarly, the interpretation of (77) is that beyond some point
further increases in labor usage lead to decreases in the
maximum permissible level of managerial emoluments. The above
procedure leads to a functional relationship that can be used
to replace the probabilistic constraint (74) with the equivalent
deterministic constraint





< t < T . (78)
It also follows from the fact that price is a random
variable that total revenue and total dividends paid are also
random variables. Hence, the objective functional in (11)
must be reformulated to take this into account. This was
done in (3). The model of the firm (11) reformulated to take
into account the existence of uncertainty is:
maximize / nE{U [ p(e )• f (K(t ) ,L(t )) ; (1-t ){p(6 ) • f (K(t ) , L(t )
)
u l{L(t),I(t),M(t)}
- w(t)«L(t) - M(t)} + T-q(t)- [6-K(t)]
- q(t)-I(t); M(t)] }e 1Ldt + U (K(T))e
2
(79)






L(t), K(t), M(t) > , 0<t<T
It is assumed that the firm modeled in (79) exhibits
risk aversion with respect to each of the arguments of the
utility function U , so that
8
2 U /8R 2 < d 2 XJ /3D 2 < 9 2 U /3M 2 < .
i i i
As indicated in subsection 1 of section B above, the interpretation
of U in (79) is different from the interpretation of U
1 !
in (11), as it is assumed in (79) that U satisfies the
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von Neumann-Morgenstern 'postulates of rational choice'.
Note that since the probability distribution of p(0
)
is known, E{ } at each time t is a function of the control
variables L, I, and M and the state variable K at that time
only. Hence, the deterministic maximum principle can be used
to characterize the multiperiod equilibrium position of the
expected collective utility maximizer modeled in (79).
2. The Firm's Optimal Operating Policies under Uncertainty
The Hamiltonian for the stochastic optimal control
problem (79) is
H [K, L, I, M, A, t ] = E(U [ ]}e" rt + A(t) [I(t) - <5-K(t)]
,
(8(
where E{ U [ ])e denotes the integrand in (79). In (80)
the costate variable A(t) measures the shadow price of capital
in terms of the discounted value of expected collective utility.
As in the deterministic case, define the Lagrangian L by
L [ K, L, I, M, A, u , t] =
y ! (81
H [K, L, I, M, A, t] + p (t)-[ M(L(t),K(t),7T ,e) - M(t)],
where H is given by (80).
In order that the time paths L*(t), I*(t), and M*(t)
provide an optimal solution to problem (79), it is necessary
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that they satisfy the following conditions:
{L*(t), I*(t), and M*(t)} maximize H(K, L, I ,M, A , t
)
subject to M(t)<M(L(t),K(t),iT ,e)
, ^ t £ T
(82
K(t) = I*(t) - S-K(t) , < t < T , K(0) given (83
dh 8U (K(T))
A*(t) = - 3/ , A*(T) - | K(T) e- (84
where L is given by (81). Since the second necessary condition
(83) merely repeats the net investment constraint, it need
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not be considered further. The other two necessary conditions
differ from (14) and (16) for the deterministic case and so
are discussed below.
To begin, consider the necessary condition (82).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions necessary for an optimal solution











d^ = E ^ac1(-q(t))}e
rt
+ A(t) = (86)
9L au au
_E = E{^1(1-t)(-1) + -^}e- rt - y = (87)
M < M(L, K, tt
,
e) y > y [ M(L, K, tt , e) - M] =0 (88)
— o i — i o
To interpret necessary conditions (85) - (88) two cases
need to be considered, depending on whether or not y = .
Since y does not appear in (86), that condition can be considered






which is analogous to (23) for the certainty case. The interpretation
of (89) is similar to the interpretation of (23), with the
obvious adjustments on account of the expected values in (89).
The Lagrange multiplier A(t) is interpreted as in the certainty
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case, although it is expressed in terms of expected collective
utility since those are the units in which the objective functional
in (79) is expressed. In addition, the left-hand side of
(89) differs from the left-hand side of (23) in that the former
8U 8U
involves E [ ^L ] in place of -^^- . Analogous to the interpretation
of (23), the ratio of the left-hand side of (89) can be interpreted
as the marginal rate of substitution between physical capital
and dividends, where numerator and denominator in (89) are
expressed as discounted expected values. According to (89),
in equilibrium the expected collective utility maximizer will
have carried investment at each time t to the point at which
the marginal rate of substitution between physical capital
and dividends just equals the price of capital goods - at which
point the internal and external trade offs between physical
capital and dividends will be equated. This result is summarized
as the following lemma:
Lemma I I 1-2
Under certainty (uncertainty) the collective utility (expected
collective utility) maximizing firm will carry investment at
each time t up to the point at which its marginal rate of
substitution between physical capital and dividends just equals
the price of capital goods.
Consideration of necessary conditions (85) and (87)
involves the following two cases:
case ( i ) : u = .
i
In this case the managerial emoluments constraint
(78) is not necessarily binding at optimality. Setting y =
in (85) leads to the following theorem:
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Theorem I I 1-5
When the risk averse expected collective utility maximizing
firm modeled in (79) is in equilibrium, it will tend to produce
more output than a similarly risk averse expected utility of
total profit maximizer. The effect of uncertainty on both
types of firms is to cause each to produce a smaller quantity
of output than it would under certainty.
Proof
Since -^—-
, p, and tt=- are all strictly positive, it
follows that E [ yjr1- P(6)-jrr] > ° and hence, from (85) with




E [ g^(l - T)(p(0)||- - w) ] < . (90)
If I(t), K(t), and M(t) are fixed, it follows from (9) that
a preference ordering over D also gives a preference ordering
over tt
. Thus, (90) implies that
8U
af
E [g^d - T)(p(6)|i - w)] < . (91)
For an expected utility of total profit maximizer with utility
dU 8Ufunction U(tt) such that -r— = -r—-
,
(91) implies that the expected
collective utility maximizer will produce greater output.
This follows from (91) and Batra's and Ullah's statement of
the first- and second-order conditions for expected utility
121
of total profit maximization:
9E [U(tt) ]
= Q 9
2 E [U(tt) ]
< Q (92)9L 8L 2
L
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Hence, from (91) and (92), the expected collective utility
maximizer uses more labor, and since 9f/9L >
, it will,
as a consequence, produce greater output.
The proof of the second statement utilizes a technique
122introduced by Sandmo and since utilized by others. The
first-order condition (85) with u =0 can be written as
i
3U 9U .„ 9U
E{ 9ir p( >fr + *ir<i-T)p(e)fi;> - e{^( i-t)w} . ( 93)
9U 9U




" E{^i(l-x)w} - E^.p.-fi + ^l ( l- T )p.|l} , (94)
where p=E[p(6)] is the expected price of output.
By definition, R = p(6)*f(K, L), and taking expectations,
E [ R ] = p»f (K, L) . Therefore, R can be expressed as
R = E [ R ] + (p - p)«f (K, L) . If p > p , then E [ R ] <_ R ,
and by the assumed risk aversion on the part of the firm,
9U 9U





where -^-^-( ^ -5-1- evaluated at arbitrary R(> E(R))
and where -r-p1 [E(R)] denotes
-^^ evaluated at E(R).
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ft
It is clear from (95) that
9U 9U
alf-CR)" (P ~ P) 1 9R
1
C E(R) ] • (P - p) . (96)
But (96) must hold for all p, since when p £ p the inequality
in (95) is reversed, while multiplication by (p - p) reverses
the direction of the inequality and gives (96). Taking expectations
9U
in (96) and noting that j^- [ E(R) ] is a constant yields
9U 9U
E [ 91^' (p " P) ] - 9R
1
" [E(R)
^ *E(P - p) = , (97)





P) ^ 1 3d
1 [E(D) ] * E(p
~ P) = • (98)
9 fSince ~y and (1 - x) are positive constants, and hence willdL 9U
not alter the inequalities in (97) and (98) when -—" is multiplied
9f 9U 9fby j- and ^L is multiplied by (1 - x )|^ , (97) and (98) imply
that the expression on the right-hand side of (94) is nonpositive.
Rearranging terms this implies
E [ 9R^ ]p -fl + E [ 9lT ] (1 - T)(p -Il - w) > , (99)
which is similar to (24) for the certainty case with mathematical
9U 9U




> "^tt" > and p. If the firm knew
art oL)
that the price p would take on its mathematical expectation
p with certainty, then (99) would hold as an equality. Since
9f/9L >
, (99) implies that the existence of uncertainty
causes the firm modeled in (79) to produce less than it would
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under certainty, a result that Sandmo and others have demonstrated
for the single period expected utility of total profit maximizer.
Q.E.D.
It should be noted that when the expected collective
g-p
utility maximizer is in equilibrium, (99) implies that p.^r - w <
does not necessarily hold. That is, in the certainty case the
firm will, according to lemma III-l, hire labor beyond the
point at which its marginal revenue product equals the wage.
Under uncertainty, the firm may, depending on the shape of U
1
and the probability distribution of p(S), hire labor beyond
the point at which its expected marginal revenue product equals
the wage. The complication introduced under uncertainty is
the firm's attitude toward risk, as embodied in the shape of
the firm's utility function U . This is made clear by the
i
following corollary to theorem III-5.
Corollary III-5-1
If the firm modeled in (79) exhibits risk neutrality with
respect to revenue and total dividends paid, then it will in
equilibrium hire labor beyond the point at which the expected
marginal revenue product of labor equals the wage rate.
Proof
au 8U
Risk neutrality implies t-^1- = k > and -r^- = k > ,
where k and k are constants that are not necessarily equal.
1 2
Then with u = (85) becomes
i
k • p.f£ + k (1 - T)(p.|£ - w) = , (100)
p\
-p
which implies that P'-jct - w < . Q.E.D.
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The interpretation of corollary III-5-1 is that risk
neutrality on the part of the firm makes it, in effect, insensitive
to the existence of uncertainty. Note that (100) is similar
in form to (24), which holds in the certainty case. Since
the risk neutral short run expected utility of total profit
gj
maximizer would hire labor up to the point at which P'-^r = w
,
under risk neutrality it is much easier to see that the expected
collective utility maximizer will hire more labor and produce
more output than the traditional firm. Under risk aversion
(or under less plausible risk seeking behavior) the marginal
8U 8U
utilities -jr-5-1- and -ryp are not constant, and it may be inferred
on the basis of theorem III-5, and in particular (99), that
if the expected collective utility maximizer is sufficiently
risk averse, then it is possible that P'-jtt > w . Theorem
III-5 and corollary III-5-1 suggest, then, that under uncertainty
a highly risk averse expected collective utility maximizer
and a risk neutral or barely risk averse traditional firm
could reach identical output decisions. Under uncertainty,
then, the firm's attitude toward risk, as well as the nature
of the sources of utility, can have a strong impact on the
behavior of the firm. If managerial firms are highly security
conscious, as Rothschild, Galbraith, Marris, and others have
124
argued, and if as a consequence they are strongly risk
averse, then to the extent that traditional firms are less
risk averse, it would become very difficult empirically to
distinguish managerial behavior from traditional behavior and
from expected collective utility maximizing behavior.
Turning next to necessary condition (87), when y = ,
E [ 9U /3M ]
E [ 9U / 9D ]
1




which is analogous to (28) for the certainty case. Unfortunately,
the ratio of two expected values is not in general equal to
the expected value of the ratio, so that the left-hand side
of (101) cannot be interpreted as the expected value of the
marginal rate of substitution between managerial emoluments
and dividends. However, given the analogy between (101) and
(28), it is, in the opinion of this writer, still meaningful
to interpret the left-hand side of (101) as the marginal rate
of substitution between managerial emoluments and dividends,
with the understanding that expected utility indifference
curves replace the utility indifference curves of the certainty
version, so that correspondingly, the ratio of expected marginal
utilities replaces the ratio of marginal utilities of the
certainty case in the calculation of the marginal rate of
substitution (i.e. the negative of the slope of the [ expected ]
utility indifference curve at a point). Then (101) can be
interpreted as the requirement that the marginal rate of substitute
between managerial emoluments and dividends equal one minus
the tax rate when the expected collective utility maximizer
modeled in (79) is in equilibrium,
case (ii ) : y f .
In this case the managerial emoluments constraint
(78) is binding at optimality, so that M = M . By analogy
with the certainty case, (77) must hold, for otherwise an
increase in output would relax the constraint. By (88), y > .
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= E{ _J_ p(e)|f + _L(1_T)(p(e)|f _ w)}e-rt > Q (1Q2)
8M
8U 9U
= E{^-(1 - t)(-1) + —L}e rt >
, (103)
which are analogous to (32) and (33), respectively, for the
certainty case. According to (102) and (103), the Hamiltonian
is a constrained maximum with respect to L and M. Were it
not for the constraint (78), the firm could increase both
revenue and managerial emoluments and thereby reach a higher
level of discounted expected collective utility. But the firm
cannot do this because it would increase the 'risk' (i.e.
the probability) that actual net income would fall short of
IT
O
The foregoing was concerned with necessary condition
(82) and the optimal time paths of labor, investment, and managerial
emoluments. Next, the implications of necessary condition (84)
for the optimal time path of the firm's capital stock are




E[(^).(-rq + q)]= - [ E(p(6 )^)f|
9U
+ E( P (e)g^-)-(i-T).f| (104)
3U 8U
+ E(g^ L )-Tq6 - 6q-E(^-)]
,
where, for convenience, only the case y = is considered.
Equation (104) can be used to establish the following theorem
and corollary.
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Theorem I I 1-6
When the risk averse expected collective utility maximizing
firm modeled in (79) is in equilibrium, the effect of uncertainty
is to cause it to use less capital and to produce less output




E{gj^p(e)f! + ^l(i_ T )p(e)|i}=E{g^(q[r+(l-T)6]-q)}
,
(105)
7) "F r\ "f
*
which is just (93) with -r-= in place of ^-r- and q[r+(l-x )6]-q
,
a K a Li
the cost of capital net of tax, in place of (l-x)w
,
the cost
of labor net of tax. Applying the technique utilized in the
proof of theorem III-5 gives
8U
- af 8U af
E [ BIT 1 p H + E C a^Hd-OP ^ " (q[r+(l-T)6]-q)}> , (106)
which is analogous to (99). But if the firm knew with certainty
that output price would be p, then it follows from (40) that
3 f
equality would hold in (106). Since -^ > , (106) implies
that uncertainty has the effect of reducing the firm's output
and its use of capital. Q.E.D,
Collectively, theorems III-5 and III-6 imply that
the existence of uncertainty causes the risk averse firm to
use less of both inputs, and therefore, to produce less output
than it would under certainty. As in the case of theorem III-5,





If the firm modeled in (79) exhibits risk neutrality with respect
to revenue and total dividends paid, then it will hire capital
beyond the point at which the expected marginal revenue product
of capital equals the cost of capital.
Proof
Same as corollary III-5-1. Q.E.D.
The existence of uncertainty causes the risk averse
firm to use less of each input. The question remains as to
whether there is any built-in bias against one of the inputs.
Put differently, will the existence of uncertainty force the
firm off the expansion path characterized by (44) for the
certainty case? The answer is 'no'. To demonstrate this result,
which is contained in theorem III-7, it is assumed that y =0
so that the effects of uncertainty only are reflected in the
results (recall from section B above that when the net income
constraint is binding the firm's expansion path may change).
Theorem I I 1-7
Regardless of the firm's attitude toward risk, the expected
collective utility maximizer modeled in (79) will have the
same expansion path under uncertainty as it would under certainty,
provided the profit constraint is not binding.
Proof
To prove the theorem it is sufficient to show that
(44) holds. From (85),
so E[9U /3D](l-x)w
3L " E[(3U /3R)p(6)+(3U / 3D)
(
1-t )






3K E[(3U /3R)p(6) + (3U /3D) (1-t )• p(6 ) ] ' (108)
1 i
where i = q(r + (1 - t)6) - q (as in the certainty case).
Combining (107) and (108) gives
3K 3f/3L E[3U /3D](1-t)w " 1-x'w " V.h.D
Theorem III-7 may appear surprising. One might suspect
that due to uncertainty the firm would try to hold less capital,
and instead employ relatively more labor in order to obtain
greater flexibility in its use of inputs. However, when the
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market for capital goods is perfect and investment is reversible,
as it is for the firm modeled in (79), the firm has the ability
to adjust both capital and labor instantaneously. Also the
firm is assumed to reach its output decision prior to observing
market price. Hence, the existence of uncertainty does not
affect the input mix, given this output decision.
This subsection has been concerned with the characterization
of the equilibrium position of the firm modeled in (79) and
with the effect of uncertainty on that equilibrium position.
Nothing has yet been said concerning the sensitivity of this




and it . The next subsection presents this sensitivity analysis,
o
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3. Comparative Dynamics and Comparative Statics Results
This subsection explores the sensitivity of the behavior
of the expected collective utility maximizer modeled in (79)
to changes in several key parameters. The main results, which
are summarized in theorems I I 1-8 and I I 1-9, are shown to be
analogous to results obtained earlier for the certainty case.
Theorem I I 1-8
An increase in e
,
the probability that net income will exceed
n
,
will cause the firm to reduce its level of output at
each time t at which the profit constraint is (or is caused
to become) binding.
Proof
Given that 9f/9L > , to prove the theorem it is
sufficient to show that 9L/9e <0 . To accomplish this, use
(85) to define the function
9 U 9 U
~
G(L,e) = E{




Note that when the profit constraint is binding, ^ i > and
8y
i . ^ T ^ -, + u *. 3
2 M









|£ = E{!A [p(0)||^ + !^ po)^f9L 8R 2 9LJ 9R ^2
9
2 U
2 [(l-x)(p(0)# -w)] 2 TF^(l-T)p(0)^-^}e-
9f
...x-, i/-, ,x„/nN9 z f, -rt





by the assumed concavity of U and f, and since
1
1<£ ^_l 1M + 9
2 M
it follows by the implicit function theorem that
The practical interpretation of theorem IH-8 is that if the firm
should become more risk averse in the sense that it raises e
(thereby reducing the probability that it will fail to generate
net income at least as great as tt ), it will find it necessary
to reduce output accordingly.
The second main result developed in this subsection
concerns the derivation of a Hicks-Slutsky-type equation similar
to (69) and (70), which were developed in subsection 5 of
section B for the certainty case. While the form of the equation
becomes somewhat more complicated under uncertainty, the
interpretation of the equation is similar. This second main
result is proved as theorem III-9 and the special case of risk
neutrality is presented as a corollary.
Theorem III-9
If the utility function U and the production function f are
both strictly concave, then the effect of a change in the tax
rate x on the equilibrium level of total sales revenue when
both total sales revenue and managerial emoluments are permitted
to vary and when the profit constraint is binding can be expressed
as the resolution of three effects, one of which can be
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interpreted as a substitution effect, one of which can be
interpreted as an income effect, and the third of which can
be interpreted as a cross substitution effect, with the first
and third being negative and the second one being, in general,
positive.
Proof
As in the certainty case, write the necessary conditions
for the optimization problem:
maximize
a, m}
H(K, L, I, M, A, t)
subject to M(L, K, tt
, e) - M(t) = ,
(109)
where the level of investment, I, is treated as fixed. The
necessary conditions for an optimal solution to problem (109)
are (85) and (87) together with the constraint in (109):
M(L, K, tt
o
, e) - M(t) = (110)
8U 9f 8U 9f -rt
E{ 8^ ^ Qm + nf^-^wm - w)}e + H 9M9L^ = (85)
9U 9U
EW (1 " T)( " 1} + ^ }e" rt - y =i (87)
Also as in the certainty case, define the bordered Hessian H by
H =
8g/3L 9g/9M
8g/8L 9 2 H/9L 2 9 2 H/9L9M
9g/9M 9 2 H/9M9L 9 2 H/9M 2
where g(L, M) = M(L, K, tt , e) - M(t). The elements of H are
shown in table III- 4. It is easily verified that
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3M 3
2 U 3fdet H = -2 ff;(-E { H 1-x ) 2 (p»|£ - w)} -rt
-EC
3D'
3U . 2 , 3 2 U
p + L(P'^r)














...x, 2n _-rt 3 2 M1 {(l-T)(p-|f - w)} ]e"IL - y .
2 oL" i 3L' (HI)
3
2 U 3 2 U
- (ff)










^-(1-T) 2 (p.|^ - w)} < 127 Thus, by the implicit
function theorem, equations (110), (85), and (87) can be used
to obtain functions
y = y (t, tt )
1 i o
L = L(t, tt )
o
M = M( T
,
TT )
that are continuously dif ferentiable for all (t, tt ) in some
neighborhood of (t, tt ) at which det H > and that satisfy
u = u (t, tt )
1 1 o
L = L(x, tt
q )
M = M( T , TT )
where the carat denotes the optimal values satisfying (110),
128(85), and (87) Treating y , L, and M each as a function
i
of x and tt and partially differentiating (110), (85), and
























Denote E[(3U /3D)(p(6)|^ - w)]e rt by a and -E[3U /3D]e rt
1 dL 1
by 3 . Note that 3 < 0, but that, unlike the certainty case,
the sign of a is indeterminate. However, by analogy with the
certainty case, it is reasonable to expect that in general
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and solving for the vector of partial derivatives with respect














To facilitate the interpretation of (114), next partially differentiate









































o 9L ^tt-1 + cu"l
9? - ITT TT + aE 22 3H 23 ' (117)
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n 22 det H n 23 det H
With these expressions for H 22 and H 2 „ (117) becomes
_3L
=
_^o dh E[(8U /9D)(p(e)|£ - w)]e" rt





It follows from (110) that 9L/9tt < . Hence, the first
o
term in (118) is negative. It follows from the fact that,
9 f
in general ,E[(9U /9D)(p(6)^T- - w)] < that the second term
1 oJLi
in (118) is in general positive. Since E[ 9U /9D] > and
9M/9L < , it follows that the third term in (118) is negative.
Q.E.D.
Corollary III-9-1
Under risk neutrality the qualification 'in general' can be
dropped from the interpretation of the second term in (118).
Proof
g f
From corollary III-5-1, p jj- - w < . Hence, for
some k > , E[(9U /9D) (p( 9 )• |£ - w)] = k«(p.|^ - w) < . Q.E.D.
In interpreting theorem III-9 and corollary III-9-1
it should be noted that the Hicks-Slutsky-type equation (118)
is expressed generically by equation (72), which furthers the
analogy between theorems III-4 and III-9 for the certainty
and uncertainty cases, respectively. The importance of theorem III-9
and the accompanying corollary III-9-1 is the demonstration
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that under uncertainty the expected collective utility maximizer
will respond to a change in either tt or t in a manner qualitatively
the same as its response to each such change under certainty.
4. Section Summary
This section has extended the model of the firm developed
in the previous section to incorporate uncertainty. It was shown
that the existence of uncertainty causes the risk averse firm
to use less of both inputs and to produce less output (theorems
III-5 and III-6), but does not induce a change in the expansion
path (theorem I I 1-7). It was also shown that an increase in
e, the probability that net income will exceed tt
,
will tend
to cause the firm to reduce output (theorem III-8) and that
a change in either tt or t will elicit the same qualitative
o
response under uncertainty as it did under certainty (theorem
III-9)
D. RECONCILING PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AND MANAGERIAL UTILITY
MAXIMIZATION: THE TWO-STATE CASE
The main purpose of this chapter is to model the behavior
of the firm over the business cycle and to demonstrate that,
depending on the state of the firm's immediate operating environment
(or loosely, the state of the business cycle), the firm may
alternate between modes of traditional and managerial behavior.
This section presents a simple two-state Markov model of the
behavior of the firm over the business cycle. In the next section
the basic theoretical model developed in sections B and C of
this chapter is adapted to incorporate the effects of the business
cycle and the number of states of the firm's operating environment
is permitted to be arbitrary.
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O.E. Williamson has developed a Markov model in which two
states of the environment were hypothesized and in which managers
could select either of two modes of behavior: managerial
1 ?1
utility maximizing behavior or profit maximizing behavior.
The firm's transition from one state of the environment to another
was modeled as a nonstationary Markov process in which the
transition probabilities were dependent on the mode of behavior
selected, as well as on the current state of the firm's environment
Williamson showed by numerical example that systematic shifts
between modes of behavior can occur, depending on the state
of the environment
.
Albin and Alcaly have described a model in which corporate
managers choose between growth maximizing policies and profit
maximizing policies and in which the state of the environment
132is indicated by the macroeconomic rate of growth. Their
model is mainly concerned with the interactions between the policy
choices of individual firms and how these policy choices determine
the general equilibrium macroeconomic growth rate (and how
expectations concerning the macroeconomic growth rate affect
these policy choices). Though their model shows that it is
"reasonable and appropriate for the same firm to be apparently
management motivated at one time and owner-interest motivated
133
at another," the level of abstraction at which the individual
firm is treated obscures the workings of the mechanism by which
systematic shifts in objectives take place.
It is this writer's view that Williamson and Albin and
Alcaly are correct in asserting that the typical large firm's
mode of behavior adjusts to the state of the firm's operating
environment. During the downswing in the business cycle
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sales and profits tend to fall, firms' financial positions
tend to worsen, and firms try to divest themselves of unprofitable
134
or marginally profitable operations. In terms of the model
of the firm developed in sections B and C of this chapter,
under severe business conditions the profit constraint is not
satisfied, and firms are forced to behave as profit maximizers
(i.e. the traditional mode of behavior). During the upswing
in the business cycle the state of the firm's operating environment
is much more favorable. Sales and profits are increasing, firms'
financial positions tend to improve, and firms become more sales-
135
and growth-oriented. In terms of the model developed in
sections B and C of this chapter, under favorable business conditions
the profit constraint is easily satisfied, and firms have greater
discretion to pursue managerial objectives.
1. The Two-State Markov Model
To model the cyclical pattern of behavior just described,
assume there are just two possible states of the firm's operating
envirnoment , one being prosperity (or the 'upswing' denoted
by H) and the other being adversity (or the 'downswing' denoted
by L). Let time be measured in discrete periods denoted by
t. During each period t the state of the firm's operating
environment must be either H or L. Also during each period,
there is some maximum level of total profit tt* . The actual
level of total profit, tt , depends on the firm's operating
posture. Define x = tt /it* • Then x < 1, where x = 1
indicates the choice of a traditional operating posture. That
is x = 1 implies that total profit is being maximized, tt = tt*
and the firm is employing those operating policies that would be
adopted by a short run profit maximizer. During each period
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.4k.
there is also some minimum required level of total profit,
it. , which is assumed known with certainty. Define x = tt./tt*.
.
L LLC
When x = x the firm is said to have chosen a managerial operating
posture. That is, x. = x implies that total profit is not being
maximized (unless
-n. = iT* t ), and in view of the sacrifice of
total profit inherent in the pursuit of managerial objectives
(as discussed throughout this chapter), the firm's behavior
when it selects x = x, may be characterized as managerial.
It follows from the foregoing that the firm's choice of operating





where x is a continuous variable and where values of x, such
that x < x. < 1 indicate varying degrees of traditional and
managerial behavior between the two extremes (x, = 1 = 'pure'
traditional and x = x, = 'pure' managerial).
It is assumed that the firm's transitions from one state
of the environment to another follow a Markov process. That
is, a transition from either state at time t to either state
at time t + 1 is (in each case) a function of the state and the
firm's choice of operating posture at time t only and is independent
of the firm's prior history. The transition probabilities,
which are written as explicit functions of the firm's current
choice of operating posture, are arrayed in the transition
probability matrix shown in table III-5.
Table III-5 Transition Probability Matrix for a
Two-State Markov Decision Process
J
PLL (x t } pLH (x t>
P =
PHL (x t ) PHH (x t }
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It is assumed that all four transition probabilities are strictly
positive. The transition probability matrix is stochastic;
that is,
pLL (xt ) + PLH (xt }
= X
pHL (xt> + PHH (xt )
= 1
(120)
It is assumed that
w; pLl (V < ° and as; pHL (xt> < °
.
< 121 >
According to (121) the more traditional the firm's current choice
of operating posture, the less is the likelihood of a transition
to state L, and correspondingly, by (120), the greater is
the likelihood of a transition to state H. The rationale under-
lying (121) is that adopting the managerial posture, and in
so doing increasing sales and managerial emoluments beyond the
respective profit-maximizing levels, tends to shrink future
choice sets, and thereby increase the likelihood of adversity
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setting in.
The firm's policy choices, as embodied in x , determine
not only the transition probabilities, but also the returns,
which are arrayed in the return matrix shown in table I I 1-6.




ULL (V ULH (xt )
UHL (x t ) UHH (xt>
The return U . .(x, ) expresses the collective utility resultingi J t
from the choice of current operating posture x when the firm
transitions from state i to state j. It is assumed that
all returns are positive and that for each choice of posture, x
ULL (xt> < ^V and UHL (xt> < UHH (xt> ' < 122 >
The rationale underlying (122) is that, regardless of the posture
chosen, the firm is better off in the sense of having achieved
a higher immediate level of collective utility if it transitions
to H than if it transitions to L. In addition, it is assumed
that for all x.
,
dl"Uij (xt ) <0 i=L, H;j=L, H. (123)
The rationale underlying (123) is that the level of collective
utility in the current period would always be enhanced if the
firm were to adopt a more managerial (and less traditional)
posture. This treatment of the relative immediate returns
from the alternative modes of behavior is consistent with
Williamson's assumptions concerning the relative returns from
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'pure' traditional and 'pure' managerial behavior. As
in the Williamson model, it will be shown below that consideration
of the future implications of the current policy choice by the
firm will prevent the firm from always assuming a managerial
operating posture, and may in fact cause the firm's behavior
to alternate systematically between the two 'pure' modes of
behavior. But unlike the Williamson model, the model developed
below allows for intermediate modes of behavior that the firm
may exhibit, depending on the nature of the matrices P and R.
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2. The Behavior of the Firm Over Time
Given the matrices P and R, the firm's choices of operating
138postures over time are modeled as a Markov decision process.
Let r denote the firm's rate of discount, which is assumed to
remain constant over time, and let U denote the expected present
value of returns resulting from all remaining transitions over
the remainder of the planning period (x, ... , T) given that
state i is occupied at the end of period t - 1. The expected
present value of returns U can be expressed in the following
recursive form:
1 w,LU 1 = p. T (x )-[U. T (x ) + (ii— )U a,]T *lL T y L lL T v l+r T+l
(124)
+ P iH (xT ).[U iH (xT ) + (^U^J ,
T IJ
where i = L, H and t = 1, ... , T and where U + - and U -
are independent of x by the Markov property. The firm's decision
problem for each time t, t=1, ... , T, is modeled as:
• • TTimaximize U
L X , . . . , Xm
)
T i (125)
subject to x, <_ x, _< 1 , t = t , ... , T
The solution to problem (125) can be obtained by decomposing













1 X ^- , . . . , X„ 5
subject to x. <_ x
t £ 1 , t = x , . . . , T
The use of decomposition is justified by the following lemma
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Lemma I I 1-3
The optimal solution to problem (126) is also the optimal solution
to problem (125).
Proof
To prove the lemma it must be shown that both the separability
condition and the monotonicity condition (i.e. Mitten's condition)
139 i
are satisfied. Since UJ ^-, is a function of x ,
.,
, ... , xmt+1 t+1 T
only (by the Markov property), separability is assured. Since
the transition probabilities p. .(x^) are strictly positive
by assumption, U f is a monotonically nondecreasing function
of UJ ,-. for every x , and thus Mitten's condition is satisfiedT+1 T
also. Q.E.D.






__|_1 , • ' ' > X rn J
(127)
subject to x < x < 1 , t = t+1, ... , T
Note that U. > U. for all t since, by definition, H represents
the more favorable state of the firm's operating environment,
and hence, permits the firm the greater degree of discretion
in the selection of its operating posture. Substituting (127)
into (126) the latter becomes
Kimize ? p (x t )[U (x x ) + Cj^U^{x_} J u
(128)
subject to x
T£ x T jc 1 ,
which is solved for each time x, t=1, ... , T. In obtaining
(128), decomposition was used to express the expected present
value of total returns over the planning period as a function





of future returns, (j^:)Ux+1 In particular, note that the
current policy decision, x
t ,
affects immediate returns through
Ui -(xT ) as well as future returns through p. .(x t )(tt— )U
j
- .
To characterize the solution to (128), form the Lagrangian
L, = p. T (x)[U. T (xT ) + (-l-)uk ]A lL T lL T v l+r T+1 J
L)U?+1]iH' iH v x 1+r (129)
+ A (1-x ) + A (x_-x ) .
1 T 2 L L
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimal solution to (128),







iL dx. d^ [ UiL + Clb> ^1 1+ PiH dUiH
dx.
dp
rjiS[U.„ + (t^-) u" ]- A - A =dx^ L iH v l+r y t+1 J i 2
(130)
A (1 - x) =












To interpret necessary conditions (130) - (132) three cases
are distinguished depending on whether or not A =0 and A =
(note that either or both must be zero),
case (i): A < (managerial behavior).
2
(130),
From (132), x = x, and then from (131), A =
dUiL
iL dx
iL r tt /In ttL -i in
sr Cu il + (t^> u x+ i] + p iH ssr
From
+ ^t UiH + <!*?> <+ l]< °
(133)
The interpretation of (133) is that the expected value of
discounted returns could be increased were it not for the profit
constraint preventing the firm from adopting a more managerial
posture.
case (ii): X > (traditional behavior).
i
From (131), x = 1, and then from (132), \ = 0. From
2
(130), the inequality in (133) is reversed, which is interpreted
to mean that, not only is the firm maximizing current period
total profit, but the expected value of discounted returns could
be increased if somehow sales revenue and/or managerial emoluments
could be traded for additional profit,
case (iii): \ = X =0 (the intermediate case).
1 2
In this case equality holds in (133) and U is an un-
T
constrained maximum. Greater insight is achieved by rearranging
terms in (133) - reexpressed as an equality - to obtain:
dp iL i _ T dP,




1 + —\ u + ( -1 ) uH 1L iL ^l+r ; x+l J dx L iH ^l+r ; x + 1dx
T T
(134)





_{ p il -air + p ih ~dx7 }
It is shown below in theorem I 11-10 that the expression on the
left-hand side of (134) must be positive whether i = L or
i = H, and it is further shown in "theorem 111-10 that the expression
in braces on the right-hand side of (134) must be negative whether
i = L or i = H. The left-hand side of (134) can be interpreted
as the marginal value of adopting a more traditional operating
posture (i.e. increasing x ), which is expressed in terms of
the impact on the present value of discounted total returns
of an increased likelihood of transitioning to H. The right-
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hand side of (134) can be interpreted as the negative of the
marginal cost of adopting a more traditional operating posture,
which is expressed in terms of the expected decrease in immediate
returns resulting from such a change in posture. Thus, (134)
is the familiar marginal value equals (in absolute value) marginal
cost necessary condition for optimality, this time applied to
the choice of optimal operating posture. Moreover, the nature
of the 'marginal value' and 'marginal cost' make clear the trade
off that must be made between the improved likelihood of transitionin
to the more favorable state of the environment on the one hand
and increased immediate returns on the other.
Cases (i) and (ii) suggest that under certain conditions
the firm's optimal operating posture would alternate between
the managerial mode of behavior and the traditional mode of
behavior. This is stated formally as the following theorem:
Theorem I 11-10
dU dUiRDefine a. = p. T —-3— + p. u —5— and define1 *iL dx *iH dx
T T
6- = -3^ [U. T + (-^) UL^] + —^ [U.„ + (tt-) u"] . For1 dx 1L v l+r y t+1 dx 1H v l+r y t+1
T T
i = L, H, cu < and B. > 0. If aL + 3L > and aR + 3R < 0,
then the firm's behavior will alternate systematically between
the traditional and managerial modes, being managerial in H




./dx < 0. Since the transition probabilitie:
are strictly positive by assumption, it follows that a. < 0,







-^ [ (u . h _ u.^ + (^(U^ - U^+1 )] . From
(122) and the fact that UH
+1 > U
L
+1 it follows that 3. > 0,
i = L, H.
If aL + 3 L > 0, then the inequality in (133) is reversed
and case (ii) applies. The firm adopts the traditional operating
posture. If au + 3tt < 0, then (133) holds and case (i) applies.
The firm adopts the managerial operating posture. Q.E.D.
The importance of theorem 111-10 is that it shows first,
that the marginal value of adopting a more traditional operating
posture, 3.: , is positive whether i = H or i = L and that the
marginal cost of adopting a more traditional operating posture,
a. , is negative whether i = H or i = L; and second, that
the firm's behavior may alternate systematically between the
traditional and managerial modes. If H is interpreted as the
upswing portion of the business cycle and if L is interpreted
as the downswing portion of the business cycle, then theorem 111-10
is interpreted to mean that the firm will act in accordance with
the managerial theories during the upswing and will act in
accordance with the traditional theories during the downswing.
3. Section Summary
This section has generalized the model of O.E. Williamson
and has shown how the behavior of the collective expected utility
maximizer may vary systematically over the business cycle.
It was shown (in (133)) that when the firm's behavior does not
oscillate between these two extremes, the firm is balancing
the marginal value of a change in operating posture against the
(absolute value of the) marginal cost of a change in operating
posture. It was also shown (theorem 111-10) that oscillation
between these two extremes results when marginal value is
675
greater than (less than) marginal cost in absolute value for
all feasible operating postures in state L (state H). The next
section demonstrates similar results for the basic theoretical
model developed in sections B and C of this chapter.
RECONCILING PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AND MANAGERIAL UTILITY
MAXIMIZATION: THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FIRM OVER THE BUSINESS
CYCLE
In this section the model of the firm developed in sections
B and C of this chapter is used to characterize the behavior
of the firm over the business cycle. The two main results
are stated as theorems III-ll and 111-12, the former characterizing
the firm's behavior when future changes in the state of the
firm's operating environment are known with certainty and the
latter characterizing the firm's behavior under uncertainty.
Let the parameter denote the state of the firm's operating
environment. It is again assumed that the firm acts as a price
taker in all possible states of the environment. It is also
assumed that changes in the state of the environment are
instantaneously reflected in changes in the price of output
p, so that p = p(9 ), where 6 denotes the state of the firm's
operating environment at time t. If it is assumed that more
favorable states of the environment are associated with higher
product price, then dp/d6 > for all 9.
The business cycle is interpreted in terms of variations
in 9 as a sequence of periods in which 9 is alternatively
rising and falling. During the upswing the firm's operating
environment becomes more favorable, and 9 and p increase.
During the downswing the firm's operating environment becomes
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less favorable, and and p decrease. Theorem I 11-11 characterizes
the behavior of output (as reflected in changes in labor usage,
L) , investment, and managerial emoluments over the business
cycle.
Theorem I 11-11
For the collective utility maximizer modeled in (11), both
investment and managerial emoluments vary systematically over
the business cycle: increasing during the upswing and decreasing
during the downswing. Total output follows the same pattern
R 3(3U /3R)provided - ~ ,,, • ^ < 1 at the margin.
i
Proof
To prove the first statement it is sufficient to show that
dl/de > and dM/d0 > 0. Necessary condition (19) implicitly
defines I as a function of . By the implicit function theorem,
2tt / <ir»2 \ /- -i _ \— i x « \ jj , tt t \ , _ * j. x x _ rt
dl v ° i(3
Z U /3D')(l-x)p'(0) f(K, L)(-q(t))e
l
== > . (135)d6 (3 2 U /3D 2 )[q(t)] 2 e""rt
By the same argument applied to (20),
, M (3
2 U /3D 2 )(l-T) 2 p'(0)f(K, L)(-l)e_rt
£f = - l —r- > . (136)a0 [(3 2 U /3D 2 )(1-t) 2 + (3 2 U /3M 2 )]e rt
To prove the second statement it is sufficient to show that
R 3(3U /3R)
dL/d0 > when - , TT " p ^ < 1. It follows from (18)' du / on dK
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2 U ^ 9U , 2 ^ 9 2U
V1 , t r 1,, 3f N 2 1 9 f 1,- v2/ 3f s2
91/ ulJ uxv 9L 2 9D
9
2 f n -rtn ri , 9
2
- ] e + m (l-x)p
3L 2 ' 1 9L 2
(139)
9D
i(l-T)p.-2-^. x u T)p.
<
.
Combining (138) and (139) gives the desired result. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorem III-ll is that the behavior
of the collective utility maximizer varies systematically over
the business cycle. During the upswing, with price increasing,
its opportunities for exercising managerial discretion increase.
In particular, managerial emoluments increase. At the same
time, both total revenue and investment increase, and with
t fixed, the firm can increase revenue and managerial emoluments
while still satisfying the profit constraint. Moreover, the
increased investment signifies growth, which is an important
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a.
source of managerial utility. It is also possible - and indeed
likely - that the firm will also increase dividend payments
to shareholders so that they benefit from the improved business
environment as well.
During the downswing, however, price falls and managers'
discretion to pursue their own objectives decreases as the
need to generate sufficient earnings to meet the profit constraint
becomes increasingly important. In particular, managerial
140
emoluments fall. This notion of a shrinking opportunity
set for managers is best illustrated by reexpressing the minimum
net income constraint (7) as a constraint on managerial emoluments,
as was done in section C. This procedure leads to the constraint
M < p(6)-f(K, L) - wL - q6K - tt /(1-t)
° (140)
E M(K, L, 7T
o
,6) .
From (140) it is easily seen that 8M/89 = p'(9)f(K, L) > 0.
During the upswing M increases with and so does the degree
of managerial discretion, while during the downswing M decreases
with 6 and so does the degree of managerial discretion.
Before proving the second main result of this section, the
requirement that
R 3(3U /9R)
— < 1 (141)
8U /9R 3R
l
at the margin in theorem III-ll deserves comment. The left-
hand side of (141) can be interpreted as the elasticity of the
marginal utility of total revenue with respect to a change
in total revenue. According to theorem III-ll, output will
vary cyclically if the elasticity of the marginal utility of
total revenue with respect to a change in total revenue is less
than one at the margin. If the inequality in (141) is reversed,
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however, output may fall as the firm's operating environment
improves - i.e. output may behave countercyclically . This
9
2 U
happens when - is 'large'
,
which means that the marginal
3R 2
utility of revenue is falling 'rapidly'. In effect, then, rapidly
falling marginal utility of revenue causes the firm to restrain
the rate of growth of revenue so that dividends and managerial
emoluments (which are relatively more important at the margin
due to the rapid decrease in 3U /3R) can be increased. The
direction of the inequality in (141) can be viewed as an indicator
of whether this shift in objectives has occurred.
The second main result of this section is stated as the
following theorem:
Theorem 111-12
For the expected collective utility maximizer modeled in (79),
both investment and managerial emoluments vary systematically
over the business cycle: increasing during the upswing and
decreasing during the downswing. Total output follows the
same pattern provided
S 2 U SU 3 2 U
E{[ L R + TvFr^ff + m-T) 2 f(K,L)[(p(9) + Y )|f - w]}e" rt > ,
3R 2 3R dL 3D 2 3L
where y is a shift parameter.
Remark
In section C the parameter 9 was used to denote the distribution
of p at each time t. To indicate the change in the firm's operating
environment under uncertainty the additive shift parameter
Y is added to p(9). This has the effect of shifting the entire
141
probability distribution of p without altering its shape.
680
After adding the shift parameter, price is given by p = p(.e ) + y
Proof of Theorem I I 1-12
The method of proof is similar to that used in proving
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It follows from (85) and the implicit function theorem that
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Combining (143) and (145) gives dL/dy > 0. Q.E.D.
It should be noted that (144) is analogous to (141), though
the latter is more complicated in form due to the presence of
the expectations operator and due also to the fact that
3 f
(p(6) + y )-jTj- - w < cannot be assured under uncertainty.
This section has modeled the behavior of the firm over
143the business cycle. As in the two-state model developed
in section D, it was shown that the behavior of the firm varies
systematically over the business cycle. The importance of these
results (theorems III-ll and 111-12) is that they suggest a
possible reconciliation of the traditional and managerial theories
of the firm. During the upswing managers have relatively
more discretion than they do during the downswing, since the
profit constraint is more easily satisfied, and managers are
freer to pursue their own objectives. During the downswing their
discretion is restricted due to the need to generate sufficient
earnings with which to satisfy the minimum profit constraint.
Hence, it is this writer's opinion that the 'pure' managerial
models are best interpreted as models of the behavior of the
firm during the upswing, and that the traditional models are




In this chapter the modern corporate enterprise was modeled,
first under certainty and then under uncertainty, as a constrained
optimal control problem. The firm was modeled as a discounted
collective utility maximizer, and under uncertainty, as a discounted
expected collective utility maximizer (in each case over a
finite planning horizon), where collective utility was expressed
as a function of total sales revenue, total dividends paid, and
managerial emoluments, (and also indirectly, growth), and where
the trade offs embodied in the collective utility function were
assumed to be established by the corporate board of directors.
Collective utility maximization was modeled as taking place
subject to an exogenously determined minimum net income constraint,
and subject to an appropriately formulated probabilistic minimum
net income constraint in the uncertainty case.
The model of the firm under certainty, the optimal operating
policies implied by the model, and the sensitivity of these
policies to changes in key parameters were presented in section B.
It was shown that such a firm would behave like a Baumol sales
maximizer and would tend to produce more output than a short
run profit maximizer. It was also shown that the equilibrium
operating policies selected by the firm could be used to
characterize an implicit ranking at the margin of the sales
revenue, dividends, and managerial emoluments objectives.
It was further shown that the extent of managerial discretion,
as indicated by whether or not the profit constraint is binding,
had a significant impact on the behavior of the firm, and that
when the profit constraint is binding, the effect of a change
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in the tax rate on the behavior of the firm can be expressed
as a Hicks-Slutsky-type equation.
The model of the firm under certainty was extended to incorporate
uncertainty in section C. It was shown that the presence of
uncertainty causes the risk averse firm to produce less output
than it would under certainty, but that for the quantity-setting
firm at least, the presence of uncertainty does not alter the
firm's expansion path. It was also shown that an increase in
the required probability of meeting the profit constraint would
cause the firm to reduce output, and further, that changes in
either the minimum net income level or the tax rate would elicit
the same qualitative responses under uncertainty as they did
in the certainty case.
Two models of the behavior of the firm that can be interpreted
in terms of the business cycle were developed in sections D
and E. The first, a two-state Markov model, generalized a model
previously developed by O.E. Williamson. The second, a multi-
state model, was based more directly on the models developed
in sections B and C of this chapter. Each model was used to
show that the behavior of the (expected) collective utility
maximizer tends to vary systematically over the business cycle,
with the firm's behavior during the upswing more closely fitting
that which would be predicted on the basis of the managerial
models and with its behavior during the downswing more closely
fitting that which would be predicted on the basis of the
traditional models of the firm.
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This chapter was mainly concerned with modeling the behavior
of the firm over the business cycle - or at least with modeling
the firm's behavior subject to a pattern of variation in the
state of its operating environment that could be interpreted
in terms of the business cycle. To focus on the impact of
these external factors in real terms, the analysis abstracted
from both financial factors and the role of resource allocation
within the firm. The purpose of the next two chapters is to
explore the implications of each of these for the behavior of
the firm of the type modeled in this chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE FOOTNOTES
1. This introductory section is intended to serve as both
an executive summary of chapter two - in order that chapter
three be essentially self-contained - and an introduction
to this chapter's discussion of the author's research
results concerning the behavior of the firm over the
business cycle.
2. Hereafter in this paper the 'traditional' models and the
'modern traditional' models of the firm will be referred
to collectively as the 'traditional theory of the firm'.
3. Such models involve a single time period and typically
assume certainty. See sections B through E of chapter
two. See also subsection 2 of section I of chapter two
for a discussion of a profit maximization model due to
Vickers that permits uncertainty, but subsumes its impact
within the functional form of the average interest rate
on debt funtion.
4. Such models typically involve a single time period and
normally assume certainty. See sections F and L of
chapter two. See also subsection 2 of section I of chapter
two for a discussion of a single period stock market
value maximization model.
5. See the discussion of the Lintner model in section J of
chapter two.
6. See the discussion of the Meyer model in subsection 3
of section K of chapter two.
7. See the discussion of Leland's models of the quantity-
setting firm and the price-setting firm in subsection
2 of section K of chapter two. Under the assumption
that owners are risk neutral, this objective function
can be simplified to one of maximizing expected profit.
8. See the discussion of Leland's model of the firm in the
context of stock market equilibrium in subsection 4 of
section K of chapter two.
9. See footnotes 4, 6, and 7 of chapter one for references
to empirical studies.
10. See the discussion of the Baumol sales maximization model
in subsection la of section G of chapter two.
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11. See the discussions of the Baumol growth maximization
model in subsection lb and the Marris growth maximization
model in subsection 2a of section G and the discussion
of the Herendeen model in subsection 3 of section I
of chapter two.
12. See the discussion of the Marris utility maximization
model in subsection 2b of section G of chapter two.
13. See the discussion of the O.E. Williamson model in
subsection 3 of section G of chapter two.
14. See the discussion of Leland's managerial model in
subsection 3b of section L of chapter two.
15. See section G, and in particular subsections 2c and
4, of chapter two for a discussion of some of this
empirical evidence.
16. As, for example, the study by Kuehn that attempts to
determine whether firms maximize profits or growth.
Kuehn , Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm: An
Empirical Analysis for the United Kingdom, 1957-1969
,
op. cit.




18. Solow, op. cit.
19. Leland, Why Profit Maximization May Be A Better Assumption
Than You Think
,
op. cit. The managerial model developed
by Leland is discussed in subsection 3b of section L
of chapter two.
20. Wong, op. cit. Wong's model is discussed in subsection
3a of section L of chapter two.
21. See section H of chapter two.
22. See also Machlup, op. cit
.
,
on this point. Indeed,
if the behavior of firms under objectives other than
profit (or value) maximization is consistent with
profit- (or value-) maximizing behavior, the assumption
of profit (or value) maximization might have the advantage
of greater mathematical tractability and might therefore
permit a wider range of phenomena to be modeled.
23. During the long upswing of the 1960s, economists became
complacent regarding the business cycle. There was a
general feeling that the careful application of Keynesian
demand management policies would strongly dampen the
amplitude of cyclical fluctuations. But as a recent
conference of economists concluded - and as the recent
recession would seem to bear out - the business cycle
is not (yet at least) obsolete. See M. Bronfenbrenner
,
ed. , Is the Business Cycle Obsolete? (Wiley-Interscience;
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New York; 1969). See also "The business cycle is alive
and well," Business Week (April 19, 1976).
24. One of the classic works relating to the business cycle
is J. Duesenberry, Business Cycles and Economic Growth
(McGraw-Hill; New York; 1958). A discussion of various
models of the business cycle can be found in S. Bober,
The Economics of Cycles and Growth (Wiley; New York;
1968). The history of U.S. business cycles, including
the 'long cycle' of 1961-70, can be found in M.W. Lee,
Macroeconomics: Fluctuations, Growth, and Stability
,
5th ed. (Irwin; Homewood, 111; 1971). The business
cycle, particularly as it affects manufacturing firms,
is discussed in T. Hultgren, Cost, Prices, and Profits:
Their Cyclical Relations (Columbia University Press;
New York; 1965).
25. The recent post-recession upsurge in profits has been
heralded widely in the business literature. See, for
example, "First Quarter's Spurt In Corporate Earnings
Is Steepest in 17 Years," Wall Street Journal (April 29,
1976); "Profits: Better than expected," Business
Week (May 17, 1976); and "Profits are growing across
the board," Business Week (August 2, 1976). The upswing
has also improved the sales outlook for most industries.
See, for example, "Semiconductor Makers See the Recovery
From '75 Slump Gaining Strength in '77," Wall Street
Journal (March 16, 1977), and "Ford Motor Chairman
Says Neither Profit Nor Market Share Is Strong as
Possible," Wall Street Journal (May 14, 1976).
26. See, for example, "Mergers, Acquisitions Come Back
Into Style - But the Style Is New," Wall Street Journal
(April 28, 1976), and "A seller's market in executive
talent," Business Week (July 5, 1976).
27. See, for example, "Westinghouse ' s Ongoing Business
Posts Profit Drop," Wall Street Journal (January 30,
1975); "GE: Not Recession Proof, But Recession Resistant,"
Forbes (March 15, 1975); and "The recession balks
Genesco's turnaround," Business Week (July 7, 1975).
28. See, for example, "Capital Budgets Are Cut by Firms
Due to Recession," Wall Street Journal (March 10,
1975), and "Firms Spend Warily In Planning Spending
On Plant, Equipment," Wall Street Journal (November
10, 1975).
29. See, for example, "A & P to Close Third Of Its Stores,
Set $195 Million Reserve," Wall Street Journal (March
14, 1975); "Westinghouse Moves To Halt Old Drains
And Avoid New Ones," Wall Street Journal (March 7,
1975); "Firms Drop Operations To Lower Their Costs
And Preserve Capital," Wall Street Journal (March 17,
1975); and "How High-Flying Firm Came Crashing Down
And Survived the Fall," Wall Street Journal (August
19, 1975).
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30. See, for example, Mergers, Acquisitions Come Back Into





and A seller '
s
market in executive talent
,
op. cit.
31. See, for example, "Hercules: A plan that failed,"
Business Week (December 1, 1975), and "More Firms Slow
Drive For Growth, Bid to Lift Return on Investment,"
Wall Street Journal (December 16, 1975). This tendency
is more pronounced among smaller, less diversified
companies. See "Small Business: The maddening struggle
to survive," Business Week (June 30, 1975).
32. See, for example, "How American Standard cured its
conglomeritis , " Business Week (September 28, 1974);
"Bludhorn the raider as elder statesman," Business
Week (January 20, 1975); Westinghouse Moves To Halt





cured its conglomerate fever," Business Week (April
7, 1975); "Why the profits vanished at Singer," Business
Week (June 30, 1975); "Bringing Order to a Billion-
Dollar Empire," Business Week (September 8, 1975);
"With A Little Bit Of Luck," Forbes (December 15,
1975); and "The Hard Road of the Food Processors,"
Business Week (March 8, 1976). In each case the emphasis
shifted from growth to profits.
33. R.M. Cyert , "Oligopoly Price Behavior and the Business
Cycle," Journal of Political Economy (vol. 63; no. 1;
February 1955), pp. 41-51; W.A.H. Godley and W.D. Nordhaus,
"Pricing in the Trade Cycle," Economic Journal (vol. 82;
no. 327; September 1972), pp. 853-882; R.L. Nelson,
"Business Cycle Factors in the Choice between Internal
and External Growth," in W. Alberts and J. Segall,
eds
.
, The Corporate Merger (University of Chicago Press;
Chicago; 1966), pp. 52-66; and D.J. Aigner and CM. Sprenkle,
"On Optimal Financing of Cyclical Cash Needs," Journal
of Finance (vol. 28; no. 5; December 1973), pp. 1249-
1254.





; K.J. Arrow, Optimal Capital Policy
with Irreversible Investment
,
op. cit. (see subsection
2 of section L of chapter two); and E.M. Birch and
CD. Siebert, "Uncertainty, Permanent Demand, and
Investment Behavior," American Economic Review (vol.
66; no. 1; March 1976), pp. 15-27.
35. R. Stone, "A Dynamic Model of Demand," in H. Townsend,
ed.
, Price Theory (Penguin; Middlesex, England; 1971),
pp. 155-169, and A. A. Alchian, "Costs and Outputs,"
in Townsend, Price Theory
,
pp. 228-249.
36. L.J. Maccini, "An Aggregative Dynamic Model of Short-
Run Price and Output Behavior," Quarterly Journal of
Economics (vol. 90; no. 2; May 1976), pp. 177-196,
and E.A. Kervinen, "An Adaptive Production Planning
Model for Seasonal Goods," Management Sciences Research
Report No. 355 (Graduate School of Industrial Administration,
Carnegie-Mellon University; Pittsburgh; December 1974).
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37. See sections J and K of chapter two and the references
provided therein. See also A.J. Douglas, "Stochastic
Returns and the Theory of the Firm," American Economic
Review (vol. 63; no. 2; May 1973), pp. 129-133; Birch
and Siebert, op. cit
.
; M.C. Gupta, "Optimal Financing
Policy for a Firm with Uncertain Fund Requirements,"
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (vol.
8; no. 5; December 1973), pp. 731-747; and S. Wu,
R. Rozek, and D. Dutton, "The Effects of Uncertainty
on the Firm's Demand for Money," Working Paper Series
No. 75-13 (College of Business Administration, The
University of Iowa; Iowa City; June 1975).
38. There has been some debate in recent years as to how
powerful boards of directors really are. See the




and R. Malik, And Tomorrow . . . The World?
Inside IBM (Millington; London; 1975). The latter points
out that the real decision-making power at IBM in recent
years has resided in the Management Review Committee,
rather than the Board of Directors. However, for many
years this committee included a member of the Watson
family, who were the major shareholders. Hence, even
where the board of directors is relatively weak, this
does not imply that shareholder objectives are ignored.
The form of the collective utility function presented
below is general enough to permit different implicit
weightings to be attached to shareholder and managerial
objectives, so that different degrees of 'management
domination' of the board of directors, management review
committee, or whatever, and even the extreme case of
a board of directors dominated by an autocratic chairman,
can be accommodated. It is assumed, however, that regardless
of the composition of the primary decision-making body,
shareholder objectives are considered explicitly when
then firm's policies are formulated.
39. As in the Baumol sales maximization model discussed
in subsection la of section G of chapter two.
40. See the introduction to section G of chapter two.
41. As in the O.E. Williamson model discussed in subsection
3 of section G of chapter two.






p. 1035. See also subsection 3
of section G of chapter two.
43. As in the Baumol sales growth maximization model discussed
in subsection lb of section G of chapter two and in
the Marris growth maximization and managerial utility
maximization models discussed in subsection 2 of section
G of chapter two. Unlike these models, however, the
model developed below will not require steady state
growth.
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44. See the introduction to section G of chapter two.
45. As in the modern traditional models that assume stock
market value maximization. See sections F and L of
chapter two.
46. The reason for including this second source, rather
than merely conjecturing present and future dividends
(suitably discounted) over an infinite time horizon,
will be made clear below.
47. However, dividend payments could be a direct source
of satisfaction if top managers and directors own
shares of the company and if the dividends they receive
form a significant portion of their incomes. In this
case, of course, the top managers and directors who
have significant share holdings might be expected to
make personal trade offs of the sort embodied in the
collective utility function U given below in (1).
i
48. See the introduction to subsection 2 of section G of
chapter two. Marris incorporated this factor directly
into the managerial utility function in the form of
the firm's valuation ratio. See subsection 2b of
section G of chapter two.
49. See, for example, "Battle of Titans," Newsweek (June
10, 1974); "Ruthlessness By The Rules," Forbes (February
1, 1976); and "Posner Prowls Again," Newsweek (August
9, 1976).
50. Under certainty and perfect capital markets, the share
price will, in stock market equilibrium, equal the
discounted stream of dividends that would be paid to
the holder of that share. See subsection 1 of section
I of chapter two.
51. A common ploy used to thwart a takeover attempt is
to increase the annual dividend rate (per share), as
Foremost-McKesson Inc. recently did (in spite of lower
quarterly net income). See "Foremost-McKesson Meeting
Dominated By Absent V. Posner," Wall Street Journal
(July 30, 1976). Microdot Inc. employed the same tactic.
See "Microdot struggles to stay single," Business Week
(February 2, 1976).
52. A similar approach (a 'managerial-owner preference
function') has been suggested by Albin and Alcaly.
See P.S. Albin and R.E. Alcaly, "Corporate Objectives
and the Economy: Systematic Shifts between Growth and
Profit Goals," Journal of Economic Issues (vol. 10;
no. 2; June 1976), p. 277.









54. The transitivity property requires that if society
prefers alternative A to alternative B and if it also
prefers alternative B to alternative C, then it must
also prefer alternative A to alternative C. That
is, preferences must be consistent. However, it is
easily shown that majority voting - the most obvious










57. It should be noted that in the certainty case the decisions
made at time zero for any time t, < t <_ T, are the
same as those that would be made at time t. That is,
open loop control (all decisions made at t = 0) and
closed loop control (decisions made sequentially) yield





pp. 299-302, on this point.
58. If these functions change in a real time sense, then
open loop control and closed loop control do not yield
identical results in terms of actual behavior. See
preceding footnote. In that case interpreting the
models developed below as planning models becomes
important
.




60. How effective boards of directors are in promoting the
interests of shareholders (i.e. to what extent they
are selected by and dominated by top management) is
a moot point. See "Outside Directors Get More Careful,
Tougher After Payoff Scandals," Wall Street Journal
(March 24, 1976); "Annual Meeting Time," Forbes (April
15, 1976); and Brown, op. cit. Differences in effectiveness
would, of course, affect the specific functional forms
of Ui and U 2 , and in particular, the trade offs between
dividends and other objectives.
61. The derivation of (2) follows. From the definition
of g,
K(T) = K(0)-(1 + g) T . (*)
Dividing each side of (*) by K(0), taking logarithms,
and solving for g yields (2).
62. Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital , op . cit
.
,













65. It should be repeated that the functional forms Ui and
U2 are assumed to be stable during the planning cycle.
692
They may change in a real time sense - in a manner
suggested by the behavioralists - when the planning
cycle repeats. See footnotes 57 and 58.
66. In particular, the assumption that f has a full set
of continuous second partial derivatives implies that
f is continuous with respect to K and with respect
3
2 f
In addition, it is normallyto L and that d
2 f
3L3K 8K8L *
assumed that the production function f is strictly
concave (or at least locally strictly concave) in order
to satisfy the sufficiency conditions for an optimum.
Strict concavity requires that
3
2 f „ „ 9*f n 9





8L- 8K' 8L 2 8K 2 8L9K
67. The direct contribution of managers to production is
allowed for in the composite labor index L(t) and their
opportunity cost, the market-determined 'wage rate'
for managers, is allowed for in the composite wage index
w(t). The definition of managerial emoluments in the
text is consistent with O.E. Williamson's. O.E. Williamson,






68. It is assumed here that depreciation for tax purposes
is figured on this basis only, so that the amount of
depreciation expense is equal to the product of the
amount of depreciation in physical units, <5*K(t), and
the unit value of capital goods, q(t). It should be
noted that replacement cost accounting is not generally
practiced in the United States, although it is used
in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. See
A.J.H. Enthoven, "Replacement-Value Accounting: Wave
of the Future?," Harvard Business Review (January-
February 1976), and "Inflation Accounting: Report
of the Inflation Accounting Committee," Cmnd Document
6225 (H.M. Stationery Office; London; 1975). Moreover,
a recent decision by the Securities and Exchange
Commission requiring companies to provide replacement
cost data in the notes to their financial statements,
as well as the strong support that exists for replacement
cost accounting in the business and accounting communities,
suggests that it may become general accounting practice
in the United States in the not-too-distant future.
See Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting Series
Release No. 190 (Washington, D.C.; March 1976) and
"SEC Adopts Disclosure Rules for Replacement Costs,"
Journal of Accountancy (May 1976), pp. 11-12. See also
J.C. Burton, "Financial Reporting in an Age of Inflation,"
Journal of Accountancy (February 1975); F.T. Weston,
"Adjust Your Accounting for Inflation," Harvard Business
Review (January-February 1975); R.F. Vancil, "Inflation
Accounting - The Great Controversy," Harvard Business
Review (March-April 1976); and "How Recently Issued
Accounting Rules Are Affecting Corporate Annual Reports,"
Wall Street Journal (March 30, 1977). Therefore, the
assumption of replacement cost accounting is not, in
the opinion of this writer, unreasonable.
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69. It is assumed in this chapter that the firm owns all
its capital and that it has no bonds outstanding, so
that no rental expense and no interest expense show
up in the firm's income statement.
70. The importance of (7) will become clearer in chapter
four where the firm will also be required to generate
sufficient pretax income to meet bond interest obligations.
71. See subsection G of chapter two.
72. See R.W. Clower, "A Reconsideration of the Microfoundations
of Monetary Theory," Western Economic Journal (vol. 6;
no. 1; December 1967), pp. 1-8. Under uncertainty,
however, the firm may have several motives for holding
cash. Traditionally, these motives have been categorized
as a transactions demand for cash (i.e. for use in normal
transactions such as purchasing inputs), a precautionary
demand for cash (e.g. to pay bond interest when pretax
income is insufficient, and to thereby prevent bankruptcy),
and a speculative demand for cash (e.g. to hold cash in
anticipation of price changes favorable to the firm
and its planned purchase of some capital asset).
D. Patinkin, Money, Interest, and Prices
,
2nd ed.
(Harper & Row; New York; 1965). The role of cash is
explored in chapter four of this thesis.
3U /8R 3U /9M
73. That is, 3U / 8tt 4 and ~„ l ,~ and .* ir. both exist\' ' 9U /8tt d\J /3tt
for all R
_> and for all M _> 0.
74. As shown below, the firm modeled in (11), like the Baumol
sales maximizer, will tend to produce more output than
a short run profit maximizer. Such a firm could increase
profits by reducing output, thereby having additional
funds with which to purchase new plant and equipment.
Therein lies the trade off between revenue and capital
embodied in the Hamiltonian (12).
75. The nonnegativity constraint on the firm's capital stock
at each time t might be considered explicitly if, for
example, the firm were permitted to go bankrupt (i.e.
to jail), with K(t) = used as the indicator of bankruptcy.











pp. 648-649. As in the case of static optimization,
conditions (13)-(15) are necessary provided the "constraint
qualification" holds. For conditions that provide the




78. This is perfectly analogous to the interpretation given
the maximization of the Hamiltonians in section L of
chapter two.
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79. Note that even though the Lagrangian (17) applies to
a single point in time, whereas the Lagrangian (13)
applies to the period <_ t <_ T, the value of Mi must
be the same for each time t in both (13) and (17) when
the firm is in multiperiod equilibrium. Hence, there
are no conceptual difficulties involved in using the
same symbol in (13) and (17).
80. Note that this follows if it is assumed (as is normally
done) that the production function is strictly concave.
It also follows under weaker assumptions (e.g. local
strict concavity). See footnote 66.
81. That is, one dollar less in managerial emoluments enables
the firm to pay out an additional 1 - t dollars in dividends
(the other t dollars must be paid in taxes).
82. See subsection la of section G in chapter two of this
thesis
.
83. Note what happens when tt approaches the maximum short




















(*) is undefined when p« _3_f3L - w = (the necessary
condition for selecting the short run profit maximizing
level of labor usage). The interpretation of (*)
is that the implicit price of meeting the constraint
increases as it increases, becoming infinite as tt
o o
approaches the short run maximum level of total profit.
]) 3H
In the intermediate case, — = (1 - t) and -~tt =
u 3M
Both constraints are binding, and by coincidence, the
Hamiltonian is simultaneously a maximum with respect
to M.
Recall that Mi and Vi have discount factors built into
them. That is, y
x
and M 2 are shadow prices expressed
in terms of present value. The factor er t "undoes
the discounting" in order to convert the expression
into one in terms of current value units.
Note that the inequalities that result in cases (i)-
(iv) are insensitive to the particular utility scale
adopted for U
1
. That is, since preference orderings
are invariant under monotonically increasing transformations
of the utility scale, the results summarized in theorem
III-l are independent of the utility scale. This also
means, however, that no quantitative significance can
be attached to differences of marginal utilities, as
these differences are scale sensitive.
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87. Note that this procedure has the effect of converting
from an ordinal scale, e.g. 8U/9D, to a ratio scale,
e.g. ( 8U/8D)/( 9U/3M) . This compensates for the arbitrariness
of the utility scale (see footnote 86) since any monotonically
increasing transformation of U will affect numerator
and denominator proportionately, and therefore not affect
the value of the ratio.
88. It deserves to be emphasized that the orderings of
objectives given below hold at the margin when the
firm is in equilibrium. That is, the orderings describe
the firm's relative preferences with regard to marginal
increments in the values of the arguments of its utility
function when the firm is in equilibrium. They do
not imply, for example, that under some circumstances
9 f 9 f(i.e. - (P*"3f - w) < P*-^r) the firm would always most
prefer an increment in dividends to equal increments
in total revenue and managerial emoluments regardless
of the values of these other variables.
89
7\ -F 3 -f
Recall that < P'-gj- < w, so that P'-gy - w < 0, in
each of the four cases considered above.
90. The reason for introducing this concept is that it
will be needed below in interpreting the possible





^w < P'-jvr , i.e. the marginal revenue
product of labor exceeds one half the wage rate.
This, together with lemma III-l, implies that when
- (p*"jvf - w) < P'-jvT the marginal revenue product of
labor is less than the wage rate but greater than one
half the wage rate. Similarly,




-9L " w) <^^ iw > p-^-
In the latter case, the marginal revenue product of
labor is less than one half the wage rate.
92. That is, the analysis proceeds in terms of the inequality
^ "F <T /^ "F
- ( l-x)(p« -jt^- - wH^P'-gf > which is equivalent to
( l^F )p 'lf {^ } " (p '!f " W) in ( i:Li )-( v ) in theorem III-2.
Making this conversion simplifies the exposition.










94. See equation (281) in chapter two. Here the term 'cost
of capital' is used in the sense of the economist's
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'price' of capital, rather than in the sense of the
financial 'cost of raising money capital'.
95. This implies that the firm is rational in the sense
that it employs capital only in the region within which
the marginal physical product of capital is positive -
a result that also has been shown to hold for the
short run profit maximizer. See section B of chapter
two.
96. Similarly, note that for case (i) considered above,
(24) can be rewritten as
w = p-^L + [ ( 1-t ;p 31/ 3U /3D ; J ' (*)
which is analogous to (40). The expression in brackets
on the right-hand side of (*) can be interpreted as
the pretax income equivalent (in terms of collective
utility) of a marginal change in sales revenue. The
right-hand side of (*) can be interpreted as the adjusted
marginal revenue product of labor (which is figured
pretax) and condition (*) is interpreted as the requirement
that in equilibrium the firm modeled in (11) will hire
labor up to the point at which its adjusted marginal
revenue product just equals its marginal cost (under
perfect competition in factor markets, the wage rate).
Cases (ii)-(iv) yield the same condition, but with
3Ui/3D + u 1 er 't in place of 3Ui/3D in (*) when the
minimum profit constraint is binding. Thus (*) above
and (40) in the text are the logical extensions of the
neoclassical equilibrium criteria to the case of the
firm modeled in (11).
For ease of exposition only case (i) developed above
is considered here. The analysis for the other cases
would proceed analogously.
See equation (284) in chapter two.
Recall that it has been assumed that the firm owns its
capital, rather than rents it, so that there is no interest
cost shown on the firm's income statement. See table
III-l. If the firm rented some portion of its capital,
then the firm would be concerned about this cost in
addition to ( 1 - x)q6 when the constraint tt ^ tt
was binding.
Another interpretation of theorem III-3 is that in
long run equilibrium, in which prices, interest rates,
input levels, output levels, etc., would be determined
such that each firm's input mix would lead to minimum
cost in both the accounting sense and the economic
sense, the condition r = q/q implies that equilibrium
interest rates are determined by real factors and not
by monetary factors (i.e. the equilibrium price of
capital goods, q, expressed as an interest rate,




101. For completeness, it should be noted that sufficiency
conditions could be established from a theorem proved
by Kamien and Schwartz. See M.I. Kamien and N.L. Schwartz,
"Sufficient Conditions in Optimal Control Theory,"
Journal of Economic Theory (vol. 3; no. 2; June 1971),
pp. 207-214. This was not done in the text since the
list of conditions is lengthy and is not for the most
part amenable to economic interpretation. It should
also be noted that Kamien ' s and Schwartz's result is
more general than Mangasarian ' s , which was referred
to earlier in this thesis. Mangasarian, op. cit.
102. A simiJar result has been obtained by Yarrow via a
geometric approach using Baumol's sales maximization
model. See G.K. Yarrow, "On the Predictions of Managerial
Theories of the Firm," Journal of Industrial Economics
(vol. 24; no. 4; June 1976), pp. 267-279.
103. Note that
r > q/q£_ > rq - q > <p^
If also
3Ui/3D < y^ 1** ,
then it follows from (47)
that
3L/3K < ,
and the firm's expansion
path is negatively sloped,




104. Note that conditions (58) are necessary but not sufficient
for -t—(8L/8K) < 0. Thus, even when the firm's expansion
path is negatively sloped, as in the figure in the previous
footnote, -7—(3L/8K) may still be positive. In order that
dr^9K ; u *> ;
it is necessary that not only (58) hold, but that
1 - r(r - q/q) - -1 ,
which requires that r be large (at least ( /5 - l)/2
- 0.618) and that the price of capital goods be falling
rapidly (i.e. q/q - -1). Thus, (*) will hold only
under (these) exceptional circumstances.
105. Hicks, Value and Capital , op. cit
.
,
ch. 2 and pp. 307-




pp. 100-105. See also Takayama, op . cit
.
,










I=constant prices^ const ant
where q. and p. are the quantity demanded and the price,
respectively, of the i-th good and where I is the consumer's
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income. The first terra in (*) corresponds to the
substitution effect and the second term corresponds




As demonstrated in the proof of theorem I I 1-4, the
derivation of the Hicks-Slutsky-type equation when
L and M vary involves the inverse of a 3 by 3 matrix.
If I were also permitted to vary, the derivation would
involve the inverse of a 4 by 4 matrix, thus making










-(l-T)(p.-j^- - W) i -rt- e
3M-








1 < 0, while by (62), det H >
That is, the price increase causes real income to fall.
This fall in real income is tantamount to the budget
constraint becoming 'tighter'. In consumer theory
a 'normal' (or 'superior') good is one the quantity
demanded of which varies directly with (real) income.
Under the assumptions stated in the theorem, total
sales revenue is a 'normal good' with respect to the
collective utility of the firm.
In particular, a tax rate increase intended as a deflationary
policy action may lead to increases, rather than decreases,
in output (and hence increases in demand for inputs
such as labor) in certain sectors of the economy,
thereby increasing inflationary pressures in those
sectors. Note also that when the profit constraint
is not binding, an increase in the tax rate will tend
to increase managerial utility at the expense of shareholder
utility by causing sales revenue and managerial emoluments
to increase and dividends to decrease (or at least, it
will tend to cause managerial utility to rise relative
to shareholder utility as sales revenue and managerial
emoluments increase relative to dividends). The reverse
tends to happen when the constraint is binding.





ch. 8. This has also been recognized by Yarrow.










The chief modifications to quantitative results are
handled in the following manner. When the product market
is characterized by imperfect competition, quantity
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demanded is a function of price and the expression
for total revenue becomes R = p*Q = p»Q(p) = p(Q)*Q,
where p = Q~ is obtained by appealing to the inverse
function theorem. Under imperfect competition
9R
. . „ df dp.3f. n , dp _3f
3L " P *3L
+
HQ "51 Q = (P + dQ' Q) 9L ' whereas under
perfect competition -^=- = P'jt since -=§ = 0. Thus
d f
P'-gT- would have to be replaced by
, dp A ,3f(P + dQ #Q) 3L
in condition (18). If there is imperfect competition
in the market for labor, then w = w(L) and
-Ty-(w(L) »L) =
-rf- L + w, and w would have to be replaced by
dw T
-r=— L + WdL
in condition (18)
114. This extension as well as the extension to more than
two inputs can be handled easily in the model by introducing
the implicit production function
F(q, x) = ,
which was discussed in chapters one and two, and by
expressing total revenue as the sum of the amounts
of revenue earned on sales of the n goods and expressing
variable cost as the sum of the amounts spent on the
m variable inputs:
n m
R(q) = .Z 1 p.q. C(x) = .E- w.L. .4 1=1 *iH i j=l j j
If different classes of capital goods were introduced,
then additional differential equations for net investment
of the form K = I - 6*K would have to be introduced
(again assuming depreciation at a constant percentage
rate)
.
115. Sandmo, op . cit
.
,
and Leland, Theory of the Firm Facing
Uncertain Demand (1972) , op. cit.
116. Specifically, from (75),
P{p(e) > f(K
*
L) [ y^- ttq + q.[6«K ]+ wL + M]} > e. (*)
Since p is a monotonically increasing function of 9
,
the probability distribution over G defines a probability
distribution over p, i.e.
G(p(6 )) = P[p(6) < p(6 )] = P[6 < 9 ] = F(0 ) .
l — i — i i
Since by assumption F is a continuously dif ferentiable
function of and p is a dif ferentiable function of
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6 with p'(6) > for all 6, it follows that G is a
dif ferentiat)le function of p. Using the continuity
of G, (*) requires that
1 - G{ f(K
1





L) [ I3? 7TQ + q.[6-K ]+ wL + M] } < 1 - e
[y^- tt + q-[6»K] + wL + M] < G 1 (l-e)f(K,L) L l-x o
M < f(K, D-G^^Cl E) 7TQ q.[6-K]
re G~ denotes the





whe inverse of the cumulative distribution
M(L,K,7T
o
,e) = f(K,L)-G 1 (l-e) - -^ 7tq - q-[6-K] - wL. (**)






|f = f(K, L)-^f G 1 (l-£) = -f(K,L) -^ < ,g(G (1-e))
provided g(G~ (1-e)) f 0, where g(x) = dG/dx.
118. From (**) in footnote 116,
|f = |1 G^Cl - e) - w < (*)
for L sufficiently large since G~ (1-e) and w are fixed
while, by assumption, 8 2 f/8L 2 < 0.
119. For references see footnote 63.
120. Assuming, as in the case of problem (11), that L(t)
and K(t) are both strictly positive at each point along
their respective optimal trajectories. It is also
assumed that M(t) > at each point along its optimal
trajectory. This simplifies the analysis of the model
by reducing by one the number of cases that need to
be considered. Permitting M(t) = can be handled
in the same manner as in the certainty case.




122. Sandmo, op . cit
.
,
and Batra and Ullah, op. cit.
123. Sandmo, op. cit.
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; and Marris, Managerial Capitalism
,
op. cit.
125. See subsection 2 in section L of chapter two of this
thesis for a discussion of the meaning and significance
of 'reversible' and 'irreversible' investment.
126. From footnote 118, —- = — G
_1 (l - e) <
3L 2 3L 2
since 3 2 f/3L 2 < and G~ (1 - e) represents the (1 - e) x 100
percentile of the distribution of output price, which
must be strictly positive. From footnote 117,
|4 - fec-fCK.D—ji ] = =>*q± < o9L8£ 8L gCG^Cl-e)) gCG^Cl-e))
since 3f/3L > and g(G-1 (l - e)) > (recall that
g is the probability density function for output price).
127. Actually, weaker conditions would suffice to ensure
this since the assumed strict concavity of Ui and f
implies that each of the last three terms in (111)
is strictly positive.
128. Assume det H > at this point.
129. Note that if the distribution of p is symmetric and
g f
that if L is chosen so that P'-jrr - w = 0, then the
strict concavity of U implies that E[(3U /9D)(p(6)*
i i
|£ - w)] < 0. If p«(3f/3L) - w < 0, this effect is
more pronounced. Even if p«(3f/3L) - w > 0, ~ f
strict concavity will ensure that E[ ( 3Ui /3D) (p( ) -^=- - w)]
< as long as p(3f/3L) - w remains relatively
small. When p is nonsymmetric the above arguments
must be modified according to the direction of skewness
.
It is conceivable, however, that examples could be
constructed in which a > 0.
<
130. From footnotes 117 and 118,
3lT 3M/3L
since 3M/3tt < and 3M/3L < 0.














134. See "Getting Out," Wall Street Journal (March 21, 1975);
"An urge to purge misfit operations," Business Week
(April 21, 1975); and "Black Future for White?" Time
(May 31, 1976).
135. See, for example, "Cash-Laden Firms Are In a Marrying
Mood, Spurring Merger Wave," Wall Street Journal (February
18, 1977).






pp. 21-22. Specifically, "A decline
in the condition of the environment is therefore more
probable and an improvement less probable when the
organization is operated along managerial lines than
when a profit-maximizing posture is adopted. Opportunities
that the profit-maximizing organization will recognize
or develop will simply go unrecognized or undeveloped






138. R.A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes
(Wiley; New York; 1960), and G.L. Nemhauser, Introduction
to Dynamic Programming (Wiley; New York; 1966).
139. Ibid, pp. 34-35.
140. One practical example of such variation is the recent
set of sharp increases in the levels of compensation
of the chief executives of the U.S. automobile manufacturers
Total annual compensation of the chairman of Ford Motor Co.
increased from $334,000 in 1975 to $970,000 in 1976.
Total annual compensation of the chairman of General
Motors increased from $575,000 in 1975 to $950,000
in 1976. Total annual compensation of the chairman
of Chrysler Corp. increased from $216,000 in 1975 to
$620,000 in 1976. "GM and Ford Chiefs Are Each Awarded
Nearly $1 Million," Wall Street Journal (April 18, 1977).
141. It also holds the risk level fixed, which is important
because, under the assumption of risk aversion on the
part of the firm, increases in price that involve an
increase in the level of risk can have offsetting
effects on output when the state of the firm's operating
environment improves.
142. Note that by (*) in footnote 118, 8 2 M/3L8y = 8f/9L >
(since G (1 - e) is the (1 - e) x 100 percentile of
the distribution of p, which increases with -y ) .
143. Strictly speaking, the cycle in question could be that
of a single industry if 6 is so interpreted. That is,
the model could apply with equal validity to a counter-
cyclical industry, with 6 and p(6) varying counter-
cyclically. Second, it should be noted that, as long
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as the assumption of perfect competition (i.e. price-
taking behavior on the part of the firm) is retained,
firms will continue to respond in a passive manner
to these cyclical influences; admitting the possibility
of imperfect competition would permit behavior of an
anticipatory nature to be considered.
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IV. THE FIRM'S FINANCIAL
DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
A. INTRODUCTION
In a world of certainty where capital markets are
perfect, the firm's production and investment decisions
(or collectively, its operating decisions) are separable
2from its financial decisions. Even when there is
uncertainty, if there exists a set of complete markets
3for contingent claims, the firm's operating decisions
4
and its financial decisions remain separable. However,
when capital markets are imperfect or when the markets
for contingent claims are incomplete, separability is
no longer assured.
In actual capital markets there exist imperfections
in the form of transactions costs, bankruptcy penalties,
6
and taxes. Information is generally not costless,
and interest rates generally vary according to the financial
strength of the borrower and the amount borrowed. Nor
are actual financial markets complete. Indeed, where
there are positive costs of establishing and maintaining
markets for contingent claims, it is virtually impossible
gfor complete markets to exist. For actual firms, then,
operating decisions are not, in general, separable from
financial decisions and the interests of holders of the
firm's securities (and in particular the firm's stockholders).
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The model of the firm developed in chapter three
abstracted from the firm's financial decisions. The
purpose of this chapter is to extend the model to incorporate
financial considerations and to use the model to study
the firm's optimal financial decisions under uncertainty.
Of particular interest is the impact of the incompleteness
of markets on these decisions, and this is explored in
section E.
Firms generally make three major classes of financial
policy decisions. First, the firm must decide how
large a stock of cash to maintain. The firm's motives
for holding cash and the other factors affecting its
caAh management pot-icy are discussed in section B.
Since cash is an asset, this first decision affects
the composition of the assets side of the balance sheet,
as illustrated in table IV-1. Second, the firm must
determine the relative proportions of debt and equity
(i.e. leverage) to be used in financing its activities.
The factors affecting the firm's levzn.agz pot-icy are
discussed in section C. Third, the firm must choose
the proportion of net income to be distributed to its
shareholders as dividends (and therefore what proportion
to add to retained earnings). The factors affecting
its dividend poticy are discussed in section D. The
latter two policies affect the composition of the total
liabilities and stockholders' equity side of the firm's
balance sheet, as illustrated in table IV-1. The balance
sheet provided in table IV-1 is a simplified version
of table II-l and will be referred to throughout the chapter.
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Total Assets C + V + qK
Total Liabilities and
Stockholders' Equity B + E
In table IV-1 there are five entries that will be of
interest in the analysis presented in this chapter. On
the assets side of the balance sheet, C denotes the stock
of cash, which is assumed to be non-interest bearing.
Inventories, V, are assumed to be directly related to the
firm's level of output. That is, in the model developed
below inventories, measured in dollars, will be expressed
as a function of the firm's output level. Fixed assets,
K, and the unit price of capital goods, q, are interpreted
as before. On the liabilities side of the balance sheet,
B denotes debt, which consists of fixed interest obligations,
chiefly bonds and bank borrowings. Equity, E, consists
of contributed capital and retained earnings. New share
issues add to contributed capital and the portion of net
income not paid out as dividends is added to retained
earnings. In what follows, however, these two components
of equity are treated collectively.
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The firm's financial decisions are important for
several reasons, which are explored at length throughout
the chapter. Briefly, financial capital is important
because production is a time-consuming process. The
firm must hire inputs and carry out production before
it can sell its output. The firm needs financial capital
in order to be able to purchase capital goods that will
provide a stream of productive services over many future
time periods. In general, the firm must also maintain
stocks of raw materials and finished goods. To finance
its investment in plant, equipment, and inventories -
i.e. real capital - the firm must obtain money capital
either through retained earnings or through the issuance
of debt or equity instruments. In addition, the firm
must hire labor and pay for raw materials, and due to
the time lag between receipts and expenditures of cash,
it must maintain a stock of cash with which to make these
12
transactions. If the firm is unable to raise the
needed financial capital, then it may be forced to eschew
profitable investment opportunities. If it suffers
a cash shortage, it may have to reduce its hiring of
inputs or sell off a portion of its inventories, or
worse yet, it may fail to meet its bond interest obligations
13
and be forced to liquidate.
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the
relationship between the firm's operating decisions and
its financial policy (i.e. cash management policy, leverage
policy, and dividend policy) decisions. In contrast
to the recent studies that have explored the firm's
production decisions in the context of single period
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stock market equilibrium, usually in attempts to derive
shareholder unanimity theorems or to prove Pareto optimality
14(or lack of it) of stock market allocation, this chapter
is concerned with the firm's integrated financial planning
15
within a multiperiod framework. The first three sections
below discuss the firm's financial policies individually.
In section E the three classes of financial policies are
integrated into a modified version of the model developed
in the previous chapter and then the optimal operating
and financial policies implied by the model are derived.
B. CASH MANAGEMENT POLICY
The purpose of this section is to explore the first
of the firm's three major classes of financial policy
decisions, cash management policy. First, the firm's
motives for holding cash are discussed. Then a simple
model of the firm's transactions demand for cash is presented
1. The Firm's Demand for Cash
Keynesian monetary theory identifies three motives
for holding money: a transactions motive, a speculative
motive, and a precautionary motive. The transactions
motive arises out of the imperfect synchronization of
17
cash receipts and cash expenditures. The speculative
motive arises out of the possibility for profit by holding
cash and arranging securities purchases to take advantage
18
of interest rate changes. The precautionary motive
arises out of the need to maintain cash balances for
protection against unforeseen circumstances, such as a
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severe decrease in net income that leaves insufficient
funds with which to pay bond interest.
In a world of certainty the firm's only motive
for holding cash is the transactions motive. Baumol
and others have modeled the firm's transactions demand
20for money as an inventory management problem, with
the stock of cash playing the role of the inventory of
21
'goods'. Such models are based on the fact that cash
inflows and outflows cannot be synchronized perfectly
and that there exist costs (e.g. transactions costs)
associated with converting securities (or inventories
of goods or fixed assets) into cash. These models assumed
(at least implicitly) that money serving as a medium
of exchange is a nonproductive asset.
In contrast, Saving has argued that money itself
22is productive in that it reduces transactions costs.
While Saving carefully distinguishes the productiveness
of money from the productivity of real resources like
capital and labor - in particular, Saving does not treat
23
money as a factor of production - Friedman has argued
that the firm's money balances yield real productive
services and that the value product of money depends
on the technical conditions of production embodied in
24
the firm's production function. Fischer and Wu, Rozek,
and Dutton have gone a step further and treated the firm's
25
real money balances as a factor of production by incorporating
them in the firm's production function:




where m denotes the firm's real money balances. Though
Fischer took great pains to justify his derivation of
(1), in the opinion of this writer the theoretical issues
that have been raised concerning the direct inclusion
of real money balances in the consumer's utility function
can also be raised concerning the direct inclusion of
27
real money balances in the firm's production function.
In both cases the demand for real money balances is a
derived demand. Under certainty, where there is neither
a precautionary demand nor a speculative demand for real
money balances, real money balances are valued for the
28
role they play in making transactions possible. Money
is useful to the firm - or 'productive' in the sense
described by Saving - not because it makes a direct contribution
to production, but because its use frees up real resources
that would otherwise have had to have been used in the
execution of transactions. Therefore, before one can
employ the production function (1) in a model of the firm,
it is necessary to specify the economic role of m and
to indicate the derivation of (1) from the traditional
production function
Q = g(K, L)
,
(2)
where the symbol g is used in (2) to distinguish that
function from f in (1). The next subsection is concerned
with the derivation of (1) from (2).
2. Money and the Production Function
The derivation of (1) from (2) is demonstrated
in this subsection by showing how a function of the form
of (1) could be constructed from (2) when certain additional
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summary information concerning the firm's cash inflows
and outflows is provided. Given any output level, Q, the
production function (2) gives the locus of input combinations
(K, L) with which Q can be produced with maximum technical
efficiency. Assume that for each output level, Q, and
for each input combination (K, L) satisfying (2), the
time pattern of cash outflows for the purchase of inputs and
cash inflows from the sale of output can be used to determine
the minimum level of real cash balances, m > 0, that will
29facilitate all such transactions. The different values of
m, together with the corresponding triplet (Q, K, L) for each,
define the minimum balance function,
m = m(Q, K, L) . (3)
That is, underlying (3) there is a particular, possibly
stochastic, time pattern of cash inflows and outflows
for each triplet (Q, K, L) that determines the functional
30
relationship between m and (Q, K, L).
If r denotes the market rate of interest, then
the minimum cost (including allowance for the opportunity
cost, r*m, of holding real money balances) combination
of inputs for producing any particular level of output,
Q, can be obtained by solving the following mathematical
,, 31programming problem:
minimize wL + iK + r«m(K, L)
{K, L} (4)
subject to Q = g(K, L)
where w and i are the unit costs of labor and capital,
respectively, and where m given by (3) has been written
as a function of K and L only since Q is fixed. The
necessary conditions for an optimal solution to (4) are:
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3m , 3g ~
w + r 3L " X 3L
=
°
3m , 3g n1 + r
^K " A 3K " °
(5)
where the Lagrangian is F, = wL + iK + r»m(K, L) + A(Q - g(K,L)).
The necessary conditions (5) lead to the following characterization




3L i + r(3m/3K) '
which is analogous to the optimality conditions arising
out of the two versions of the Vickers model discussed
32in section I of chapter two.
Returning to (3), note that if 3m/ 3Q f in some
region, then the implicit function theorem may be invoked
to use (3) to define a function
Q = h(K, L, m) (6)
that holds locally (within the region where 3m/3Q f 0).
Note that (6) is really just another way of characterizing
the relationship between minimum real money balances,
output, and input levels that is embodied in (3). To
allow in addition for the technological relationships
that also underlie (1), define the function
f(K, L, m) = g(K, L) + h(K, L, m)
,
(7)
where g is given by (2) and where h is given by (6).
The following two lemmas demonstrate that the dzhtved
ph.odu.ctA.OYi fiuncti-on (7) can be used in models of the
firm without introducing distortions, provided of course
that they are correctly formulated (and interpreted).
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Lemma IV-1
If the derived production function (7) were used in place
of the production function (2) in determining the firm's
least cost combination of inputs for any given output
level Q, the choice of input mix would not be affected,
i.e. the optimal input mix would again satisfy (5).
Proof
Using (7), the least cost combination of inputs
can be obtained by solving the following mathematical
programming problem:
minimize wL + iK + rm
{K,L,m} (g)
subject to Q = f(K, L, m)
where Q is given. The necessary conditions for an optimal
solution to (8) are:
-
- *<!« + !r> " °
1
- *«M * l«> - ° ^ (9)
r
- «3=> = ° •
where the Lagrangian is F, = wL + iK + rm + A(Q - f(K, L, m))
The necessary conditions (9) are easily rearranged to
obtain (5). Q.E.D.
The next lemma demonstrates that the derived
production function (7) exhibits the same mathematical




If 9m/9Q > 0, 9m/9K < 0, 9m/9L < 0; and if g given
by (2) and h given by (6) are concave; then 9f/9K > 0,
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8f/3L > 0, and 3f/9m > for f given by (7), and moreover,
f is concave.
Remark
The assumed signs of the first partial derivatives
of the function m given by (3) can be given the following
interpretation. An increase in the 'average' rate of
output Q with the 'average' input levels held fixed requires
greater (minimum) real money balances in order to fund
the consequent increase in the number of transactions
(per unit time period). On the other hand, increasing
the 'average' input levels while holding the 'average'
rate of output constant has the opposite effect, i.e.
the number of transactions (per unit time period) falls
and so do the required (minimum) real money balances.
Proof of Lemma IV-2
From (7), -^ = -^ + — . By the implicit function
theorem, -tt^ = - •*—4-^ . From the stated assumptions it
d i\. dm/ dy
follows that tt^t > for all K, and hence, that -^ >
whenever -=-§£ > 0. The proof that -rrr- > is similar. To
a i\. a Li
^ -P ^ -F *!^ V^
show that =— > 0, note that from (7), -r— = tt- , and from9m v ' ' 8m 9m '
the implicit function theorem, that -^— = - —z
—
tttr .9m -9m/9Q
But by assumption -7-^ > , so that tt- > also.dy dm
The second statement follows from the well-known
result that the sum of two concave functions is concave.
Q.E.D.
The significance of lemmas IV-1 and IV-2 is that
the use of a production function of the form of (1) in
the model of a firm will not lead to distortions in the
policy implications derived from the model, provided of
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course that the function is defined correctly. In particular,
it follows from lemma IV-1 that, for any output level
Q, the correct application of (7) leads to the true minimum
cost combination of inputs for producing Q. It follows
that the use of (7) does not affect the shape or position
of the firm's total cost curve. Since the use of (7)
clearly would not alter the treatment of demand or revenue
conditions in the model, it follows that production functions
of the form of (1), provided they are correctly formulated
and correctly interpreted, can be incorporated into models
of the firm in which the firm's transactions demand for
real money balances is to be given a role to play.
In subsection 4 the model of the firm developed
in chapter three will be modified for the purpose of studying
the firm's transactions demand for real money balances.
In that analysis the derived production function (7)
will be used in place of the neoclassical production
function (2).
3. Other Motives for Holding Money Balances
The transactions motive for holding money exists
34
whether or not there is uncertainty. In contrast, the
speculative and precautionary motives for holding cash
are due to uncertainty. Precautionary balances, in
particular, provide a buffer to protect the firm's viability
when economic conditions worsen unexpectedly and when,
as a result, its operations fail to generate sufficient
cash to meet the firm's cash obligations. The firm can
employ the precautionary balances, and then replenish
35
its precautionary stock of cash when conditions improve.
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In the model of the firm under uncertainty developed later
in this chapter the precautionary motive (as well as the
transactions motive) is treated explicitly. The speculative
motive, which in some circumstances may be incidental to
the precautionary motive, is not treated explicitly.
In the model developed below the firm is motivated to
hold precautionary cash balances when markets are incomplete -
though not when markets are complete - to compensate for
risks (such as the risk of bankruptcy) that cannot be
fully diversified away due to the incompleteness of markets.
4. A Simple Model of the Firm's Transactions Demand
for Cash
The purpose of this subsection is to modify the
model of the firm under certainty developed in section B
of chapter three to incorporate the role of cash management.
Only the deterministic case is considered here. The
firm's demand for cash under uncertainty is explored in
sections E and F later in this chapter. The main results
of this subsection are first, that the collective utility
maximizer modeled in chapter three tends to maintain greater
real cash balances than a short run profit maximizer, and
second, that its transactions demand for real cash balances
is inversely related to the interest rate.
To modify the model (11) of the firm under certainty
formulated in section B of chapter three, the production function
(1) needs to be substituted for f(K, L). Assume that
the production function (1) is concave and non-decreasing
in each of its arguments. In addition, denote the change
in the firm's nominal (i.e. unadjusted for inflation)
stock of cash by N and denote by J the price index (e.g.
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the GNP deflator) used to deflate the nominal addition
to the stock of real money balances. Then
m(t) = N(t)/J(t)
, (10)
where the dot again denotes differentiation with respect
to time. Assume that there are no borrowings and no new
issues, so that N(t) represents the difference between
total cash generated from operations less total cash applied
to dividends and the purchase of capital goods, as illustrated
in table IV-2. Then total dividends paid satisfies the
following accounting identity:
D(t) = 7T(t) - q(t)[I(t) - 5-K(t)] - N(t)
, (11)
which is just equation (9) of chapter three with a -N(t)
term on the right-hand side. The only modifications that
need to be made to the model (11) in chapter three, then,
are the addition of the constraint (10); the substitution
of (1) for the production function and (11) for the expression
—rTfor dividends; and the addition of a term Uo(m(T))e
to the objective function to reflect the value the firm
attaches to having nonzero terminal real money balances
(i.e. m(T) > 0). The introduction of Uo , which plays
a role analogous to that of U2 , serves the important purpose
of preventing terminal real money balances from falling
to zero. For the convenience of the reader the modified
model is set out below:
maximize fT U 1 [p( t ) • f (K( t ) , L( t ) ,m( t ) )
;
{L(t),I(t), °









subject to K(t) = I(t) - 6»K(t), < t < T, K(0) given
m(t) = N(t)/J(t), < t < T, m(0) given
(l-T){p(t).f(K(t),L(t),m(t)) - w(t)-L(t) - M(t)
- q(t).[6.K(t)]} >tt , < t < T
L(t), K(t), M(t), m(t) > 0, < t < T
37The Lagrangian for problem (4) is
L [K,m,L,I,M,N,A ,A ,t] =
M 1 2 (13)
U
x
[ ]e"rt + A
i
(t)-[l(t) - 6-K(t)] + A
2
(t)-[N(t)/J(t)]
+ y (t)[(l-T){p(t)«f(K(t),L(t),m(t)) - w(t)'L(t) - M(t)
- q(t)-[6-K(t)]> - 7T
q ] .
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution
to (12) are conditions (14), (15), and (17)-(21) of chapter
three, and in addition,













(t)/j(t) = o (16)
8U
3 -rT
where =— e measures the (discounted) marginal utility9m \ / b j
of the firm's terminal stock of cash. Since (14) merely
repeats one of the constraints, it need not be considered
further.
Of the two remaining conditions, first consider
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Note that equation (17), which relates to the accumulation
of cash, is analogous to equation (22) of chapter three,
which relates to the accumulation of physical capital.
In (17) A (t) is interpretable as the shadow price of
2
cash, i.e. the value in terms of collective utility of
an additional dollar added to the stock of cash. The
-rt
ratio A ( t )/ ( 8U1 /8D)e expresses the internal (to the
firm) trade off between real cash balances and dividends,
where numerator and denominator are each expressed in
terms of discounted marginal collective utility. The
right-hand side of (17), the price index J(t), measures
the externally imposed rate at which real cash balances
and dividends can be traded off. According to (17), then,
in equilibrium the firm modeled in (12) will have equated
its internal rate of trade off between real cash balances
and dividends to the externally imposed rate of trade
off between these quantities, J(t). This is, of course,
perfectly analogous to the interpretation of equation (22)
of chapter three.
Turning next to (15), evaluate -8L /9m, use (17)
to obtain a second expression for A (t), equate the two
2
expressions, and rearrange terms to obtain
af af 3U../3R + (l-T)y e
rt
r - J/J - p.||(l-T) + P-||(-^ ^TaD — > ' < 18 >
where p = p/J is the price of output in constant dollars.
Note that equation (18) is analogous to equation (39)
of chapter three. In particular, the left-hand side of
(18) can be interpreted as the firm's opportunity cost
of maintaining a stock of cash, expressed as the nominal
721
rate of interest, r, adjusted for inflation. The difference
r - J/ J is called the real rate of interest. The right-
hand side of (18) can be interpreted as the marginal revenue
product of real money balances adjusted upward by the
marginal revenue-equivalent of the increased dividends
38that the increase in real money balances makes possible.
According to (18), in equilibrium the firm modeled in
(12) will increase real balances up to the point at which
the marginal revenue product of real balances just equals
the marginal cost ( = average cost in this case) of real
balances
.
Note that, since p, 8f/8m, and the terms in parentheses
on the right-hand side of (18) are all positive and since
f is assumed to be strictly concave, the firm modeled
in (12) will tend to maintain larger real cash balances than
a short run profit maximizer. This follows from the fact that
the traditional firm's criterion for optimal real balances
g f
is r - J/J = p -r—(1-t), which is perfectly analogous to
' * 9m
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equation (40) of chapter three. This important result
is stated as the following theorem.
Theorem IV-1
When the firm modeled in (12) is in equilibrium, it will
maintain greater real cash balances than a short run profit
maximizer would under identical cash inflow and outflow
conditions (i.e. the same functions m = m(Q, K, L) and
Q = f(K, L, m)).
The practical interpretation of the theorem is that the firm
modeled in (12) produces greater output, using more of both
inputs, than a short run profit maximizer. Ceteris paribus,
the firm modeled in (12) will make more transactions, and
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thus have to maintain greater real balances than a short
run proiit maximizer.
This section concludes with a theorem that establishes
the inverse relationship between the firm's transactions
demand for real balances and the market rate of interest
r when the firm's profit constraint is not binding.
Theorem IV-2
If the production function f and the utility function U..
are strictly concave, then the collective utility maximizer
modeled in (12) exhibits a transactions demand for cash
that is inversely related to the interest rate.
Proof
To prove the theorem it is sufficient to show
that tt— < 0. First define y = u e and substitute
or i i
40into (18). Then use (18) to define the function,
af aiL 3U- 3tL . 31L
G(r,m)=p g[d-T)^ + ^ +(1-t) Vi ]-p 3/ + ( J / J )^TT •
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It follows by the strict concavity of f and U.. that the
denominator in (19) is negative. Hence -r— < 0. Q.E.D
oT
The practical interpretation of the theorem, which also
41holds for the short run profit maximizer, is that the
firm's opportunity cost of holding real cash balances
increases with the interest rate, inducing the firm to
reduce its stock of cash. Alternatively, the higher interest
rate makes the firm more willing and better able to bear
723
the transactions costs associated with converting other
assets into cash when the (now smaller) stock of cash
runs out
.
This section discussed the firm's cash management
policy. The next two sections discuss the firm's leverage
and dividend policies, and then all three classes of
financial policy decisions are integrated into the model
42
of the collective utility maximizer under uncertainty.
C. LEVERAGE POLICY
The firm's choice of capital structure was discussed
in sections F and K of chapter two. The purpose of this
section is to review briefly the salient points of that
discussion and to explore the implications of introducing
debt into the model of the firm under certainty developed
in chapter three.
1. The Meaning and Importance of Leverage
The firm's leverage policy, or choice of capital
structure, involves the choice of the portion of the
firm's total investment to be financed through the issuance
43
of debt instruments (i.e. bonds and bank borrowings )
and the portion to be financed through either the issuance
of equity instruments (i.e. shares of common stock) or
an increase in the pool of retained earnings. In terms
of the balance sheet illustrated in table IV-1, given
the firm's total assets C + V + K, its leverage policy
involves determining the relative sizes of B and E in
724
the identity,
C + V + K = B + E .
One indicator of the firm's leverage policy is the value
of its le.ve.fia.ge. natto (or de.bt-e.qu.ity ncitio) , defined
here as
leverage ratio = B/E .
44According to traditional financial theory,
an increase in leverage, as indicated by an increase in
the value of the firm's leverage ratio, can have two
important effects. Since bondholders are paid a rate
of interest that is fixed at the time the bond is sold,
if the firm's rate of return on investment exceeds the
interest rate on debt, the increase in net income resulting
from an increase in the leverage ratio (i.e. net of bond
interest as well as operating costs) causes the total
market value of the firm (i.e. the sum of the market
values of its debt and equity) to increase. This continues
as the leverage ratio increases. The increased leverage,
however, also has a second effect. Since the firm's total
fixed interest obligations must be met when they are due,
or else the firm can be forced to liquidate, the increased
leverage ratio carries with it increased risk. Eventually,
the risk effect predominates, and the total market value
of the firm falls as the leverage ratio increases further.
This is illustrated in figure IV-1. The firm's (unique)
optimal capital structure occurs at the point A where the
total market value of the firm is maximized.
45According to the Modigliani-Miller view,










Figure IV-1 Total Market Value Versus
Leverage Ratio
value of the firm is independent of the firm's leverage
ratio, provided capital markets are perfect and there
46
are no corporate income taxes. The assumptions of
perfect capital markets and the absence of corporate income
taxes - or at least the absence of a tax that treats
47dividends and interest paid by the firm differently
48
are both crucial. Under uncertainty, the Modigliani-
Miller proposition on the irrelevance of the firm's debt-
equity ratio can be shown to hold, provided financial
49
markets are complete and also provided that either
bankruptcy is impossible or that, if it is possible, there
50do not exist any bankruptcy penalties.
One would expect on the basis of imperfections
in actual capital markets and a tax system that gives
special treatment to interest payments that the firm's
leverage ratio and changes in that ratio would be of
material interest to the managers, the creditors, and
51
the shareholders of the firm.
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52
2. A Simple Model of the Impact of Leverage
The purpose of this subsection is to modify the
model of the firm under certainty developed in section B
of chapter three. In this subsection debt is introduced
into the model. Let B(t) denote the firm's amount of
outstanding debt at time t. By assuming that each bond
sells for one dollar, B(t) can simultaneously represent
both the number of bonds and the amount of debt outstanding
at time t. Let i(t) denote the average interest rate
on debt at time t, so that the product i(t)*B(t) represents
the firm's interest expense at time t. Denote the amount
of funds raised at time t through new debt issues by
Y(t). Then, by definition,
B(t) = Y(t) . (20)
Assume that due to bond market imperfections the interest
rate the firm pays on new issues is a monotonically increasing
function of the amount borrowed and that the average interest
rate on debt at time t satisfies the functional relation
i(t) = i[B(t), Y(t)]
,
(21)
where 3i/8B > and 3i/8Y > reflect the impact on i
53
of increased borrowings at time t. Further assume that
8
2 i/8Y 2 > 0, i.e. an increase in new debt issues causes
the average rate of interest to increase at an increasing
rate; that 8 2 i/8B 2 > 0, i.e. an increase in the level
of debt outstanding causes the average interest rate to
rise at an increasing rate; and that 9 2 i/8B8Y > 0.
Taking into account the interest expense on debt, the typical
firm's income statement is illustrated in table IV-3, which
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statement of sources and uses of cash that takes into
account bond interest expense is illustrated in table IV-4.
Note that the firm is assumed not to hold cash balances.
This is done in order to focus the analysis on the impact
of debt issuance.
It follows from table IV-4 that total dividends
paid at time t must satisfy the following accounting
identity
:
D(t) = Tr(t) - q(t)[I(t) - S-K(t)] + Y(t)
, (22)
which differs from equation (9) of chapter three in that
7r(t) in (22) allows for interest expense.
For the convenience of the reader the modified
version of the model of the collective utility maximizing
firm is set out below:
maximize: /* tL [p( t ) • f (K( t ) , L( t ) )
;




_ w(t) . L(t) _ M(t) _ i(B(t),Y(t))-B(t)}






subject to: K(t) = I(t) - 6-K(t), < t < T, K(0) given
B(t) = Y(t), < t < T, B(0) given
(l-T){p(t)-f(K(t),L(t)) - w(t)-L(t) - M(t)
- i(B(t),Y(t))-B(t) - q(t)-[6-K(t)]} > tt
q ,
< t <_ T
L(t), K(t), M(t), B(t) > 0, < t < T
The modified model (23) differs from (11) in chapter three
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for debx interest expense in the expression for total
dividends paid and also in the expression for net income
in the profit constraint; and the introduction of the
55
utility function IL, which is analogous to tU in (12).
54The Lagrangian for problem (15) is
L [K,B,L,I,M,Y,A ,A ,t] =
y i 2
U-,[ ]e~rt + X (t).[I(t) - 6-K(t)] + A (t).[Y(t)] (24)
J- 1 2
+ u (t)[(l-T){p(t).f(K(t),L(t)) - w(t)-L(t) - M(t)
l
- i(B(t),Y(t)) -B(t) - q(t)[6-K(t)]-7T ]
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution
to (24) are conditions (14), (15), and (17)-(21) of chapter
three, and in addition,





~ 9B^ ' A
* (T) = 8B^ e (26)
dh 9U
a/ inrtd-fX- # b) + i>e-rt + yi (i-T )(- f£ b)
(27)
+ X (t) =
2
3U4 -rT
where -r-g— e measures the (discounted) marginal utility
attached to having a nonzero terminal stock of outstanding
debt, B(T) > 0. Note that since (25) merely repeats one
of the constraints, it need not be considered further.
Of the two remaining conditions, first consider





1 { 1-( 1-'0|y B}e_rt - Ui (l- T )|i B . (28)
Note that equation (28) is analogous to equation (22)
of chapter three. In (28) X (t) is interpretable as the
2
implicit cost of debt, i.e. the cost in terms of discounted
731
collective utility of having an additional dollar of debt
outstanding at time t. Note that X is negative since
2
the additional dollar of debt requires future interest
payments (and hence smaller dividends) and, if the debt
is retired, a dollar decrease in future dividends in order
to purchase the dollar of debt (and thereby 'retire' the
dollar's worth of bonds). Issuing an additional dollar
of debt at time t enables the firm to increase dividends
at time t by an amount equal to one dollar less the marginal
»> •
cost of debt, 1 - (1 - t )-r?; B, where the factor (1 - x)
a i
allows for the deductibility of interest expense for tax
purposes. The term -u (I-t)-^tt B, which is positive when
1 01
the profit constraint is binding since u > and 3i/8Y > 0,
measures the negative impact on collective utility implied
by an additional dollar of new debt issues, and the resulting
increase in interest expense, (1 - x )-^ B. The right-hand
side of (28), then, is interpretable as the discounted
marginal collective utility of an additional dollar of new
debt issues at time t. According to (28), then, the firm
should continue to increase new debt issues at each time
t up to the point at which the discounted marginal cost
of the new debt issues just equals the marginal value
of the new issues, where marginal cost and marginal value
are measured in terms of discounted collective utility.
Turning next to (26), evaluate -3L /dB, use (28)
to obtain a second expression for X (t), equate the two
2
expressions, and rearrange terms to obtain
(J +Pi ert )(l-x)[|i(Y-rB)-i- f| B]-(l-r)^i = . (29)
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Equation (29) is used to demonstrate the main result of
this section, which is stated as the following theorem:
Theorem IV-3
When the profit constraint is not binding, the firm modeled
in (23) will substitute debt for equity in its capital
structure in response to an increase in the tax rate x
.
When the profit constraint is binding, the overall effect
is indeterminate, being the sum of an income effect and
a substitution effect, which act in opposing directions.
Proof
When the profit constraint is not binding, u =0.
i





G(Y,x) = (l- T )[|i(Y-rB)-i- || B]-(l-r)^i . (30)
Note that since r < 1 it follows from (29) that the expression
in brackets in (30) is positive. Since i > 0, B > 0,
3i/8Y > 0, and d±/dB > it also follows that Y-rB > 0.
By the implicit function theorem,
^Y
=
8G/8x -[|Y(Y-rB)-i- |§ B ^
dT 9G/9Y 2 ' { *±}(l-x)[—(Y-rB)+ |i]
3Y 2 dY
By the foregoing the numerator in (31) is negative. By
assumption 9i/9Y > and 9 2 i/9Y 2 > 0, so that the denominator
is positive. Hence 9Y/9x > 0, and an increase in the
tax rate causes the amount of new debt issues to be increased.
Since everything else was held fixed, the first statement
has been proved.
To prove the second statement, define the function
G(Y, x ) by the expression on the left-hand side of (29).
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By the implicit function theorem,
3U
3Y IG^r -(alT ^ i e
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is positive since the expression in brackets in (29) must
be positive, which implies that the expression in braces
in (33) must be negative. Hence, the first term in (32)
is positive, and, by analogy with (31), corresponds to
a substitution effect. The second term in (32) is negative,
and corresponds to an income effect. Q.E.D.
Theorem IV-3 leads to the Hicks-Slutsky-type equation
(32), which can be expressed generically as:
— = (— ) + (
^
) (34)
8x v 9x y TT ^constant v 9tt y x=constant ' v J
o o
where the first term in (34) corresponds to a substitution
effect and where the second term corresponds to an income
effect. The interpretation of theorem IV-3 is that an
increase in the tax rate x increases the attractiveness
734
of debt financing since interest expense is tax deductible.
For the firm in equilibrium with the profit constraint
not binding, the increase in x would induce the firm
to substitute debt for equity in its capital structure,
i.e. to increase dividends (thereby reducing retained
earnings) and to increase debt in order to maintain the
pool of money capital available for investment purposes.
When the profit constraint is binding there is a second
effect. Since increasing new debt issues increases the
firm's debt interest obligations, the profit constraint
becomes violated unless other adjustments are made. In
the extreme case, the increase in the tax rate causes
equity to be substituted for debt and that happens when
the second term of the Hicks-Slutsky-type equation (32)
is greater in value than the first. As in chapter three,
the profit constraint, if it is binding, can cause the
firm to exhibit the opposite form of behavior to that
which it exhibits when the constraint is not binding.
D. DIVIDEND POLICY
The preceding section studied the firm's choice of
leverage policy - its choice of the (optimal) debt-equity
mix within its capital structure. This section discusses
the firm's choice of dividend policy; it takes the firm's
choice of leverage policy as given and considers the firm's
choice involving the size of the cash dividend. The firm's
dividend policy determines what portion of net income
will be distributed as dividends to shareholders, and
735
given its investment policy and its leverage policy, also
determines the required amount of new equity issues and
the composition of equity, E, in table IV-1 between contributed
57
capital and retained earnings.
The relevance of the firm's dividend policy for the stock
market value of its equity shares was discussed in section I
of chapter two. That discussion will not be repeated here.
Rather, the salient points will be reviewed and the role
of the firm's dividend policy in the model to be developed
in the next section will be suggested.
The traditional view of the relevance of the firm's
dividend policy is that a marginal increase in dividends
58(at the expense of retentions) will raise the share price.
Several empirical studies have suggested that a higher
dividend payout ratio leads to a higher price-earnings
59
ratio, i.e. to a higher share price for a given level
of earnings. It is argued that shareholders prefer
immediate dividends to future, less certain capital gains.
An alternative view has been put forward by Miller
and Modigliani, who argue that, given the firm's invest-
ment policy, its dividend policy is irrelevant to the stock
market value of the firm, provided certain assumptions
62
are satisfied. As shown in section I and in the discussion
of the Krouse model in section K of chapter two, these
assumptions require that capital markets be perfect.
In addition, Rubinstein has shown that for irrelevancy
to hold under uncertainty, stronger assumptions, such
as the assumption of complete markets, are required.
The Krouse model, which was discussed in subsection 4
in section K of chapter two, illustrates the interdependence
736
of the firm's investment and dividend policies when capital
markets are imperfect. Krouse ' s model concerned a value
maximizing firm under certainty. In the extension of the
author's basic model in the next section of this chapter,
the question of separability is studied for an expected
collective utility maximizing firm under uncertainty.
E. THE EXPECTED COLLECTIVE UTILITY MAXIMIZER'S OPTIMAL
OPERATING AND FINANCIAL POLICIES
The purpose of this section is to characterize the
financial policy decisions of the firm under uncertainty.
Sections B, C, and D of this chapter discussed the firm's
financial policies individually, and each of the illustrative
models discussed in those sections abstracted from uncertainty
In this section the three major classes of financial policy
decisions - cash management policy, leverage policy, and
dividend policy - are considered within the same model
under uncertainty, and the relationship between the firm's
financial policy decisions and its operating policy decisions
is explored.
1. The Model
The purpose of this subsection is to develop the
model of the expected discounted collective utility maximizing
firm. The modeling technique employed below in formulating
64the model is the time-state-preference framework.
As before, it is assumed that the firm seeks to
maximize expected discounted collective utility over a
finite planning horizon extending T periods into the future.
In chapter three collective utility during each period t
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was expressed as a function IL of total revenue, total
dividends paid, and managerial emoluments, and in addition,
as a function U2 of the terminal capital stock. But
in chapter three the firm's choice of dividend policy
and the impact of this policy choice on the firm's share
valuation were not treated explicitly. In this chapter
the firm's choice of dividend policy as it affects share
valuation and collective utility is a matter of interest.
In the remainder of this chapter it is assumed that dividends
are valued by shareholders because of their contribution
to the value of the shares they hold. In the remainder
of this chapter it is the share value, v, rather than
total dividends paid, D, that is the direct source of
shareholder satisfaction; and v replaces D in L . As
described below, v is a function of the firm's choice of
dividend policy. But v is a function of the riskiness
attached to the shares as well as a function of the dividend
per share. Thus, a framework for handling uncertainty (or
65
risk ) must be developed before an expression for v can
be obtained.
To deal explicitly with uncertainty it is assumed
that at each time t there are S distinguishable states
of nature. These are designated s = 1, ..., S. While
it is assumed for convenience that the number of possible
states is the same for each time t, it is not required
that the set of possible states be the same for each t,
nor is it required that the states be numbered in any
particular order. Time is measured in discrete units.
The time periods are designated t = 0, ..., T, where t =
738
denotes the present, at which the state of nature is assumed
known with certainty. Henceforth, the double subscript
t,s, 1
_< t <_ T, s = 1, ..., S, will designate the state of
nature at time t.
The possible states of nature s at each time t
are meant to reflect the different possible states of
demand for the firm's product, the different possible
conditions prevailing in factor markets (implying different
factor prices) and in financial markets (implying different
interest rates and different stock market values), the
different possible acts of nature that might affect the
firm, and other conditions of the firm's operating environ-
ment that might have a nonnegligible impact on the firm.
It is assumed that the possible states of nature at
each time t lie beyond the firm's control, and that the
firm can attach a (possibly subjective) probability of
occurrence, tj). , to each.
In this section it is not required that financial
markets be complete. It is also not required that a set
of complete markets for contingent output claims exist.
Let Q^_ denote the quantity of output sold during period
c } s
t in state of nature s. It is assumed that the alternative
output levels, Q, , for each time t represent contingent
output levels. Inputs are purchased during period t and
output for period t is produced only after state s has been
realized. The set of output levels, Q. , t = 1, ...,
T, s = 1, ..., S, that arise out of the model developed
below are interpreted, then, as planned output levels
contingent on the state s that actually obtains at each
time t, rather than as output levels to which the firm
739
68is contractually committed.
In the remainder of this chapter a modified version
of the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin share valuation formula
is used to express the value of a share, v. , at each time




E[d ] - B-Var(d\ (35 )v_
p
where E[d] denotes the expected dividend at time t, Var(d)
denotes the variance of the dividend at time t, 3 denotes
an exogenously determined positive constant that measures
70the stock market's collective aversion to risk, and
p denotes the exogenously determined riskless rate at
which the stock market capitalizes the firm's risk-adjusted
expected return, E[d] - $*Var(d). Thus, in (35) it is
assumed that the variance of the dividend, Var(d), serves
as the measure of the riskiness attached to the shares by
the stock market. It is assumed that the parameter p
takes into account the market's assessment of the firm's
long run growth prospects.
Denoting by d. the dividend per share at time





= E[d 2 ]-(E[d]) 2 = Z <J> t)S dt, s
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v. given by (36) is one of the three arguments of the
collective utility function U-, , and the firm can influence1 S






Denoting total revenue at time t in state of
nature s by R , and similarly interpreting M and
L , S X , S
KT , the objective functional is expressed asi , s
T S It



















where, as discussed above, the stock market value of a
share, v
. ,
given by (36) replaces total dividends paid,
D. , as the argument of U-. reflecting the main source
t , s 1
of shareholder utility. For each date t and state s
denote the price of output by p. and denote the wage
rate, the price of capital goods, and the average interest
rate on debt by w,
, q, , and i, , respectively. If
it is again assumed that the product, labor, and capital
goods markets are perfectly competitive and that the
average interest rate on debt for each date and state
satisfies (21), then total revenue for each period t and
state of nature s is given by
Rt,s Pt ,s-«t,s < 38 >
where Q, denotes the quantity of output at date t inLib
state s. Total profit at date t in state s is given by
tt. = (l-x){p, «Q, - w. L, - M. - q. '6'K.t,s v y ^t , s ^t,s t,s t,s t,s Ht,s t,s
(B. , Y^ )-B + > ,
,s
v t ,s' t ,s y t ,
s
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where t and 6 are the exogenously determined tax rate and
rate of depreciation, respectively, and where depreciation
is again figured on a replacement cost basis.
Previously it has been assumed that net income given
by (39) had to satisfy some minimum required level determined
by financial factors, such as the need to generate sufficient
cash from operations with which to pay bond interest and
the need to maintain sufficient profits to satisfy the firm's
shareholders that the firm's assets were being well-managed
and to reduce thereby the threat of takeover. In the
remainder of this chapter these financial factors are treated
explicitly, so that a minimum net income constraint would
be redundant. Specifically, the threat of takeover is linked
72directly to the share value. By incorporating v. as
an argument of UL in (37) this factor is taken into account.
A higher share value increases managerial utility, in
addition to shareholder utility, because it reduces the
likelihood of a takeover. The second aspect of the previously
employed net income constraint that is incorporated directly
into the model in this section is the explicit treatment
of cash, part of which must be used to meet bond interest
obligations, and the introduction of precautionary cash
balances, which are held as a reserve to enable the firm
to meet its bond interest obligations when poor market
demand conditions cause the firm's net income to be inadequate.
Turning to production, it is assumed as before
that the firm has a production function that is strictly
concave and continuously dif ferentiable with strictly
positive first partial derivatives. In addition, it is
assumed that the same technological relationship between
742
inputs and outputs holds for each date and state, so
that
«t,8
= f(Kt,S' Lt,S> < 40 >
for all t and for all s, with
^t,s/ 8Kt,s > ° 9Qt,s/ 3Lt,s > °
(41)
9
2 Q. /9K 2 < 8 2 Q. /9L 2 < .
^t ,s' t ,
s
t , s' t , s -'





date and state must satisfy the constraint
AKt,s - Kt,s - Kt-l,s' h,s - 6 - Kt,s • < 42 >
where the change in the capital stock in (42) is dependent
on the state s' obtaining during period t - 1, and where
it is assumed that investment is made at the beginning
of the period and that depreciation is reckoned on the
basis of the current period's capital stock. Note that
(42) is just the discrete analogue of the net investment
constraint employed in chapter three and earlier in this
chapter. Solving (42) for K. yields
Vs <m>Kt-l ( s' + (TT6>Vs (43 >
To complete the model it is necessary to formulate
the financial identities. First, there is a balance sheet
identity that needs to be satisfied. With reference to
the typical firm's balance sheet in table IV-1, the following
accounting identity must hold for each date t and state s:
C. + V. + q. -K. = B. + E + . (44)t,s t,s Mt,st,s t,s t,s y
Cash on hand, C. , is assumed to equal some minimum level,
C.
,
which is needed to fund transactions and which is
Is O
a function of the level of output, plus some additional
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amount (possibly zero), C
t ,
held as precautionary balances,
or in equation form,
Ct,s " Ct,s (Qt,s> + Ct,s • < 45 >
where
dC/dQ > d 2 C/dQ 2 <
. (46)
It is also assumed that there is some minimum value of
inventories held at each time t and state s that is a function
of the level of output
,
Ys Vt,s«t,s' - < 47 >
where
dV/dQ > d 2 V/dQ 2 < . (48)
Substituting (45) and (47) into (44) yields the balance
sheet identity,
C. o (Q. ) + C. + V. (Q. ) + q. -K, = B. + E. .(49)t,s vvtt,s / t,s t,s^t,s ^t,s t,s t,s t,s v '
Turning to the liabilities side of the balance sheet
in table IV-1, there are several identities that must be




redeemed at time t in state of nature s, where for convenience
each bond is assumed to be worth one dollar, and letting
Z denote the number of shares of stock issued/repurchased
at time t in state of nature s, (20) becomes
B. = B.
., ,
+ Y. , (50)
t ,s t-1 , s ' t , s '
and the analogous identity for shares is
n t,s " nt-l,s-
+ Z
t,s (51)
where n denotes the number of shares outstanding at
time t in state of nature s.
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Next, consider the change in equity. As indicated
by table IV-1, total equity consists of contributed capital
plus accumulated retained earnings. Let E, denote the
amount of equity at time t in state of nature s, and let











Et,s • < 52 >







Et,s • < 53 >
But A„E is the change in contributed capital, which is
K. X , S
just the share price times the number of shares issued/







t,s- Vt ' < 54 >
As indicated by table IV-5,
ADE, ^ = 71. - D, . (55)Rt,s t,s t,s v/
Substituting (54) and (55) into (53) and rearranging terms
gives
E, = E, -
,
+ Z. -v. + 7T, - D, . (56)t,s t-l,s' t,s t t,s t,s v '
Unlike the version of the expected discounted
collective utility maximizer presented in chapter three,
in this section the dividend per share for each date and
state, d,
,
is a decision variable. It is assumed that
new shares are issued with dividends (i.e. they are issued
at the beginning of the period), so that total dividends
paid amount to
D, = n. »d. . (57)t,s t,st,s v '
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Table IV-5 Statement of Retained Earnings
Beginning balance REt_1 '
Add net income for the year tt\J t ,s
Total DE, - ,+tt.R t-l,s' t ,s
Less total dividends paid during the year D
Ending balance, retained earnings DE, =r>E, - ,+tt. -D.K L
,






If it is assumed that all dividends are paid in cash, rather
than through the issuance of new shares, then it follows
from table IV-6 and the identity between sources of cash
on the one hand and uses of cash plus the increase (or
decrease) in the stock of cash on the other that total
dividends paid at time t in state of nature s must satisfy
the identity
D+ = n^ -d^ = (1-T){p. *Q. - w, »L, - M+t,s t,s t,s v ' Kt,s^t,s t,s t,s t,s
t,s t,s Ht,s t,s t,s
(58)
+ Zt,S ,Vt " ^S'^S - (Ct,S - Vl.B^
- < Vt,s " Vt-l,s'> •
Substituting (36) for v
, ,
(38) for R , (39) for
TT
t g ,
(40) for Qt s , (45) for Ct g , and (57) for Dt , and
collecting the constraints (43), (49), (50), (51), (56),
and (58), the model of the expected discounted collective
utility maximizer generalized to incorporate the firm's
financial policy variables can be formulated as the following




<f> 'U-Cp. 'f(K S ,L _);±( Z <}> t d


























E, =E. . ,+Z+ •-( Z <|>. d+t,s t-l,s' t,s p v _- t,s t,s
S S






S o=1 ' ^ t , s
+(l-x){p -f(K ,L )-w -L (59d)
-M. -q. «6«K. -i. (B. ,Y. )-B^ }t,s^t,s t,s t,s v t,s't,s y t,s
-d, *n. . E_ given
t , s t , s o, s
o
C. [f(K. ,L. )]+C. +V+ [f(K. ,L, )]t,s v t,s' t,s y t,s t,s v t,s' t,s'
(59e)
+q^ *K =B. +E
n. -d + =(i- T ){ p «f(K. ,L+ )-w+ -L.t,s t,s v ' ^t,s v t,s't,s / t,s t,s
-M. -i, (B. ,Y. )«B. } /rrn^Nt,s t,s v t,s' t,s' t,s (59f)
+T-q. -6-K. +Y, +Z^ x
^t,s t,s t,s t,s
1
S S








-{ I <$>. d } 2 ])-q + -I.
-(C. [f(K. ,L. )]+C„.v t,s v t ,s' t ,s /J t ,s
^t-l f B ,Cf(5t-l,S f ' Lt-l,8» ):,
"Ct-l,S ,)
-(V [f(K ,L. )]
-Vt-l,s' Cf(Kt-l,s" Lt-l,s' )]) '
C , C , V given
o.s ' o,s o.s to
o ' o o
K+ ,L+ ,M. ,B. ,n. ,E. ,C. , d . >t,s' t,s' t,s' t,s' t,s' t,s' t,s' t,s —
where s denotes the (certain) state at time t = 0.
According to (59), the objective of the firm is
to maximize expected discounted collective utility subject
to a net investment constraint (59a), a bond issue/ redemption
constraint (59b), a share issue/repurchase constraint (59c),
a change in total equity identity (59d), the basic balance
sheet identity (59e), and the sources of, uses of, and
change in the stock of cash identity (59f), plus, of course,
nonnegativity constraints. The decision variables are
shown in table IV-7, according to the type of policy involved.
The next two subsections are concerned with the optimal
operating and financial policies implied by the model (59)
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2. Optimal Operating Policies
Define the following generalized Lagrangian for (59):
VJX j1*t,s- Ul [Pt,s' f (Kt,s' Lt,s)^j1*t,sdt,s^ [j1*t,sdt,
1 xt 1 xT
{ Vt,s- dt,s }2] >; Mt,s ]( TTF> + VT,s- U2( KT,s>(lTF>
T S S
+
t-l s=l AYt.s.s'CWt-l.s^WVs-Vs] < 60 >
T S S
+ Z Z Z X
,
[B - ,+Y -B ]
=1 s=l s =1 ' '
T S S




t=l s=l s'=l ' ' '
T S S - S







-3[ Z <j> d* -{ Z <}> d } 2 ])
'
' s=l ' '









+X J1x8,t,» CBt.8+Bt.--et,B':«Kt,.' It_,8> ] -£t.«
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+t=l s=l s ,f1
X6,t,s,s^(l-){Pt,s- f ( Kt,s' Lt, S )"wt,s- Lt,s
-Mt,s- it,s (Bt,s' Yt,s)- Bt,s }+T ^t,s' 6
- Kt,s
S S




^t,s- dt,s }2]) ^t,s- I t,s- Ct,s [f ( Kt,s' Lt,s^
-at,s
+Vl,s' [f ( Kt-l,s" Lt-l,s'> ]+at-l,s'
-Vt,s [f ( Kt,s' Lt,s) ]+Vt-l,s^ f ( Kt-l,s" Lt-l,s'>^
-nt,s- dt,s ]
T S
+ E Z X 7 t s
C
t s 't=l s=l ' ' '
where the last term in (60) corresponds to the nonnegativity
73
constraint C, > in (59). In the next subsection
t , s —
the firm's decision regarding precautionary cash balances
will be considered and conditions under which C, =0
t , s
at optimality will be distinguished from those under which
C. > at optimality.
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution
to (59) are the following, where the constraints in (59)
have not been repeated and where all decision variables
but C. have been assumed to be strictly positive all
along their respective optimal time paths:
^A ^1 3f 1 t ^ 8f
9L7
=
^s 8R~ pt,s 9lT (I+r ) + , Z , X 4 , t , s , s ' ( 1_T ^ {p t , s 3L7~













*>* 5 '^ s





8C + 9ft , s





3C. 3f 3V+ ..
r t , S + t ,S 9f
B-l 6 ' t + 1 ' S '' S









































+ //l.t+l.s 1 ,s ( l+6 )+
,
Z A4,t,s,s ,(1
~ T){pt,s 9K+s =1 s =1 t
,
9C





} A5,t,s^ 9Qt>s 9Kt)g " 3Q 9Kt)S
"qt,s^
^.ye.t.B.s^d-OCPt^^^J+T.^^.
9Ct,s 9f 9V 9f






t,s 9f 9V 3f -,
,
,
6,t +l,s\s L 3Q^ 9K + 9Q, * 3K + Js'=l ' ^t,s t,s t,s t,s
=
,










*T,s 3R PT,s 3K™ c
v l+r ; YT,s 3K™ '1+r








o -i ,i r_ T , S d I





T,s w"T,s 8QT,s 9KT,s T ' S
3fS
V^.T.b.b'^^^^b 3KT)S } +T.qT)S .6
9CT.s 3f 3VT,s 3f




, S S 3i
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t , s s'=l ' ' ' s '=1 ' ' ' t , s '






, ( — 1 ) + E A ,-j , .. ,






s ' =1 ' ' s ' S
3i
t , s













E X, + I (~1) + E A /1 + T v +-d b
,
,
., o , X , S , S , -• 4 , X , S , S X , S
t , S S ' =1 ' ' ' S ' =1 ' ' '
s
+ E A~ .
,
v =





E A q ,+ E L -. , _(-l)+ E A. o-("d + )
t _i o , X , S , S C3 ' =1 «J)L +X,S ,S e ' =1 "^ > X , S , S X , S
S
+ E X a ,(-d. ) =







X4,t,s,s-(- 1 ) +
s














V4,t,s,s^-t,s) + 3^ J, s , =Y6,t,s,s.* C7D
s
' S'=l 6 > t > s » s t,s
;
3 L S S
^T ' = X 5,t,s ( -1)+
s^1






Ct,s>° A 7,t,s±° A 7,t,s- Ct,s " ° < 73 >





= p(* t>s-B[2* t;SdtjS-2* t;Ssiyt)A|S ,]) (74)
in (71). Note that (74) implies that
_L_ > o^ —^ > £[2<j>. d+ -2<j>. E <j>. ,d + ,]
t p p









(75) implies that an increase in the dividend per share planned
for time t and state of nature s may decrease the share
value at t if its marginal impact on the expected dividend
per share is less than the marginal impact on the riskiness
per share, but that if the distribution of the planned
dividend per share across states of nature is clustered
74 1
tightly around the mean (i.e. d -E[d] < -^ for aH d ),
then an increase in any d. will lead to an increase
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in v . . In particular, if d. is independent of s, then
d. = E[d] for all s, and since 3 > by assumption,
9v
t








since 3 > 0, p > 0, and < <J> < 1. According to (76),
even if increases in the planned dividend lead to increases
in v
.
, they do so at a decreasing rate.
The remainder of this subsection characterizes
the firm's optimal operating policies, which are implied
by (61)-(65), and the next subsection characterizes its
optimal financial policies, which are implied by (66)-(73),
and explores the relationship between the firm's financial
policy decisions and its operating policy decisions. In
each case the optimal policies under certainty are determined
by fixing the states of nature s at t and s' at t + 1 , and
then the optimal policies under uncertainty are determined
by permitting multiple possible states at t and at t + 1
.
First, consider the policy implications of (61)
under certainty. Fix s at t and s' at t + 1 . That is,
cj>. = 1 for some s at t (with (J) =0 for all other s
L y S L y S
at t ) and
<f> ++1 , = 1 for some s' at t + 1 (with 4)^,-, , =
for all other s' at t + 1). But then the subscripts s
and s' in (61) (as well as in (62)-(73)) are redundant and
S S
X c , replaces Z X n , , and X n , ,- replaces E X n . ,-, .6,t y g(=1 6,t,s,s' 6,t+l F s , =1 6,t+l,s',s




^R~ P t (I+7 ) " [A 5,t +X 6,t" A6,t+l ]( 3Q + 3Q )} 3lT
+ (l-T)(X4>t+X6jt )<Pt f^ - wt ) = .
The first term on the left-hand side of (77) can be interpreted
as the total revenue-related impact on marginal collective
utility of an incremental change in labor usage, which is
adjusted for the implicit cost of the marginal cash balance
and working capital (i.e. inventory) requirements associated
with the change in output. It is shown below that X,-
can be interpreted as the firm's implicit marginal cost





, - can be interpreted on the basis
of (60) as the implicit cost in terms of dividend payments
this period and next of an increase in cash balance and
working capital requirements, where this difference reflects
the fact that an increase in cash balances and working
capital totaling one dollar this period will, ceteris
paribus, reduce the amount of cash available for paying
dividends this period by one dollar but will also, ceteris
paribus, increase the amount of cash available next period
by one dollar (by reducing the required increase or increasing
the permitted decrease in the levels of cash and value
of inventories). Thus, the implicit cost of the marginal
cash balance and working capital requirements,
-
[A 5,t +A6,t-Vt + i ](!l + !^ • (78) ,
9P 8 V
is comprised of an opportunity cost term -X t (~%Q + Tq)
and a dividends-related cash flow impact term
~ LA 6,t A 6,t+l Jk 8Q 9Q ; '
756
Before interpreting the second term on the left-
hand side of (77), it will prove helpful to prove the
following lemma.
Lemma IV-3
Under certainty A. , + A g > when the firm modeled in
(59) is in equilibrium.
Proof
It follows from (63) that
3Ui i t
But 8U../8M > and < x < 1 by assumption, so that A. ,
+ Ag , > at optimality. Q.E.D.
The sum A. , + A
fi
. can be interpreted as the implicit
cost of a change in net income, measured in terms of the
change ' s impact on total equity, A. ,, plus its impact
on current period cash flow, A
fi
. .
According to lemma IV-3,
this unit cost is strictly positive at optimality.
The second term on the left-hand side of (77)
can be interpreted as the net income-related impact on
collective utility of a change in labor usage, where this
marginal impact is measured as the product of the change
d fin net income (1-t)(p -jry- -w) , which is negative when
8 f
p -jry- <w, and the implicit marginal cost of a change in
net income, A 4 t + A fi ., which is positive by lemma IV-3.
According to (77), then, under certainty a firm of the
type modeled in (59) should continue to expand its labor
usage until the point at which the marginal increase in
collective utility resulting from the increase in total
revenue adjusted for the implicit cost of the increased
757
cash balance and working capital requirements plus the
implicit cost of the increased labor usage in terms of
its impact on net income is zero. More importantly,
(77) leads to the following result.
Theorem IV-4
Under certainty for a firm of the type modeled in (59),
if a unit increase in output contributes more to collective
utility than the required increases in cash balance and





+ A 6,t- A 6,t + l ](!i
+ H> > °' then the
firm will produce more output than a short run profit
maximizer would when it is in equilibrium.
Proof
It follows from (41) and the stated assumption
that the first term on the left-hand side of (77) is






at optimality. Hence p.
-^— - w, < 0, and the conclusion
follows by the assumed concavity of f. Q.E.D.
A somewhat different interpretation of (77) is
possible when the necessary condition is rewritten as
3U
air Pt'ife)* fir < 1
- T >< x4.t+x8,t><Pt It -V
t t (79)
" LA 5,t A 6,t A6,t+1 J ^8Q 3Q ; 8L
t
"
(79) leads to the following corollary.
Corollary IV-4-1
Under certainty a firm of the type modeled in (59) will
increase its usage of labor up to the point at which
the marginal increase in collective utility due to the
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marginal impact on collective utility due to the change
g -f
in net income, (1-t)(A 4 + +^a t^ p t ~3T— ~wt ^ ' J ust equals
the implicit marginal cost of the increased cash balance
and working capital requirements, [A,-
t
+ Ag t~^6 t + l-^~3Q
8V,9f
Also of interest is how the firm modeled in (59)
would be expected to react to changes in the implicit cost
of marginal cash balance and working capital requirements.
To explore this, three cases are considered, according
to whether A c .+A,, .-A„ , .. is positive, zero, or negative,
o , t b , t b , t+±
Since A c > and since one would expect A,, and -A~ ,- to5,
t
6 , t 6, t+1
be roughly offsetting under most circumstances, the case in which




fi +~^a t+ i > (marginal cost is positive).
Corollary IV-4-2
If the implicit marginal cost of the increased cash balance
and working capital requirements decreases less rapidly
with an increase in output than the sum of the marginal
impacts on collective utility of the changes in total
revenue and net income, i.e. if
8U.
ai; {-8ir Pt ( i+T
)t:
It;








+ X 6,t X 6,t + 1"' ( 3Q
+ SQ^L^ '
then an increase in the firm's cost of financial capital,
Ac- , , or more generally, an increase in the implicit cost







g t+1 ] , leads to a fall in the
firm's optimal level of output. If the implicit marginal
cost of the increased cash balance and working capital
requirements decreases more rapidly, i.e. if the sign in


















K dQ 8Q ; 9L
9 [ A 5,t +A 6,t~ A 6,t+l ] B
where
B = I^" Ie^^* + ^ P(^
}t S + (1 -TKA4.t + A6,t>P g
(82;
" U 5,t + A 6,t- A6,t + 1 ]{(^ + '^ )(^L ) +( 8Q + BQ^T 1 '
has the same sign as B given by (82). But (80) implies




-X ^ < by (80),
and thus, by (41), Q falls when X,. t + ^ fi t~^« t+1 increases -
Moreover, B > when the inequality in (80) is reversed,
so that in that case, by (81) and (41), Q rises when
A5,t +A6,t _A6,t+l ^creases. Q.E.D.
Corollary IV-4-3
If (80) holds, then an increase in the marginal cash
balance and working capital requirements, -^ +
-^q , for
each output level causes the firm's optimal output level
to fall. But when the inequality in (80) is reversed,
3r^ 3v
the increase in -^ +
-*tq for each output level causes the








where B is given by (82).





The results presented in corollaries IV-4-2 and
IV-4-3 are summarized graphically in figure IV-2. In each





+ (1- T)(X4,t +A 6,t )(p fr
~W) *nd curve









t+1 ] (f£ + §|)f£ .
Note that under the stated assumptions (of this case), each
curve must be downward sloping. Note also that an increase
in either[A c .+\~ .5 , t b , t t + i ] or ("5n + an) shifts B upward6, l J V 8Q dQ









Effect on Labor Usage of a Change
in the Implicit Cost of and Level





curve B has a smaller slope than curve A, i.e. (80) holds,
so that labor usage (and hence output) falls when B shifts
upward to B' due to the increase in the implicit marginal
cost of cash balance and working capital requirements.
The reverse happens in figure IV-2(b) because there B
is steeper than A, i.e. the inequality in (80) is reversed.
It should be noted that if C and V were convex,
rather than concave, then the curve B in figure IV-2 would
be upward sloping. In that case an increase in either
[A 5,t +A 6,t" A 6,t+l ] °r !§ + H WOuld CaUSe labor usage '
and hence output, to fall. However, it seems more reasonable
to this writer, in view of the EOQ formulas from inventory
theory, to treat C and V as concave functions of Q, as
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fi + ~^a t + l
=
^ ( margina-l cost is zero).
Corollary IV-4-4
An increase in the implicit cost [A c .+A,, .-A- ,-]r 5 , t b , t 6 , t+l
causes both labor usage and output to fall, while an
increase in cash balance and working capital requirements,
"ktt + -rrr , has no effect on either labor usage or output.dQ dy
Proof
The first statement follows from (81) and (82),
where B < when A_ ^ + A„ -A,, .... = in (82). The second5
,
t 6, t 6 , t+l
statement follows from (83) with A,. ,+A~ .-A_ . .- setJ 5 , t 6 , t 6 , t+l




fi +~^a t+l K °-( marg ina l cost is negative)
Corollary IV-4-5
An increase in the implicit cost [Ac t + Ag t~^6 t+1-^ causes
both labor usage and output to fall, while an increase
762
in cash balance and working capital requirements,
-jq + -z-~
,
causes labor usage and output to increase.
Proof
The first statement follows from (46), (48), (81),




< 0. The second statement follows from (83) since
6 , t+1
B < and -[A- .+X a .-X a . . - ] |r > . Q.E.D5, t 6 , t 6 , t+1 8L
The results presented in corollary IV-4-5 are
summarized in figure IV-3. Since A-
t
+Ag t~^c ++1 K 0>
increasing A c .+X n ^-A- . .- causes curve B, which is nowto 5, t 6, t 6 , t+1
positively sloped, to shift upward, while increasing
-^tt + -^r causes B to shift downward (unlike figure IV-2
in which an increase in either factor caused curve B to






Figure IV-3 Effect on Labor Usage of a
Change in the Implicit Cost
of and Level of Cash Balance
and Working Capital Require-
ments (negative marginal cost)
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to B' and labor usage (and hence output) falls due to the
increase in L^ +^ t~^6 t+1 In fi Sure IV-3(b) curve
B shifts downward and labor usage increases.
The importance of theorem IV-4 and its corollaries
is that it demonstrates clearly the relationship between
the firm's output decisions and the cost of obtaining
the needed financial resources to support the required
transactions cash balance and working capital requirements.
Where such requirements exist, the firm's choice of output
level is not, in general, independent of financial cost
considerations. The results suggest, for example, that
when the implicit cost L^ c + ^_ ,-^~ , -, J is positive it5
,
t 6 , t 6 , t + 1
is not unlikely that the firm's choice of output level
is constrained in the sense that a greater output level
would be chosen were the implicit cost lower. In the
extreme case, the firm might even find itself facing a
liquidity crisis, in which the implicit cost (and possibly
even the explicit interest cost as well) of the marginal
cash balance and working capital requirements was very
large indeed, and in which, as a consequence, financial
restrictions were severely affecting operating decisions.
Turning to (62) and (63), the following theorem
is easily proved.
Theorem IV-5
Under certainty a firm of the type modeled in (59) will
pay a level of managerial emoluments at each time t such
that the collective marginal rate of substitution between
managerial emoluments and net income just equals one minus
the tax rate. The firm will select the level of investment
at each time t such that the collective marginal rate of
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substitution between physical capital and dividends just
equals the price of capital goods at t.
Proof








A 4,t A 6,t





~V7_ " qt ' ( }
where in each case the stated necessary condition was
reexpressed as the appropriate necessary condition under
certainty. Q.E.D.
Theorem IV-5 merely verifies results proved in
chapter three. Note in particular that (84) is analogous
to (28) in chapter three and that (85) is analogous to
(23) in chapter three, where X. t + A fi . in (84) measures
the impact of a change in managerial emoluments on net
income, and indirectly, on total equity (A. ) and cash
flow (X n ,), and where (A., .)(ttt) in (85) measures the6 , t 1 , t 1+6
value of a unit of investment in terms of the undepreciated
balance remaining at the end of the period. Thus, as
in chapter three, the firm selects the optimal levels
of managerial emoluments and investment at each time t
by equating the appropriate internal rate of trade off,
or marginal rate of substitution, on the left-hand side
of (84) and (85), respectively, with the relevant externally




Turning next to the selection of the optimal
capital stock at each time t, K,
,
consider (64). The
analysis for the terminal capital stock, KT , proceeds
analogously using (65), and so is not considered here
explicitly. For the certainty case (64) can be rewritten
^ife^ + d-)(A 4 ,t + A 6,t> } Pt % " Vt + (lT6> A l,t + l
"
A 5,t q t " (1
" T) X4,t'V 6 + A6,t' T 'V 6 < 86 >
"
(A 5,t
+ A6,t" A6,t + l )( "9Q 3K~ + 3Q W7> " ° '
It follows from (62) that
Vt+i = Vt+r qt+i -(1+6) •
Substituting (87) into (86) and rearranging terms yields
9U
^-T >< A4,t
+x6,t>Pt % + vr p t H-^)'
"
(A 5,t
+ A 6,t~ A 6,t + l )( "8Q + "SQ^ (88)
= A
5,t q t
+ (1 - T)(A4,t +A 6,t )q t* 6 " [A 6,t + l q t + l- A 6,t' q t ]
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,,()VlW E A 5,t + A 6,t- A 6.t + l ](1"I)P
» P » [ A 4,t +Yt V^Yl "
(i + H^ < 89 >
5,t
./-i \ jp r 6 , t + 1=
"A +A q t
+ ( 1-^)q t ,(S - Lt lttt q f + 1
4,t 6,t A4,t +A 6,t t
A 6,t .




The equilibrium condition (89) is analogous to
the equilibrium condition (40) in chapter three, though
(89) is somewhat more complex due to the explicit treatment
given financial factors in the model of the firm (59).
In particular, the left-hand side of (89) is analogous
to the right-hand side of (40) in chapter three and can
be interpreted as the marginal value of an additional
unit of physical capital adjusted (as were the corresponding
expressions for labor, (75) and (77)) for the implicit
cost of the marginal cash balance and working capital
requirements associated with the increase in output resulting
from the incremental unit of physical capital applied
in production, where the cost adjustment term is
A 5,t
+ A 6,t~ A 6,t + l^ / 8C 3Vx3f „,. . . . . , . ,
" X
4 t
+ X Q [
(
^Q + 3Q>3K ' The right
"hand Slde
of (89) is analogous to the left-hand side of (40) in chapter
three and can be interpreted as the marginal cost of
physical capital expressed as the sum of the opportunity
A
5 t




depreciation cost (net of tax), (l-x)q. *6, less the
implicit value (in terms of cash flow) of the increase
A ~ .
i
in capital goods prices between t and t + 1, [* -j-r Q+.i
A
6 t
A4,t +A 6,t t+1
- t jr\ q+J. Hence, the marginal cost of physicalA 4,t A 6,t *
capital has the same three components as before. The main
difference between the marginal cost of physical capital
implied by (89) and the one implied by (40) in chapter three
is that the values attached to the various cost elements
in (89) are determined implicitly.
In view of the analogy between (88) and (77),
results analogous to those presented in theorem IV-4 and
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its corollaries could be proved for physical capital.
Rather than essentially reproduce those results, (88)




Under certainty the expansion path for a firm of the type
Ci T "1
modeled in (59) is given by tt^ = i — , wherefe J dK 1-t w
A 4,t +A 6,t t t A4,t +A 6,t t+1 A4,t +A 6,t t
Proof
It follows from (77) that
9f
=





+ A 6,t" A 6,t + l ] <i + !^ + (1-T)(X4,t+A6,t>P
(91)
and it follows from (88) that
9f
:




31T P^lTr)* " [A 5,t + A 6,t- A 6,t + l ]( l§ + U ) + (1-T)(X4 f t+X 6 f t>P
(92
Dividing (92) by (91) yields
dL 9f/3K 1 i , q „.
dK " 9f/3L " 1-t w ' *" ;
where i in (92) and (93) is given by (90). Q.E.D.
The significance of theorem IV-6 is that whatever
restraints on the firm's choice of output level are implied
by the cost adjustment term -E^ 5 t +A 6 t~ A 6 t+1 ^"30 + Jo^
are neutral with regard to the firm's selection of its
optimal input mix since the cost adjustment term does not
appear in (90), and hence, does not affect (93). However,
it cannot be concluded that the expansion path of the firm
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modeled in (59) is independent of financial considerations,
even under certainty. Even though (93) above and (44)
in chapter three are identical in form, the marginal cost
of physical capital, i, is not necessarily the same in
both cases.
Corollary IV-6-1
Under certainty the expansion path for a firm of the type
modeled in (59) will coincide with the expansion path of
a short run profit maximizer only if i given by (90) is
identically equal to rq. + (1-T)q,<5 + qt+1 - q f for all
output levels at each time t.
Proof
Under the stated assumption (93) above and (44)
in chapter three (written in discrete time form) agree.
Q.E.D.
Conditions when the two formulas would agree and conditions
when they would not agree were discussed in chapter three.
It follows from (90) that the two would agree if there
were effectively no constraint on total equity, i.e.
A. = 0; if the relative value of an additional unit
of cash this period and next were identically one, i.e.
A~ . = A~ ,
,
-. : and if the normalized marginal cost of
6 , t 6 , t+1 ,
5 tfinancial capital were equal to the interest rate, t j-r = r;
A 4,t A 6,t
all of which would require at the very least the sort
of frictionless world hypothesized in neoclassical models
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of the firm.
Next considering the firm's optimal operating
policies under uncertainty, begin with (61), which can
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be rewritten
Vs alT Pt^ITF** ^~
s
+ (1-T)
s^/ A4,t,s,s' +X6,t,s,s^ x


















(94) is perfectly analogous to (79), with the main differences
being that
- For each time t there is a necessary condition (94)
for each state s that might obtain at t.
- Each term in (94) is probability weighted, with the
probability
<J). appearing explicitly in the first
term on the left-hand side of (94) and being incorporated
within the Lagrange multipliers in the other terms
in (94).
- Where intertemporal effects are to be taken into
account in (94) there are Lagrange multiplier sums,
S
e.g. IX. ,, that can be interpreted as expected
o t = i 4 , x , s , s
values contingent upon state s at t , where the expectation
is taken with respect to the states s'that might obtain
at t + 1.
Before interpreting (94) it will prove helpful to prove
the following lemma, which is analogous to lemma IV-3.
Lemma IV-4
S
Under uncertainty E (A , +X„ ,) > when the
qi_i 4 , X , S , S O , X , S , S
firm modeled in (59) is in equilibrium.
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Proof










so that the conclusion follows. Q.E.D.
According to lemma IV-4 , the expected implicit cost of
S
a change in state s net income, Z (A. , i +^« + t)>
g i_i ft , X , S , S t> , L , S , S
where the expectation is taken over the possible states s'
that might obtain at t + 1 , is strictly positive at optimality
The implications of (94) are summarized in the
following theorem and corollaries.
Theorem IV-7
If a unit increase in output at time t in state of nature
s would contribute more to expected collective utility
than the required increases in cash balance and working





















) > 0, then the firm modeled in (59) will8Qt,s 8Qt,s
produce greater output in that state of nature when it
is in equilibrium than a short run profit maximizer.
Proof
It follows from (41), lemma IV-4, and the stated
9 f
assumption that p. -rz - w, < 0, which leads to
L . S O Li , L , S
' t , s '
the desired result by the assumed concavity of f. Q.E.D.
Corollary IV-7-1
Under uncertainty the firm modeled in (59) will expand
its usage of labor up to the point at which the marginal
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increase in expected collective utility due to the increase
9U
1 1 t 3fin total revenue in state s,
<fr -^ p (^ ^ ,
t , s
plus the expected marginal impact on expected collective
utility due to the change in net income in state s,
(1 " T)
fY A4>t,s,s' +X6,t,s,s' )(pt,s a!f- " Wt,s>' Justs =1 ' t ,
s
equals the expected implicit marginal cost in state s of
the increased cash balance and working capital requirements.
Corollary IV-7-2
If the expected implicit marginal cost in state s of each
unit of additional cash balance and working capital requirements





=1 6,t,s,s' gI=1 6,t+l,s',s
and if this implicit marginal cost in state s decreases
less rapidly with an increase in output than the sum of the
marginal (expected) impacts on expected collective utility
of changes in total revenue and net income in state s, i.e.
if
3L7^ { *t,s nr Pt.s^*^ + (1 - T) s4 (A 4,t,s, s -
+X6,t,s,8'><Pt 81^- Wt,s> < 95 >







=1 6,t,s,s' gf=1 6,t+l,s' ,S
9C, dV+ a -
/ "t , S , t , S > dl -i
^Vs 3Qt,s 3Lt,s •
then an increase in the firm's marginal cost of financial




in the expected implicit cost per unit of increased cash
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1 , ], leads to a fall in the firm's optimal
s i = i
b,t+J-,s ,s
level of labor usage, and hence output, in state s. The
opposite is true if the expected implicit marginal cost
decreases more rapidly, i.e. if the sign is reversed in
(95).
Proof
Follow the steps in the proof of corollary IV-4-2
using (94) and (95). Q.E.D.
Corollary IV-7-2 for the uncertainty case is analogous
to corollary IV-4-2 for the certainty case. Similarly,
results analogous to corollaries IV-4-3, IV-4-4, and IV-4-5
could be proved for the uncertainty case. But since the
steps in the proof under uncertainty are the same as the
steps in the corresponding proof under certainty, as suggested
by the proofs of corollaries IV-4-2 and IV-7-2, the details
need not be provided here.
Turning to (62) and (63), the following theorem,
which is analogous to theorem IV-5, is easily proved.
Theorem IV-8
Under uncertainty the firm modeled in (59) will set a
level of managerial emoluments for each time t and state
of nature s such that the collective marginal rate of
substitution between managerial emoluments and net income
in s at t just equals one minus the tax rate. The firm
will also set a level of investment in s at t such that
the collective marginal rate of substitution between
physical capital and dividends in s at t just equals the




It follows from (63) that
-^
X t^l+r'
= (1 _ T) (96)
i _i 4 , X , S , S O , L , S , S
and it follows from (62) that
S
,f1
Xl,t,s,s ,( l+6 )
a +- t
o i = 1 O , T , S , S
=
*t.s • (97 >
Q.E.D
Note that (96) and (97) are the logical extensions of
(84) and (85), respectively, to the uncertainty case, where
it should be repeated that the Lagrange multiplier sums,
such as those in (96) and (97), represent measures of
value that are associated with intertemporal phenomena
and that are computed as expectations taken over the
possible states s' in the next period.
Next consider the firm's selection of the optimal
stock of capital for each period t and state of nature
s, K , and accordingly, from (43), its optimal invest-
ment policy for each period and state, I . As in the
certainty case, only the case < t < T is considered
explicitly since the case t = T proceeds analogously
using (65) in place of (64).
It follows from (64) that the optimal capital

















+ ( l+6 )
s ,^ 1
X l,t+l,s',s A 5,t,s' qt,s
S S
t _-t 4 , t , S , S L , S , _- b , L , S , S X , S
s s
— ( A •- . Z A,, ,— ZA/-...-I . ) xv 5,t,s
g , =1 6,t,s,s* g , =1 6,t+l,s',s
y
r
8Ct,s df 9V 3f v
n
which is perfectly analogous to (86) for the certainty case.
The optimal investment levels, I, , must satisfy (62),




= (1+6) Z A
fi c «
# q + • (99)
„i_i -L,L,S,S t—1 b , L , S , S t , S





{<J>4- -^t~(t~,— ) + (1-t) Z (A. . ,+A~ . , ) Ip^ tttz—Yt,s 8R v l+r y v /
, =1





g , =1 6,t,s,s' g , =1 6,t+l,s',s
y







which is analogous to (88) for the certainty case. (100)
differs from (88) in that the marginal value of an additional
unit of physical capital on the left-hand side of (100)
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is probability weighted as well as discounted because it
pertains to a particular state s at period t. Similarly,
the marginal cost of capital on the right-hand side of
(100) is also state-specific. But the last two terms
on the right-hand side of (100), which together play the
role of the term in brackets on the right-hand side of (88)
S






place of X a . 1 , . Obtaining an expression for the
impact of changing capital goods prices over time is more
78difficult under uncertainty, because the impact must
be averaged over all possible states of nature during
both time periods (the 'present', or t, and the 'future',
or t + 1). To allow for this, sum both sides of (99)
over s, and, since (99) must hold for each time t when
the firm is in equilibrium, substitute t + 1 for t.
After reindexing this yields
S S S S
Z Z A- ^ , (1+<S) Z Z \ c .... , q. .- , . (101)
S=l S'=l 1 > t+1 ' S > s s=l s*=l 6 ' t+1 > S > s t+l,s'
Summing each side of (100) over the states s at t and
substituting using (101) gives
S 3U



























s s s s
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Comparing (102) with (88) leads to the following theorem.
Theorem IV-9
Under certainty (uncertainty) when the firm modeled in
(59) is in equilibrium it will have expanded investment
at each time t to the point at which the (expected) marginal
value of an additional unit of physical capital just equals
the (expected) marginal cost of the required financial
capital, plus the (expected) marginal cost of depreciation
net of tax, less the (expected) cash flow impact of changing
capital goods prices.
(102) also suggests the following investment criterion
for each period t and state of nature s.
Corollary IV-9-1
A sufficient condition for meeting the investment criterion
(102) for optimal investment in capital at each time t
in state of nature s is the following: the firm should
expand investment at each date t for each state s to the
point at which the marginal value of an additional unit





Y t.s 3R v l+r y v J . . 4.t.s.s' 6 . t . s . s ' *i, y
s ,^ 1
v , , , * , t , s , s ' ' J ^t , s 3Kt , s
S S
5,t,s
g , =1 6,t,s,s' gI=1 6,t+l,s' ,s
)
3C, 3V, a -
/ t,s t ,S v 3f
3Q. 3Q. y 3K
just equals the marginal cost of the required financial
capital, A- *q
,
plus the implied marginal cost (net
of tax) of depreciation, (1-t)(A
4 t g S ,
+ Ag
t g s .)qt s
,(5,
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A6,t+l,s',sqt+l,s' " * X6,t,s,s' qt,s' or in equation
>
— 1 S — -L












+ Jo )idr- ( 103 )8Qt,s 8Qt,s 8Kt,s
= A 5,t,s* qt,s





A 6,t,s,s' qt,s ]
Proof
For given period t, if (103) holds for each possible
state of nature s at t , then (102) follows by summing each
side of (103) over s. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorems IV-7, IV-8, and IV-9
is that they demonstrate that the optimality criteria
for the firm's operating policies under certainty can be
extended in a straightforward manner to each specified
state of nature under uncertainty. Moreover, by dealing
directly with the probability distribution over the possible
states of nature, rather than with the parameters of the
distribution as in the mean-variance approach to uncertainty
that was adopted in the previous chapter, more definitive
results concerning output levels, input levels, and invest-
79
ment levels can be obtained.
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3. Optimal Financial Policies
The previous subsection was concerned with the
policy implications of necessary conditions (61)-(65).
This subsection is concerned with the policy implications
of necessary conditions (66)-(73). Proceeding as in
the previous subsection, first the policy implications
of (66)-(73) under certainty are explored, and then the
policy implications under uncertainty are developed by
extension of the certainty results.
Beginning with the bond issue/redemption policy,
the amount of issues/redemptions during each period t,
Y. , must satisfy the following necessary condition:
A 2,t
+ (A 4,t +A 6,t )(1
-T)( - w; V + A e,t ° • < 104 >
which was obtained from (66). Similarly, (67) implies
that under certainty the amount of bonds outstanding at
each date, B
.






+ (Vt+Vt^-^-V-S; V - ° • < 105 >
Solving (105) for X 2 ,, substituting into (104), and solving
for A,- . gives
A
5, t (^"^.rt^V ai; Bt + S; Bt> - A e,t - A 2, t+ i • < 106 >
To interpret (106) note that the first term on the
right-hand side can be interpreted as the immediate impact
on net income, and indirectly on collective utility, of
a change in the level of debt and a corresponding change
in the rate of new issues/redemptions, where the two effects
are related through (50) and are transmitted through the
induced changes in the interest rate given by (21). Moreover,
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it follows from lemma IV-3 and the assumptions that d±/dB >
and 8i/9Y > that the first term on the right-hand side
of (106) is strictly positive at optimality. The second
term on the right-hand side of (106) can be interpreted
as the direct cash flow impact in the current period of
an additional dollar of new debt. The third term on the
right-hand side of (106) can be interpreted as the value
of an additional dollar of debt in terms of reduced future
needs, as can be seen from (50). As such, one would normally
expect this term to be nonnegative. Collectively, the
three terms on the right-hand side of (106), and hence





marginal cost of debt capital at time t, where this marginal
cost is adjusted for the direct impact of a change in
issues/redemptions on current period cash flow and is
also adjusted for the impact of increasing the current
80
stock of debt on future debt requirements.
Turning to the firm's share issue/redemption policy,
the number of shares outstanding during each period t,




- A Q ^ - cTCA. . + X c «.) = , (107)3 ,t " 3,t+1 " d t ( 4,t A 6,t ° '
which was obtained from (69). The issues/redemptions




+ Wt + *6,t> " ° (108)
which was obtained from (68). In addition, total stockholders'
equity at each time t, E, , must be such that the following








which was obtained from (70). Solving (108) for A
o , t
substituting into (107), and rearranging terms gives




+ A6,t> " ° • < 110 >
Solving (109) and (110) for A. ., equating the resulting




f t X- + - X. + .- . (Ill)5,t v. - d. 6,t 4, t+1
To interpret (111) note that the first term on the
right-hand side can be interpreted as the value of an
additional dollar's worth of newly issued shares. To see
this recall that each new share is issued at the beginning
of the period, so that net receipts for the period are equal
to the share price less the dividend, v t - d. . Also,
since L , -. applies to the new issues/redemptions constraint
in (59), the effect of dividing Ao t+1 by v. - d, is to
convert the value measure in terms of shares into one in
terms of a dollar's worth of newly issued shares. The
second and third terms on the right-hand side of (111)
represent adjustments for the current cash flow impact
of a change in share issues/redemptions and the impact
of increasing the current amount of total stockholders'
equity on future equity requirements. Collectively, the
three terms on the right-hand side of (111) can be interpreted
as the equilibrium marginal cost of external equity capital
adjusted for the current cash flow and future equity
requirements impacts.
The equilibrium conditions (106) and (111) lead
to the following theorem.
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Theorem IV-10
In equilibrium under certainty the firm modeled
in (59) will have adjusted its capital structure so that
the marginal cost of debt capital equals the marginal
cost of external equity capital.
Proof
Equate (106) and (111). Q.E.D.
The importance of theorem IV-10 is that X c can
o , t
be interpreted as the firm's marginal cost of financial
capital (from either external source). (106) also leads
to the following corollary.
Corollary IV-10-1
Under certainty, an increase in the tax rate x
leads to a reduction in the firm's cost of debt capital.
Proof
It follows from (106) and lemma IV-3 that
H7 A 5,t = " (Vt+Yt^t + ^ Bt + ^ V < ° '
Q.E.D.
The significance of corollary IV-10-1 is that the marginal
cost of debt capital falls, while according to (111),
the marginal cost of equity capital is unaffected. This
would, of course, induce the firm to increase its leverage,
i.e. to substitute debt for equity in its optimal capital
structure.
A more important result arising out of (106) and
(111) is the following theorem, which states that, in
general, the firm's choice of capital structure is not
irrelevant to its investment decision.
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Theorem i\l-±x
Under certainty, the choice of capital structure
for the firm modeled in (59) is not, in general, irrelevant
to its investment decision, and therefore, the separability
81
theorems do not, in general, apply.
Proof
Consider (106) and (111). If the firm's choice
of capital structure were irrelevant, then a marginal
increase in the stock of equity would have to have the
same value as a marginal increase in the stock of debt
,
i.e. L e A4 , in (106) and (111). In that case the
two expressions for X- , are equal only if
(1-T)(A +A w .
X
t R , \ R v _ 3,t+l M1SM4 >t 6,t)( 1 t + a!" Bt + 3Y~ V " v + - d+ ' (112)t t t t
But it follows from (110) that
3 t+1






Substituting (113) into (112) and simplifying yields
u-'Xit + is; Bt + w; Bt ) = x • (114)
But the left-hand side of (114) is a monotonically increasing
82function of B. , so that (114) is satisfied (if at all)
by a unique value of B, , and given the sum B, + E. , by
a unique value of the leverage ratio, B./E.. Hence, the
firm's cost of financial capital is not, in general, independent
of the firm's choice of capital structure. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorem IV-11 is that the
firm's choice of capital structure, at least in the certainty
case, will affect its cost of financial capital, and by
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(88) and (89), its investment decision. Hence, its choice
of leverage is not, in general, separable from its invest-
ment decision.
Turning to the firm's dividend policy under certainty,
necessary condition (71) leads to the following condition
that must be satisfied under certainty:
8U dv dv
iwpraf-W + Vdd7< A 4,t +Vt> = Wt+Vt*- (115)
The first term on the left-hand side of (115) can be interpreted
as the direct impact on discounted collective utility of
a change in the dividend per share. The second term on
the left-hand side can be interpreted as the indirect
impact on discounted collective utility of a change in
the dividend per share that results from the fact that a
change in the dividend induces a change in the share
price, which alters the number of shares, Z that need
to be issued (or redeemed) to meet any particular total
equity requirement. The term on the right in (115) can
be interpreted as the impact on discounted collective
utility of a change in the dividend that, given the number
of shares outstanding, n,
,
increases the total required
dividend payout, thereby reducing retained earnings (and
total equity) and the firm's stock of cash. This interpretation
of (115) leads to the following theorem.
Theorem IV-12
Under certainty the firm modeled in (59) will set
its dividend policy, d.
,
per share, such that the direct
impact on discounted collective utility due to a marginal
increase in d. plus the indirect impact resulting from
784
the increased contributed capital and cash that can be
raised through any predetermined level of new issues
just equals the cash flow and retained earnings impact
of the marginal increase in d.
.
(115) also implies the following interesting result.
Corollary IV-12-1
Under certainty the firm modeled in (59) will
set its dividend policy for each time t so that the marginal




retained earnings at t, —
r
tt , just equals
4, t 6,
t










dd^ = ?- < 116 )






= P-iU " Z + , (H7)A4,t +A6,t * *
which was to be proved. Q.E.D.
Remark
Note that in (117) the left-hand side represents a marginal
rate of substitution - that between the share value v.
and the total equity and cash flow impacts of a change in
retained earnings due to a change in dividend policy.
The right-hand side of (117) contains the stock market





so that p*v. = d,
,
and n.'P'v. = n, # d, = D,
,
and hence, P'n^ = D-^/v^, where Dt represents total dividends
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paid. Therefore, P*n. can be interpreted as the share
equivalent of the total dividend payout, whereupon p*n.-Z.
can be given the interpretation stated in corollary IV-12-1.
The point is that n and Z are related by (51) by definition,
and in addition, are related by (117) due to the preferences
of the firm on the one hand and the stock market on the
other.
Corollary IV-12-2
The net share equivalent, p*n. - Z, , of the firm's
dividend/share issues/redemptions policies is strictly
positive for each period t when the firm modeled in (59)
is in equilibrium.
Proof
By assumption, 8U../8V. > for all values of v. .
By lemma IV-3, \* , + \„ . > at optimality. Therefore,
the left-hand side of (117) is strictly positive at optimality.
Therefore, p'n, - Z. > when the firm is in equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
The significance of corollary IV-12-2 lies in
the fact that, if new share issues are viewed as negative
go
dividends, then the corollary states that the net flow
of dividends must always be strictly positive. That is,
the firm modeled in (59) will never find itself with such
large financing needs that the flow of new equity into
the firm exceeds (or is even equal to) the flow of dividend
payments. The reason for this result is that the firm
adjusts its equity issues/redemptions each period in line
with present, as well as future, requirements. In terms
of (111), future equity needs affect A. ++1' ceteris
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paribus, an increase in future equity requirements would
be expected to increase ^ 4 .,- and to reduce thereby the
effective marginal cost of external equity for the current
period. As a result, new share issues would be expected
to increase (or redemptions to decrease) during the
current period. Thus, the fact that future equity require-
ments are implicitly taken into account in (59) means
that the stream of issues/redemptions over time undergoes
a sort of smoothing due to the implicit consideration
of intertemporal financial needs.
Turning next to the explicit consideration of
the firm's financial policy choices under uncertainty,
consider (72) and (73), which govern the firm's choice
of precautionary cash balances. At each time t for each
state of nature s the optimal level of precautionary
cash balances, C, , must be chosen so that (72) and
' t , s
(73) are satisfied. This leads to the following two cases:






It follows from (73) that C, = 0, so that the
optimal level of precautionary cash balances is zero.




gl _1 6,t,s,s' 5,t,s
The left-hand side of (118) can be interpreted as the net
marginal value of an additional dollar of precautionary
cash balances at t in s, which is expressed as the difference
between the expected value of additional precautionary
cash balances at t in s contingent upon s' at t + 1 on
the one hand and the expected value of additional precautionary
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cash balances at t in s contingent upon s' at t - 1 on
the other. The right-hand side of (118) is the familiar
marginal cost of financial capital. According to (118),
optimal precautionary cash balances are zero (at t in s)
when the opportunity cost of precautionary cash balances,
Ar .
,
exceeds their marginal value (at t in s).
case (ii): C, > 0. (positive precautionary cash balances)
It follows from (73) that X„ = and from7,t ,s
(72) that equality must hold in (118). In this case
the marginal value of precautionary cash balances at t
in s just equals the marginal cost of financial capital
(i.e. the opportunity cost of precautionary cash balances)
at t in s.
The above cases are summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem IV-13
For any period t and state of nature s, the
equilibrium net marginal value of an additional dollar
S S
of precautionary cash balances, E A~ .,- , - L X n . ,,
.i 6,t+l,s',s , ., 6,t,s,s''s ' =1 ' ' ' s =1 '
will never exceed the firm's equilibrium marginal cost





marginal value of precautionary cash balances is strictly
less than the equilibrium marginal cost of financial
capital, then the optimal level of precautionary cash
balances is zero. If the optimal level of precautionary
cash balances is strictly positive at optimality, then
the equilibrium net marginal value of precautionary cash
balances just equals the firm's equilibrium marginal
cost of financial capital.
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Proof
The first statement follows directly from (72)
S
and (73) since A_ > and thus Z A~ . .- ,
o « > ^ > S ,_-D,L+±,S,S
Z X a . , < A,- . . The second statement characterizes
case (i) and the third statement characterizes case (ii).
Q.E.D.
Theorem IV-13 leads to the following corollaries.
Corollary IV-13-1
The implicit marginal cost of an increase in cash
balance and working capital requirements associated with
an increase in output, A,- , + A
fi
,




X6,t,s f s' " s1 l1
X6,t+l ) s^s
under uncertainty,
is nonnegative. Under uncertainty, during any period t
and state of nature s in which the equilibrium net marginal
value of precautionary cash balances is strictly less than
the firm's equilibrium marginal cost of financial capital,
then the optimal level of precautionary cash balances is
zero and the implicit marginal cost of increased cash
balance and working capital requirements is strictly positive.
Proof
The first statement follows from (72) and (73)
since under certainty \ n . > and A c , + A~ - A„ ,- > 0,J 7,t — 5,t 6,t 6,t+l —
while under uncertainty A 7 . j> and A. , + Z A„ ,o /,L,S D,"C,S ,_-|fc>,"L,S,S
Z A^
, ,^ ,
> 0. The second statement follows from
s -=l 6,t+l,s' ,s
-
theorem IV-13 and the fact that
S S
s , =1 6,t+l,s',s s , =1 6,t,s,s' 5,t,s 5,t,s
S S
+ Z \- .
,
- Z A„ .... > . Q.E.D.
s , =1 6,t,s,s' gI=1 6,t+l,s',s
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Corollary IV-13-2
Under uncertainty during time periods t and states
of nature s when the equilibrium net marginal value of
precautionary cash balances is strictly less than the firm's
equilibrium marginal cost of financial capital, and as a
result, the optimal level of precautionary cash balances
is zero, the firm's output decision is constrained by the
impact a change in the level of output would have on the
firm's cash balance and working capital requirements.
Proof
It follows from the stated assumptions that the
expression on the left-hand side of (94) is strictly positive
at optimality. In the absence of cash balance or working
capital requirements (or if their cost were zero), then
this expression would be zero. The conclusion then follows
by the assumed strict concavity of U-. and f. Q.E.D.
Corollary IV-13-3
Under uncertainty the cash balance and working
capital requirements associated with an increase in output
tend to restrict the firm's output decision.
Proof
Since X„ > 0, it follows that X_ . + X c - X c 1 > .7,t — ' 5,t 6,t 6,t+l —
Hence, the left-hand side of (79) is nonnegative at optimality.




Reconsidering the bond issue/redemption policy,
this time under uncertainty, the amount of new issues
at t in s, Y , must satisfy (66), and the amount of
debt outstanding at t in s, B, must satisfy (67).
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= (1 - T)
s ^ 1
(A4,t,s,s' +A 6,t,s,s' )(i t,s
+ W^ Bt,s
3i, S S < 119 >








which is analogous to (106). (119) expresses the marginal
cost of debt capital at time t in state of nature s, and
because it applies under uncertainty, the intertemporal
net income-related total equity and cash flow impacts,
S




^« -*- c i ) > tne intertemporal
,_- 4 , L , S , S O , "C , S , S g
direct cash flow impact, as measured by Z A~ . ,
,








and the intertemporal impact on future debt requirements,
S
as measured by Z A 1 , , each must be computed
s i —-^
^ > L+l , s , s
as an expected value in order to take into account the
S possible transitions from some state s' at t - 1 to
state s at t , in the case of the net income-related total
equity and cash flow impacts and the direct cash flow
impact, and the S possible transitions from state s at
t to some state s' at t + 1, in the case of the impact
on future debt requirements. The exact interpretation
of (119), as it relates to the interpretation of (106),
is given below in theorem IV-14.
Next, reconsidering the share issue/redemption
policy, the number of shares issued at each time t in
each state of nature s, Z , must satisfy (68); the number
of shares outstanding at each date and state, n, , must&
' t , s
'
satisfy (69); and total equity for each date and state,
S





_^ o , t , s ,
s
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substituting into (69), and rearranging terms gives
S S
"
s4A3,t+l, S .,s + (Vt " dt,s> s ,y A4,t,s,s' +A 6,t,s,s'> = °' < 12°
Solving (70) and (120) for Z A , , equating the
o i = i ^ , t , s , s








£ A 4. J_- . „ - Z A^ _, - Z A5,t,s v
t
-dtjg s , =1 3,t+l,s',s sf ^1 6,t,s,s' g ,^4 , t+1 , s * ,s
(12
which is analogous to (111). The exact interpretation
of (121), as it relates to the interpretation of (111),
is given in the next theorem.
Theorem IV-14
Under certainty (uncertainty) the marginal cost
of debt capital at each time t (at each time t in state
of nature s) for the firm modeled in (59) is equal to
the (expected) implicit cost of the change in net income
resulting from a change in the amount of debt and rate
of new issues/redemptions, less the (expected) implicit
value of the direct cash flow impact of the new issues/
redemptions, and also less the (expected) implicit value
of the impact of increased debt in the current period
on future debt requirements. Under certainty (uncertainty)
the marginal cost of external equity capital at each time
t (at each time t in state of nature s) for the firm modeled
in (59) is equal to the (expected) implicit value of
an additional dollar's worth of newly issued shares, less
the (expected) implicit value of the direct cash flow
impact of the new share issues/redemptions, and also
less the (expected) implicit value of the impact of increased
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total equity in the current period on future equity
requirements. In equilibrium under certainty (uncertainty)
the firm modeled in (59) will have adjusted its capital
structure for each period t (for each period t and state
of nature s) so that the marginal cost of debt equals
the marginal cost of external equity.
Proof
The first statement follows from (106) and (119).
The second statement follows from (111) and (121). The
third statement repeats theorem IV-10 for the certainty
case and follows for the uncertainty case by equating (119)
and (121). Q.E.D
Similarly, corollary IV-14-1 is perfectly analogous to
corollary IV-10-1.
Corollary IV-14-1
Under certainty (uncertainty) an increase in the
tax rate t leads to a reduction in the firm's cost of
debt capital.
Proof
The result for the certainty case was proved as
corollary IV-10-1. The result for the uncertainty case
is proved in the same manner, but proceeding from (119)
and using lemma IV-4. Q.E.D.
A more important result arising out of (119) and
(121) is the following theorem, which extends theorem
IV-11 and which states that, in general, the choice of
capital structure for the firm modeled in (59) is not
irrelevant to its investment decision.
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Theorem IV-15
Under certainty (uncertainty), the choice of capital
structure for the firm modeled in (59) is not, in general,
irrelevant to its investment decision, and therefore, the
separability theorems do not, in general, apply.
Proof
The result for the certainty case was proved as
theorem IV-11. The proof for the uncertainty case proceeds
analogously. Consider (119) and (121). If the firm's
choice of capital structure were irrelevant, then
A 2,t+l,s',s
= A4,t+l,s\s for a11 tj S ' and S '' But then
y














3Yt,S t' 8 " Vt-dt,S 8'-l 3.t+l,8'.0 .
1
S
But solving (120) for -3 Z X„ 1 , and substitutingvt"at,s S'=l J ' t+1 ' S ' S
into (122) yields
< 1 - T )( i t
>
s
+ 3S7^ Bt,s+^ Bt,s > = x (123)' t , s ' t ,s '
which implies that (114) must hold for each date and state.
As argued in the proof of theorem IV-11, (114), and hence
(123), implies a unique leverage ratio. Hence, it is also
true under uncertainty that the firm's cost of financial
capital is not, in general, independent of its choice of
capital structure. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorem IV-15 is that the firm's
investment decision and its choice of capital structure
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are not, in general, separable. That is, given the level
of investment, it is not true, in general, that the cost
of capital for the firm modeled in (59) is independent
of its choice of capital structure. It follows then, that
investment and financing decisions are, in general, related
inextricably and must therefore be made concurrently.
The last type of financial policy to be explored
under uncertainty in this subsection is the firm's dividend
policy. Necessary condition (71) must be satisfied at
84













t,s s=l ' t t,s s=l s'=l
s
(124)
+A 6,t,s,s' ) nt,s ,£- (X4,t,s,s ,+X 6,t,s,s' ) '
o JL
which is analogous to (115). The analogy between (124)
and (115) leads to the following theorem.
Theorem IV-16
Under uncertainty the firm modeled in (59) will
set its dividend policy, d, per share at time t in state
of nature s, such that the expected direct impact on discounted




1 1 tincrease in d,




indirect impact resulting from the increased contributed
























just equals the cash flow and retained earnings impact
S
of the marginal increase in d^, n^ ^ (* 4 , t , s ; s , +V t , s , s . ) •
The significance of theorem IV-16 is that it extends
theorem IV-12 for the certainty case to the uncertainty
case. As in the certainty case, the firm modeled in (59)
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must balance the direct effect on collective utility and
the indirect effect on contributed capital and cash flow
associated with new issues/redemptions against the effect
on cash flow and retained earnings associated with the
total dividend payout when it sets its dividend policy.
In both cases the potential cash flow impact of a change
in the firm's dividend policy weighs heavily in the selection
of the optimal dividend policy. Theorem IV-16 is also
significant because it demonstrates, along with theorems
IV-14 and IV-15, the straightforward extension of financial
policy results obtained under the assumption of certainty
to the case of uncertainty.
4 . Summary
In this section an integrated production-finance
model of the firm was formulated and the model's implications
for the optimal operating policies and the optimal financial
policies of the firm were derived. The model was developed
by incorporating financial factors, and specifically,
those factors relevant to the firm's cash management
policy, leverage policy, and dividend policy, all of which
were discussed earlier in this chapter, into the model
of the discounted (expected) collective utility maximizing
firm discussed in chapter three of this thesis.
The model developed in this section lends itself
to either of two interpretations depending on the wider
economic milieu within which the firm is assumed to operate.
At one extreme, if the alternative output levels Q.
are interpreted as contingent output claims, and if the
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set of markets for such claims is assumed to be complete,
then with regard to its output decision the firm behaves
86
as if it were functioning within an Arrow-Debreu world,
and the plan characterized by (61)-(73) will, when all
such markets are in equilibrium, constitute a multiperiod
equilibrium for the firm such that its production plans
are consistent with those of all other transactors in
the firm's product market. In such a world the trading
in contingent output claims gives the firm perfect insurance
coverage in the sense that there is no economic incentive
for the firm to alter its production plans prior to the
planning horizon - although depending on the assumed
state of input markets and financial markets, its choice
of production techniques and its financial policy decisions
may require alteration.
At the opposite extreme is the interpretation
suggested at the beginning of this section. If markets
for contingent output claims are nonexistent, then the
plan constitutes a temporary equilibrium in the sense
that the firm's production plan may not be consistent with
the future period plans of the other transactors in the
87firm's product market. In such a world the firm may
have to revise its production plans each period as the
product market (and the economy) shifts to a new temporary
equilibrium. According to this interpretation of the
model developed in this section, the firm's plan, as
characterized by (61)-(73), is of a contingency nature
only. The difference between this interpretation and
the previous one lies in the different assumptions made
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concerning the character of the product markets in the
wider institutional environment.
The main results obtained in this section include
the following. The firm modeled in (59) tends to produce
more output in each period (theorem IV-4) and in each
state of nature (theorem IV-7) than a short run profit
maximizer. The firm modeled in (59) pays managerial
emoluments at a level that equates its marginal rate of
substitution between managerial emoluments and dividends
to one minus the tax rate (theorem IV-5 for the certainty
case and theorem IV-8 for the uncertainty case). Cash
balance and working capital requirements do not affect
the expansion path of the firm modeled in (59) (theorem
IV-6), although they do affect the firm's output decision
(theorem IV-4, theorem IV-7, and corollary IV-13-2).
It was found that at optimality, the marginal cost of
debt capital for the firm modeled in (59) equals its
marginal cost of equity capital (theorem IV-10 for the
certainty case and theorem IV-14 for the uncertainty
case); that the firm's decision regarding precautionary
cash balances depends on whether or not the marginal
value of such balances is as great as their marginal cost
(theorem IV-13); and that the firm's choice of capital
structure is not, in general, irrelevant to its cost of
capital (theorem IV-11 for the certainty case and theorem
IV-15 for the uncertainty case). In addition, optimality
rules were derived for the firm's investment decision
(theorem IV-9) and for the firm's dividend policy (theorem
IV-12 for the certainty case and theorem IV-16 for the
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uncertainty case).
It deserves to be emphasized that several of the
results obtained in this section demonstrate the relation-
ship that exists between the firm's operating policy decisions
and its financial policy decisions. In general, the firm's
output decision is not independent of the firm's cash
management policy (theorems IV-4 and IV-7 and corollary
IV-13-2), and, also in general, the firm's cost of capital,
and hence its investment decision, is not independent
of its leverage policy (theorems IV-11 and IV-15).
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has extended the model of the firm developed
in the previous chapter to incorporate those decision
variables and constraints relevant to the firm's financial
policy decisions. Three classes of financial policies
were distinguished: cash management policy, leverage
policy, and dividend policy. An integrated production-
finance model of the firm was formulated and the model's
implications for the optimal operating policies and the
optimal financial policies of the firm were derived.
In addition, the relationship between these two sets of
policy decisions was explored.
The main results obtained in this chapter include
the following. The collective utility maximizer tends
to maintain greater transactions cash balances than a
short run profit maximizer (theorem IV-1) and, as in
the case of the neoclassical firm, its demand for
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transactions cash balances is inversely related to the
interest rate (theorem IV-2). It was also found that
an increase in the tax rate t will tend to cause the
(expected) collective utility maximizer to substitute
debt for equity in its capital structure (theorem IV-3
and corollaries IV-10-1 and IV-14-1).
It was also found that the discounted expected collective
utility maximizing firm modeled in section E tends to produce
more output in each period (theorem IV-4) and in each
state of nature (theorem IV-7) than a short run profit
maximizer. It was found that cash balance and working
capital requirements do not affect the expansion path
of the firm (theorem IV-6), although they do affect its
output decision (theorem IV-4, theorem IV-7, and corollary
IV-13-2). At optimality the firm's marginal cost of debt
capital equals its marginal cost of equity capital (theorem
IV-10 for the certainty case and theorem IV-14 for the
uncertainty case); that the firm's decision as to whether
to maintain precautionary cash balances depends on whether
the marginal value of such balances is as great as their
marginal cost (theorem IV-13); and that the firm's choice
of capital structure is not, in general, irrelevant to
its cost of capital (theorem IV-11 for the certainty case
and theorem IV-15 for the uncertainty case). In addition,
optimality rules were derived for the firm's investment
decision (theorem IV-9) and for the firm's dividend policy
(theorem IV-12 for the certainty case and theorem IV-16
for the uncertainty case).
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It deserves to be emphasized that several of the results
obtained in this chapter demonstrate the relationship that
exists between the firm's operating policy decisions and
its financial policy decisions. In general, the firm's
output decision is not independent of the firm's cash
management policy (theorems IV-4 and IV-7 and corollary
IV-13-2), and, also in general, the firm's cost of capital,
and hence its investment decision, is not independent
of its leverage policy (theorems IV-11 and IV-15).
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This assumes, for simplicity, that all decision
variables and all state variables are strictly
positive along their optimal trajectories.
The interpretation of the adjustment term in (18),
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y 1e=y 1 e e =y 1 . Thus, y x is expressed in
current value units and is independent of r.
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Ibid P The lemma is consistent with a property
that Keynesian monetary theory holds to be generally





One question that is of interest in this regard
is the extent to which the firm's working capital
requirements contain what Weston and Brigham call
a 'permanent working capital component' that can
be financed more cheaply by long term capital than
by repeated short term borrowing. See J.F. Weston
and E.F. Brigham, Managerial Finance (Holt, Rinehart
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which treats this problem.
43. For completeness it should be noted that, according
to the definition of debt provided in section A of
chapter two, debt also includes preferred stock.
For convenience, preferred stock is not treated
separately in this chapter, but rather, is subsumed
within the composite measure of debt, B, defined in
section A of this chapter.
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'irrelevance proposition' on the firm's leverage
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ment Criteria in Competitive Markets
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47. Currently, interest expense is deductible for tax
purposes while dividends are not.
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chapter two of this thesis.
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but for a value maximizing firm in the absence of
corporate taxes. Inselbag, op. cit.
53. Inselbag employs a relation similar to (21), although
he works directly with total interest expense, rather
than just the interest rate, and incorporates the
capital stock at time t as one of the arguments of
the function in order to allow for the impact of
uncertainty (as transmitted through changes in the
leverage ratio). Ibid.
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(21) to be meaningful, it is necessary that debt
be rolled over instantaneously so that the actual
borrowing histories (amounts with corresponding
interest rates up to time t) are irrelevant. Without
such a restriction the Markov property embodied in
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all control variables and all state variables are
strictly positive along their optimal trajectories.
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From (26),
V " 3V 8B= -tSr^X- 1- M B)e- rt + p i( l-x)(-i- || B)]
From (28),
V - [Sr{1- (1-T)!f B}(-r)e-rt + ^l{l-(l- T)|i B)e-rt
-U
1
(-r)e-rt (l-T)|i B-y iert (l-T)|i B ,
— rt




1 - Si(^ +y i)( l-T)(-l- |i B) =
^"hr. +r( 3ir +V(i-*>!f B-(arr +V <!-*>!? Y
rt
which, after terms have been rearranged and ye





57. There is a second aspect of the firm's dividend policy
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the actual form the distribution of dividends is to
take (i.e. cash vs. non-cash forms of distribution).
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Stock Prices
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of retained earnings built into the Gordon study
and other similar studies.
61. This has been christened the ' bird-in-the-hand
'
argument after the proverb that states that 'a
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush'. See
Fama and Miller, op. cit.
,
pp. 84-85. See also
"Dividend-hungry investors cry for more," Business
Week (August 2, 1976).
62. Miller and Modigliani, op. cit.




64. See section K in chapter two of this thesis.
65. The terms 'risk' and 'uncertainty' are used synonymously
in this thesis. See section C in chapter one of this
thesis.
66. See footnotes 529 and 530 of chapter two of this
thesis for a discussion of the meaning of 'complete'
markets
.
67. However, as discussed later in this section, this
interpretation could be given to the model developed
below if the appropriate additional assumptions are
made concerning the firm's institutional milieu.
68. If it were assumed that there exists a complete
set of markets for contingent output claims, then
such contractual commitments could be the result
of the firm's trading within these markets.
69. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
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70. 3 = would correspond to risk neutrality and 3 <
would correspond to risk preference on the part of
the stock market as a whole.
71. In the simplest case, p = r - g, where r is the
interest rate and g is the firm's long term average
rate of growth (say, of total assets). That is,
under certainty with perfect markets and steady




where d is the dividend per share, as discussed
in chapter two of this thesis.
72. As discussed in section G of chapter two of this
thesis.
73. All other decision variables are assumed to be strictly
positive for each date and state along their respective
optimal trajectories.
74. (75) would also hold if 3 were sufficiently small,
i.e. if the stock market's degree of risk aversion
were sufficiently mild. See footnote 70.
75. Hadley and Whit in, op . cit
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and Bierman, op. cit
.
76. The main advantage of (89) is that the Lagrange multipliers
in (88), which are expressed as marginal utilities
(since the objective functional in (59) is expressed
in terms of utility units), are replaced by ratios
of marginal utilities in (89). Thus, the marginal
cost of financial capital, A,. , which is meaningful
in an ordinal sense, but not in a cardinal sense,
is replaced by the (normalized) marginal cost of
A
5 tfinancial capital ? fi , which is meaningfulA 4,t +A 6,t
in a cardinal sense. Thus, in what follows it will
be important to work with the right-hand side of
(89) as 'the' marginal cost of physical capital when,
as in theorem IV-6, the absolute size of this marginal
cost matters. Similarly, A- can be spoken of as
the marginal cost of financial capital when only
relative size matters. But when absolute size matters,
the Lagrange multiplier terms, including A 5 . , will





77. The requirement that A4 . = provides the connection
between the model developed in chapter three and
the model developed in this chapter. In chapter
three it was found that, in general, the expansion
path of the collective utility maximizer coincides
with the expansion path of the short run profit
maximizer only if the net income constraint is not
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binding. But this corresponds to A = in (90)
since the value of additional net income, which is
measured by A 4,t in (60) in terms of net income's
contribution to total equity, is zero in (11) in
chapter three when the profit constraint is not
binding.
78. Note that (99) does not imply that
S S
s , =1 l,t+l,s',s S '=l 6 » t+1 » s » s
79. The time-state-preference approach is also consistent
with the detailing of scenarios (or states of nature)
that accompanies actual corporate planning. See
chapter six of this thesis for a further discussion
of this point as it applies to the U.S. airframe
industry.
80. That is, a change in the debt level has an immediate
impact on cash flow since the firm's bond interest
obligations are altered. This affects net income
and collective utility through the impact of a change
in net income on total equity (A 4 , ) and cash generated
from operations (A
fi
.). A change in the rate of
issues/redemptions also has an immediate cash impact
as new debt issues are a source of cash while redemptions
use up cash. In addition, a change in the level
of debt outstanding in the current period will, given
the firm's debt requirements next period, affect
next period's required issues/redemptions decision,
which in turn will affect next period's average
interest rate i = i(B, Y). This impact is measured
by *
2 ,t+l in ( 106 )-
81. The separability theorems are discussed in sections




Igd-Dd + || B + ff B) = (i_T){2 3i 3i9B BY







As was done in the Marris models that were discussed
in section G of chapter two of this thesis and as
was also done in the Herendeen model that was discussed
in section I of chapter two of this thesis.
Note that the double sum on the left-hand side of
(124) reflects the fact that a change in any dividend
per share, d,
,
planned for any particular period
and state of nature that period affects the share value,
v., that period, according to (36), and hence, affects
the equity and cash flow impacts of any planned share
issue/redemption in each possible state s that might
obtain that period.
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85. See footnotes 529 and 530 of chapter two of this
thesis for a discussion of the meaning of 'complete'
markets.
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V. CORPORATE PLANNING AND THE INTERNAL
ALLOCATION OF THE FIRM'S RESOURCES
A. INTRODUCTION
With the exception of the behavioral theories of the
firm, the models discussed in chapter two of this thesis
were formulated for the purpose of studying phenomena external
to the firm, e.g. how actual price and output were related
to (external) product demand. More generally, this is true
of microeconomics, which traditionally has been concerned
with allocative efficiency - i.e. the efficiency with which
the market system allocates resources and goods between
firms (and also between firms and other economic units) -
and much less concerned with what Leibenstein calls ' X-ef f iciency ' -
the efficiency with which resources are allocated and utilized
within firms. The main purpose of this chapter is to extend
the model developed in chapters three and four of this thesis
to incorporate phenomena internal to the firm, such as the
nature of its organizational structure, and to explore the
relationship between internal phenomena and the behavior
exhibited by the firm.
In the traditional theory of the firm, the firm's organizational
structure was given only an indirect role to play. It
was argued that within the entrepreneurial firm the limited
decision-making capacity of the entrepreneur was one of
2the major factors limiting the size of the firm. The
813
larger the organization, it was argued, the weaker the degree
3
of control exercised by the decision maker. As a result,
internal diseconomies of size would set in beyond some point,
causing the firm's long run average total cost curve to become
upward-sloping beyond that point. These organizational factors
were not, however, integrated directly into the model of
the firm, but rather, were invoked as one justification
for the U-shaped long run average cost curve, and hence,
the optimum firm size, hypothesized in the neoclassical
4theory of the firm.
In recent years economists have come to appreciate better
the multidivision form of corporate organization pioneered
5by General Motors in the 1920s and 1930s and have begun
to explore its implications for the coordination and control
of the corporate enterprise. Several economists have explored
the economics of the divisionalized firm, noting in particular
that the separate divisions may be viewed as quasi-firms
linked to corporate headquarters and to each other by a set
7
of internal markets for both human and nonhuman resources.
It has also been noted that different organizational forms
o
exist within the basic multidivision form, although the
implications of these different structures for coordination
and control are not entirely clear as yet.
One of the consequences of the multidivision firm and
decentralized decision-making is the need for planning
9procedures to guide the internal allocation of resources.
Capital, labor (particularly managers and scientists), and
other resources may be transferred from one division to
another. In addition, the output of one division
814
may be used as an input by another division. Since there
are seldom market-determined prices to guide these allocations -
as there normally are for transactions between firms -
the firm must rely on some other means of determining the
(optimal) allocations. For this purpose the firm might
adopt price- or nonprice- guided planning procedures,
such as those employed in planned economies. In some
cases, the planning process supplants the market, as for
example, when vertical integration takes place and resources
that were previously transferred between firms via markets
are thereafter transferred between divisions of the firm,
while in other cases the planning process is intended to
serve a function for which markets are poorly designed,
as for example, the allocation of managers on the basis of
12differences in quality and performance.
The question regarding the efficiency with which resources
are allocated and utilized within the firm is an important
one. Leibenstein argues that the potential gains from improved
X-efficiency - through the improved allocation of managers
and workers, better motivation of workers, better organization
of production, and quicker adoption of innovations - exceed
13
the potential gains from improved allocative efficiency.
Organizational structure is important to the extent that
14
it affects the coordination and control of the enterprise.
Where controls are weak, the firm may operate at a low level
of X-efficiency, becoming more efficient only when adverse
business conditions force cost cutting, productivity improvements,
15
and other changes. The multidivision form of organizational
815
structure has evolved due to the need for effective coordination
and control in large, diversified firms, although as Williamson's
analysis suggests, managerial preferences for staff and
emoluments make the multidivision organizational form a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for X-efficiency
in large manager-controlled firms.
Most studies that have been concerned with the allocation
of resources within firms have emphasized the informational
17
aspects of the problem. These studies have suggested
that "the firm, in large part, consists of nonmarket institutions
whose function is to deal with resource allocation in the
presence of informational constraints that markets handle
18poorly or do not handle at all." Several studies have
explored how these informational constraints affect the
structure of internal labor markets and the allocation of
19human resources within the firm, while others have analyzed
the functioning of internal capital markets, how they differ
from external capital markets, and the relationship between
the quality of information (e.g. quality of forecasts) and
20
the internal investment decision. While these studies
have contributed significantly to the understanding of what
goes on inside the firm, the relationship between what goes
on inside the firm and the state of the firm's external
21
environment remains largely unexplored.
To reiterate a point made earlier, the main purpose of
this chapter is to extend the model developed in chapters
three and four of this thesis to incorporate phenomena internal
to the firm and to explore the relationship between internal
816
phenomena and the behavior exhibited by the firm. Section B
distinguishes different classes of labor and develops a model
of organizational slack that relates the degree of organizational
slack to the state of the firm's operating environment.
Section C presents the model of the multidivision firm.
Under the assumption that decision-making is centralized,
rules are derived for the optimal allocation of human and
physical capital among the firm's divisions. These optimality
rules are utilized in section D to construct an algorithm
to solve the decentralized multidivision firm's multiperiod
finite horizon planning problem. Also in section D, the
problem of achieving compliance with corporate objectives
in the decentralized multidivision firm when division managers
attempt to maximize their own utility is studied and the
implications of imperfect compliance for the loss of X-efficiency
are discussed.
B. A MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK
1. Introduction
The model developed in chapters three and four assumed
all labor to be homogeneous and assumed that inputs were
employed with maximum technical efficiency. In this chapter
two classes of labor are distinguished: manufacturing labor
and administrative labor. In addition, it is no longer required
that inputs be combined with maximum technical efficiency.
In this section the concept of organizational slack is introduced,
and the model developed in chapter three is modified so that
817
variation in the degree of organizational slack over the
business cycle can be studied.
2. The Model
It is assumed that the firm hires labor of two types:
manufacturing labor, which is productive, and administrative
labor, some of which is productive and some of which is not.
Specifically, it is assumed that the units of administrative
labor hired by the firm are homogenous, but that a portion
of these units are allocated to staff jobs in which their
22productivity is zero. Let the amount of manufacturing
labor hired by the firm at time t be denoted by L(t) and
let the amounts of productive and nonproductive administrative
labor be denoted by A (t) and A (t), respectively. It is
assumed that the markets for both types of labor are perfectly
competitive, with the constant unit costs being denoted by
w(t) for manufacturing labor and by s(t) for administrative
labor. Since administrative labor is assumed to be homogeneous,
both productive and nonproductive units are paid the same
salary s(t) (per period).
Productive administrative labor is valued by the
firm for its contribution to production. Its contribution
is recognized by introducing A (t) as an argument of the
neoclassical production function,





where it is assumed, as in chapter three, that the firm
produces a single output and that the production function (1)
has a full set of continuous second partial derivatives.
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It is also assumed that the marginal product of each input
in (1) is strictly positive at all usage levels and that
the use of each input is subject to diminishing returns,
so that
3f/3K > 9f/3L > 3f/9A >
(2)
8
2 f/3K 2 < 3 2 f/8L 2 < 3 2 f/8A 2 <
Nonproductive administrative labor is valued by the
firm, and specifically, by the firm's managers, for its direct
23
contribution to managerial utility. Its contribution is




U = U (R(t), D(t), M(t), A (t)). (3)
i i n
The introduction of administrative labor also requires
that the minimum net income constraint be modified to take
this into account. Since total labor cost is now
w(t)«L(t) + s(t)*[A (t) + A (t)], the minimum net income
XT
constraint becomes










- M(t) - q(t)-l6-K(t)] > tt
o ,
where 6. indicates the state of the firm's operating environment
at time t (as in section E of chapter three).
Recognizing A (t) and A (t) as decision variables,
and using (1), (3), and (4) to modify the model of the firm
(11) in section B of chapter three, the model of the firm
819
is reformulated as the following optimal control problem:
T
maximize / U [p( 9 ) • f (K( t ) ,L( t ) ,
A







(t)) - w(t)-L(t) - s(t)-[A (t)
+ A
n
(t)] - M(t)} + x-q(t)[6-K(t)] - q(t)-I(t);
M(t); Aft)]e~ rt dt + U (K(t))e"rT
n 2
(5)






- s(t)-[A (t) + A
n
(t)] - M(t) - q(t)-[6-K(t)]}
> 7T , < t < T





(t) > 0, < t < T
The purpose of the remainder of this section is to characterize
the solution to problem (5), and to study its implications
for the behavior of the firm in response to changes in the
firm's operating environment.
3. Organizational Slack
Since nonproductive administrative labor by definition
does not contribute to output, it represents slack to the
firm in the sense that when A (t) > 0, total administrative
n
labor could be reduced by an amount A (t) (i.e. the slack
could be eliminated) and the level of production, Q(t), would
not change. The degree o & organizational Alack at time
t is defined to be the amount of nonproductive administrative
labor in the firm's personnel organization at time t. The
main result of this section demonstrated below is that the
820
degree of organizational slack varies systematically with
the state of the firm's operating environment (i.e. over
the business cycle).
Before applying Pontryagin's maximum principle to
problem (5) and characterizing the resulting necessary conditions,
the significance of organizational slack, and its meaning
in terms of the efficiency with which the firm's resources
are utilized, should be noted. Given the firm's production
function (1), if the units of nonproductive administrative
labor could be utilized productively, then output would be
Q* = f(K(t), L(t), A (t) + A (t)), which exceeds Q when
A (t) > since by (2), the marginal productivity of the
additional 'productive administrative labor' is strictly
positive. The output level Q* can be interpreted as the
level of output that would result if all inputs in the firm's
employ at time t were utilized in production with maximum
technical efficiency. The difference Q* - Q represents the
loss of potential output due to organizational slack and
is strictly positive when A (t) > 0.
Returning to problem (5) and proceeding as before,
define the Lagrangian by
L
y






A, u^ t] =
H[K, L, I, M, A A. A, t] + u (t )
•
[(1-t ){p(8 )•
p n i l
f(K(t), L(t), A (t)) - w(t)-L(t) - s(t)-[A (t)
+ A
n
(t)] - M(t) - q(t)-[6-K(t)]} - 7TQ ] ,
where H denotes the Hamiltonian for (5),











—rtin which U [ ]e denotes the integrand in (5).
In order that the time paths L*(t), I*(t), M*(t),
A* (t), and A*
n
(t) provide an optimal solution to problem (5)
it is necessary that they satisfy the following conditions:
(L*(t), I*(t), M*(t), A* (t), A* (t)} maximize
H[K, L, I, M, Ap> An , A, t] (8)
subject to the minimum net income constraint
and the nonnegativity constraints in (5), £ t _< T
K(t) = I*(t) - 6-K(t), < t < T, K(0) given (9)
9L d\J (K(T))
_ T
A*(t) = - ^ , A*(T) =
^ K(T) e"
r (10)
Since (9) and (10) are identical to (15) and (16), respectively,
in section B of chapter three, they are stated for completeness
only and are not considered further in this section.
To characterize the solution to (8), define the
Lagrangian L , by introducing the Lagrange multiplier y
y , t 2
and by appending the product y [A (t)] to L given by (6).
2 n y
It follows that the necessary conditions for an optimal
25
solution to (8) (for each time t) are the following:
dL , 8U ~
_p 3U ^ o ,
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(11)
8L , 8U .
Tl = { 3D 1( -q(t))}e + X(t) = ° (12)
9L . 3U 9U
"sF m t^d-Ot-D + 3Hi-}e-rt + U.d-TX-l) = (13)
822
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A„(t) > y > y [An ] = (17)n — i — 2 n
Conditions (11), (12), (13), and (16) have the same interpretation
as conditions (18)-(21) in section B of chapter three, and
need not be considered separately in this section.
The interpretation of condition (14) and its analogy
to (11) are summarized as the following lemma:
Lemma V-l
In equilibrium the collective utility maximizer modeled in
(5) will hire more administrative labor and more manufacturing
labor than a short run profit maximizer.
Proof
Follows directly from (11), (14), and (2), and the fact that
the short run profit maximizer will hire manufacturing labor
8 f
up to the point at which w = p(6)-~y- and productive administrative
8 flabor up to the point at which s = P(6)"Ta— • Q.E.D.
P
Remark
Note that (14) is just (11) with A in place of L, so that
proving that the firm hires more productive administrative
823
labor than a short run profit maximizer is perfectly analogous
to proving that it hires more manufacturing labor. Note
also that since the firm hires more productive administrative
labor than a short run profit maximizer, the existence of
organizational slack (i.e. A (t) > 0) strengthens the conclusion
that 'too much' administrative labor is hired.
The interpretation of conditions (15) and (17),
and their analogy to (13) when the possibility that M(t) =
is admitted, are summarized as the following lemma:
Lemma V-2
In equilibrium if the collective utility maximizer modeled
in (5) hires any nonproductive administrative labor, it
will do so up to the point at which the marginal rate of






just equals salary expense net of
i
tax, (1 - t)s. If no nonproductive administrative labor
is hired, it is because the marginal rate of substitution
between nonproductive administrative labor and dividends
is strictly less than salary expense net of tax (at A =0).
Proof
The first statement follows directly from (15) with u =0
2
(since by (17) u =0 when A > 0). The second statement
2 n
follows directly from (15) with u > (since by (17) A =
2 n
when u > 0). Q.E.D.
2
Remark
Note that lemma V-2 provides an interpretation of (15)
and (17) that is perfectly analogous to the interpretation
of (28) and (30) in section B of chapter three. As in the
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case of managerial emoluments (according to (28) in section B
of chapter three) the firm will, if it hires nonproductive
administrative labor, equate the subjective rate of trade




/?,n , with the objective rate of trade off permitted by
1
the market for administrative labor and government tax policy.
That is, (1 - t)s is the rate at which dividends and nonproductive
administrative labor can be traded off within the firm's
income statement, given the market-determined salary level
s and government tax policy as embodied in t. Also as in
the case of managerial emoluments (according to (30) in section
B of chapter three), the firm will not hire any nonproductive
administrative labor - there will not be any organizational
slack - unless the subjective rate of trade off exceeds the
objective rate of trade off over some range of values for
The third lemma of this section relates the firm's
marginal rate of substitution between managerial emoluments
and nonproductive administrative labor to the ratio of their
unit costs.
Lemma V-3
When the firm modeled in (5) pays managerial emoluments and
hires nonproductive administrative labor when it is in equilibrium,
the marginal rate of substitution between nonproductive
9U /3A
administrative labor and managerial emoluments, ^* ,~ M ,
i
is equal to the unit salary of administrative labor, s.
Proof
Follows directly from (13) and (15). Q.E.D.
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Remark 1
Note that the unit cost of administrative labor is s and
the unit cost of (a dollar's worth of) managerial emoluments
is one, so that s also represents the ratio of the unit





,~ M = s that arises out of
lemma V-3 is similar to the neoclassical optimality condition
for production that requires that inputs be combined in such
a way that the marginal rate of technical substitution between
each pair of inputs just equals the ratio of their unit costs.
Here 'production' is interpreted in the sense of 'contributing
to collective utility'. The point to be emphasized is the
important analogy that exists between optimally combining
amounts of items that contribute to collective utility so
as to maximize a concave multivariate utility function subject
to certain constraints and optimally combining amounts of
inputs (i.e. sources of output) so as to maximize a concave
multivariate production function subject to certain constraints.
Remark 2
Note that in the special case in which s is fixed, lemma
V-3 could be restated as: in equilibrium the marginal rate
of substitution between expenditures in the form of managerial
emoluments and expenditures for nonproductive administrative
labor is equal to one.
One of the consequences of lemma V-3 is that an
increase in the unit cost of administrative labor will tend
to cause the firm to substitute managerial emoluments for
(the now relatively more expensive) nonproductive administrative
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labor, provided the marginal rate of substitution between
nonproductive administrative labor and managerial emoluments
is decreasing in A . This is illustrated in figure V-l.
The line AB shows the permissible combinations of M and A
n
when all other variables in (5) are held fixed (at their
optimal levels). The convex indifference curve shows those
combinations of M and A that yield the same level of collective
utility as the combination (A* , M*). The convex shape of
the indifference curve embodies the decreasing marginal rate
of substitution property. When the unit cost of administrative
labor is s, the firm will hire an amount A* and will pay
managerial emoluments M* . This is the consequence of lemma
V-3, which states that the optimal levels A* and M* must
'
n
occur at a point of tangency such as C in figure V-l.
When the unit cost rises to s' (all other variables in (5)
held fixed), the line AB rotates clockwise through A to the
position AB' since the maximum permissible level of managerial
emoluments is unchanged, but the maximum permissible amount
of nonproductive administrative labor that can be hired
has been reduced. The pure substitution effect of the change
in s is determined by holding the utility level fixed, which
is accomplished geometrically by drawing a third line parallel
to AB ' and tangent to the indifference curve. The pure
substitution effect, according to which managerial emoluments
are substituted for nonproductive administrative labor with
the utility level held fixed, is depicted by the 'shift'
from C to D in figure V-l. The second portion of the overall
effect of a change in s, the income effect, is depicted by











Figure V-l The Firm's Trade Off Between Managerial
Emoluments and Nonproductive Administrative
Labor
both managerial emoluments and the amount of nonproductive
administrative labor employed by the firm are reduced as a
result of the increase in s.
The two effects of a change in s illustrated in
figure V-l can be stated in more formal mathematical terms
through the development of the appropriate Hicks-Slutsky-type
equation. This is stated as the following theorem.
Theorem V-l
Assume that the utility function U is strictly concave.
Holding the amounts of manufacturing labor, productive administratis
labor, and investment fixed, when the minimum net income
constraint in (5) is binding, the effect of a change in s
on the firm's hiring of nonproductive administrative labor
can be expressed in the form of a Hicks-Slutsky-type equation
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as the sum of two effects, one a substitution effect according
to which managerial emoluments are substituted for nonproductive
administrative labor when s is increased and the other an
income effect.
Proof
The appropriate mathematical technique is that used in proving
theorem III-4. The technique is applied to equations (13),
(15) with y =0, and (4) expressed as an equality, with
2
y , M, and A each expressed as a function of s and it
n
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since L < and < by the concavity assumption.
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n
Differentiating with respect to tt as in the proof of theorem
III-4 leads to the equation
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From (18) and (21) it follows that






+ (l-DEgpi Mj e"]H- 33 ,
where the first term on the right-hand side of (22) is the
income effect and the second term is the substitution effect.
It follows from (20) that H
_1
= -(l-x) 2 /det H < 0, and hence,
that the substitution effect is always negative. Q.E.D.
As before, the relationship embodied in the Hicks-




- ( 5.) + ( H) C23)9s 9 it s = constant 9s tt ^constant '
o o
where the first term on the right-hand side of (23) represents
the income effect and the second term represents the substitution
effect
.
4. Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle
The main result of this section is proved as the
following theorem.
Theorem V-2
For the collective utility maximizer modeled in (5), investment,
managerial emoluments, and organizational slack vary cyclically,
i.e. increasing in the upswing and decreasing in the downswing.
The firm's employment of manufacturing labor and productive
830
administrative labor, and hence its output, vary cyclically
3(3U /3R)
also, provided - gTfTgo* jd? < 1 at the margin.
1
Proof
In the proof of theorem III-ll it was shown that





• ^ < 1 at the margin. The proof
i
that dA /d8 > is perfectly analogous to the proof (using
(15)) that dM/de > 0, and the proof that dA /de > 0, provided
D 3(3U /3R)
*k A < 13U /3R 3R
l
at the margin, is perfectly analogous
to the proof (using (11)) that dL/de > 0, provided the same
condition holds. Q.E.D.
The importance of theorem V-2 is twofold in nature.
First, it links the phenomenon of organizational slack to
the business cycle. During the upswing the profit constraint
is more easily satisfied, and one result is that staffs
expand and organizational slack develops (or worsens if it
is already present). During the downswing the need to satisfy
the profit constraint requires that organizational slack
be reduced and leads to the sort of cost cutting and staff
reductions reported by Williamson and widely reported in the
business and financial press when the level of economic
activity declines. Second, theorem V-2 extends theorem III-ll
to reflect factors internal to the firm.
Thus far in this chapter the firm has been treated
as having a single division organizational structure. The
remainder of this chapter is concerned with firms having
a multidivision organizational structure and with the allocation
of the firm's productive resources among these divisions.
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C. A MODEL OF THE MULTIDIVISION FIRM
1. Introduction
The purpose of this section is to develop a model
of the multidivision firm and to use the model to derive
rules for optimally allocating the firm's productive resources
among the divisions. In this section it is assumed that
all operating decisions, as well as all capital allocation
decisions, are made at the headquarters level. The consequences
of decentralized decision-making are explored in section D.
The purpose of this subsection is to describe briefly the
nature of the multidivision firm.
The organizational structure of a typical multidivision
firm is illustrated below in figure V-2. At the top of the
organizational pyramid is the headquarters, which includes
the chairman of the board of directors, the president, one
or more vice presidents with functional responsibilities
(often the divisions are organized into groups, each of which
is headed by a vice president), and supporting staff. This
supporting staff typically includes legal staff, corporate
planning staff, and financial staff (offices of the treasurer
and controller, which in smaller organizations are usually
combined into one office). Beneath the headquarters are
the divisions, which are the principal operating units of
27
the corporation and which may be viewed as quasi-firms.
This notion of a division as a quasi-firm is developed further
below.
In the multidivision firm decision-making is typically















Figure V-2 Organizational Structure of
the Multidivision Firm
made at the division level, though decisions concerning
investment, new product development, and financial policy
are typically made at the headquarters level. In figure
V-2 the solid line from headquarters to the divisions indicates
the allocation of capital and managerial talent (productive
administrative labor) among the divisions and the dashed
line indicates the flow of each division's net operating
income to the headquarters level. A portion of these funds
is used to pay headquarters expenses, to meet the firm's
financial obligations (e.g. to pay bond interest), and to
pay dividends, and the remainder is allocated among the divisions
for investment purposes in accordance with the firm's objectives.
Thus, there are two main internal allocation problems: one
involving managerial talent (i.e. human capital) and the
other involving investment resources (i.e. physical capital).
Subject to these allocation decisions by the headquarters,
28
833
each division determines manufacturing labor and output levels,
carries out production and marketing, and remits its net
operating income to the headquarters. It is in this sense
that each division acts as a quasi-firm.
In this section these quasi-firms are given a minimal
degree of discretion. All significant operating decisions
are made at the headquarters level. In the next section
decision-making is permitted to become decentralized, and
it is shown how such decentralization can lead to such problems
as loss of internal control, lack of compliance with corporate
objectives, and loss of X-ef ficiency . In developing these
results, the model developed in this section will be used
for comparative purposes.
In this section and the next the problems introduced
by uncertainty, which were explored in chapters three and four,
and the role of financial considerations, which was studied
in chapter four, are abstracted from in order to deal exclusively
with questions related to organizational structure, internal
resource allocation, and corporate control. Since the presence
of uncertainty was shown in chapters three and four to lead
to complexities, but in most cases to results not fundamentally
different from those obtained under certainty, and since the
multidivision firm's financial operations are typically
concentrated at the headquarters level, it is this writer's
opinion that neither abstraction detracts seriously from the
results obtained in the remainder of this chapter.
2. A Model of the Multidivision Firm
In this subsection it is assumed that all decision-
making within the firm is centralized at the headquarters
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level. It is also assumed that the firm has I divisions,
numbered i = 1, ... , I, each of which produces a single
good. Associated with each division is a production function
of the form
«i f i< K i> Li' Ap,i'
Al
p,H> • < 24 >
where K. is the amount of real capital allocated to the division
by the headquarters, L. is the amount of manufacturing labor
hired by the division, A . is the amount of productive
' P,i
29 i
administrative labor hired by the division, and A „
p,ri
is the amount of headquarters management time (hereafter
referred to as 'productive headquarters administrative labor')
devoted to problems arising in the i-th division. As before,
it is assumed that (24) has a full set of continuous second
partial derivatives and that all its first derivatives are
strictly positive for all input usage levels.
If the firm's total stock of fixed capital at time
t is denoted by K(t) and if its quantity of productive head-
quarters administrative labor at time t is denoted by A u(t),
then it follows that
I





1 (t) < A (t)
must hold at each time t, < t < T, where K(t) is determined
along with the optimal allocations, K.(t), and investment,
I(t), and where A Tj(t) is also determined along with thep,n
optimal allocations, A u(t), in the model set out below.
p , XI
While (25) are inequalities, it is shown below that when
the firm is in multiperiod equilibrium, (25) will hold as
equalities.
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Employing (24) as the firm's production functions;
adding the constraints (25); expressing total revenue as
the sum of the amounts of revenue earned by the I divisions,
I
R(t) = Z p (t)-f (K (t), L (t), A (t), A 1 „(t)); and
^= 1 1 11 1 p,l p,H
redefining net income ^(t), and total dividends paid, D(t),
to reflect the productive administrative labor employed by
the divisions, A • (t), and the amount of productive headquarters
administrative labor employed by the firm, A Tr(t); leads
P , -ii





'0 Vi=l P i (t)-f i (K i (t),L. ( t ) ,Ap>i (t),A
1
p)H (t ) ) ;
A At),
J'" (t) (l-T ) {p i (t ) .f. ( K i( t ) ,L i (t),Ap)i (t ) ,A
i




-w(t) Z L (t) - s(t)[A „(t) + A (t)
i=1 1 P,n n
I
+ Z A .(t)] -M(t)} + T-q(t)[5-K(t)]




+ U (K(T))e rT
2
V v (26)
subject to K(t) = I(t) - 6-K(t), < t < T, K(0) given
Z K.(t) < K(t), < t < T
i=l x
Z A
1 (t) < A (t), < t < T
^_jL P» h
— P> H —
I i(1-t){ Z p i (t)-f i (K i (t),L i (t),Api (t),A p>H (t))
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KI I
-w(t). Z L.(t) -s(t)U „(t)+A
n (t)+ Z A^ ,(t)]
i=l 1 P' H n i=i P' 1






pH (t) > 0, 0<t<T, i=l,...,I
M(t),A (t) > 0, < t < T
According to the model of the multidivision firm (26),
the objective of the firm is to set allocations among the
firm's operating divisions of capital, K.(t), manufacturing
labor, L.(t), productive administrative labor, A .(t), and
l p , i
productive headquarters administrative labor, A u(t), and
p , n
in addition, to determine levels of productive headquarters
administrative labor, A Tj(t), investment, I(t), managerial
p, h
emoluments, M(t), and nonproductive administrative labor,







collective utility over the firm's planning period, subject
to four constraints (in addition to nonnegativity constraints):
the familiar net investment constraint; a constraint requiring
that the amount of capital allocated not exceed the amount
available (at each time t); a constraint requiring that
the amount of productive headquarters administrative labor
allocated not exceed the amount available (at each time t);
and the familiar minimum net income (i.e. profit) constraint.
As before, it is assumed that all product and factor markets
are perfectly competitive, so that w(t), s(t), q(t), and
p.(t), i = 1, ... , I, are treated as given by the firm
at each time t. Also as before, it is assumed that capital
markets are perfect, so that there is a unique rate of interest
r at each time t, and further, that r as well as t and 6
QQ7
remain constant throughout the planning period. Also as
before, U and f., i = 1, ... , I, are assumed to be strictly
concave with strictly positive first partial derivatives.
3. Optimal Internal Allocation Rules
The purpose of this subsection is to derive the
rules for optimally allocating inputs implied by the model
(26) formulated in the previous subsection. The Hamiltonian
for (26) is
(27)
H[K, K., L., A ., A 1 „, A „, I, M, A , A, t] =
' i' i' p,i P,H' p,H' ' ' n' '
U [ ]e" rt + A(t)[l(t) - 6-K(t)] ,
i
— rt
where U [ ]e denotes the integrand in (26). To find
i
the necessary conditions for an optimal solution to (26),
from which the desired allocation rules can be obtained,
define the following generalized Lagrangian:
L [K,K.,L A .^A 1 A I,M,A A,y ,u ,y ,t] =
y l l p, l p ,tt p ,rt n 123
I
H[K,K L A A 1 A „, I ,M, A A , t]+ u (t)[K(t) - Z K.(t)|1 1 P, 1 P.*1 P> W n 1 i= l !
I I
+ y (t)[Ao „(t) - Z A
1
^ „(t)] + y (t)[(l-i){ Z p.(t)-
















(t) + Z An .(t)] - M(t) - q(t)-[6-K(t)]} - tt ] ,
-} =1 "
'
where H[ ] is given by (27).
In order that the time paths K*.(t), L* (t), A* . (t),
1 1 P > -*-
i*
A p,H (t) ' A * „(t), I*(t), M*(t), and A* (t) provide an
p,rt n
optimal solution to problem (26) it is necessary that they






















, I ,M, A
r
, A , t
]
(29)
subject to the allocation constraints (25) and subject
also to the minimum profit and nonnegativity constraints
in (26) , < t < T
K(t) = I*(t) - 6»K(t), < t £ T, K(0) given (30)
9L 9U (K(T))
_
A * (t) = " 8K^ ' A
* (T) = %K(T) e ' (31)
Since, as before, (30) merely repeats the net investment
constraint, only (29) and (31) need be considered explicitly
below. Since the implications of M and A being zero at
optimality have already been considered and since the variables
K
.
, L. , A . , and A „ contribute directly to production,
j- i P>i P>"
and hence would be expected to be strictly positive at optimality,
it is assumed in what follows that each of the decision
variables is strictly positive all along its optimal trajectory.
First considering (29), the necessary conditions
30
are the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
3L,, 9U 3f. 9U 9f.
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J 1
9L 3u 9 f. d U 3 f
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9f
+ u U-OCPiSET • w] = °
9L 9U 9f 9U 9f
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r i 1 \, A N 1 , -rt
<;
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3f .












+ A(t) = (37)
3L 3U 3U
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Z K (t) K(t) y > y [K(t) - Z K.(t)] = (40)





1 (t) < A (t) y > y [A (t) - Z A* (t)] = (4:
I .1 I
(1-t){ Z p -f (K L A A 1 )-w Z L -s[A +A + Z A* ]







y [d-T){ Z p -f (K L A A 1 )-w Z L -s[An „+A + Z A
1
]
3 i=1 1111 p,l p,H i= 1 1 p,H n i = 1 p,H
-M-q-6-K} - tt ] =
By comparing necessary conditions (32)-(39) for the model
of the multidivision firm (26) with necessary conditions
(11)-(15) for the model of the firm (5) having what Williamson
31
calls the unitary form of organization, it is immediately
apparent that (33), (37), (38), (34), and (39) are virtually
840
J
identical to (11)-(15), respectively. In particular, the
manufacturing labor allocation rule (11) is, according to
(33), applied to each division separately. Similarly, the
productive administrative labor allocation rule (14) is,
according to (34), applied to each division separately.
This result is stated as the following lemma.
Lemma V-4
The multidivision firm modeled in (26) will employ the same
rules for optimally allocating manufacturing labor and productive
administrative labor to each division as the firm modeled
in (5).
The significance of the lemma is twofold. First,
lemma V-4 makes clearer the point made earlier that the
divisions of a multidivision firm behave like quasi-firms.
Second, the lemma leads immediately to the following theorem.
Theorem V-3
The multidivision firm modeled in (26) will allocate to (or,
employ in) each of its divisions more manufacturing labor
and more productive administrative labor, and hence, will
produce more of each of its I goods, than a short run profit
maximizer
.
Next, consider the necessary conditions (32) and
(35), which have no counterparts among (11)-(15). These
conditions together with (40) and (41) determine the allocations
of physical capital, K., and productive headquarters administrative





3f. (9U /3R) + (l-x)y ert y ert
pi8KT (1
- T) + p i8KT [ ' auyaD
a ]= 3uy3D < 43 >
and
rt3f. 3f. (3U /3R) + (l-T)y e






By analogy with equation (40) in chapter three, the left-
hand side of (43) can be interpreted as the marginal value
32
of an additional unit of capital allocated to the i-th division,
where this marginal value is figured net of tax and where
the role of the expression within brackets in (43) is to
measure the marginal impact on revenue and the profit constraint
in terms of the marginal utility of dividends (i.e. in terms
of a 'dividend equivalent'). Similarly, the left-hand side
of (44) can be interpreted as the marginal value of an additional
unit of productive headquarters administrative labor allocated
to the i-th division. Recognizing that the right-hand sides
of (43) and (44) are independent of i leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem V-4
When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in multiperiod
equilibrium, the marginal value of an additional unit of
capital allocated to any division will be the same for all
divisions and the marginal value of an additional unit of
productive headquarters administrative labor allocated to
any division will be the same for all divisions.
Proof
The first part of the statement follows directly
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from (43), which must hold for i = 1, ... , I. The second
part of the statement follows directly from (44), which also
must hold for i = 1, ... , I. Q.E.D.
Remark
The right-hand sides of (43) and (44) are actually
marginal rates of substitution. For example, the ratio
rtye /(8U /8D) can be interpreted as the marginal rate of
i i
substitution between dividends and a unit of capital allocated
rt
to any division. Alternatively, the ratio y e /(3U /dD)
can be interpreted as the marginal value of an additional
unit of capital allocated to any division, expressed in terms
of the marginal impact of such an allocation on total dividends
(and therefore, indirectly on collective utility). In either
rt
case, dividing ye by 3U /3D converts the nonmeasurable
marginal utility expression for value into a ratio (i.e. a
marginal rate of substitution) that is, in theory at least,
measurable.
The significance of theorem V-4 is that it provides
the rules for optimally allocating physical capital and
productive headquarters administrative labor among the I
divisions of a multidivision firm. In order for these allocations
to be optimal it is necessary that the marginal value of an
additional unit of each resource be the same in every alternative
use for that resource within the firm. Moreover, (43) and
(44) yield expressions for these common marginal values in
terms of the Lagrange multipliers, or shadow prices, y and
y . The following corollary states that in equilibrium
2
these marginal values must be strictly positive. A later
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theorem demonstrates the relationship between the internal
price of capital, y , and the firm's external cost of capital.
Finally, the planning algorithm developed in section D will





When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
rt
the marginal value of capital ye /(9U /9D) and the marginal
rt
value of productive headquarters administrative labor ye /(9U /3D
2 1
are both strictly positive.
Proof
Follows from (42)-(44) and the assumptions that
3f./8K. > 0, Sf./BA 1 „ > 0, 9U /8R > 0, and 9U /3D > 0.11 l p ,ti i i
Q.E.D.




When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
the available amounts of physical capital and productive
headquarters administrative labor at each time t will be
fully allocated, i.e. the constraints (25) will hold as
equalities.
Proof
It follows from corollary V-4-1 that y > and
i
y > at optimality. Hence, from (40) and (41), the constraints
2
(25) must hold as equalities when the firm modeled in (26)
is in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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Next, consider (36), which also has no counterpart
among (11)-(15). (36) leads immediately to the following
theorem.
Theorem V-5
When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
it will hire productive headquarters administrative labor
up to the point at which the marginal rate of substitution




just equals the salary level net
3U a /3D + y erZ
of tax, (1-t)s. 3
Proof
Rearranging terms in (36) yields
rt
= (1 - t)s
,
(45)
8U /9D + y ert
1 3
which is the desired result. Q.E.D.
The left-hand side of (45) represents the firm's
subjective rate of trade off between dividends and productive
headquarters administrative labor, while the right-hand side
represents the externally imposed rate at which these quantities
can be traded off for one another. Thus, according to theorem
V-5, the firm will hire productive headquarters administrative
labor up to the point at which its internal rate of trade
y ert
off,
—p , just equals the externally imposed rate,
3Ui/3D + y 3 e
(1-t)s, at which dividends and productive headquarters administrative
labor can be traded off within the firm's income statement.
This result is, of course, perfectly analogous to results
obtained earlier in chapter three and in section B of this
chapter. The next corollary also follows from (36).
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Corollary V-5-1
When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
the marginal value of an additional unit of productive head-
quarters administrative labor allocated to any division,
u e
rt
a ^ /gD , is equal to the after tax marginal cost of an
1










Rearranging terms in (36) yields
rt rt
^79D = (1 " T)s{1 + 8Uy3D } ' < 46 >
which is the desired result. Q.E.D.
Remark
Note that if the profit constraint were not binding,
then y =0 and the right-hand side of (46) becomes (1 - t)s,
3
the marginal cost of a unit of productive headquarters
administrative labor. Thus, (46) is the familiar marginal
value equals marginal cost optimality criterion. Moreover,
(46) makes clear that when the profit constraint is binding,
the marginal cost of a unit of productive headquarters
administrative labor must be adjusted upward to reflect
the impact on net income of the hiring of an additional
y e
rt





Together (35) and (36) lead to the following corollary
Corollary V-5-2
When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
it will hire more productive headquarters administrative
labor than a short run profit maximizer.
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Proof
rtSolving (35) and (36) for y e , equating the resulting
2
expressions, and rearranging terms gives
3U 3f. 3U 3f.
3R
1 pi^73-^ + ^ + V h^Xpittt2- " s) ° • (47)
p,H p,H
Since Sf./aA 1 „ > 0, 3U /3R > 0, and 3U /3D > by assumption,





< s . (48)
3A 1 „p,H
The desired result follows from (48) by the assumed strict
33
concavity of f. . Q.E.D.
The foregoing has been concerned with characterizing
the solution to (29). Turning to (31), evaluating the derivative
- 3L /3K gives
3L 3U








( 1-t ) (-q6 )] . (49)
Solving (37) for A(t) and differentiating gives
3U
.
A = WI (- rq + q)e rt . (50)
Equating (49) and (50) and solving the resulting expression
rtfor ye /(3U /3D) leads to the following important theorem.
i i
Theorem V-6
When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
the marginal value of an additional unit of physical capital
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allocated to any division is the same for all divisions and
is equal to the firm's marginal cost of physical capital.
Proof
The first part of the theorem is merely a restatement
of the first part of theorem V-4 . To prove the second part
rt
a.ut! \*±v ) a.iiu k<->vj anu soive lor y e
1
This procedure yields
of the statement, equ te (49) nd (50) d l f /(3U /3D)
rt rt
W^79D = ^ r + (i^)^ 1 + 3^79D>^ " Q . (51)
where the right-hand side is interpreted as the firm's marginal
cost of physical capital and is identically equal to
i(= rq + (l-x)q6 - q) when the profit constraint is not
binding (i.e. y = 0). Q.E.D.
3
Remark
As (51) makes clear, the firm's marginal cost of
capital must be adjusted for the impact the purchase of an
additional unit of capital will have on the current period's
net income (and indirectly, the impact of such a purchase




(51) is (1-T)q5 ... 3 .. n . Similarly, the marginal value .
aV aD 3f. y ert
expression (43) contains the adjustment term p .-^r~( 1 ~ t ^ 9tj 3 /8D '
i i'
When the profit constraint is not binding, then y =0 and
(43) and (51) can be combined to yield equation (40) of chapter
three (with K. in place of K).
Theorem V-6 leads to the following corollaries.
Corollary V-6-1
When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
it will allocate more physical capital to each division than
848
a short run profit maximizer would.
Proof
Follows directly from (43) and (51), the assumed
concavity of each f
.
, and the fact that
3f. (3U /9R) + (l-x)u ert
Pi 8K7[
1
BU /3D ] > ° • Q ' E - D
Corollary V-6-2
When the multidivision firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium,
it will allocate more of each input to each division, and
hence produce more of each output, than a short run profit
maximizer.
Proof
Theorem V-3, corollary V-5-2, and corollary V-6-1.
Q.E.D,
The significance of theorem V-6 is that it extends
the necessary condition for optimal investment in physical
capital ((40) in chapter three) to the multidivision firm.
That is, the marginal value of an additional unit of physical
capital for each division must equal the firm's marginal
cost of physical capital. Moreover, when the firm's profit
constraint is binding, this marginal cost of capital must
be adjusted upward to reflect the impact on the firm's net
income of enlarging the firm's capital stock. In the planning
algorithm developed in the next section the shadow price
u will play a vital role along with u and u in achieving
3 12
the optimal allocation of the firm's productive resources.
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4. Section Summary
In this section the model of the single product firm
formulated in chapter three was extended. A model of the
multidivision firm (26) was developed and rules for optimally
allocating inputs among the firm's divisions were derived
under the assumption that decision-making within the firm
was centralized at the headquarters level.
The main results obtained in this section are the
following. The multidivision firm modeled in (26) will
in equilibrium allocate more of each input to each division,
and hence produce more of each output, than a short run profit
maximizer (theorem V-3, corollary V-5-2, and corollary
V-6-1, stated collectively as corollary V-6-2). In equilibrium
for the multidivision firm modeled in (26), the marginal
value of an additional unit of physical capital will be
the same for all divisions, and similarly for the marginal
value of an additional unit of productive headquarters
administrative labor (theorem V-4). In addition, this common
marginal value of physical capital is equal to the firm's
marginal cost of physical capital when the multidivision
firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium (theorem V-6). In
equilibrium the multidivision firm modeled in (26) will hire
productive headquarters administrative labor up to the point
at which its subjective rate of trading off that type of labor
for dividends just equals the externally imposed rate at
which those quantities can be traded off for one another
within the firm's income statement (theorem V-5).
In addition, it was shown that the Lagrange multipliers,
or shadow prices, u , u , and p , play important roles in
1 2 3
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the resource allocation process. These roles will become
more crucial in the next section where decentralized decision-
making is permitted and where a planning algorithm based on
the necessary conditions (29)-(42) is developed for the
decentralized multidivision firm.
D. DECENTRALIZATION IN THE MULTIDIVISION FIRM
1. Introduction
In the previous section it was assumed that decision-
making within the multidivision firm was centralized at the
headquarters level. In this section decision-making is
largely decentralized. Specifically, each division decides
how much manufacturing labor, L., and how much productive
administrative labor, A
.
, to hire, and it is assumed thatp,i'
each division hires these amounts directly via the external
(to the firm) markets for these types of labor. Each division
also decides how much physical capital, K., and how much
productive headquarters administrative labor, A „, to
p ,n
'hire', but these amounts must be 'hired' at prices established
by the headquarters, which decides how much physical capital
and how much productive headquarters administrative labor
the firm as a whole will hire.
The next subsection develops a planning algorithm
the multidivision firm modeled in (26) could use to ensure
optimal input and output decisions by the divisions. The
planning algorithm makes important use of the shadow prices
y , U , and y discussed in the previous section. In applying12 3
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the algorithm, the headquarters would act as a central planning
board and would effect changes in input allocations by changing





. In the following subsection12 3
it is shown that, in general, such a planning algorithm
could work only if the headquarters is able to control the
divisions, i.e. to force them to establish hiring practices
consistent with (29)-(42). In particular, it is shown that
if division managers are free to maximize their own utility,
then resource allocations that are suboptimal with regard
to collective utility are likely to result.
2. A Multiperiod Finite Horizon Planning Algorithm
for the Multidivision Firm
The planning algorithm developed in this subsection
for the multidivision firm modeled in (26) establishes a
34price-guided planning procedure. The planning process,
as modeled in this subsection, is iterative. This contrasts
with the treatment of planning in chapters three and four
and earlier in this chapter, in all of which the planning
problem was formulated as an optimal control problem, with
the characterization of the necessary conditions for an
optimal solution to the optimal control problem constituting
the rules for optimally allocating productive resources through-
out the planning period. Solving the planning problem in





and f. In the case of the multidivision
1 2
firm, the firm's planners would need to determine the production
function f. for each division.
852
The value of the decentralized planning procedure
set out in this subsection - indeed, the value of decentralized
planning procedures in general - is the reduction in the
amount of information needed by the headquarters of the firm
35(i.e. the 'central planning board') in carrying out planning.
The reduction in informational requirements is made possible
by the (correct) use of the information conveyed by the
shadow prices u , u , and u . In the planning algorithm12 3
set out below the divisions will not need to know U , but
i
rather will only need to know the marginal utilities 8U / dR
and 8U /9D and the shadow prices u , u , and u . The head-
1 12 3
quarters will not need to know the individual production
functions f.
,
but rather, will only need to know each division's
input decisions, K. , L. , A , and A „ , and the division'si i p , i p , n
resulting total revenue R. .
While the reduced informational requirements is the
main advantage of the planning algorithm set out below, the
use of such a decentralized, iterative scheme also has
important disadvantages. First, because the headquarters
lacks complete information concerning each division's production
function, internal corporate control can become a problem.
As discussed in subsection 3 of this section, division
managers may be motivated to pursue their own objectives -
in much the same way that corporate managers within headquarters
are motivated to pursue their own objectives (at least to
some extent) at the expense of shareholders' objectives.
As a result, resource allocations may not be optimal with
regard to collective utility, and the firm may suffer a
loss of X-ef f iciency
.
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A second disadvantage concerns the difficulty of
establishing equilibrium, feasibility, and convergence
properties for planning algorithms. In general, convergence
proofs appear to require conditions no weaker than strict
37
concavity of all utility and production functions. Even
38then, however, exact convergence often cannot be assured.
In addition, even when convergence can be proved, in practical
applications there remains the problem of determining how
many iterations of the planning cycle to have, since iterations
are time-consuming and costly and planners typically face
39both time and budget constraints. Since these more practical
considerations normally arise when two or more algorithms
for obtaining a solution are compared, and since this sub-
section is concerned with the development of a single algorithm
consistent with the characterization of an optimal solution
that was obtained in section C, they are not discussed further
here. However, after the planning algorithm has been presented
the issues of the existence of an equilibrium plan, the
feasibility of intermediate plans, and the convergence of
the algorithm are addressed.
The remainder of this subsection is concerned with
developing a multiperiod finite horizon planning algorithm
for the multidivision firm modeled in (26). The hierarchical
levels at which decisions are assumed to be made are shown
in table V-l. Each division makes the decisions shown on
the left-hand side of table V-l, while headquarters makes
the decisions shown on the right-hand side of the table.
The purpose of the planning algorithm is to ensure that
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the decisions are consistent with (29)-(42)
Table V-l Decisions Made at the Division Level





manuf. labor input L.
admin, labor input A











nonprod. admin, labor A
n
The planning process, as described by the planning
algorithm set out below, is iterative. A representative
cycle of the planning process is shown in figure V-3.
V? n £j rtj-'v^ u /in j. £jno
> t
R. ,K. ,L. ,A . ,A
X
„1
' l' l' p, l ' p,H
d\J 9U
8R ' 9D ,y x ' y 2 ,P 3
J <
r>TVT<5 THMCJ VUi Viol U1N o
Figure V-3 A Representative Cycle of the Planning
Process
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The arrows in figure V-3 indicate the direction of the informationa:
flows. As indicated below, the first cycle of the planning
process is atypical and additional information, such as the
discount rate r, must be furnished the divisions.
Figure V-3 indicates the information transmitted
to the divisions from headquarters and the information transmitted
to headquarters from the divisions. First, consider the
information transmitted to the divisions by headquarters.
The headquarters planning staff acts as a central planning
board, announcing the revised marginal utilities 8U /8R
and 8U /9D and the revised shadow prices u , u , and u
1 12 3
at each cycle. The divisions, having been told the discount
rate r and the tax rate x in the initial cycle, use the
information received from headquarters and (32)-(35) to
compute new input usage levels, K
.
, L., A . , and A H .
Then these new input usage levels and (24) can be used to
compute the new output level, Q . . Given price, p., total
revenue is simply R. = p.Q.. It should be emphasized that
this is done simultaneously for all t, <_ t < T. Then the
division's (revised) proposed time paths of input usage,
K.(t), L.(t), A .(t), and A 3" u (t), and its proposed timei v '' i v y ' p,i P,H
path of total revenue (also revised), R. ( t ), are sent to
headquarters. It also needs to be emphasized that no transactions
take place on the basis of this information. Transactions
take place only after the iterations of the planning cycle
have been completed and the final plan has been approved
by headquarters.
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In deciding how much of each input to use each
division uses the market prices of manufacturing labor, w,
and of administrative labor, s, and also uses the implicit
prices of physical capital, y
,
and of productive headquarters
administrative labor, y , which are supplied by headquarters.
2
In addition, the implicit price of diminishing net income,
y , enters the calculations when the profit constraint is
3
binding. When the profit constraint is not binding (or
more correctly, when it was not found to be binding as a
result of the previous iteration), then y =0 can be
3
transmitted to the divisions, and each division's decisions
become, in effect, unconstrained by net income considerations.
Next, consider the information transmitted to head-
quarters from the divisions and how this information can
be used to revise the shadow prices ii , \i , and y . Note
1 2 3
that equation (51), which was obtained from (31) and (37),
implies that at optimality
y = (1 - T)q6y + i(3U /8D)e~ rt , (52)
1 3 1
where i = rq + ( 1 - x)q6 - q. Thus, (52) expresses y in
terms of y and 8U /8D - all other variables in (52) are
3 1
exogenously determined. Similarly, (36) implies that at
optimality
y = (1 - T)sy + (1 - x)s(8U /8D)e~rt , (53)
2 3 1
where only 8U /8D (in addition to y and y ) is variable.
1 2 3
Thus, (52) and (53) can be used to alter y and y in accordance
1 2
with changes in y and 8U /3D. It follows from corollary
3 1
V—4-2 that at optimality the constraints (25) will hold as
equalities, so that at each iteration of the planning process
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K(t) = Z K (t)
i=l x
I
A (t) = Z A* „(t)




That is, corollary V-4-2 makes separate adjustments to (52)
and (53) on account of (25) unnecessary.
It remains to be shown how y is to be adjusted and
3
how d\J /3R and d\J /3D change. First, using the same values
i i
for 3U /9D and y that were sent to the divisions, the headquarters
1 3
planning staff uses (38) to compute the proposed level of
managerial emoluments, M, and uses (39) to compute the proposed
level of nonproductive administrative labor, A . Then, given
R.(t), K.(t), L.(t), An (t), and A
1 (t), < t < T, i = 1,
1 1 1 p,l p,H — —
... , I, transmitted by the divisions, it is a straightforward
exercise for the headquarters planning staff to use (54)
to compute K(t) and A u(t) and then to use the following
identities to determine TT(t) and D(t):
I I
7T(t) = (1-t){ Z R.(t) - w(t) Z L.(t) - s(t)U H (t) + A(t)




.(t)] - M(t) - q(t)[6-K(t)]}
i=l p '
I I
D(t) = (1-t){ Z R.(t) - w(t) Z L.(t) - s(t)[A (t) + A (t)
1=1 1 i=l x P' n
I
+ Z A .(t)] - M(t)} + T-q(t)[6-K(t)] - q(t)-I(t) ,
i=l P' 1
where I(t) is computed using K(t), 1 < t < T, and the net
investment constraint K(t) = I(t) - 6-K(t), i.e. by using




Following the above computations, U for each
1
t, _< t _< T, can be found by substitution. Also, values
for 3U /8R and 8U /3D can be found by substitution into
general expressions for these derivatives (computed from
U ). Lastly, an appropriate change in y needs to be
1 3
determined. Let p denote a positive constant. Then one
scheme for adjusting jj is the following:
3
\ (t) k + P (7T - 7T(t)), if 7T(t) < 7T
3 O — O
y
3
(t) k+1 = \ (57)
0, if 7T(t) > 7T
where k denotes the iteration number and where (57) is used
for each time t, <_ t <_ T. According to (57), when the
profit constraint is violated, i.e. 7T(t) < it
,
the value of
y - the penalty for violating the constraint - is increased.
3
When the constraint is satisfied as an equality, the value
of y is unchanged. When the profit constraint is satisfied
as a strict inequality, the value of y is reduced to zero
3
since in that case the firm's choice of operating policies
is unaffected by a marginal increase in tt (or marginal
decrease in Tr(t)). While the choice of p is a matter of
some concern since it affects the convergence properties
of the algorithm, it is not, in general, possible to specify
41
exactly how p should be chosen.
For the convenience of the reader, the entire planning
algorithm is set out in table V-2. The central portions
of the algorithm have already been discussed, but the initial
cycle and the stopping rule have not. During the initial
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cycle the optimality criteria (32)-(35) and values for the
discount rate r and the tax rate t, all of which are used
in each cycle, must be communicated to each division. In
the simplest case the rules and the values for r and t are
unchanged from the previous year, and as long as this information
was stored by each division, the divisions need only be informed
that the optimality criteria, r, and t are unchanged from
the previous year.
To begin the planning process it is also necessary
that the headquarters planning staff select initial values




and y for each time t. One
1 1 12 3
of the simplest procedures is first, to use the values for
years 1 through T of the previous year's final plan as initial
values for the same variables for years through T-l of
the current year's plan, e.g. use y *(t) from the previous
year's final plan as the initial value for y (t-l), 1 _< t £ T,
in the current year's plan, and second, to set the initial
values of each of the five variables for the period T-l < t <_ T
in the current year's plan equal to the variable's initial
value at time T-l, e.g. y (t) = y (T-l), T-l < t < T. No
i i
—
special virtues are claimed for this procedure; it is merely
one method of initializing the values of the five variables
to be transmitted to the divisions. The procedure seems
reasonable to this writer since it does take advantage of
the overlapping periods covered by plans made in adjacent
years, and also since one would hope for a reasonable degree
of consistency of plans over time.
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Table V-2 The Planning Algorithm
HQ = headquarters D = divisions, i = 1, ... , I
Step I. [Initialize] HQ sets k = 1 (k is a counter for
the number of iterations) and also sets V° = . HQ
selects e and K to be used in step IV. HQ selects
initial values for 8Ui/8R, 9Ui/8D, ui, \iz , and y 3 ,
and informs D of these values. HQ also transmits the
optimality criteria (32)-(35) and values for r and t
to D.
Step II. [D Computations] D use (32)-(35), r, x, 3Ui/3R,
3Ui/8D, ui, Vz, and y 3 to compute proposed allocations
K., L. , A ., and Ai u . From these D compute R. , andl ' l ' p , l ' P,H * i '
R. , K. , L
.
, A ., and A^ „ are transmitted to HQ.
i' i' i' p, l ' p,H ^
Step III. [HQ Computations] HQ uses K. and A „ to compute
K and A u . HQ also uses (38) and (39) to computep,H
proposed M and A and (55) and (56) to compute ir(t)
and D(t). Then U is computed for each t, < t <_ T,
k T 1 — rt —rT
and V = /n U [ ] e dt + U ( )e is also computed.U i 2
k k—
1
Step IV. [Stopping Rule] HQ compares V and V . If
i k k-1jV - V
I
< e and 7T(t) >_ it , then stop. Otherwise
continue. HQ increments k by 1. If k > K, then stop.
Otherwise continue.
Step V. [Revise Prices] HQ computes new Blh/aR and 8Ui/3D.
HQ uses (57) to revise y 3 and uses (52) and (53) to
revise Ui and y 2 . HQ transmits revised 8U /9R, 9U /3D,
u
, y , and y to D. GO TO STEP II. 1 l
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The stopping rule, or rule for terminating the algorithm,
is also easy to explain. Let V denote the value of the
objective functional in (26) computed by the headquarters
planning staff at the k-th iteration. According to the stopping
rule given in table V-2, the search for a 'better' (in the
sense of satisfying the constraints in (26) and at the same
time yielding a greater value of discounted collective utility)
ceases either if the value of the objective functional changes
by less than some predetermined amount e during any iteration
or if some predetermined maximum total number of iterations,
K, have been performed. The latter condition is needed due
to the possibility that, unless certain conditions that are
discussed below are met, the algorithm may fail to converge.
The algorithm having been presented, the remainder
of this subsection deals with three questions: the existence
of an equilibrium plan, the attainment of feasible plans,
and the convergence of the planning algorithm. The existence
of an equilibrium plan is assured by the following theorem.
Theorem V-7
If there exists an optimal solution to (26) - i.e. an optimal
plan covering the period <_ t < T - then it serves as an
equilibrium solution for the planning algorithm in table V-2.
Proof
The optimal plan must satisfy (29)-(42). For values
of the decision variables satisfying (29)-(42), it follows
_ k+1 „ k Trk+1 __k T k+1 _ k . , ,that K. = K. , K = K , L. = L. , etc., and hence
k+1 k
that V = V . Hence, such a set of values for the decision
variables constitutes an equilibrium plan. Q.E.D.
862
It should be noted that no claim can be made as to
the uniqueness of the equilibrium plan. In general, uniqueness
of the equilibrium plan requires uniqueness of the optimal
solution to (26), which has not been assumed here.
The second question concerns feasibility. A desirable
quality of planning algorithms is that they produce feasible
plans during intermediate cycles, so that if the predetermined
maximum number of steps has been reached (say due to slow
convergence, or possibly even to failure to converge), the
plan produced just prior to termination will at least be
feasible. In connection with problem (26), the main concern
is the minimum net income constraint, ir(t) > tt . Since
the shadow price y constitutes a penalty for violating
3
the profit constraint, one would expect that increasing y
3
would eventually lead to a feasible plan, provided one exists.
This is indeed the case, as proved in the next theorem.
Theorem V-8
Assume that U and f., i = 1, ... , I, are strictly concave.
i i
If there exists a feasible solution to (26), and if at any
iteration of the planning cycle 7T(t) < tt
,
then in subsequent
iterations Tr(t) increases monotonically until feasibility
has been achieved.
Proof
It follows from (57) that y is strictly increasing,
3
k+1 ki.e. y > y , when Tr(t) < tt . Hence, the theorem will
3 3 o
be proved if it can be shown that dTr/dy > 0.
3
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It follows from (55) that
d7T I 8f. dK. I 3f. dL.
35- - (1-T)( Z (p.^i - q«)^i + £ (PrtIl - w)^
3 1-1 1 3 1=1 1 3
I 3f. dA
.
I 3f. dA 1 „
+ I ( P . ,,
1
- S) P' 1 + I (p. r-±-. - S) ^ P>H






Given the concavity of U and f., i=l, ... , I:
9f. dK. * x







Ij follows from ( 52 )
i 3






















- s)—-rP-^ > o, i = 1, ... , I, follows from (53)
3A 1 „ ay 3p,H
and (35)





< follows from (39)dn v '
3
Thus, each of the terms in (58) is strictly positive, and
therefore so is dii/dy . Q.E.D.
3
Theorem V-8 is significant not only because it demonstrates
that the planning algorithm in table V-2 revises infeasible
plans in such a way that net income increases (so that in
864
this sense the revised plan is 'nearer to' feasibility than
the previous plan), but also because it suggests how the
nonexistence of any feasible plan may be detected. That
is, if u becomes unboundedly large, then this might indicate
3
the lack of any feasible plan (it may also indicate that for
some time t, <_ t £ T, the maximum attainable level of
net income is equal to or marginally less than tt ). Specifically,
theorem V-8 leads to the following result.
Corollary V-8-1
If no feasible plan exists, then for some t, £ t £ T,
k k
y (t) * °° as k becomes large. Moreover, 7r(t) > ir(t)*
3
monotonically , where ir(t)* denotes the maximum attainable
level of net income at time t (and ir(t)* < tt ).
The third question concerning the planning algorithm
in table V-2 involves convergence. In general, convergence
properties are very difficult to assess. Even in single period
planning problems, the strict concavity of the objective
function, plus additional concavity/convexity assumptions
needed to ensure that the planning problem is a concave
programming problem, must be supplemented by additional
assumptions, e.g. concerning the size of the adjustment
parameter, before even convergence to within some region
43
of proximity to the optimal plan can be proved. In spite
of this difficulty, a somewhat weaker stability result can
be proved.
Theorem V-9




I, are strictly concave, then
for any feasible solution to (26), the levels of total revenue,
total dividends paid, managerial emoluments, and nonproductive
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administrative labor will vary directly with regard to changes
in their respective marginal utilities, i.e. dR/d(3U /3R) > 0,
dD/dOU /3D) > 0, dM/d(3U /3M) > 0, and dA /d(3U /3A ) > 0.
Proof
Since R(t) = Z R.(t) it follows that
i=l 1
HR I 3f. dK, I 3f. dL.QK
_
__1 1 . y 1 1L P-i ZV rU 3TT /?>EM L P-d(3U /3R) i=i i8Ki dOu / 8R ) i=l i8Li d^u / 8R )
+






I 3f. dA 1 „
+ Z p. = P^
1-1 ^A* „ d(3U /3R) •
P > n
By the strict concavity of U and f., i = 1, ... , I, it
dK. 2 x dL.
follows that
d(3Ui/3R) > bM32), d(aP y 8R)
> by (33),







price and the marginal productivities are strictly positive
by assumption, each term in (59) is strictly positive, and
.. „ dRtherefore so is ,, ~ TT—t-^ttt •d(3U /3R)
From (54) and (56),
,n I 3f. dL.
= (1-t){ Z (p.^f w)-d(3U /3D) v i^l i3L H d(3U /3D)
I 3f. dA .
. -
^ p i3A b; d(3U /3D)i=l p,i i'





(Pi7^" " S) d(3UP /3D) ( 6 °)1-1 9A p,H l
dM dAn ,
- sd(3U /3D) d(3U /3D) J
i i
I 3f. dK
+ Z [ (l- T )p.~A + Tq61 ,„ * - q dl
i=1
LV




By the strict concavity of U and f., i = 1, ... , I, it
follows from (33)-(35), (38), (39), and (53) that each of
the terms within braces in (60) is strictly positive. If
it can be shown that the sum of the last two terms in (60)
is positive, or at least small in absolute value if it
is negative, then
^farr /an^ > will follow. Consider an
incremental change in any K.. From the net investment constraint,
dK. - dl and the incremental impact on dividends is
3f. 3f.
[(1" T)piaiT + T(i^ dKi - qdI B [(1- T )Pi9ir + Tq6 " q]dKi ' (61)
i i
By (43) and (51),
3f
±




i gj^ + Tq6 < (r + 6 - q/q)q < q , (62)
i
provided r + 6 - q/q < 1, which is almost always the case
since r + 6 - q/q is the firm's pre-tax cost of capital
(expressed as a decimal). Hence, the term in brackets in
(61) is strictly negative (provided r + 6 - q/q < 1).





so that (61)-(63) imply that the sum of the remaining terms
in (60) is at worst negative but small in absolute value.
it dD ^ nHence d(3U /3D) > ° '
1 dM nThe last two results, d(3U /m) > and d(3U /3A s >
i i
n
follow directly from (38) and (39), respectively, due to




What theorem V-9 establishes is that the planning
algorithm in table V-2 modifies feasible plans in a manner
that promotes stability. That is, an increase in the value
of any of the four objectives in (26), as measured by the
value of the appropriate marginal utility, sets in motion
changes that tend to lead to an increase in the value of
the particular argument of U at the next iteration. Clearly,
1
a systematic tendency to cause the opposite result - i.e.
a decrease in the value of the argument - would suggest a
failure on the part of the algorithm to produce a convergent
sequence of plans.
This subsection has presented a multiperiod finite
horizon planning algorithm that could be used to determine
the optimal internal allocation of productive resources for
the multidivision firm modeled in (26). It was shown that
an equilibrium plan exists for the algorithm (theorem V-7);
that when an intermediate plan is infeasible, the algorithm
reallocates resources so as to increase net income and thereby
restore feasibility (theorem V-8); and that changes in the
marginal values of objectives lead to resource reallocations
that cause corresponding changes in the values of the respective
arguments of the collective utility function (theorem V-9).
3. Achieving Compliance with Corporate Objectives in
the Decentralized Multidivision Firm
In section C and again in the previous subsection
it was assumed that the firm's productive resources were
allocated in accordance with the firm's objectives, as embodied
in the collective utility functions U and U . To theJ
1 2
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extent that the goals and objectives of division managers
conflict with the goals and objectives of top managers and
shareholders, it was implicitly assumed that all such conflicts
were resolved in the process of obtaining U and U , and
1 2
that once these utility functions had been formulated by
the firm's board of directors, division managers would
accept the marginal values 8U /8R and d\J /9D and would employ
the optimality criteria (32)-(35) in arriving at their planned
input usage levels. Moreover, the planning algorithm in
table V-2 is based on such acceptance. The purpose of this
subsection is to suggest what may happen - i.e. how the firm's
internal allocation of productive resources may be affected -
when such acceptance fails to materialize.
Suppose that, instead of employing (32)-(35) in
step II in the planning algorithm in table V-2, division
managers seek to
T .
maximize / U 1 (R.(t), TT.(t), M.(t), A„ .(t))e rtdt . (64)
(K.,L.,A ., x 1 x n ' ±
.
l
' l ' p,
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That is, suppose each division's management has some control
over salary levels, so that M.(t) > is possible, and some




and further suppose that each division's managers select input
usage levels so as to maximize their own discounted collective
utility. According to (64), the i-th division's collective





(t) = pi (t).f i (K.(t), L.(t), Ap .(t), A^yt)), (65)
the division's net income,
7T
i
(t) = (l- T ){R
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9U /9D A p,H (t) '
and the division's managerial emoluments, M.(t), and non-
productive administrative labor, A .(t).^
n , i y
The expression for total revenue (65) is the same
as the one used in (26). The expression (66) for the division's
net income has not been encountered previously. From (51),
y e
r
-jr 1 ,~^ will equal the firm's marginal cost of capital net
i
of tax (for time t) when the multidivision firm modeled
y e
r





will equal the firm's marginal cost of productive headquarters
administrative labor after tax (for time t) when the multi-
division firm modeled in (26) is in equilibrium. Thus,
(66) assumes that division managers value net income after
44
tax, rather than before tax, and the last two terms in
(66) represent the division's after tax costs of physical
capital and productive headquarters administrative labor,







/8D might be explained as internal accounting prices
i
that are charged against the division's revenue for the
use of physical capital and productive headquarters administrative
45labor. Collecting (64)-(66) and recognizing that maximizing
(64) is equivalent to maximizing U at each time t, it is
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assumed that each division seeks to
maximize U x (p -f (K L A^ , ,AX ); (l-x){p x
{K.,L.,A ., 1111 P,i P,n i
.1 i P,
i
A 1 H M. ,
* V X f.(K.,L.,A ^A 1 „) - wL. - s(A^ . + A .)A
„ -; -f ll'l'D.l' P,H y 1 P,l n,l'i i' i' p,i' ' i p i i






" 9l/ /3D Ki " 9U /9D A p,H ; Mi ; An,i } '
i i
subject to K. , L., A . , A 1 „, M. , A„ . >° i' i' p,i P,H' l ' n,i-
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution
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to (67) are the following:
~ TT i 9f. ~ TT i 9f. ye9U l 9U r , _i i -, n
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iSr'-' 1-*" (^° cISt^ 1-*" + f^ ] - M i " ° \ >-° (72)
1 11 l










Collectively (68)-(73) can be used to explain what is meant
by a loss of internal control and a loss of X-ef ficiency
.
In particular, (68)-(71) can be compared with (32)-(35)
to determine the implications of the divisions' seeking
to maximize their own utility levels, and (72) and (73)
can be used to argue that, in general, M.(t) > and
A . (t) > 0.
n , l
It is obvious that the input usage levels determined
using (68)-(71) will, in general, differ from those determined
using (32)-(35). However, a more positive result can be
proved.




rt 3U 1 /9R. 3U /3R+(l-x)y ert




l i 9U /'"i i
where the elements of the ratio on the right are transmitted
to the division by headquarters, and iff., i=l, ... , I,
are strictly concave, then the division following rules
(68)-(71) will employ more of each input, and will therefore
produce more output and earn greater total revenue, than




Solving (32) and (68) for * /3p gives
i
3U 1 /3R. 3f. u e 3U /3R+(l-x)y e rt
L1 T
^ TT
i.^ JP i3K. 3U /3D L± T 3U /3D J
3U /3tt i i' i'1 (74)
3f . '
P.i3K. j
where 3f.'/ 9K - denotes the marginal product of capital when
(32) is used to determine capital input usage. It follows
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from (74) that




But (75) implies by the assumed strict concavity of f. that
K. > K.
'
, i.e. that capital input usage is greater under
u e
(68) than under (32) for given ,,* ,~ p .
i
The same procedure applied to (33) and (69), to
(34) and (70), and to (35) and (71) - by solving for
rt
3U~/3D ' 3U~/3D ' and 3TJ
2
/3D ' resPectivel y




By the above, since more of each input is used, more
output is produced. Given constant price (or in the more
general case, a downward-sloping demand curve and positive
marginal revenue), the division's total revenue is greater
when it applies (68)-(71) than when it applies (32)-(35),
given the above assumptions. Q.E.D.
Corollary V-10-1
Under the assumptions stated in theorem V-10, if one or more
divisions use (68)-(71) instead of (32)-(35) in determining
input usage levels, then the firm's total revenue will exceed
the level consistent with (32)-(35).
Theorem V-ll .
3U 1 /3M.
As long as : > 1 - t for some M. > and as long as
au^BA su
1/^
: ^-J-^ > s(l-x) for some A . > 0, then the i-th division
3U 1 /3tt. n ' 1
' l
will pay strictly positive managerial emoluments and will




(72) implies that — <_ (1-x) must hold at optimality
' 1
8U1/9M.
If —:• decreases with increasing M., i.e. if the tt . - M
3U /9tt. ± x x
' 1
indifference curves have the standard convex shape, then
suVsm
- > (1-t) when M. = 0. Therefore M. = cannot be
8U /3tt .
' l
optimal, as (72) would be violated. Hence M. > 0.




Under the assumptions stated in theorem V-10, the firm's
collective levels of managerial emoluments and nonproductive
administrative labor are greater under (68)-(71) than under
(32)-(35).
Proof
Theorem V-ll and (38) and (39). Q.E.D
Corollary V-ll-2
Under the assumptions stated in theorem V-10, the firm's
net income is lower when one or more divisions employ (68)-
(71) than it is when all divisions employ (32)-(35). As
a result, the firm sets a lower dividend payout D(t).
Proof
The first statement follows from corollary V-10-1,
theorem V-ll, and corollary V-ll-1, and the definition of
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the firm's net income (55). The second statement then follows
from (56). Q.E.D.
Theorem V-12
When the profit constraint in (26) is not binding at optimality,
the multidivision firm in which one or more divisions seek
to maximize their own utility will have greater total revenue
and will have greater collective levels of managerial emoluments
and nonproductive administrative labor, but will earn lower
net income and will pay smaller total dividends, than a multi-
division firm of the type modeled in (26).
Proof
When the profit constraint is not binding at optimality,
y = by (42). Then by (46) and (51),
3
rt rtye ye
3!J^ = (l-x)s and 3If±7 35 = rq + (1-t)q6 - q (76)
l l
at optimality. But (76) must hold for firms of both types.
Hence, the conclusion follows by corollary V-10-1, corollary
V-ll-1, and corollary V-ll-2. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorems V-10, V-ll, and V-12
is that the divisions may exhibit a revenue preference and
an expense preference relative to the collective preferences
embodied in U in a manner analogous to the revenue preference
i
and expense preference relative to the preferences of shareholders
exhibited by the firm modeled in (26). The required condition
is that
d^/dR. 3U /3R+(l-x)y ert
> * 3 (77)
aTTi /a 9U /3D ^
}




which has the following interpretation. The left-hand side
of (77) can be interpreted as the i-th division's marginal
rate of substitution between revenue and net income. The
right-hand side of (77) can be interpreted as the marginal
rate of substitution between total revenue (adjusted for the
impact of a change in revenue on minimum net income) and
dividends. When (77) holds, the i-th division can be said
to show a preference for revenue relative to net income (and
indirectly dividends) that exceeds the firm's preference for
revenue relative to dividends. As a result of the firm's
inability to enforce its preferences, the divisions' use of
(68)-(71) leads to greater total revenue. If somehow the
firm's control could be restored, resources could be reallocated
in accordance with \J
1
and a higher level of discounted collective
utility could be achieved.
It should be noted that if the inequality in (77)
were reversed, the divisions would underutilize inputs and
would therefore produce too little output and earn too little
revenue. This is possible, as for example, when the firm's
headquarters has designed a compensation scheme that attaches
relatively great importance to net income, and at the same
time, division managers are motivated to a much greater extent
by income considerations than by enhanced promotional opportunities
and other factors associated with size, staff, etc., that are
held to be the traditional sources of managerial satisfaction.
However, in view of the discussions in section A of chapter
one and in section G of chapter two, it is the opinion of
this writer that the case discussed earlier in this subsection
is the more likely, and hence the more interesting, of the
two.
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Theorems V-10, V-ll, and V-12 suggest what can happen
when division managers exercise some degree of discretion.
Moreover, the theorems suggest that (provided (77) continues
to hold) the actual behavior exhibited by the divisions can
vary systematically from that which would be expected by
headquarters on the basis of (32)-(35), if headquarters had
sufficient information with which to determine the input
allocations consistent with maximizing discounted collective
utility at the firm level. But such information may be very
costly and time-consuming to obtain, and this was the main
justification for introducing the decentralized planning
procedure in the previous subsection. The implication is that
decentralized multidivision firms may systematically exhibit
X-inef f iciency of the type indicated in theorem V-ll, namely,
excessively large staffs - staffs that are excessive even
from the standpoint of the firm's collective utility. There
may be organizational slack within each division, as well
as within headquarters, and as a result, the firm's total
labor force will not be utilized with maximum technical efficiency.
Having demonstrated the possible adverse impact
decentralization may have on the efficiency with which productive
resources are allocated and utilized within the firm, the
remainder of this subsection addresses the issue of how head-
quarters can attempt to achieve (greater) compliance on the
part of the divisions with respect to corporate objectives.
It is assumed that (77) holds. Then theorem V-12 indicates
that revenue, managerial emoluments, and nonproductive administrative
labor exceed, while net income and dividends fall short of,
corporate objectives (i.e. their respective collective utility
maximizing levels).
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To counter the tendencies stated in theorem V-12,
the firm might seek to centralize control. Full centralization
would be impractical in very large organizations, for it would
wipe out the very advantages for which the multidivision
form of organization was adopted. Short of this, headquarters
could do the following:
- set the salary levels of top managers in each division,
and rely on these individuals to control salaries in the
lower levels of the division's managerial hierarchy, thereby
reducing each M.
- impose an upper limit on total direct hiring of administrative
labor (those individuals who might fill a nonproductive
slot) by the division,
A .(t) + A .(t) < A.(t) . (78)
If nonproductive staff positions could be identified, they
could be ordered eliminated. But this procedure may prove
costly, so that the somewhat weaker approach embodied in
(78) may have to be adopted.
- impose a net income constraint on the division,
TT.(t) > 7T . . (79)
1 v ' — O
,
1
If headquarters sets managerial emoluments for each
time t, M.(t) = M.(t), and if it also applies to each division
constraints of the form (78) and (79), then the model of a
division (67) can be reformulated as the following mathematical
programming problem:
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i k - ^ A -A ^
3U /3D l 3U /3D p,H' n,i ;
(80)
subject to A . + A .
_< A
.
VJ y J- XX y J- -L
(l-x){p. -f .(K. ,L. ,A .,A X „) - w L. - s(A . +A .))
rt rtye ye.
K. - * ,^ A
x
TT > 7T3U /3D i 3U /3D p,H - o,i
where the nonnegativity constraints have not been stated and
where the level of managerial emoluments set by management,
M. = M., has been dropped from the model.
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution to
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i n , i
(A. - A . - A .)X =0 A . + A . < A . A > (86)i P,i n,i' i p,i n,i - i i -
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(TT.(t) - TT .)X = TT (t) > TT A > (87)1 0,12 1— 0,1 2~
Since (81)-(87) make clear that the policy choices of the
division are unaffected when the constraints in (80) are not
binding at optimality - by (86) and (87), A = A =0 and
1 2
(81)-(84) reduce to (68)-(71), respectively, and (85) reduces




headquarters has selected A. and tt . so that both constraints
1 o , 1
in (80) are binding when the division selects its optimal
operating policies.
The Lagrange multipliers A and A serve as shadow
1 2
prices internal to the division. Since A tends to increase
as A. decreases and since A tends to increase as tt . increases,
1 2 o, 1
it follows that the headquarters can achieve greater compliance
on the part of the divisions by lowering A . and by raising
n , x
tt .. This is proved as the following theorem and corollaries,
o , l ^ to
Theorem V-13
If U and f. are strictly concave and if the two constraints
in (80) are binding at optimality, then the division's optimal
usage of each input tends to decrease as the net income objective,
tt .
,
is increased and its hiring of nonproductive administrative
labor, A ., also tends to decrease as the hiring ceiling,
' n, l
'
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< o
,
where the terms within braces are the same as in (81).
Analogous results follow when the same procedure is applied
to (82)-(85).
To prove the second statement, it follows from (85)
that
dA dA . dX - dX
n, i
_
n, i L _ _ -1 i_ > Q




where the secondary effect on the net income constraint has
been ignored. Q.E.D.
It immediately follows that
Corollary V-13-1
By imposing on each division a minimum net income constraint,
the firm's headquarters alters each division's marginal rate
of substitution between revenue and net income in favor of
d\ji/dT\
.
net income, i.e. tending to increase : , and by imposing
3U 1 /9R-
' l
a constraint on the hiring of administrative labor, the firm's
headquarters alters each division's marginal rate of substitution
between net income and nonproductive administrative labor
9Ui/87T .
' iin favor of net income, i.e. tending to increase




It follows from (81) (and similarly from (82)-(85))
that
3U 1 /8tt. + A p. -3f . /3K.12 *i 1' i








when A > .
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,
when A > and A > 0.
3U 1 /3A . - A s^±-t; 3U X /3A . x 2
' n,i i ' n,i
Q.E.D.
Corollary V-13-2
By imposing on each division a constraint on the hiring of
administrative labor, the firm's headquarters alters the
optimal mix of manufacturing labor and productive administrative





It follows from (82) and (83) that









, (88)dA 3f/3L. w ,
., w , ^^tt 1 /^ \ wp,i ' l w(1-t)(A +3U /3tt.)
2 1
provided A > 0.
i
Corollary V-13-3
Imposing a minimum net income constraint tt . does not cause^ o , 1
the marginal rates of technical substitution between pairs
of inputs at optimality to be altered.
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Proof
Follows from (88) and from analogous optimality conditions
for the other inputs when X = 0. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorem V-13 and corollaries is
that the headquarters of the firm can push the divisions toward
compliance with corporate objectives by imposing a hiring
ceiling on administrative labor and also by imposing a net
income constraint (theorem V-13). The first approach induces
each division to use less administrative labor by imposing
an implicit tax X on its use (corollaries V-13-1 and V-13-2).
1
The second approach also encourages a reduced usage level
of administrative labor, but also encourages reduced usage
levels of the other inputs by imposing the same implicit
proportional tax X on the use of each input. As a result,
2
marginal rates of technical substitution at optimality are
unaltered (corollary V-13-3).
4. Section Summary
This section has explored some of the consequences
of decentralization in the multidivision firm modeled in
(26). First, a planning algorithm for the firm was developed,
and several important properties of the algorithm were derived
(theorems V-7, V-8, and V-9). Second, it was assumed that
division managers were free to exercise discretion in selecting
input usage levels and that they sought to maximize their
own utility. Several implications for the efficiency with
which the firm's productive resources are allocated within
the firm were explored (theorems V-10, V-ll, and V-12, plus
corollaries). Third, it was shown that one possible step
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toward achieving compliance on the part of the divisions
with corporate objectives might involve the imposition of
hiring and profit constraints on the divisions by headquarters.
The implications of such constraints for the behavior of
the divisions was indicated (theorem V-13).
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has extended the model of the centralized,
single division firm developed in chapters three and four
of this thesis to incorporate several divisions (and several
products) and to permit decentralized decision-making. The
focal point of the chapter was the development of a model
of the multidivision firm (26) and the use of that model and
later variants of it, (67) and (80), to study resource allocation
within the firm, to explore the consequences of decentralization
when division managers seek to maximize their own utility,
and to suggest measures that might be taken by the firm's
headquarters to gain greater compliance with corporate objectives
on the part of the firm's divisions.
In section B two classes of labor, manufacturing labor
and administrative labor, were distinguished and the concept
of organizational slack was introduced. It was shown that
the effect of a change in the salary level, s, on the firm's
employment of nonproductive administrative labor could be
expressed in the form of a Hicks-Slutsky-type equation (theorem
V-l). It was also shown that the degree of organizational
slack varies systematically over the business cycle (or at
least, systematically with regard to the state of the firm's
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immediate operating environment )( theorem V-2).
A model of the multidivision firm (26) was formulated
in section C. In the model each division acts as a quasi-
firm, hiring its own manufacturing labor and productive
administrative labor directly, although at the direction
of the firm's headquarters, and hiring capital and productive
headquarters administrative labor from the firm's headquarters.
It was shown that in equilibrium the firm will allocate more
of each input to each division, and hence, will produce more
of each output than a short run profit maximizer (theorem
V-3, corollaries V-5-2, V-6-1, and V-6-2). It was also shown
that in equilibrium the marginal value of an additional unit
of physical capital will be the same for all divisions and
that the marginal value of an additional unit of productive
headquarters administrative labor will also be the same for
all divisions (theorem V-4), and further, that the common
(internal) marginal value of an additional unit of physical
capital will equal the firm's (external) marginal cost of
physical capital (theorem V-6).
The consequences of decentralization in the multidivision
firm were explored in section D. First, a multiperiod finite
horizon planning algorithm was developed for the firm modeled
in (26), and it was shown that an equilibrium plan exists
(theorem V-7), that when an intermediate plan is infeasible
the algorithm iterates toward feasibility (theorem V-8),
and that the algorithm exhibits stability in the sense that
resource reallocations occur in line with changes in the relative
marginal values attached to corporate objectives (theorem V-9).
Second, division managers were permitted to seek to maximize
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their own utility, and it was shown that the divisions could
exhibit revenue and expenses biases with regard to corporate
objectives analogous to those exhibited by the firm with
regard to shareholders' objectives (theorems V-10, V-ll, and
V-12, plus corollaries). Third, the implications of two
approaches to trying to achieve greater compliance on the
part of divisions with corporate objectives were derived
(theorem V-13).
Taken collectively, this chapter and the two that precede
it have dealt with three areas within the theory of the firm
that, as the survey of the literature in chapter two of this
thesis indicates clearly, have in the past been given only
superficial treatment in the theory of the firm literature.
Chapter three modeled the behavior of the firm in response
to systematic changes in the state of its immediate operating
environment - i.e. the business cycle. Chapter four explored
the relationship between the firm's operating policy choices
and its financial policy choices, indicating clearly the
fundamental interrelationships, and did so within a partial
equilibrium time-state-preference model. The present chapter
modeled internal resource allocation and demonstrated several
of the important implications of decentralization for the
modern firm.
Chapters three, four, and five constitute the author's
basic theoretical model. The remainder of the thesis is concerned
with an application of the model within the institutional
milieu of the U.S. airframe industry. The representative
airframe builder model is developed in chapter seven, and
to provide the necessary background discussion, chapter six
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characterizes the major airframe builders; describes their
rather special relationship with their main customer, the
U.S. government; and discusses how these firms conduct their
short term and long term planning.
887
CHAPTER FIVE FOOTNOTES
1. Leibenstein, op . cit
.
As discussed below, the concept
of X-efficiency introduced by Leibenstein is actually
somewhat broader than the statement in the text suggests.
The concept of X-efficiency does indeed involve the
efficiency with which resources are allocated and utilized
within firms, but Leibenstein is also concerned with
the impact of motivational factors and organizational
factors on the allocation and utilization of resources,
and not just with 'efficiency' in the purely technical
sense in which that term is normally used.




3. A recent neoclassical model that treats managerial control
at each level of the organizational hierarchy as an
intermediate good and incorporates these intermediate
goods in the firm's production function can be found
in M.J. Beckmann , "Management Production Functions and
the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Economic Theory
(vol. 14; no. 1; February 1977), pp. 1-18.
4. See section B of chapter two of this thesis.
5. P. Drucker, The Concept of the Corporation (Mentor;
New York; 1964), pp. 46-88.
6. A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure (Doubleday;
New York; 1966); Monsen and Downs, op . cit
.
; and
O.E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion, Organization
Form
,
op. cit. For an interesting practical account
of one firm's experience under different organizational
structures see "Parsons Picks Up," Forbes (July 15,
1976).
7. J. Hirshleifer, "Economics of the Divisionalized Firm,"
Journal of Business (vol. 30; no. 2; April 1957), pp. 96-108;
S.A. Allen, III, "Corporate Divisional Relationships
in Highly Diversified Firms," in J.W. Lorsch and
P.R. Lawrence, eds., Studies in Organization Design
(Irwin; Homewood , 111.; 1970), pp. 16-35; O.E. Williamson,





and A.M. Spence, "The Economics of Internal Organization:
An Introduction," Bell Journal of Economics (vol. 6;
no. 1; spring 1975), pp. 163-172. The Spence paper gives
a partial survey of a growing body of literature, the
'economics of internal organization', which constitutes
888
an important new direction for the theory of the firm.
For practical examples see "Group management to control
diversity," Business Week (September 15, 1975), and
"Two PhDs turn Teledyne into a cash machine," Business
Week (November 22, 1976).
8. O.E. Williamson and N. Bhargava, "Assessing and Classifying
the Internal Structure and Control Apparatus of the









J . C . Emery , Organizational Planning and Control Systems
(Macmillan; New York; 1969); Galbraith, The New Industrial
State, op. cit
.
; J. Markham, "Market Structure and
Decision-Making in the Large Diversified Firm," in Weston






ch. 14; J. Bower, "Planning within
the Firm," American Economic Review (vol. 60; no. 2
May 1970), pp. 186-194; and Davis, Caccappolo, and
Chaudry, op. cit. See also "At Potlatch, nothing happens
without a plan," Business Week (November 10, 1975),
and "The Opposites: GE Grows While Westinghouse Shrinks,"
Business Week (January 31, 1977).
10. See Heal, op . cit
.
; J. Kornai, Mathematical Planning
of Structural Decisions
,
1st ed. (North Holland; Amsterdam;
1967); and C.J. Bliss, "Prices, Markets and Planning,"
Economic Journal (vol. 82; no. 325; March 1972), pp. 87-100.
11. K.J. Arrow, "Vertical Integration and Communication,"
Bell Journal of Economics (vol. 6; no. 1; spring 1975),
pp. 173-183, and O.E. Williamson, "The Vertical Integration
of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American
Economic Review (vol. 61; no. 2; May 1971), pp. 112-123.




13. Leibenstein, op. cit. See also M.A. Crew and C.K. Rowley,
"On Aliocative Efficiency, X-Efficiency and the Measure-
ment of Welfare Loss," Economica (vol. 38; no. 150;
May 1971), pp. 199-203, and G.J. Stigler, "The Xistence
of X-Efficiency," American Economic Review (vol. 66;
no. 1; March 1976), pp. 213-216. See also O.E. Williamson,






emphasizes the control aspects associated with organizational
structure (and their implications for X-ef f iciency )
,





pp. 65-66, which reviews the argument that
the large diversified corporation is a more efficient
(i.e. X-efficient in an intertemporal sense) vehicle
for growth than small single product firms.
14. In particular, the value of the mult idivision form of
organization is that it permits greater coordination
and control in large diversified firms, i.e. too much
centralization can hurt. O.E. Williamson, Managerial
Discretion, Organization Form
,
op. cit. For a practical
example, see "New Spur for a Sluggish Giant," Business
Week (March 17, 1975).
889
15. See Leibenstein, op. cit
.
, pp. 405, 408-409, where the
results of various empirical studies are discussed.
See also "How a Big Company Controls Its Costs In Good
Times and Bad," Wall Street Journal (June 4, 1975).
For a practical example of the importance to large firms
of effective internal controls, see "Investigating the
collapse of W.T. Grant," Business Week (July 19, 1976).




17. Spence, op. cit
.





; R. Wilson, "Informational
Economies of Scale," Bell Journal of Economics (vol. 6;
no. 1; spring 1975), pp. 184-195; S.A. Boorman, "A
Combinatorial Optimization Model For Transmission of
Job Information Through Contact Networks," Bell Journal
of Economics (vol. 6; no. 1; spring 1975), pp. 216-249;
H.A. Simon, Models of Man (Wiley; New York; 1957);
A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, "Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic
Review (vol. 62; no. 5; December 1972), pp. 777-795;
Monsen and Downs, op. cit
.










pp. 165-167; P. Doeringer and M. Piore, Internal
Labor Markets and Manpower Analyses (D.C. Heath; Lexington,
Mass.; 1971); J.E. Stiglitz, "The Theory of "Screening,"
Education, and the Distribution of Income," American
Economic Review (vol. 65; no. 3; June 1975), pp. 283-300;
A.M. Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer
in Hiring and Related Screening Processes (Harvard University
Press; Cambridge; 1974); R. Radner, "A Behavioral Model
of Cost Reduction," Bell Journal of Economics (vol. 6;
no. 1; spring 1975), pp. 196-215; R. Radner and M. Rothschild
"On the Allocation of Effort," Journal of Economic Theory
(vol. 10; no. 3; June 1975), pp. 358-376; and O.E. Williamson
M.L. Wachter, and J.E. Harris, "Understanding the Employ-
ment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange,"
Bell Journal of Economics (vol. 6; no. 1; spring 1975),
pp. 250-278.
20. Spence, op. cit
.
,
pp. 167-169; S.F. Maier and J.H.
Vander Weide, "Capital Budgeting in the Decentralized
Firm," Management Science (vol. 23; no. 4; December 1976),
pp. 433-443; W.T. Carleton, G. Kendall, and S. Tandon,
"Application of the Decomposition Principle to the Capital
Budgeting Problems in a Decentralized Firm," Journal of
Finance (vol. 29; no. 3; June 1974), pp. 815-839; and
H.M. Weingartner, Mathematical Programming and Analysis
of Capital Budgeting Problems (Markham; Chicago; 1967)-,
J. Bower, Managing the Resource Allocation Process
(Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University; Cambridge; 1970); and Arrow, Vertical
Integration and Communication , op. cit. Calculating
the cost of capital for a division of a firm is discussed
890
in M.J. Gordon and P.J. Halpern, "Cost of Capital for
a Division of a Firm," Journal of Finance (vol. 29;
no. 4; September 1974), pp. 1153-1163.






pp. 353-354, makes the same point.
22. This notion of nonproductive administrative labor corresponds
to O.E. Williamson's notion of 'slack staff. O.E.





ch. 4. The assumption that the firm employs
individuals in staff positions who are completely non-
productive may seem extreme. The important point is,
as Williamson argues, that corporate staffs may "be
increased without explicit regard for the potential
contribution to production of those hired. Assuming
that the productivity of such individuals is zero, rather





24. Rather than introduce a separate argument of Ui , the
managerial emoluments argument could be replaced by the
sum of managerial emoluments and nonproductive administrative
labor expense, M(t) + s(t)*A (t). This latter approach
assumes, however, that the marginal rate of substitution
between managerial emoluments and nonproductive administrative
labor expense is always equal to one. Since (3) does
not involve such a restriction, it is preferred to the
alternative formulation.
25. It is assumed that L, K, and Ap are strictly positive at
each time t along each variable's optimal trajectory
since each contributes positively to output. It is
also assumed that M is strictly positive at each time
t along its optimal trajectory since the possibility
that M(t) = at some time t was considered in chapter
three.









28. In this section and the next it is assumed for convenience
that the investment is undertaken at the headquarters
level and that the firm's stock of physical capital is
allocated among the firm's divisions at each time t.
This is more inclusive than merely allowing for the
allocation of investment funds - and assuming that physical
capital is purchased at the division level - since it
allows for the reassignment of plant and equipment from
one division to another.
29. Both L. and A (i.e. the amounts division i is permitted
l p,i
to hire) are determined at the headquarters level.
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30. Note that since there is just a single revenue argument
of the collective utility function in (26), 3U /9R. =
3U /3R.
,
i = 1, ... , I; j = 1, ... , I. That is, the
marginal collective utility of revenue is the same for
each division (product) when the firm is in equilibrium,
or equivalent ly, in equilibrium the marginal rate of
substitution between revenue earned by one division and
revenue earned by any other division is one. Hence
9U/3R in (32)-(35) can be written without the subscript
i. To allow for the value of diversification - i.e.
implying marginal rates of substitution that may differ
from one - separate revenue arguments could be introduced
into the collective utility function. This is done in
the representative airframe builder model formulated




32. Note that the left-hand side of (43) is identical to
the right-hand side of equation (40) in chapter three
when u
3
= 0. Indeed, in obtaining (40) in chapter three
it was assumed that the profit constraint was not binding
(i.e. that u = 0)
.
3
33. (48) implies that the firm modeled in (26) will allocate
more productive headquarters administrative labor to each
division than a short run profit maximizer. But (48)
must hold for each division, and since, by corollary
V-4-2, all productive headquarters administrative labor
is allocated among the firm's divisions, the firm modeled
in (26) actually hires more productive headquarters














39. Ibid. , ch. 3.
40. This assumes that K(t) a sing out of (54) is dif ferentiable
for all t, t < T. Note that this would follow if
each K.(t) were dif ferentiable for all t, < t < T.
This latter assumption is not untenable in view of the
standard assumption that K(t) is dif ferentiable for all
t, < t < T, in the case of the single product firm.
41. Ibid. , ch. 4.
42. This assumes that K, the predetermined upper bound on
the number of iterations, is large enough that the number
of iterations required to achieve feasibility can be




ch. 4; and H. Uzawa, "Iterative Methods for Concave
Programming," in K.J. Arrow, L. Hurwicz, and H. Uzawa,
eds
.
, Studies in Linear and Non-Linear Programming
(Stanford University Press; Stanford, Calif.; 1958),
pp. 154-165.
44. It should be noted that what follows is not affected materially
if iT.(t) is defined as net income before tax, rather
than after tax. As long as x is constant, as assumed
here, the necessary conditions and the resulting expressions
for the marginal rates of substitution between pairs
of arguments in (64) are changed only slightly. However,
since (32)-(35) are expressed net of tax, the comparisons
made below are somewhat more straightforward when 7T.(t)
is defined net of tax.
rt rtye ye
45. That is, 9U /8p and * /an are rents established by
the headquarters management. The use of these prices,
or rents, was not discussed previously, though this
interpretation is consistent with the model formulated
in section C and with the planning algorithm presented
in the previous subsection. These prices would be
charged against the division's revenue at each iteration
of the planning cycle, although no transactions would
take place until the final plan had been agreed upon.
46. Only the possibilities that M.(t) = or A
R i
(t) =
are economically interesting here.
47. (81)-(85) follow from differentiating the Lagrangian
L = U 1 + A (A - A - A ) + A (7T (t) - tt ).
a ii p, i n,i 2l o* 1
In addition, there are the two constraints in (80),
which for brevity are not repeated. (86) and (87) are
the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the constraints
in (80).
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VI. A DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERNAL
PLANNING PROCESSES OF THE MAJOR
U.S. MILITARY AIRFRAME BUILDERSl
A. INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years many articles have appeared in the
business literature describing the problems that in recent years
have plagued the United States aerospace industry, and in partic-
2
ular, the major military airframe builders - the nine firms
listed in Table VI-1 that serve as prime contractors for the pro-
duction of the tactical, bomber, and support aircraft used by the
Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy to carry out their re-
spective missions. There have been reports of an impending shake-
out of makers of tactical planes, due mainly to the apparent re-
duction in the number of contracts for new military tactical air-
3
craft. A prolonged slump in defense spending for weapons systems
procurement that began in 1970 and the political debate over the
future of the Bl bomber program that delayed - and still threatens
to put an end to - its production placed added pressure on the
4
stability of the industry. In addition, commercial aircraft sales
5
fell dramatically as airline passenger traffic leveled off, pre-
cipitating a financial crisis for one of the three major producers
of both commercial and military aircraft.
More recently, the 1976 national elections and the well-publicized
upturn in real defense spending that began the same year have drawn
the attention of not only the business community, but also the public
,
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Table VI-1 Profile of the Nine Major Airframe











Military Aircraft in Production
E-3 (airborne command and control)


















1. Or soon to go into production.
2. Uses the Boeing 707 airframe.
3. Uses the Boeing 747 airframe.
4. Total deliveries of approximately 5000 aircraft.
5. Total deliveries of approximately 3000 aircraft.
6. The F-18 will be produced jointly by McDonnell Douglas and Northrop.
Sources: Company Form 10-K reports for company fiscal year 1975
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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to the defense industry - those firms that produce the weapons systems
on which the nation's defense depends. More importantly, the turn^
about in defense spending has brightened the general outlook for the
aerospace industry considerably, New arms programs, such as the
F-16 to be produced by General Dynamics and the F-18 to be produced
jointly by McDonnell Douglas and Northrop, have meant that, for some
aerospace firms at least, the future looks very bright. For others,
however, the trend toward longer production runs and fewer contracts
threatens their continued existence as prime contractors. Indeed, in
the absence of a sufficient number of new programs, a shakeout will
occur and the victims will be forced to increase foreign sales or
to work as subcontractors, or else to drop out of the aircraft end of
the aerospace business altogether.
The next section describes these and several other problems that
confront the major airframe builders, and in particular, how the
uncertainties concerning the future state of product market demand,
future resource availabilities and costs, etc., that all firms face
are compounded by the technological uncertainties that result from
having to push the state of the art each time a new weapons system
is developed, and in addition, by a dwindling number of contracts
from its principal customer - the Department of Defense - that threa-
tens several firms' survival as prime contractors. In such a business
environment, the need for effective corporate planning to somehow
deal with these uncertainties is, in the opinion of this writer, crit-
ical. The development of a new weapons system normally requires
several years or longer from conception to production. In addition,
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the financial resources necessary to support the research and de-
velopment effort are scarce - even though the Department of Defense
does provide partial financial assistance through the distribution
of independent research and development (hereafter referred to as
IR&D) funds and in recent years has demonstrated a willingness to
o
fund development programs on a cost-plus basis. For these rea-
sons it is necessary that these firms exercise particular care and
forethought in allocating their scarce financial resources. Just
as important, each of these firms must also allocate its highly
skilled design and engineering talent among existing and proposed
future projects. In each case the problem confronting the firm's
managers is one of deciding how best to allocate the firm's re-
sources to meet their own objectives and the objectives of the firm's
9
shareholders.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the
long term and short term planning processes of the nine major mili-
tary airframe builders in the United States, The focal point for
the discussion is how these planning processes are designed to en-
sure an allocation of the firm's fixed and variable resources that
is consistent with the firm's goals and objectives. Section C sets
out the general objectives the major airframe builders seek to ac-
complish when they plan their long term strategies and annual opera-
tions. Sections D through F discuss in broad terms the internal
planning processes of these firms. This description forms the
basis for the planning model of the representative airframe builder
formulated in the next chapter.
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The description represents a synthesis of these firms' planning pro-
cedures, rather than an attempt to describe with perfect accuracy
how any one firm plans, Though there are certain differences in how
these firms plan, these differences are, in the opinion of this
writer, differences of detail rather than of substance, and there
is sufficient commonality in the ways these firms plan to justify
the synthesis attempted here. Section G, which describes the cor-
porate review process that follows the planning processes and Sec-
tion H, which presents the summary and conclusions complete the
chapter.
Before proceeding to the discussion of planning, it may prove
helpful to the reader to provide an overview of the major military
airframe builders: their distinguishing characteristics, the pe-
culiar problems they face, and their rather special relationship
with their main customer, the Department of Defense (hereafter DOD)
.
This is the purpose of the next section.




The United States aerospace industry is composed of approxi-
mately 50 major manufacturing firms together with hundreds of
other smaller firms that produce parts and auxiliary equipment.
The industry is a large contributor to the nation's output and em-
ployment. During 1975 aerospace sales made a direct contribution
to gross national product of 1.9 percent, and accounted for 2.6
898
percent of all manufacturing sales and 5.4 percent of durable goods
12
production. Aerospace employment during 1975 averaged 942,000
workers, or approximately 1.5 percent of total civilian employment
13
and 5.1 percent of total employment in manufacturing. Also
during 1975, U.S. aerospace firms rung up a record trade surplus
of $7 billion, or approximately 75 percent of the total U.S. trade
surplus.
The output of the aerospace industry consists chiefly of air-
craft, missiles, space systems, parts, and auxiliary equipment. Of
these products, civil and military aircraft account for nearly 55
percent of the industry's output. Of all the firms in the aero-
space industry, there are nine - Boeing, Fairchild, General Dynamics,
1 f.
Grumman, LTV, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, and Rockwell -
that serve as the prime contractors for all of the major tactical,
bomber, and support aircraft used by the military. In addition,
three of the nine - Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas -
are the principal producers of large commercial aircraft in the United
States.
Turning to the buying side, during 1975 the federal government
purchased nearly 60 percent of the aerospace industry's output, and
over the last decade, the federal government's share of the industry's
18
output has reached as much as 74 percent. This dependence on
government sales makes aerospace production susceptible to large swings
in the level of government demand, as national policy and economic
. . 19
conditions change and as the nation experiences alternating periods
20
of war and peace, In addition, the business cycle, as it affects
899
national disposable income and the demand for commercial airline
travel, causes fluctuations in the demand for commercial aircraft.
When the two cycles coincide, as they have in recent years, output
21
and employment within the aerospace industry can fall dramatically,
The remainder of this section characterizes the nine major mili-
tary airframe builders and explores the major risks associated with
these firms' heavy dependence on a single customer.
2, Size and Diversification
The nine major military airframe builders are large multi-
product companies whose sales are, in general, heavily weighted to-
ward aerospace products. There are, however, important differences
in the extent to which these companies have diversified away from
the aerospace business.
Table VI-2 provides a. profile of the nine firms according to the
1975 sales of each and the value of new military contracts won by
each during fiscal year 1975. Eight of the nine firms are among the
500 largest industrial corporations in the United States, as ranked
according to annual sales by Fortune magazine. The ninth largest,
Fairchild Industries, falls within the upper range of the second 500
largest. Six of the firms are among the 100 largest. What the table
does not show is that several of the firms have experienced some slip-
page in their rankings since 1970 due to a shrinkage in orders for
22
military and commercial aircraft. Nevertheless, these firms re-
23
main large, and one would expect that they face problems of organ-
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Table VI-2 also indicates where the nine firms fall in relation
to the other firms that make up the list of the top 100 DOD contrac-
tors. Five of the top six DOD contractors are airframe builders,
and the nine major airframe builders all fall within the top 34 DOD
24
contractors. The nine firms collectively accounted for almost
25 percent of new military contracts awarded during fiscal year 1975.
It is apparent, then, that how well these firms plan and conduct their
operations will be of considerable interest to DOD, Not only is DOD
one of the biggest buyers of the products of each firm, but also,
each firm is among DOD's largest suppliers of durable goods.
Table VI-3 shows how the sales of each of the nine companies are
distributed among aircraft, missiles and space, and non-aerospace
product lines. Four companies - Boeing, Fairchild, Grumman, and
McDonnell Douglas - derive at least 80 percent of total revenue from
the sale of aircraft, engines, parts, and auxiliary equipment, and
these four companies, as well as Lockheed, each earn at least 90
percent of total revenue from the sale of these items and missiles
and space equipment. For these five firms, non-aerospace production
constitutes a relatively small part of the firm's total operations,
In contrast, General Dynamics, LTV, Northrop, and Rockwell appear
much less dependent on aerospace sales, with, for example, the sale
of aerospace products amounting to only 12 percent of LTV's 1975 sales,
However, even though the percentage contribution of aerospace sales
may be relatively small, large variations in the level of such sales
might still have a significant impact on the firm's profit and loss
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spectrum, if a firm derives 80 percent or more of its revenue from the
sale of aircraft and related parts and equipment, then the performance
of the company is highly sensitive to variations in the demand for
aircraft. For such firms, this greater dependence on sales of air-
craft makes the need for a planning organization that can cope with
the cyclical fluctuations inherent in the demand for commercial and
military aircraft all the more pressing.
The picture of the major airframe builders that has emerged thus
far is one of large firms that have diversified away from aerospace
production to varying degrees, but that are still very much depen-
dent for their overall success on the success of their aerospace
operations. The next two subsections discuss the important character-
istics of the aerospace research and development process and the
aircraft production process and suggest several important implica-
tions for the internal planning processes of the major airframe
builders,
3. Aerospace Research and the Aircraft Development Process
It is a characteristic of the aerospace industry that each
new product pushes the state of the art. Whether the new product
is a new military fighter aircraft capable of reaching greater speeds
and carrying heavier payloads than its predecessors or a new commer-
cial passenger jet that can achieve greater fuel economy while meeting
more stringent noise standards, the development of the aircraft re-
quires the expenditure of large sums of money for highly skilled sci-
entific and engineering talent. Usually these expenditures must be
spread over a long period of time before the aircraft is ready for
905
production. Often seven to 10 years - and sometimes even longer -
25
will elapse between program initiation and completion.
The long and expensive research and development process has im-
portant implications for the aerospace industry in general and for
the major airframe builders in particular. First, the industry is
labor-intensive, employing as many salaried workers as production
2 ts
workers. In 1975 the U.S. aerospace industry employed nearly
20 percent of all U.S. scientists and engineers engaged in research
and development, and at times this percentage has been as high as
30 percent. These scientists and engineers and the knowledge and
experience they possess constitute a valuable capital resource, the
efficient allocation of which is critical to each firm's overall
27
,performance. It is of some concern to corporate planners, then,
that major programs be time- phased in such a way that the firm's
scientific and engineering talent can be kept fully employed in
jobs requiring their skills.
A second implication of the special character of the research
and development process in the aerospace industry is that large
sums of money capital must be raised in order to finance the re-
search and development process. For example, the production of a
new commercial jet might require as much as $2 billion in research
and development and initial production costs before the firm begins
28
to recover its investment - a sum that far exceeds the net worth
29
of any of the commercial airframe builders. The financial pres-
sures these firms face are, however, mitigated to a great extent by
906
government funding of IR&D, by development contracts that are typ-
30
ically awarded on a cost-plus-fee basis, and, in the case of
commercial aircraft development, by the spillover effects of research
funded at least in part by IR&D money. Indeed, the aerospace in-
dustry is an anomaly among U.S. industries due to the extent to which
the government - mainly through DOD and NASA, although the latter has
diminished in importance rapidly in recent years as the total space
31
effort has wound down - finances its research and development.
As an example of the importance of government funding, Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation spent $52.8 million of its own funds on research
and development during 1975, but received more than $480 million
from DOD for defense-related research and development, testing, and
32
evaluation.
A third implication of the special nature of the aerospace in-
dustry's research and development process is the risks - technological,
financial, and otherwise - inherent in expending large sums of money
on new products that push the state of the art and that, in the case
of new weapons systems, will lead to actual production only if the
proposed weapons system (i.e. the prototype) survives a winner-take-
33
all competition for the right to go into production. As far as
research and development per se is concerned, the main risk is that
associated with technological uncertainty, namely, whether the firm
will be able to make the required advances in the state of the art
within a 'reasonable' period of time and at a 'reasonable' cost in
accordance with its contract.
A fourth implication of the special character of the industry's
907
research and development process is that the length of the process
often makes it necessary for the firm's planners to look well be-
yond the five-year outlook provided by the Five Year Defense Plan
in order to determine how to allocate defense-related research
and development funds. While some guidance is provided by the
projects on which DOD will permit IR&D funds to be spent, the
35
airframe builders cannot rely on this source of information alone.
Moreover, for commercial markets there is nothing akin to a Five
Year Defense Plan. Hence, planning the allocation of research and
development funds necessitates projections of military and com-
mercial needs in the next decade and beyond, and, needless to say,
these projections involve a high degree of uncertainty. Coping
with such uncertainty requires corporate planners to make certain
adjustments in the way they plan, and these adjustments are dis-
cussed below in Section E.
This subsection has discussed the research and development
requirements that underlie aircraft production and some of the
important implications of the nature of this process and for each
of the firm's planners. The next subsection takes a look inside
these firms at the aircraft production process and at what the
nature of this process implies for corporate planners.
4. The Aircraft Production Process and the Learning Curve
It has long been recognized by aeronautical engineers that
airframe production is characterized by a learning process. As
the total number of airframes produced of a particular type increases,
the direct labor input - the number of man-hours of labor per airframe -
908
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diminishes. This is due to the fact that, as the airframe is
put together, items such as hydraulic systems, fuel lines,
electrical wiring, and avionics gear must be installed by hand. As
the total number of airframes increases, the production workers who
install these items become more proficient - the experience gained
on previous airframes has taught them what goes where, so that air-
craft drawings need not be consulted as often as on earlier air-
frames, and has also taught them the best order in which to install
the various items.
Studies of airframe production have revealed the shape of the
38
learning curve. The typical learning curve is what is called an
'80 percent curve' , which means that every time airframe production
is doubled, the direct labor input per airframe declines by 20 per-
cent, or equivalently, falls to 80 percent of what it was before pro-
duction doubled. Such a curve is shown below in Figure VI-1, where it
has been assumed that the first airframe requires a direct labor in-
39
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It should be emphasized that the learning curve, and the process
of learning by doing that it embodies, applies to all airframes sin-
gly. Each completely new airframe requires that the learning pro-
cess begin anew. This is one reason why corporate planning within
the major airframe builders proceeds on a more or less airframe-
by-air frame basis. This point is developed further in later sections.
The existence of the learning curve has several important im-
plications for corporate planners in addition to the one just men-
tioned. First, the fall in the direct labor input per airframe means
that, barring major design changes that seriously disrupt the learn-
ing process or a surge in inflation that sharply increases the cost
of labor and other inputs, both the marginal fly-away cost and the
average fly-away cost of a particular type of aircraft tend to fall
40
as the cumulative number of units produced increases. This
would imply that, from a cost standpoint at least, it is more eco-
nomical to have a smaller variety of aircraft in order to derive
maximum benefit from the learning curve. Thus, it might be argued
that producing a common lightweight fighter aircraft that meets the
needs of both the Navy and the Air Force, rather than producing a
different airplane for each, would enable the government to take
maximum advantage of the learning curve. It should be emphasized
that such commonality can prove to be more cost-effective (rather
than simply less costly) only if a compromise design that will
41
effectively satisfy each service's needs proves feasible.
Second, the existence of a learning curve makes it impractical
for the Department of Defense either to have more than one firm
910
build a particular type of aircraft or to switch contractors once
production has begun. In the first case, the full benefits of the
learning curve could not be derived (i.e. for any given budget,
fewer aircraft would be produced), and in the second case, the new
contractor would have to begin at the top of the learning curve
and a portion of the overall cost savings that had previously been
possible would have to be sacrificed. Thus, by the time an airframe
builder has won the initial production contract, there is no longer
42
any effective competition on the selling side of the market, and
the government-contractor relationship becomes one of bilateral
43
monopoly. The significance of this is explored further below.
Third, the learning curve gives rise to a special problem for
the producers of commercial aircraft, which are typically fixed-
priced. Before fixing the price and announcing the price to the
commercial airlines, the producer must make a careful assessment
of the likely future demand for his product, for the lower is the
price, the greater is the number of planes that must be sold before
the break-even point is reached. An overly optimistic demand
projection - say, one that overestimates either the need for addi-
tional carrying capacity or the need for replacement aircraft (or
both) - can lead the producer to charge a price that implies an
unattainably high break-even point, and, as Lockheed's L-1011 ex-
perience demonstrates, to intolerably large losses should the ex-
44
pected sales fail to materialize. While the risk of such losses
would tend to discourage the firm from setting the break-even point
too high, the existence of strong competition among sellers of
911
commercial aircraft, as well as each producer's desire to sell suf-
ficient numbers of aircraft to keep its production lines in con-
tinuous operation, push prices in the opposite direction by tending
to make producers overly optimistic with regard to how fast they
can proceed down the learning curve.
A fourth implication of the existence of the learning curve
concerns the relationship between the production of commercial
aircraft and the production of military aircraft. If a producer
of both commercial and military aircraft can win a contract to
produce a military plane that utilizes the same airframe as one of
45
the company's commercial planes, then that company will gain an
advantage over its commercial competitors to the extent that it is
able to progress down the learning curve more quickly than it could
have otherwise. Of course, the military buyer also benefits by
saving, not only on research and development costs, but also on a
portion of what it would otherwise have cost to produce the military
airframes. This is yet one more important aspect of the interface
between government sales and commercial sales.
This and preceding subsections have menioned the importance of
government sales to the major airframe builders. The next two sub-
sections look more closely at the importance of government sales and
at the risks involved in doing work under contract for the govern-
ment.
5. The Importance of Government Sales
During 1975 almost 60 percent of the aerospace industry's
46
total output was purchased by the federal government. For the
912
nine major airframe builders the proportion of total net sales
made to the government was somewhat less, amounting to nearly 55
47
percent of the total. This high proportion of government sales
means that these firms' total sales, and indirectly their profits
and overall financial health, are very sensitive to changes in
the amount of DOD weapons purchases. A somewhat more informative
picture of this dependence emerges when total sales figures are
broken down between government sales and commercial sales on a
company-by-company basis. This is done below in Table VT-4.
Including sales of aircraft and other items to foreign govern-
ments among 'commercial sales' - in accordance with an accounting
convention adopted throughout the industry - yields the percentages
48
of government sales in consolidated net sales shown in column six.
These percentages range from a low of 38 percent in the case of Boeing
and Rockwell to a high of 88 percent in the case of Vought Corp. , with
seven of the nine firms deriving more than half their revenue from
government sales. The main reason Boeing has such a low percentage
of government sales is its relatively high proportion - 60 percent -
of sales of commercial aircraft. At the opposite end of the aircraft
sales spectrum, Grumman Corp. derived 77 percent of its total revenue
from sales of aircraft to the government.
The dependence of these firm's total sales on government sales,
in general, and on sales of aircraft to the government, in partic-
ular, means that changes in the DOD budget can have a significant
49
impact on the sales and levels of employment of these firms. It
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process, these firms carefully prepare environmental forecasts that
provide the planning staff with an assessment of the likely politi-
cal and military environment and what defense policy and military
hardware needs are likely to be in such an environment, as far as
five to 10 years into the future.
An aerospace company's dependence on government sales, partic-
ularly if a large percentage of its sales are derived from a single
contract, may subject the firm to a significant termination risk,
since the government may terminate a contract for its convenience
at any time. This risk and the other risks involved in doing
business with the government are discussed in the next subsection.
6. Doing Business with the Government: Risks and Regulations
The recently completed Department of Defense Profit Policy
Study (nicknamed Profit '76), which entailed an analysis of defense
industry risks and profitability and which led to important re-
visions in DOD procurement policy, once again raised the question
of whether the profits contractors earn on government work are com-
mensurate with the risks they must bear in performing such work.
As the Profit '76 study and several earlier studies have noted,
working under contract for the government involves certain risks not
present in commercial dealings, and the scale of these risks is de-
j j 52pendent on the type of contract awarded.
It is not the purpose of this subsection to attempt to determine
whether defense work is of a relatively high risk/low return nature.
That issue has been debated - often heatedly - many times in the
53
past, and, in the opinion of this writer, the debate is likely to
916
continue well into the future as DOD procurement policy changes
and as each side reassesses the relative risks and rewards of
54
government business. One of the complicating factors in the
debate is the nonquantif iability of risk. Many studies have
listed the risk elements in government contracting, but be-
yond that, it is very difficult to do more than adopt some sur-
rogate measure - the Profit '76 study employed as a surrogate mea-
sure of risk the standard deviation of the firm's rate of return
over a ten-year period. Lack of agreement as to the most
appropriate measure of risk will, to the extent that different
measures lead to different conclusions, help keep the debate alive.
Whether government regulations permit profits sufficient to
compensate defense contractors for the risks they face is also
important from a planning standpoint. A firm will be willing to
invest its own funds in new plant and equipment only if the ex-
pected returns from the investment, when adjusted for risk, are
judged by top management to be adequate from the standpoint of
the firm and its shareholders. If potential returns are felt to
be inadequate, then top management will instead allocate the firm's
available investment capital to commercial projects.
The remainder of this subsection examines the buyer-seller
relationship that exists between the federal government and its
prime contractors - a relationship that is conditioned largely
by the procurement policies that have been established by the
government. The latter part of the subsection discusses how
the government's procurement policies - and, in particular, the
917
type of contract it is willing to award - can affect the allocation
of risk between buyer and seller. Unlike the studies of risk cited
earlier, which either catalogued a long list of risks or else con-
centrated on developing a single overall measure of risk, this sub-
section develops a set of risk classifications and clearly distin-
guishes (for any particular program) between those risk elements
associated with the period prior to the award of the first production
contract and those risk elements associated with the period following
the award of the first production contract. In the opinion of this
writer, such a distinction has important implications for corporate
planners and top managers who must carefully weigh expected returns
and risks before deciding how best to allocate the firm's scarce
engineering, scientific, and managerial talent among current and
proposed programs.
a. The Buyer-Seller Relationship
Government contracts are awarded and administered under a detailed
set of rules spelled out in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPR) , an imposing collection of volumes that totals more than 3000
CO
pages. The provisions of ASPR, together with thousands of addi-
tional directives and instructions, detail the conditions that must
be met when the contract between buyer and seller, which specifies
the obligations of both parties under the procurement agreement, is
written. Such an agreement is necessitated by the fact that the
procurement of weapons systems does not - indeed, can not - take place
via normal commercial market transactions. In commercial markets
firms design and develop new products entirely on their own and
918
finance research and development and initial production prior to
observing the actual demand for the good. Due to several factors,
among them national security considerations, the high cost and
long lead time required to develop new aircraft, and all the un-
59
certainties connected with weapons system acquisition, it is
not in the best interests of the government to rely on this pro-
60
cess for obtaining major weapons systems. The government
needs some assurance that it will get what it needs when it needs
it and at a reasonable price, and the contractor needs some as-
surance that the government has a need for the new aircraft it is
developing, as well as financial support during the lengthy and
costly research and development process. Thus, there is the need
for negotiation and contractual relationships to supplant the mar-
ket place in determining product design, price, etc.
In discussing the buyer-seller relationship that exists be-
tween the government and the airframe builders, it is important to
distinguish, for any particular program, between the period prior
to the award of the initial production contract and the period
following that award. The contracting process for a new type of
aircraft begins with a Request for Proposals, which the government
issues to interested bidders. These contain detailed specifications
of the government's requirements. At this stage of the process,
and continuing through the building of prototypes for a fly off,
there are two or more sellers but only one buyer . The buyer-
seller relationship is what economists call a 'monopsony' - two
or more sellers competing against one another to sell their output
919
to the sole buyer. In such an environment there is a danger
that a contractor will submit an unrealistically low bid or an
unrealistically optimistic set of technical specifications in
ft?
order to increase its probability of winning. This danger in-
creases when there are not enough major contracts to go around,
and increases even further when the procuring agency resorts to
auctioning - i.e. asking contractors whose bids fall within the
competitive range for "best and final" offers. During this
portion of the contracting process the main risks the contractor
faces are those associated with either losing the competition or
else winning the competition but finding it impossible to meet
the terms of the contract.
Once the aircraft has gone into production, however, the
buyer-seller relationship changes dramatically. The existence
of the learning curve precludes further competition among air-
frame builders, and the government -contractor relationship becomes
one of 'monopsony' - a single buyer and a single seller. Pro-
duction contracts are typically renegotiated on a yearly basis.
But once the plane has gone into production, there no longer re-
main any technical uncertainties. Moreover, the shape of the
learning curve is known well enough that labor costs can be es-
66
timated fairly accurately, at least over the next year. Though
the cost of components purchased from subcontractors can change,
the degree of risk associated with cost increases that diminish
net income is relatively small. However, there is always a risk
that the government will terminate the contract at its convenience,
reimbursing the contractor for costs incurred up to the termination
920
date and paying it a pro rata share of the previously negotiated
fee, but leaving it on its own to decide what to do with facilities
and a labor force for which there is no longer any need. The im-
portance of the termination risk is difficult to assess, but, in the
opinion of this writer, is likely to be small in relation to the
risks associated with not winning the contract in the first place.
After the contractor has performed the work required under the
contract and been paid, any profits it may have earned are subject
to scrutiny by the Renegotiation Board. The board averages con-
tractor performance on all contracts on a yearly basis, and if it
determines that during the year under review the contractor earned
'excessive' profits, it recaptures the 'excess' for the government.
This review process is, however, a one-way street because the con-
tractor has no recourse in the event it believes its profits were
68
too low that year. Moreover, the determination of the reason-
ableness of each contractor's profits is made on the basis of a
69
set of six criteria that are widely regarded as vague and sub-
70jective. Government contractors and independent analysts
have criticized the Renegotiation Board's decisions as arbitrary.
Kaysen and others believe that the way the government does business,
and in particular, the operation of the Renegotiation Board, dulls
whatever incentives exist in individual contracts for promoting
efficient contractor performance.
This subsection has mentioned several of the risks involved in
government contracting. The next subsection examines these and
other associated risks.
921
b. Financial Risks and Business Risks
The term 'risk' is one that is subject to varying interpreta-
73
tions. Some authors treat 'uncertainty' as a synonym for 'risk',
74
while others follow Knight and distinguish 'uncertainty' , which
is held to be 'elusive and nonmeasurable' , from 'risk' which is
75held to be measurable. Financial and business writers often
use the term 'risk' in an all-inclusive manner to encompass all
the assorted uncertainties, most of which are not susceptible to
measurement, that confront a firm, while financial management text-
books normally aim for a higher degree of precision, often carefully
distinguishing between 'business risk', measured, say, as the co-
efficient of variation of the firm's net operating income, and 'fi-
nancial risk', measured, say, as the coefficient of variation of the
firm's net income (or earnings available to shareholders) or as the
probability of bankruptcy. Studies dealing with the specific
subject of risk elements in government contracting tend to drift to
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uncertainty or else selecting some single overall measure of risk.
One exception is a recent publication of the Aerospace Industries
79
Association of America that categorizes risks that confront aero-
space firms into four broad classes. A similar approach is adopted
in the first portion of this subsection, although the categories
differ somewhat and, in contrast to the earlier approach, a surrogate
measure of each of the risks in each category is suggested.
The major types of risk that are encountered by the nine major
military airframe builders are discussed below. Many of these risks,
922
as indicated below, are those that affect all government contrac-
tors. In what follows a distinction is drawn between financial
risks and business risks ^ hut as the discussion makes clear, gov-
ernment contracting affects both types of risk.
As discussed above, financial risk, which must be borne to
some extent by all corporations, encompasses the risk of bank-
ruptcy and the variability in the firm's net income. Surrogate
measures for these two components of financial risk are the prob-
ability of bankruptcy and the coefficient of variation of net in-
80
come, respectively. The probability of bankruptcy is, of
course, the ultimate risk that any business organization faces,
but, in the case of the major airframe builders, this risk is,
according to at least one expert, almost insignificant. Kurth
has offered empirical evidence in support of his belief in a
'bail-out imperative' that prompts the government to come up with
a new program and award it to a prime contractor in deep financial
8
1
trouble. Kurth would undoubtedly argue that the Navy's modi-
fication of the F-14 contract and the government's loan guarantee
for Lockheed were merely different manifestations of the same
8?
phenomenon. The second component of financial risk is also
affected by the way the government does business. For example,
Fairchild Industries, Inc., reported to its shareholders that
"the transition from the development to the production contract
[for the A-10 attack aircraft] substantially impacted 1975 sales
a .. 83and earnings.
What distinguishes financial risks from business risks is that
923
only the former reflects the impact of the firm's financial
decisions, and in particular, what proportion of the firm's
capital has been raised through the issuance of debt instruments.
Both financial risk, as defined above, and business risk, as
defined below, reflect the impact of the operating decisions of
the firm. In this sense, then, financial risk is the more in-
84
elusive term and can be thought of as the firm's overall risk.
Business risks are of six types: (i) technical risks, (ii)
bidding risks, (iii) production risks, (iv) cost risks, (v) gov-
ernment dependence risks, and (vi) commercial market risks. Each
of these is discussed below.
Technical risks are those associated with pushing the state
8 "5
of the art each time a new military aircraft is developed.
Often there are several unknowns to be dealt with, and even if
the firm is confident it can solve each technical problem individu-
ally, there may remain much uncertainty concerning the time and
cost required to accomplish these results and there may also be
uncertainty as to how well the new integrated system incorporating
Of.
all these advances will perform. Since aerospace firms typically
earn a greater portion of their sales revenue on research and de-
87
velopment work than do firms in other industries, this source of
uncertainty is of somewhat greater significance in the aerospace
industry. However, in view of DOD's apparent increasing willing-
88
.
ness to fund research and development on a cost-plus basis, the
impact of technical risks on the firm is correspondingly reduced.
One way to measure these risks, while reflecting the importance
924
of government funding, is to estimate the firm's probability of
failure to meet the contract's specifications. Since increasing
the government's share of the costs makes it less costly for the
firm to engage in an additional dollar's worth of research and de-
velopment, as long as the additional dollar is spent productively,
the probability of failure will tend to fall. Reducing this prob-
ability is in the firm's interest because failure to meet the con-
tract specifications may result, not only in financial loss, but
in loss of reputation as well.
The second category of business risk, bidding risk, is also
associated primarily (although not exclusively) with government
contracting. Prior to the award of a contract, the firms that in-
tend to bid spend money, some of it their own and the rest of it
the government's bid and proposal (B&P) money, preparing the bid.
As in the case of technical risks, government funding helps reduce
the impact of these risks. Also similar to technical risks, the
measurement of bidding risk may be carried out by once again esti-
mating the probability of failure, in this case, the probability of
failing to win the contract.
The third class of business risk, production risk, is associ-
ated with fluctuations in the levels of demand for the firm's prod-
uct that lead to volatility in manpower requirements. One major
source of fluctuation in demand for military aircraft is the rapid
buildup and the rapid phasing out that accompany the start and
89
completion, respectively, of a major government contract. Such
fluctuations may force the firm through successive periods of
925
layoffs and rehirings, both of which involve substantial direct and
indirect costs. For example, where labor unions exist, one would
90
expect on the basis of economic theory that unions would press
for higher wages in order to obtain for their workers a risk premi-
um to compensate them for the risk of being laid off. A more
serious problem from the company's standpoint is the threat of not
being able to rehire previously laid off skilled scientific or
engineering talent or skilled line managers because they were hired
by other firms, or worse yet, because they left the industry. Any
measure of the volatility of aerospace employment, such as the co-
efficient of variation of the number of employee-hours per week over
some specified time period, might serve as a measure of this type of
risk.
The fourth category of business risk, cost risk, involves the
contractor's possible failure to produce the item within target cost.
This category of risk overlaps with technical risk, since the greater
is the technical complexity of the item - i.e. the greater are the
technical risks - the greater is the risk that actual costs will
exceed target cost. As discussed below, when research and develop-
ment contracts are of the cost-plus form, the government assumes
most of the cost risk. On production contracts, on which the tech-
nical risks are normally much smaller than on research and develop-
ment contracts, but on which the government normally insists on a
fixed price, there is also cost risk. This risk is induced by such
factors as production delays, design changes ordered by the govern-
ment that lead to cost increases that are not fully reimbursed, and
increases in the cost of inputs due to general inflation that are
926
not fully covered in the contract. Also, as discussed below, the
use of fixed-price contracts for the production phase of a major
program forces a larger share of the cost risk to fall on the con-
91
tractor. As far as the measurement problem is concerned, cost
risk on any contract or project could be measured either by the
standard deviation of the probability distribution of actual cost
about target cost - estimated, say, on the basis of historical
data - or more simply, as the estimated probability that target
cost will be exceeded.
Two other aspects of cost risk should be noted. First, to re-
duce bid risk the contractor may submit an unrealistically low bid,
thereby increasing its cost risk. Second, the use of subcontractors
92
can also have an impact on cost risk in two offsetting ways. On
the one hand, the greater use of subcontractors relaxes the prime
contractor's direct control over those phases of research and devel-
opment and/or production that have been contracted out, while on
the other hand, a portion of the prime contractor's overall cost
risk can be transferred to the subcontractor if the latter accepts
93
the work on fixed-price basis.
The fifth category of business risk, government dependence risk,
also overlaps with the other categories of business risk. Govern-
ment dependence risk is caused by a contractor's having to sell
high technology military aircraft to (or at least through) a single
buyer. This imposes certain risks in research and development work
because the government must be satisfied with the product before it
will authorize production, and in addition, because the contracting
authority may alter its requirements as the weapons system evolves,
927
ordering the contractor to modify components, which in turn may have
a ripple effect on other components in the system. A second aspect of
government dependence risk is the volatility of government funding,
which can have a strong impact on a contractor's production risk. The
fall in DOD spending following the Vietnam war peak is one of the main
factors responsible for the current overcapacity in the aerospace
94
industry. In addition, each of the above factors can also com-
pound cost risk. A third aspect of government dependence risk is
termination risk - the probability that the government may terminate
a contract for convenience. Such termination may be due to a lack
of funding, or to political pressures such as those threatening the
Bl bomber program, or more simply, to altered priorities. In any
case, the very limited possibilities for, and the very high cost
in terms of direct outlays and loss of efficiency of, converting the
95
production facilities to some alternative use mean that layoffs
follow, the contractor's business base and earnings shrink, and the
amount of unused capacity increases. A fourth aspect of government
dependence risk is that associated with the present very real pos-
sibility that, even if real defense spending continues to increase,
the number of major contracts, and hence, the number of airframe
96
builders needed to serve as prime contractors, may diminish.
As far as measurement of government dependence risk is concerned,
one might adopt some measure of the volatility of a contractor's
government sales, as, for example, the standard deviation of gov-
ernment sales (about a trend) over some specified period.
The last category of risks includes those risks that are strict-
ly commercial, and as such, can be interpreted and measured in the
928
same manner as Van Home's business risks. In the case of the three
firms producing commercial passenger aircraft, however, it may be
more meaningful to attach risks to specific programs. These are of
essentially two types: the risk (i.e. the probability) of not
reaching the break-even number of units sold for a particular type
of aircraft and the risk (i.e. the probability) of a disastrous
accident that will tarnish the company's image and might thereby de-
tract from future sales. The first of these also reflects the risks
97
associated with mistiming the introduction of a new commercial aircraft.
One method of dealing with these substantial financial and busi-
ness risks is for the airframe builders to cooperate through joint
98
ventures. This approach is superior from the standpoint of the
firms involved to the more traditional prime contractor - subcontrac-
tor form of business relationship in that research and development
are shared more equally and each producer shares in the production
and marketing of the aircraft. Hence, in a joint venture each pro-
99ducer is a prime contractor, and as will be argued below, it is
prime contracting rather than subcontracting, and the prestige that
accompanies the successful development and production of a new high
technology aircraft that is one of the primary sources of satisfaction
for the managers of these firms.
c. The Government - Airframe Contractor Relationship:
Allocation of Risks by Contract Type
Having indicated the major sources of risk, the discussion will
deal next with the question of risk-sharing between the government
and the contractor. At one extreme, the government could provide
all the fixed capital (i.e. plant and equipment) and all the working
929
capital (i.e. short term funding for inventories and work in
process) and pay the airframe contractor a fixed fee for managing
these assets. In this case the government would assume the larger
share of business risk. At the opposite extreme, the contractor
could provide all its own fixed and working capital and according-
ly assume all the business risk. In reality, the government does
furnish some fixed capital, although it appears to be trying
102
to phase out its plant ownership role in the aerospace industry.
The government also funds a large portion of the major airframe
builders' working capital requirements by providing progress pay-
103
ments, though with interest now an allowable cost, the extent
of government funding of working capital requirements may decrease.
One of the most important mechanisms by which the government
is able to shift risk between itself and the airframe builder is
by its selection of the type of contract for a particular procure-
ment. Several studies have examined the relationship between
contract type, the extent of the risks borne by the contractor,
and contractor performance. Procurement contracts are of four
basic types: firm-fixed-price (FFP) , fixed -price-incentive (FPI)
,
cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) , and cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF)
.
108
As implied by the fee ranges set by the Department of Defense,
the government's share of overall risk (and, in particular, its
share of cost risk) is greatest under CPFF contracts, somewhat less
under CPIF contracts, less yet under FPI contracts, and least under
FFP contracts. Correspondingly, the contractor's share of the risk




A third mechanism by which risk, is shifted is via government
contract provisions regarding warranties. The purpose of a
warranty is to protect the buyer in the event the item turns out
to be defective. The warranty typically specifies the extent of
the producer's liability for repairing or replacing defective
items. Several comparisons of government contract provisions
regarding warranties with commercial warranties have shown govern-
ment warranties, in general, to be more demanding. The ex-
istence of more stringent warranties has the effect of increasing
the share of technical risk, and hence the share of overall financial
risk, borne by the firm, since ceteris paribus the more exacting are
the standards, the greater is the likelihood they cannot be met, and
consequently, the greater is the likelihood the contractor will suf-
fer some sort of financial penalty.
This subsection has examined the government-airframe contrac-
tor relationship and has discussed the major risks airframe contrac-
tors face and how government procurement policy affects the sharing
of these risks with its prime contractors. The next subsection
looks at the commercial side of the airframe builders' business,
and in particular, at their attempts to diversify in order to re-
duce their dependence on government sales.
7. Diversification: Balancing Government Business and
Commercial Business
The previous subsection discussed some of the major differences
between the buyer-seller relationship that exists between the gov-
ernment and a prime contractor and the buyer-seller relationship
931
that is typical of commercial markets. The subsection went on
to point out the risks associated with this special relationship,
and in particular, the risks a contractor faces as it becomes
increasingly dependent on government sales. While commercial
ventures also pose certain risks, some of which are of great
magnitude, many of the major airframe builders have increased
their efforts to diversify into non-aerospace commercial ventures
112
in recent years.
One reason offered to explain this desire to diversify is
the relatively low profitability and the relatively high risks of
government business. A second reason is the limited growth po-
tential provided by government sales during recent years as real
defense spending fell. Table VI-5 summarizes the recent profitability
and growth experience of the nine major military airframe builders.
As the table shows, the median profitability, whether measured
by the average return on equity or the average return on total cap-
ital, as well as the median net profit margin and the average annual
sales growth, for the nine firms were below the respective median
values both for the aerospace industry as a whole ( 'industry median 1 )
113
and for all industries taken collectively ('all industries median').
If one views a corporation as a business entity that exists primarily
for the benefit of its shareholders, then, of the three indicators
of profitability shown in Table VI-5, average return on equity is the
most appropriate. Therefore, on the basis of this measure and the
114
profitability figures provided, one must conclude that whatever
differences exist between the profitability of the major airframe
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in other industries are not significant. It is equally clear
from the figures provided in Table VI-5 that the major airframe
builders have grown more slowly than other firms. Moreover,
Rockwell International, which grew the fastest, was also the most
active in acquiring other firms outside the aerospace industry.
One direction in which the major military airframe builders
might choose to diversify is the production of commercial jet air-
craft. Indeed, three of the nine already dominate the world market.
The technological complementarity of military and commercial air-
craft would tend to make such diversification appear attractive.
Also, the character of the production processes is similar enough
that managerial and productive expertise could also be transferred
rather easily - certainly more easily than to, say, automobiles or
food products. However, the demand for commercial aircraft is
highly cyclical and, despite the evident need for new jetliners,
the present outlook for commercial jet aircraft sales is clouded
120
by the severe financial problems afflicting the nation's airlines
and the apparent peaking out of the growth of airline passenger
121
traffic. Moreover, the financial risks are enormous, with out-
lays for research and development and initial production amounting
to as much as $2 billion before the producer begins to recover its
122
investment. The recent entry of foreign producers, supported
by the vast financial resources of their governments, has greatly
123
increased the competitive pressures faced by U.S. firms.
Thus, the opportunities for diversification in this direction are,
in the opinion of this writer, virtually nonexistent.
935
Diversification into commercial non-aircraft product lines has
also been carried out, and the major airframe builders have gener-
ally been more successful in those ventures than involve the trans-
ference of the technological expertise developed in their aerospace
124
operations. However, as Table VI-6 indicates, these commercial
non-aircraft ventures have, in four cases, recently acted as a net
125drain on corporate net earnings. Admittedly, some of these
losses are due to the recent recession, rather than to the firm's
basic inability to develop profitable commercial non-aircraft lines
of business. However, the fact remains that the managerial skills
required to oversee an organization that develops and produces a
relatively small number of high technology products that it markets
to only a small number of select customers are different from those
required to mass produce and to market on a wide scale consumer-
oriented goods and services. As a result, in trying to diversify
into commercial non-aircraft ventures, the major military airframe
126
builders have to be very careful where they invest their money,
and as the experience of Rockwell International would seem to indi-
cate, diversification by external means (i.e. by taking over es-
tablished firms) is preferable to diversification by internal means,
since the former approach brings experienced managers into the firm
127
and brings an established marketing network under its control.
More seriously, the limited opportunities for profitable diversifi-
cation, when coupled with the relative inflexibility of the plant
and equipment these firms operate, may rave the effect of forcing
these firms to accept (what they may regard as) subnormal profits
without recourse to the avenue of relief open to firms in tradi-
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In the course of interviews with executives of the major
military airframe builders, the author was told that these
firms would like to diversify into new product lines in order
129
to reduce their dependence on the government. These firms
generally view government business as relatively risky and
relatively less profitable than commercial business, and they
see diversification as one way to reduce the overall risks
130
they face. Yet, as this subsection has tried to point out,
diversification into commercial markets poses special problems
for many of these firms. It is not surprising, then, that many
of them have also pursued a different approach to risk reduction,
namely, the expansion of foreign markets for their goods and the
development of cooperative ventures with foreign producers. These
developments are discussed in the next subsection.
8. Foreign Sales and Foreign Competition
As sales of military aircraft to the U.S. government fell
following the Vietnam war and as domestic sales of commercial air-
craft fell during the recent recession, one of the factors that
helped sustain the U.S. aerospace industry was foreign sales of
military aircraft. During 1975, for example, foreign sales of
military aircraft and other aerospace products amounted to $2.5
131
billion and accounted for 350,000 jobs and for seven percent
132
of U.S. exports. As domestic opportunities diminish, the
133
major airframe builders have tried to expand foreign sales.
134
Such sales can, however, lead to political difficulties since,
even if the sales are made by the manufacturer directly to the
939
foreign government, they must be reviewed by various U.S. gov-
135
ernment agencies. In addition, the foreign buyer may insist
on certain conditions, such as the sharing of production with
1 ~\f\
one or more firms in that country or a guaranteed purchase
137by U.S. buyers of a certain amount of that country's exports,
as part of the deal.
In addition to the difficulties associated with having to
make various concessions to foreign governments in order to sell
airplanes, the U.S. airframe builders are meeting with increased
competition from foreign builders of both commercial and military
aircraft. Most of these foreign competitiors are supported fi-
1 38
nancially by their governments. Since many of the foreign
commercial airlines are government -owned , the foreign government
139
can direct its airline to buy domestically produced aircraft.
A third factor making for increased foreign competition is the
multinational pooling of efforts, which permits the sharing of
140
heavy development costs and which can also serve to expand
141
the 'guaranteed market' for a particular foreign aircraft.
These factors place the major U.S. airframe builders at a
disadvantage, and in order to counter the risk of erosion of
their foreign markets, several U.S. firms have recently entered
.... 142into joint ventures with foreign aerospace firms.
9 . Summary
This section has provided an overview of the nine major
military airframe builders in the United States. The discussion
940
has focused not only on the firms themselves, but also on the
environment within which they operate, and in particular, on
their relationship with their principal customer, the United
States government, on the financial and business risks they
must bear, and also on the increasing foreign pressures they
face. With the material presented in this section as a back-
ground, the remainder of the chapter describes how these firms
conduct their long term and short term planning.
C. BACKGROUND TO THE PLANNING PROCESS; THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRM
1. The Planning Process
In light of the many risks associated with the aerospace
business that were discussed in the previous section, as well as
the apparent reduction in the number of major military aircraft
programs and the intensifying foreign competition for both mili-
tary and commercial aircraft sales, the following maxim culled
from the office wall of an aerospace planning executive seems to
this writer an appropriate way to begin this section:
"The company that doesn't plan for its future isn't likely
to have one."
The overall purpose of the corporate and divisional planning
conducted by the major airframe builders may be stated succinctly
as follows: to allocate the company's scarce productive resources -
manpower, facilities, and skilled managerial, engineering, and
technical talent - and its scarce financial resources among existing
and potential commercial product lines and among existing and
941
potential government contracts in accordance with goals and objec-
tives of the company. The 'existing' in the above statement re-





phasis on the firm's most efficient use of its current stocks of
capital resources - both physical capital in the form of plant
and equipment and human capital in the form of the knowledge and
skills embodied in the firm's managers, engineers, and scientists -
and its emphasis on carrying out production to meet current commit-
ments in the most efficient manner - in terms of minimizing pro-
duction costs while maintaining product quality and contract per-
formance (in an attempt to generate maximum sustainable earnings).
The 'potential' in the above statement refers mainly to long term
,
or strategic, planning ^ with its emphasis on new business - and
the most effective use of research and development funds, engineers,
and scientists in order to develop the expertise necessary to de-
velop new products and secure new government contracts - and its
emphasis on the most efficient use of the firm's financial resources
to purchase new production facilities and new equipment and to start
up or acquire new businesses.
Planning, then, takes place on two levels: short term planning,
for which the time period involved is typically one year, although
some of the major airframe builders carry out operational planning
over longer periods, and long term planning, for which the time
period involved is typically five years, although some of the major
airframe builders carry out strategic planning over longer periods.
As described below, consistency between the long term plan and the
short term plan is achieved by first formulating the long term
942
plan and then using the first year of the long plan (or the first
two years or five years if that is the firm's short term planning
period) as the basis for the short term plan.
At both the strategic and the operational levels, planning is
done iteratively. The nine major airframe builders are organized
as multidivision companies, with one or more divisions producing
144
aircraft and other aerospace products and several divisions
145
producing non-aerospace products, as illustrated in Figure VI-2.
Decision-making and much of the responsibility for planning are
decentralized, although major decisions, such as those requiring
capital investment, and strategic and operational plans must be
cleared with the company's headquarters, which maintains its own
planning staff - sometimes consisting of just one individual -
and which ensures that the plans of the various divisions, when
amalgamated, are consistent with the company's goals and objectives.
Achieving this consistency may require several iterations between
division and headquarters until the latter is satisfied with the
former's plans.
The headquarters planning staff has an additional responsibility
that is critical to the planning process. The corporate planning
staff prepares annually an environmental forecast, which, as the
name implies, characterizes the firm's operating environment over
a period of years at least as long as the strategic planning period.
Each division inputs information relating to its own area of exper-
tise to the corporate planning staff, which gathers additional in-



















lines of operating authority
lines of planning authority
Figure VI-2 The Headquarters-Division Planning Relationship
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in future years, the future political environment and its likely
impact on future defense budgets, etc., and prepares the final
document (s) . No claim is made as to the perfect accuracy of these
projections, but rather, the environmental forecast is intended
as a summary statement by the company of what it regards as rea-
sonable assessments of future conditons likely to have an impact
on the demand for the company's products - i.e. assessments on
which the corporate planning staff would expect the divisions to
base their strategic and operational plans.
The preparation and use of the environmental forecast are
discussed in greater detail below, where section D focuses on
the forecast itself and sections E and F discuss long term plan-
ning and short term planning, respectively, for which the environ-
mental forecast provides important input data. The remainder of
this section concentrates on the objectives of the firm, which,
like the environmental forecast, underlie the planning process.
2. The Objectives of the Firm
Though a company's objectives may not be stated explicitly
at the outset of the planning cycle, the acceptance or rejection
of divisional objectives and plans is based to a large extent on
how well these objectives and plans support the company's objectives.
Indeed, the divisional long term and short term plans finally ac-
cepted by headquarters and the specific goals they contain - a sales
or output goal, a profit goal, etc. - are a reflection of corporate
objectives. This subsection discusses the broad objectives of
the nine major military airframe builders. While recognizing that
9^5
all corporations do not share identical goals, the author believes
that there is sufficient commonality among the nine firms as to
broad objectives to warrant the general treatment undertaken here.
Before describing the objectives of these firms, it will help
to make that discussion more meaningful if the sources of the
firms' objectives are discussed first. According to the traditional
146
theories of the firm, the objective of the firm is that of its
shareholders, and the firm acts so as to maximize shareholder util-
ity, which, under the appropriate assumptions, reduces to maximiz-
ing the stock market value of the firm's equity. According to an
147
alternative point of view, as expressed by the managerial theories,
the objectives of the firm are set by top management, and profit-
ability or the stock market value of equity affect managers only as
constraints on their discretion to pursue alternative objectives.
148
According to a third point of view, that of the behavioralists,
the firm's objectives are established through an internal bargain-
ing process that takes place among the various special interest
groups, for example, the labor force, the marketing staff, technical
staff, shareholders, top management, middle management, etc., that
compromise the firm and its 'owners' .
Based on personal interviews with executives of the nine firms,
it is the belief of this writer that none of the three views dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph is entirely correct. Rather, it
is the author's view that the objectives of each firm are set by
top management, principally the president and the chairman of the
board of directors, together with the other members of the board
149
of directors. It is up to top management to weigh the specific
9^6
objectives of the various special interest groups, to resolve any
conflicts that might arise, and to ensure compliance on the part
of these groups with regard to the firm's established objectives.
In particular, it is the board of directors, which includes rep-
resentatives of shareholders and top management, rather than the
shareholders themselves, that sets the firm's dividend policy and
that also makes the major financial and investment decisions that
affect the firm's future ability to pay dividends. It is also
the board of directors that sets the compensation levels for top
management. Of course, the relative weights assigned to a partic-
ular set of objectives could vary considerably from one firm to
another, depending, for example, on the degree of influence of one
or more key shareholders, and could also vary over time for
any one firm. Yet, the role of top management in establishing
objectives would imply that, to the extent that the objectives of
managers conflict with those of shareholders, shareholders' goals
are not likely to be followed exclusively (in contrast to what the
traditional theories have implied) , and the role of the key share-
holders in establishing the objectives of the firm would also imply
that managers' goals are not likely to be followed exclusively
either (in contrast to what the managerial theories have implied).
Moreover, in establishing objectives, top management and other
directors can take into account the desires of the various special
interest groups within the firm, as suggested in the behavioralist
approach, but in a manner suggestive of greater consistency in over-
all objectives over time than the behavioralists have implied.
9^7
Broadly, the objectives of the nine major military airframe
builders, as interpreted by this writer, fall into five classes:
(i) sales objectives; (ii) a profit, or earnings, objective;
(iii) a product quality, or in the case of weapons systems, weap-
ons system performance, objective; (iv) a backlog, or new busi-
ness, objective; and (v) a managerial emoluments objective. The
first class consists of multiple objectives in order to reflect
managements' desire to balance government and commercial business,
while the other four classes consist of a single objective each.
The remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion of these
five classes of objectives.
The sales objectives reflect top managements' interest in
size and diversification. In a model of the typical DOD airframe
contractor to be developed in a subsequent paper, four sales objec-
tives will be specified, one each for sales of aircraft and re-
lated parts and equipment to the government, sales of other prod-
ucts to the government, sales of aircraft and related parts and
equipment to commercial buyers, and sales of other commercial goods.
Alternatively, given the initial levels of these quantities, the
four objectives could be restated in equivalent form as growth
objectives. The reason for stating four sales objectives, rather
than merely having two - one for government sales and one for com-
mercial sales - or one - combining all sales figures into a single
measure - is so that diversification between aircraft and non-
aircraft products, as well as diversification between government
and non-government sales, can be represented. As discussed in the
previous section, several of the nine firms have in recent years
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tried to develop new commercial non-aerospace ventures and two
of the nine, LTV and Rockwell, are already widely diversified
away from government sales and away from aircraft sales. In
addition, all have some non-aircraft sales to the government -
chiefly missiles and space equipment or ships. They are inter-
ested in diversifying in the two general directions mentioned
above, though as David Lewis, Chairman of General Dynamics, re-
cently made very clear, these firms are going to continue to
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actively seek government contracts to produce military aircraft,
and diversification is going to take place through the expansion
of sales in commercial and non-aircraft ventures and not through
the intentional contraction of their airframe business. It is
felt by this writer that the value of increased sales in each of
the four product areas as well as the importance of relative in-
creases in non-government and non-aircraft sales - i.e. diversi-
fication - are best captured by stating multiple sales objectives.
The second objective, which relates to profits, is important
for at least two reasons. Profits serve as an index of the effi-
ciency with which management employs the firm's assets. Also,
profits serve an important financial function. They represent
the surplus of revenue over costs that may be used to pay divi-
dends, and thereby satisfy the owners of the firm's equity shares}
and, after dividends have been paid, the remainder represents re-
tained earnings that may be used to finance new investment in
plant and equipment or to acquire other firms.
The third objective, maintaining high product quality and
9^9
strong weapons system performance, is highly important to the
managers of these firms, many of whom have engineering backgrounds
and many of whose families, for example, the McDonnells and the
Rockwells, have been in the aerospace business for generations.
Product quality is so important also because each firm's managers
want their company's name associated with technical excellence.
Not only does such a reputation help foster a favorable public
attitude toward the firm, but it also helps the company main-
. . . . .
153
tain its position as a prime contractor and can contribute
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to sales of its commercial products that bear the company's name.
More importantly, high product quality and strong weapons system
performance contribute to the firm's long run profitability.
The fourth objective, enlarging the business backlog, is par-
ticularly important in the case of aircraft sales, where production
lead times are normally several months or more and where a tempo-
rary shutting down of a production line could cost several million
dollars. A larger backlog provides some security and, as discussed
below in section E, pushes the firm's going-out-of-business curve
outward and makes the task of long term planning somewhat easier.
The last objective, managerial emoluments, reflects managements'
interest in its own level of compensation. This includes not only
salary, which is fully taxable, but also the perquisites, such as
stock options, the earnings on which are taxed at the lower capital
gains rate (provided, of course, the securities are held long enough
to qualify for special tax treatment), and expense accounts, company
cars, etc., which are not taxable.
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In the next chapter the four sales objectives and the profit,
product quality, backlog, and managerial emoluments objectives
will be used as arguments of a managerial utility function that
will constitute the objective function in the mathematical pro-
gramming formulation of the typical DOD airframe builder's plan-
ning problem. For the purposes of this descriptive chapter, how-
ever, all these objectives will remain in the background. As
part of the long term and short term planning processes described
below, top management evaluates proposed projects in terms of the
five classes of objectives, and an important part of the two
planning processes is the formulation of divisional goals and ob-
jectives, which top management reviews carefully and which, once
approved by top management, are the focal point around which the
divisonal plans are structured.
D. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORECAST
1. The Corporate Planning Cycle
The corporate planning cycle for each of the nine major
military airframe builders consists of the following three pri-
mary phases: preparation of the environmental forecast, develop-
ment of the corporate long range plan, and specification of the
corporate operating plan. These phases occur sequentially and
together they span the company's entire fiscal year. That is,
planning for fiscal year T and beyond takes place throughout
fiscal year T-l.
The primary phases of the corporate planning cycle are
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illustrated in Figure VI-3. Each company's fiscal year is divided
into four quarters. During the first quarter of year T-l the
environmental forecast is prepared. During the second and third
quarters of year T-l various long range planning studies are
carried out and reviewed, culminating in the company's long range
plan for years T and beyond. During the fourth quarter of year T-l
the operating plan for year T is established, essentially by speci-






















Figure VI-3 The Corporate Planning Cycle
2. The Environmental Forecast: Its Purpose and Its Structure
The publication of the company's environmental forecast and
its distribution among the firm's operating divisions initiates
the planning cycle. The form and content of the environmental fore-
cast may vary from one company to another. In some cases the fore-
cast is a formal document that carefully analyzes and weighs political,
social, economic, and business factors that may in the future have an
impact on the firm. In other cases it is an informal paper prepared
by a small staff who gather information and supporting data from a
variety of public and private sources to highlight those significant
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factors likely to affect the firm in the future. In either case
the purpose of the environmental forecast is the same.
The purpose of the environmental forecast is, as its name
suggests, to summarize within a single document the company's
prognosis of the most likely external business environment
within which it can expect to operate over its long term planning
horizon. More importantly, the environmental forecast establishes
a common set of assumptions that, when used in the next two phases
of the planning cycle, give the plans of the individual operating
divisions a vital degree of consistency that would otherwise be
lacking.
The environmental forecast is written in conjunction with the
firm's operating divisions, each of which is asked to submit to
the corporate planning staff early in the first quarter informa-
tion within its area of expertise that is relevant to its planning
problem. Such a procedure has two main advantages. First, the
divisions are involved in the planning process very early in the
planning cycle and, since they provide much of the information on
which the environmental forecast is based, they are more likely to
view the environmental forecast's projections as reasonable than
they would if the projections had been developed by the corporate
planning staff without consultation. Second, the corporate plan-
ning staff can utilize the marketing expertise that is available
in the divisions, thus enabling them to spend more time on analy-
sis, rather than on data collection.
The structure of the environmental forecast varies from one
company to another, depending on the needs of divisional planners.
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Generally, the forecast treats three main subject areas. First,
it describes the international environment and how such factors
as international political tensions and international economic
trends are likely to affect world demand for military aircraft.
Second, it discusses the domestic political and economic envi-
ronment and projects the size of the defense budget over the long
term planning horizon. Of particular concern to the company is
how changes in the defense budget might affect the company's
current military programs as well as any future military programs
on which the company is planning to bid. Third, it discusses
factors relevant to the specific product markets, both military
and commercial, in which the company sells its goods. For example,
if the company produces commercial aircraft, such factors as the
expected future growth of airline passenger traffic, the expected
future growth of air cargo shipments, the expected future impact of
fuel price changes, and regulatory trends, would, to the extent that
meaningful projections can be made, give planners in the commercial
aircraft division a good planning base from which to work.
A useful by-product of the process leading to the environmental
forecast is a set of analyses, one for each operating division,
of the strengths and weaknesses of the company's operations. Each
such analysis assesses such factors as the strengths and weaknesses
of that division's products in relation to the products of the firm's
major competitors (in the case of commercial products) and problems
that might arise in connection with government contracts (in the case
of military weapons systems). The analysis of the division's
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strengths and weaknesses is used by the divisional planning staff
in conjunction with the environmental forecast that comes down
from the corporate planning staff near the end of the first quarter
to formulate the division's long term plan.
E. LONG TERM PLANNING: PORTFOLIO SELECTION AND THE
GOING- OUT- OF- BUSINESS CURVE
1. Introduction
The second phase of the corporate planning cycle consists
of long term planning. The purpose of long term, or strategic,
planning is to determine the corporation's business strategy over
the long term planning horizon - typically a period of five years'
duration. The long term planning process leads to a long term
plan for each of the firm's operating divisions that is consistent
with the corporation's goals and objectives and that spells out
that division's role - i.e. its business strategy - in meeting the
company's goals and objectives.
This section describes the long term planning process that is
followed within the nine major military airframe builders. At the
outset it should be noted that long term planning, as practiced by
these firms, is not designed to lead necessarily to an 'optimum'
plan. The planning process is an iterative one, as described be-
low, though the iterations are designed to achieve feasibility and
robustness rather than to ensure optimality. During the long term
planning process headquarters and the operating divisions search
for a long term plan - essentially a collection of business
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strategies together with the facilities, financial, research and
development, and manpower requirements needed to support them -
that is feasible in the sense of leading to the attainment of cor-
porate goals and objectives if the 'expected' environment (as de-
scribed in the environmental forecast) materializes and that is also
robust in the sense that the plan will also permit the firm's goals
and objectives to be attained if the business environment in general,
and market conditions in particular, should vary from what is
expected in a manner that top management perceives as reasonable.
The fact that these firms do not strive for a plan that is
optimal - in the sense that it leads to a higher level of managerial
utility, a higher stock market value of the firm's equity, or a
higher value of some other function or quantity than any other
feasible plan - is due to at least two factors, each of which was
mentioned by several of the executives interviewed by the author.
First, gathering the information required to formulate the long
term planning problem as an optimization problem, say as a mathe-
matical programming problem, would, in the opinions of virtually
all the executives interviewed, be prohibitively costly in terms
of time and money. Second, even if the problem could be formu-
lated in a manner acceptable to top management, a solution would
have to be obtained, and in the opinion of most of the executives
interviewed, the size and complexity of the problem would make it
prohibitively costly to find the solution. These cost
considerations would imply, if they are correct, that even though
the long term plans that are developed are not necessarily optimal,
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the planning process itself may be optimal - in the sense that,
of all the procedures available for achieving any particular set
i fir\
of feasible and robust plans, it involves the least cost.
2. Long Term Planning at the Divisional Level
At approximately the same time the corporate planning staff
releases the environmental forecast - late in the first quarter or
early in the second quarter - top management distributes among the
company's operating divisions a statement of the corporation's long
term goals and objectives and a set of strategic guidelines. From
this point onward in the corporate planning cycle, the primary or-
ganizational responsibility for planning shifts from headquarters
to the operating divisions. The corporate planning staff continues
to be involved in the planning process, but its role involves co-
ordinating the planning efforts of the divisions, analyzing the
plans of the divisions, and amalgamating the plans of the divisions
for review by top management. The long term plans themselves are
prepared at the divisional level.
The long term planning process as carried out at the divisional
level is illustrated in Figure VI -4. The process begins with the
environmental forecast that establishes the projected future states
of the firm's operating environment and with the statement of cor-
porate goals and objectives and the set of strategic guidelines hand-
ed down by top management. The environmental forecast together with
























Figure VI-4 The Divisional Long Term Planning Cycle
958
top management, within which the division must develop its business
strategy.
An important part of the long term planning process is the prep-
aration of long term planning studies, most of which are carried
out at the divisional level. As indicated in Figure VT-4, the divi-
sional long term planning studies, which are initiated in the first
quarter, are the basis for the division's input to the environmental
forecast, which, in turn, is carefully considered by top management
when it formulates the corporation's goals and objectives and the
strategic guidelines. That is, the goals, objectives, and guidelines
do reflect what top management perceives as the firm's likely future
operating environment.
Even after the environmental forecast has been distributed, the
divisional long term planning studies continue. As indicated in
Figure VT-4,the later long term planning studies generally narrow in
focus, providing specific market analyses, e.g. the state of future
demand in specific product markets, and detailing the strengths and
weaknesses of the division vis-a-vis the division's major competi-
tors in each of its product markets.
Concomitant with the preparation of the planning studies is
the formulation of the division's goals and objectives. As indi-
cated in Figure VI -4, the two major inputs used by divisional man-
agers are the environmental forecast and top management's state-
ment of corporate goals and objectives. The divisional goals and ,
objectives are submitted to top management, which must approve
them before long term planning can proceed any further.
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After the divisional goals and objectives have been approved
and the division's long term marketing studies and its assess-
ment of its strengths and weaknesses have been completed, the
division's management prepares the division's long term business
strategy for achieving its goals and objectives, and by implica-
tion, for achieving the goals and objectives of the corporation.
The business strategy covers such items as product design, pricing
policy, development of new customer relationships, etc., for ex-
isting product lines as well as its strategies concerning new
product lines, i.e. in which direction(s) it intends to diversify,
what new product lines it intends to develop, when the new prod-
ucts should be introduced to the market place, for what upcoming
government programs it intends to bid, etc. From the divisional
business strategy flows sales estimates for existing product lines
and the new business plan.
Generally, the business strategy is developed and sales es-
timates are generated and the new business plan is formulated by
product line and by government contract. Often the corporation's
principal operating units will consist of several subdivisions
each, with each subdivision responsible for one or more individual
product lines. One of the tasks assigned to the planning staff
1 ft?
of the division - i.e. the principal operating unit - is to
integrate the various sales estimates provided by these subdivi-
sions with the new business plan for the division in order to
establish the following plans: (i) the technical plan, which
lists the technical requirements and the size of the technical
staff and the amount of funds needed to support the division's
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research and development effort; (ii) the manpower and produc-
tion plan, which lists planned output and the numbers and cost
of production and managerial personnel needed to meet these
targets; and (iii) the facilities plan, which lists the types
and amounts of plant and equipment needed and the costs of
1 fii^
maintaining existing facilities and investing in new facilities.
These three plans, together with sales estimates and the new
business plan, are used to generate the division's long term
financial plan.
Once completed, the financial plan, together with the new
husiness, technical, manpower and production, and facilities
plans, are submitted to the corporate planning staff, which
reviews the division's plans. If the corporate planning staff
is not satisfied, for example, because the plan contains in-
consistencies or because the division appears to have deviated
too far from the assumptions contained in the environmental
forecast, it sends the plan back to the division. If the cor-
porate planning staff accepts the plan, it then amalgamates
the plan with the plans of all the other operating divisions.
The amalgamated plans form the provisional corporate plan,
which is submitted to top management for its approval. Top
management reviews the provisional corporate plan as well as
summaries of the divisional plans and checks for consistency
with corporate goals and objectives. Specifically, top manage-
ment checks the provisional corporate plan for feasibility - i.e.
will the plan enable the corporation's goals and objectives
to be attained? - and for robustness - i.e. if the plan is
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carried out, but environmental conditions change from what
has been anticipated, how seriously will the corporation's
ability to meet its goals be impaired? Top management
is also likely to check for other desirable characteristics,
such as flexibility - i.e. is the plan sufficiently flexible
that certain actions can be postponed without having severe
consequences for other parts of the plan, or does the plan
call for substantial irreversible investments very early in
the planning period? If any of the divisional plans require
modification, they are returned to the division. As indi-
cated in Figure VI-4, the division will probably have to alter
its business strategy. Once the long term plan has been ac-
cepted by headquarters, the long term planning phase of the
corporate planning cycle has been completed.
The above description of the long term planning process
was intentionally kept general in order to give the reader
an intuitive feel for the overall process. The remainder
of this section looks at important aspects of this overall
process more closely.
3. Long Term Planning: Government Sales and the
Going-Out-Of-Business Curve
The description of the long term planning process
provided in the preceding subsection did not distinguish
between government sales and commercial sales. In Figure VI-4
government sales and commercial sales were lumped together
in the blocks labeled 'sales estimates for existing product
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lines' and 'new business plan' . Yet, because of the impor-
tant differences between doing business with the government
and doing business with commercial customers, which were
discussed in section B, the long term planning process must
treat these two classes of sales somewhat differently. This
subsection discusses long term planning for government sales,
and the next discusses long term planning for commercial sales.
Long term planning, as it relates to government sales,
involves the two types of planning indicated in Figure VI-4:
(i) planning for the future resource requirements implied
under existing government production contracts and under an-
ticipated follow-on government production contracts and (ii)
determining the upcoming government programs on which to bid
and planning for the resources - particularly technical staff
and research and development facilities requirements - required
to launch a successful bid for each. One of the devices plan-
ners use to illustrate both aspects of government sales planning
is what is called the going-out-of-business curve, an example
of which is the heavy curve in Figure VI-5. The going-out-of-
business curve shows what would happen to government sales if
current programs were not extended beyond their present ter-
mination dates and if no new programs were won. If the viability
of the division were heavily dependent on government sales,
then a lack of extensions and an absence of new programs could
literally drive the division out of existence (and hence the
















Figure VI-5 Going-Out-Of -Business Curve
With Overlays
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hopes to win and contract extensions it hopes to be granted
can be overlaid, as shown in the figure, to provide a graphical
representation of government sales for each year covered by the
long term plan. Each of the modified going-out-of-business
curves shows the growth pattern of government sales over the long
term planning period, contingent upon contract extensions and/or
new programs.
The type of planning that is done for existing government
programs - those that underlie the going-out-of-business
curve - depends on whether the program is in the production
stage or in the development and testing stage. For production
contracts, planning is relatively easy since the required tech-
nical advances have already been made, and in the case of air-
craft production, the division is likely to have estimated the
position of the learning curve. Production planning, which is
based largely on projections of future needs supplied to the
contractor by the government, is concerned mainly with manpower
and facilities needs. In aircraft production the direct labor
input per airplane will fall as the cumulative number of air-
craft produced increases due to the learning curve effect dis-
cussed in section B. A second factor that needs to be considered
in production planning is the program's peak production rate -
seldom do programs call for a uniform production rate - for this
can affect the need for plant floor space and storage space for
inventories of parts and equipment. A third factor is the pro-
gram's termination risk. If termination occurs, the divison
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will find itself with excess capacity unless some contingency
use for the facilities has been planned. However, according
to the executives interviewed by the author, estimation of the
termination risk is so highly subjective as to be, in practice,
of little use. In addition, the overcapacity that exists
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throughout much of the industry and the limited alternative
uses to which these production facilities can be put, imply
that termination will in most cases result in additional sparce
capacity until such time as a new program can be won.
For development and testing contracts the planning required
is more difficult than for production contracts because the
division and the firm are interested in making the required
technical advances within the required time and within the
projected costs. The prediction of the resources - mainly
engineering and design personnel, development facilities, and
the facilities and manpower required to assemble the test and
evaluation aircraft - needed to develop the product called for
under the contract is inherently more difficult than projecting
production resource requirements and costs. Even though de-
velopment and testing contracts are typically of the cost-plus
variety, thereby reducing the firm's share of the overall cost
risk below what it would be under a fixed price contract, the
contractor is anxious that its customer - the government - be
satisfied with the final product. It is important that the
product perform well enough and that its cost of production be
kept low enough that production funding will not be threatened.
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Indeed, several executives told the author that their companies
would make additional improvements not called for in the contract,
possibly even when there was virtually no chance of immediate re-
imbursement for costs incurred, in order to improve the product's
performance and thereby increase the likelihood of a larger and
longer production run.
The type of planning that must be carried out for new pro-
grams - planning that involves the allocation of scientific and
research talent, the allocation of IR&D funds plus the company's
own research and development funds, and the allocation of engi-
neering and design personnel and manpower and facilities to be
used in the development of such items as prototypes that will be
flown in a competition to determine the winner of relatively more
lucrative production contracts - is more difficult than the plan-
ning that is conducted for existing programs. The uncertainities
and business pressures are normally greater since the division
is interested not only in meeting the specifications of the re-
search and prototype development contracts assigned to it by
headquarters, but also in placing the company in an advantageous
position for any follow-on contracts.
The efficient allocation of research and development funds
and personnel is of critical importance to the firm because of
the long lead times required for research and development and
also because of the small number of new major programs. In plan-
ning their research and development program, the division and the
company must have some conception of what the government's needs
will be many years in advance. For this reason, long term planning
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studies often try to look out beyond the Department of Defense's
Five Year Defense Plan in order to predict the military's needs
far enough in advance to permit the necessary research to be under-
taken. In other words, one of the responsibilities with which
divisional planners are charged is the responsibility of allocating
'pure research' moneys - some of which are reimbursed through IR&D
awards - in such a way that the company (and the division) will have
accumulated a sufficient store of technical and scientific skills
by the time a new program is formally announced to be competitive
in its attempt to win the program.
In allocating the research and development resources over
proposed new programs, divisional planners must analyze the
risks and potential returns associated with possible new pro-
grams and allocate the resources to those programs most likely
to lead to accomplishment of the division's goals and objectives.
Generally, it is impossible for a company to bid competitively
on every major new program, so selectivity is required, and
typically, the decision as to the major new programs the company
is going to try to win will be made by top management and will
be incorporated within the company's and within the appropriate
division's goals and objectives. It is then up to that division's
managers and planners to allocate the division's research and
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development resources to meet those goals and objectives.
4. Long Term Planning: Commercial Sales
As in the case of government sales, planning for
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commerical sales is best treated as two types of planning:
(i) planning resource requirements for existing product lines and
(ii) planning resource requirements for new business, including
both new products, e.g. a new generation of commercial passen-
ger aircraft, and new lines of business, e.g. the acquisition
of another company as part of a diversification strategy. Both
aspects of commercial sales planning are discussed below.
In general, the factors that must be considered when plan-
ning commercial sales are different from those that must be
considered when planning government sales. Variations in gov-
ernment sales are due to changes in the needs of the sole
customer or to changes in the sole customer's ability to pur-
chase weapons that result from changes in the levels of
Congressional funding of major weapons system programs, which
in turn can often be traced to political factors, i.e. to the
political cycle. In contrast, commercial sales are made to a
variety of customers who select from among a variety of products
that can meet their needs and whose ability to pay is largely
affected by the condition of their balance sheets and by the
state of demand for their goods and services, which in turn can
be traced to a variety of economic factors, i.e. to the business
cycle.
Long term commercial sales planning for existing product
lines requires a careful analysis of each competitor's products,
and unlike sales of existing products to the government, which
take place under conditions of bilateral monopoly, commercial
markets, such as those for commercial passenger aircraft, are
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usually served by a number of producers, each of which carefully
watches its market share - its percentage of total market sales.
In the case of commercial aircraft, planning for production is
similar to planning for the production of military aircraft in
that the learning curve effect must be taken into account. How-
ever, whereas a single contract for military aircraft will spec-
ify the delivery schedule, and by implication, the production
schedule, for that aircraft for a year, the production schedule
for commercial aircraft is typically less certain since the
number of customers is much greater; since the continued ability
of each purchaser to pay for the planes it has agreed to buy is
somewhat less certain; since each commercial customer's purchase
of a particular aircraft is more easily postponed both because
commercial aircraft can be leased and because the introduction
of a new commercial aircraft does not normally have associated
with it the sense of urgency that typically accompanies the
introduction of a new military aircraft; and since a potential
sale can be lost to one of the commercial producer's competitors.
Hence long term planning for sales of commercial aircraft, as
well as for sales of other commercial products, requires con-
tingency planning in the form of 'high' and 'low' sales esti-
mates for each year, in addition to the 'best' estimate of
future sales for each year. In the case of commercial aircraft,
the best estimates are obtained after careful analyses of trends
in first, commercial airline passenger traffic and second, in the
future demand for air cargo shipments have been performed. These
analyses are used to project future commercial airline fleet
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requirements for new aircraft, and in light of financial projections,
to predict the likely demand for new aircraft in each year over
the long term planning period. The 'high' and 'low' estimates
may be obtained by applying some simple rule of thumb, such as
'add 10 percent to the best estimate to obtain the high esti-
mate and subtract 10 percent from the best estimate to obtain
the low estimate for each year' . Alternatively, high and low
estimates may be obtained by varying the assumptions on which
the best estimates were based and by applying the same esti-
mation procedures to an 'optimistic' set of assumptions and
to a 'pessimistic' set of assumptions. As illustrated below
by Figure VI-6, this results in three sets of demand projections
for each year, one for each of three states of nature: the
expected state, as specified in the environmental forecast,







Figure VI-6 Projections of Long Term Demand for Commercial
Aircraft
One of top management's more difficult decisions, which can
greatly affect the long term plan, is the decision regarding
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what to do when the demand for a particular commercial airplane
has been very weak and threatens to remain weak for some time.
Commercial aircraft sales are generally made on a contractual
basis, but when the financial positions of the commercial
airlines worsen seriously, as they have in recent years, the
1 f>7
airlines are loath to enter into long term contracts. In
the absence of long term contracts or some other indication of
likely future demand, the commercial airplane maker has essen-
tially three choices: (i) to continue production at a low rate
1 f>R
and hope that future sales will materialize, (ii) to in-
troduce product variations, such as a 'stretch version' of the
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airplane - to try to increase sales, or (iii) to close
down the production line. The first two choices involve addi-
tional costs and potentially large financial risks, while
the third may require a massive write-off that can adversely
affect the firm's financial health over a period of several
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years.
Planning for new commercial business involves, as in the
case of planning for new government programs, considerably
greater uncertainty than planning for sales of existing prod-
ucts, in the case of a new generation of commercial passen-
ger aircraft, there are the risks discussed in section B.
The initial investment required often exceeds the company's
net worth, and if the introduction of the new plane has been
poorly timed or if potential demand for such a plane has been
seriously overestimated, the company's viability may be threat-
ened. In planning for diversification into new product lines
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there are several factors that need to be considered. These
include the product line's compatibility - in terms of the nature
of the product and the requirements for marketing it - with
existing product lines, the need to hire production and staff
workers, the need to purchase equipment, and the financial re-
sources that will have to be tied up in the new product line.
In addition, if diversification is to take place by external
means, there is the problem of selecting a takeover candidate
and launching a successful bid for a controlling interest in
the firm. Normally these decisions and the required financial
arrangements are made at the headquarters level, although the
formulation of the technical, manpower and production, facili-
ties, and financial plans involving the new product line are
the responsibility of the division to which the new product
line has been assigned.
Once the sales estimates and new business plans for both
commercial sales and government sales have been prepared and
reviewed by divisional management, divisional planners can
derive the technical plan, the manpower and production plan,
and the facilities plan for the division as a whole, and then
from these, the division's financial plan. From there the
long term planning process proceeds as described in subsection
2 of this section.
5. Long Terra Planning: Human Capital and Fixed Capital
The preceding subsection explored several of the im-
portant planning considerations that underlie the blocks
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labeled 'sales estimates for existing product lines' and 'new
business plan' in Figure VI -4. This subsection deals with the
next stage in the divisional long term planning process, and
in particular, with the technical plan and with the facilities
plan. The former is primarily concerned with the allocation
of the division's scientific and engineering talent - human
capital - whereas the latter is mainly concerned with the
allocation of plant and equipment - fixed capital.
The economic literature in recent years has contained many
books and papers that have explored the economic significance
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of human capital. The purpose of this section is not to
review that literature, but rather, it is first, to characterize
human capital and to indicate its importance to the major mili-
tary airframe builders, and second, to indicate how the exis-
tence and importance of human capital affect the long term
planning process in these firms.
Following Schultz and others, a firm's 'human capital' is
defined as the scientific and technical knowledge and skills
embodied in the scientists, engineers, designers, and techni-
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cians who work for the firm. In contrast, fixed capital
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consists of durable goods such as plant and equipment.
Both types of capital are valued by the firm for the services
they provide. In the case of human capital, there are the
services provided during the research and development phases
of a weapons system program, and in the case of fixed capital,
there are the services provided during the production phase of
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the program. In addition, both types of capital normally
require an investment on the part of the firm. Fixed capital
is normally purchased and maintained by the firm, although
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firms often lease plant and equipment, while human capital
must be accumulated through research and development activi-
ties funded, at least in part, by the firm, although firms can
in a sense lease human capital by hiring engineers and scientists
who have worked on similar projects for other aerospace firms.
There are also important differences between human capital
and fixed capital. First, human capital tends to accumulate
through use (i.e. experience) as skills and techniques are ac-
quired and as valuable lessons are learned from past mistakes,
whereas fixed capital tends to deteriorate through use. Second,
the typical airframe builder tends to enjoy greater flexibility
in its use of human capital than in its use of fixed capital.
Human capital can be gained or disposed of through the hiring
or laying off, respectively, of an individual, whereas fixed
capital, which comes in larger units, typically requires much
greater cash outlays when acquired and, because of the limited
alternative uses for much of the equipment, often can be sold
only at a loss. Third, knowledge and skills are transferable
so that improvements in human capital can be transmitted from
one individual to another, whereas embodying technological im-
provements in machinery more often requires that a completely
new machine be built. Fourth, due to differences in individual
learning ability and due also to the importance of recent
975
experience on similar projects to the learning effect that underlies
the growth of human capital, the quality of human capital about
to be hired by a firm is generally more difficult for a manager
to evaluate than the quality of a piece of equipment for which
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engineering specifications and various test data are available.
Fifth and last, it is possible to order a particular piece of
equipment or a plant meeting certain specifications, but to
hire an individual with the requisite scientific background
and experience can involve a costly and time-consuming search
process. It should be noted that the last two factors are two
of the major reasons why the major airframe builders are anxious
to stabilize their scientific, engineering, design, and technical
staffs.
The importance of human capital to the major airframe builders
lies in the role each firm's scientists, engineers, designers, and
technicians play during the research and development phases of a
major weapons program. As discussed in section B, the develop-
ment of a new generation of aircraft typically calls for several
advances in the state of the art. Second, the military buyer
typically outlines its needs for a new weapons system, but leaves
it up to the several firms willing to enter the competition for
the program to submit specific designs. Similarly, the develop-
ment of a prototype requires a great deal of engineering and de-
sign work, and as the performance and overall effectiveness -
i.e. the quality - of what is produced weighs so heavily in the
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final decision, the firm's success in winning new programs
is heavily dependent on how well its scientists, engineers,
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designers and technicians perform.
The implications of the critical role played by human
capital for the long term planning process of the major airframe
builders are first, that scientists, engineers, designers, and
technicians are treated as a class of labor distinct from pro-
duction workers, and second, that these highly skilled workers
are treated more like fixed capital than like labor. That is,
planners make a conscious effort to time phase major programs
in such a way that the staff embodying human capital can re-
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main fully employed and reasonably stable over time. It
may also mean that, on occasion, a firm will bid on a program
or on a piece of a program, at least in part, because it needs
work to provide stable employment opportunities for its scien-
tific and technical staff.
Due to the overcapacity throughout much of the airframe
industry, which was discussed in section B, as well as the
paucity of new major weapons programs, it is the allocation
of human capital, rather than the allocation of fixed capital
that is the more critical capital allocation problem facing
these firms' planners. In particular, the decline in aircraft
sales since 1968 has forced over 70,000 scientists, engineers,
and technicians to leave the industry, ' many of them for
good, and this decline in the pool of available talent has
made the airframe builders increasingly reluctant to release
these people for fear that in the future they might not be
able to rehire sufficient numbers when the need arises. While
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under more favorable business conditions, with demand pressing
against capacity, the airframe builders would also face the
problem of having to decide how to allocate spare productive
capacity and the decision as to whether to expand productive
capacity, the fixed capital allocation problem is not a pres-
sing one at the present time.
6. Long Term Planning as a Portfolio Selection Problem
Up to this point in this section, the discussion has
been mainly descriptive, rather than analytical, and has fo-
cused on long term planning at the divisional level. This
subsection considers long term planning at the headquarters
level and suggests that, in reviewing the amalgamated divi-
sional plans, top management approaches the long term plan-
ning problem in much the same way that an individual investor
approaches the problem of selecting the portfolio of securi-
ties that, in terms of his relative risk aversion, provides
the proper balance of risk and return.
As indicated in Figure VI -4, once the division has comple-
ted its financial plan, which lists the financial requirements
implied by its technical, manpower and production, and facil-
ities plans, it submits these four plans together with the
new business plan to the headquarters planning staff for their
review. The headquarters planning staff may require that cer-
tain divisions modify their plans. After the required modi-
fications have been made to the satisfaction of the corporate
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planning staff, the divisional long term plans are amalgamated
into a provisional corporate long term plan, which is typically
broken down into a corporate new business plan, a corporate
technical plan, a corporate manpower and production plan, a
corporate facilities plan, and a corporate financial plan, each
of which is, with the exception of the corporate financial plan,
an amalgamation of the respective divisional plans.
In addition, there may be one or more divisions that perform
support, rather than operational, duties. For example, there
may be a computer services division that provides for all the
data processing needs of the operating divisions but does not
sell to outside users. Even if it sells to outside users, these
sales may be peripheral to the division's support function. In
that case, the headquarters planning staff may find it more
efficient from a planning standpoint to have the support division
estimate only the external demand (if any) for its services and
to estimate the internal demand for the support services at the
same time it amalgamates the plans of the operating divisions.
External and internal demands for support services would then
be combined and the various provisional corporate plans would
be revised accordingly. Finally, the provisional corporate
plans are prepared in summary format for review by top manage-
ment and are then forwarded for their scrutiny.
One of top management's greatest concerns is the corporate
financial plan, which indicates the financial needs of the cor-
poration over the long term as well as the anticipated impact
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of the new business, technical, manpower and production, and
facilities plans on the firm's financial statements. In ad-
dition, since all funds generated internally that are avail-
able for distribution as dividends or for reinvestment are
allocated by top management, and since all funds that are
raised externally must be raised through the issuance of debt
or equity financial instruments or through a loan agreement
with one or more banks, in either case handled through the
corporate controller, it is necessary to add top manage-
ment's plans for obtaining the financial resources - i.e. the
money capital - needed to fund the activities of the operating
divisions to the amalgamated divisional financial plans.
In reviewing the corporate financial plan and the other
four plans that comprise the overall corporate long term plan,
top management faces a multiperiod portfolio selection prob-
lem. Associated with each of the product lines that the di-
visions plan to continue and also with each of the new business
ventures planned are (i) an expected return - a contribution
to corporate net operating income - for each year out to the
long term planning horizon and (ii) various risks, which fall
within the categories discussed in section B. These risks can
have a major impact on the corporation's overall financial risk.
In addition, the product lines and projects must also be evalu-
ated in terms of the contribution of each to the other objectives
of the corporation. The firm's present financial health as well
as its capacity for borrowing limit the extent to which current
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commitments can be undertaken, thereby imposing a "budget
constraint," while current commitments will affect future
earnings and future borrowing capacity, which in turn will limit
the extent to which future commitments can be undertaken.
The foregoing suggests what the author believes could prove
to be an interesting analytical approach to understanding the
typical airframe builder's long term planning problem. A somewhat
different, though not inconsistent, approach is adopted in the next
chapter.
7 . Summary
This section has described the typical airframe builder's
long term planning process - the second of the three phases of
the corporate planning cycle. Key elements in the planning pro-
cess were highlighted, the special treatment accorded human cap-
ital was discussed, the headquarters planning staff's role in
coordinating divisional planning and in amalgamating divisional
plans in order to prepare an overall corporate long term plan
for review by top management was described, and the formulation
of the corporate long term financial plan was discussed. In
addition, an analytical approach to modeling top management's
role in the long term planning process was suggested.
The next section describes the short term planning process
and indicates how consistency between the long term plan just
discussed and the short term plan is achieved.
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F. SHORT TERM PLANNING: ANNUAL BUDGET PREPARATION
1. Introduction
The third phase of the corporate planning cycle involves
the preparation of the short term, or operating, plan, which is
generally carried out for the first year of the long term plan-
18?
ning period only. The annual operating plan, which for rea-
sons of consistency, is derived from the corporate long term
plan, provides much greater detail for the period covered than
does the long term plan.
The annual operating plan is presented in the form of a
1 go
detailed budget. Unlike the long term plan, which is mainly
concerned with the allocation of capital resources and with the
development of strategies and plans whose main impact will be on
sales and earnings five years or more into the future, the short
term plan is mainly concerned with the allocation of variable re-
sources and with the development of strategies and plans that
will largely determine sales and earnings within the next year.
Whereas the long term plan is heavily concerned with developing
new product lines to replace those that will eventually be phased
out and with winning new programs to replace those that are due
to expire, the short term plan is heavily concerned with con-
trolling direct costs and overhead cost for the firm's current com-
mercial and military product lines. Also unlike the long term plan,
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which generally summarizes projections on a year-by-year basis,
the short term plan is presented on a month-by-month basis.
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This section describes the short term planning process that
is followed within the nine major military airframe builders.
As was the case with the long term planning process, most of
the short term planning takes place at the divisional level,
with the headquarters planning staff once again coordinating
divisional planning efforts and with top management once again
carefully reviewing the final product of this phase of the
planning cycle.
2. Short Term Planning at the Divisional Level
After top management has approved the corporate long
term plan - normally late in the third quarter - the short term
planning process can begin. This process begins much as the
long term planning process was begun, namely, with the distribu-
tion of the corporation's short term goals and objectives by top
management. These short term goals and objectives are generally
more specific than the long term goals and objectives and are
normally accompanied by a set of specific guidelines for division-
al short term planning. For example, the long term plan is likely
to specify an overall profit margin, i.e. the ratio of net opera-
ting income to net sales, for each year, while the short term plan
is likely to specify the profit margin (or more specifically, the
'contribution margin') for each product for the coming year. To
ensure consistency with the corporate long term plan, these goals
and objectives and guidelines sent out from headquarters are based
on the approved corporate long term plan. As was the case with
long term planning, from this point in the short term planning
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process onward, most of the actual planning takes place at the
divisional level.
Figure VI-7 illustrates the short term planning process as it is
typically carried out at the divisional level. The process begins
with a statement of the assumptions on which the divisional short
term plan is to be based and with the formulation of the division's
short term goals and objectives. The planning assumptions flow
directly from the corporate and divisional long term plans, and the
goals and objectives follow from the divisional long term goals and
objectives embodied in the corporate long term plan and the more
specific corporate short term goals and objectives and planning
guidelines supplied to the division. As in the case of the long
term planning process, headquarters approval of the division's
goals and objectives is required, although such approval is less
problematical than in the long term case because the basic direction
and strategies for the corporation and for the division have already
been mapped out during the long term planning process.
Once the division's short term goals and objectives and plan-
ning assumptions have been approved, the goals and objectives to-
gether with the divisional business strategies approved as part
of the long term planning process are used by divisional manage-
ment to formulate the division's short term business strategies -
the collection of policies that specify the division's competi-
tive position vis-a-vis its competitors in each of the commercial
markets in which it sells and its approach to contract negotiations






























































































































Figure VI -7 The Divisional Short Term Planning Cycle
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taken to ensure that these short term strategies are consistent
with the long term strategies that underlie the long term plan.
For example, not altering the design of a particular product, say
a particular type of aircraft, may enable the division to avoid
the expense involved in design changes, and thereby boost the
division's overall profit margin, though the failure to 'modernize'
the airplane may hurt future sales and profits in the event
competitive pressures or a change in government regulations force
these changes to be made hurriedly.
After establishing the division's short term business
strategies, divisional management directs the division's
planning staff to collect the information needed to determine
the actual resource requirements of the division and to plan
how these requirements will be met. This part of the short
term planning process results in several component plans, which,
for convenience, have been grouped into four component plans in
Figure VI-7. The monthly facilities usage and expenditure plan
indicates the plant and equipment allocated to each product line -
whether government or commercial - for each of the twelve months
covered by the operating plan. It also indicates the time of
arrival and use of new equipment that will be purchased and the
beginning of operation and use(s) of new plant that will become
available during the year. The monthly overheads plan indicates
the monthly overhead rates to be applied to direct labor to deter-
mine the cost of goods sold. The plan gives a breakdown as to
general and administrative costs, the cost of facilities, research
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and development, etc. The monthly manpower and production plan
indicates monthly output rates, the delivery of commercial and
military aircraft on a monthly basis, direct (i.e. for production)
labor requirements (numbers of personnel and their cost) on a
monthly basis, and the projected monthly hiring/firing quotas.
The subcontracting and procurement plan indicates subcontractors
for government programs and details the firm's need for inputs
other than labor on a monthly basis, along with the anticipated
costs of these inputs.
The four plans just described form the division's annual oper-
ating plan, which is submitted to the headquarters planning staff
after it has been approved by the division's management. As in the
long term planning process, the headquarters planning staff may
return the plan for modifications. Finally, after, all divisional
short term plans have been accepted, they are amalgamated into a
corporate operating plan. Also incorporated into this plan is the
annual operating plan for the corporate office. The corporate short
term plan is submitted to top management for its review, and once
this plan has been approved, the short term planning process ends.
At the conclusion of the short term planning process, the
corporate planning cycle begins again. At the same time, a cor-
porate review process begins, during which the just completed annual
operating plan will be reviewed on a quarterly, or possibly on a
semiannual, basis in light of actual operating results. The
next section describes this review process. The remainder of
this section looks more closely at certain important aspects of
the short term planning process just described.
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3. Short Term Planning: Government Sales, Contract
Performance, and Cost Controls
Much of the short term planning associated with the sale
of goods and services to the government can be based on the
provisions of the contracts that were negotiated prior to the
start of the short term planning process. In particular, for
such items as military aircraft, government contracts generally
specify product performance standards, a monthly delivery schedule,
the price per plane (since, as pointed out in section B, pro-
duction contracts are typically of the fixed price variety) , the
method by which the fee will be determined, etc. Such information
proves helpful to the contractor during the preparation of the
monthly manpower and production plan.
In addition, the government negotiates the overhead rates to
-IOC
be applied on all contracts, and one of the by-products of
this process is an estimate of reimbursable overhead costs. Under
certain circumstances, such as those surrounding either an audit
by the General Accounting Office or a general management review
carried out by, or at the direction of, the administrative con-
tracting officer, the government can issue specific directives
] Qf.
to a contractor concerning its overheads. Such information
can prove helpful to the contractor when it formulates its monthly
overhead plan.
Since contractor performance (or effort) weighs heavily in
1 87
determining the fee to be earned, the division must care-
fully plan the allocation of labor over government contracts
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during the short term planning process. Where prices are fixed,
as they are on most development contracts as well as on pro-
duction contracts, control of costs is critical in order to
prevent costs from rising and consuming part or all of the fee.
Even under cost plus contracts, cost control is important, for
even though costs now play a smaller role in determining the
size of the fee, the contractor's productive efficiency, and
in particular, improvements in productivity, are now included
as a factor in determining the fee.
A second important performance factor is the contractor's
performance in meeting delivery schedules. Where the number of
subcontractors and suppliers is large, the problem of trying
to control the scheduling of production and delivery becomes
more difficult. A subcontractor making a late delivery can
cause the production schedule to slip, and this can lead to a
late delivery, for which the prime contractor is likely to be
penalized. Controlling subcontractor performance often neces-
sitates placing teams of people, analogous to the government's
plant representative offices, in the subcontractor's plants,
and this in turn requires that manpower and dollars be allocated
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for that purpose.
In short term planning connected with government sales, then,
the emphasis is placed on allocating personnel and dollars so
as to ensure satisfactory contract performance. In particular,
short term planning for government sales emphasizes control of
production and overhead costs and the control of production
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rates in order to meet delivery schedules. Similarly, as the
next subsection makes clear, short term planning for commercial
sales also displays a decided cost and productivity emphasis.
4. Short Term Planning: Commercial Sales and
Operating Efficiency
Short term planning for commercial sales is, in some
important respects, more difficult than short term planning
for government sales, although the basic thrust of the planning
process is essentially the same. In each case short term plan-
ning is concerned with the employment levels of the variable
inputs needed to satisfy the firm's production commitments.
What tends to make commercial sales planning somewhat more
difficult is the greater uncertainty concerning actual product
demand. On the other hand, the difficulties associated with
trying to predict resource requirements for research and develop-
ment projects, which tend to complicate the task of government
sales planning, generally have a smaller impact on the commercial
side of the business. Overall, then, the relative difficulty
of these two aspects of short term planning, and by implication,
the relative amounts of time, manpower, and money that must be
allocated to each aspect of short term planning, is largely de-
pendent on the proportion of government sales made under research
and development contracts.
In the case of commercial aircraft sales, the short term
planning problem is more complicated than the one for military
aircraft sales. While commercial aircraft are sold on a
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contractual basis, the limited financial resources of the com-
mercial airlines make contract cancellations or delivery post-
ponements more likely than in the case of military aircraft
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sales. A second problem associated with commercial air-
craft sales concerns advance payments. If such payments are
made at all on a commercial contract, they are generally much
lower than progress payments made by the government under
191
military contracts. In addition, when the financial po-
sitions of commercial airlines worsen, they become loath to
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enter into long term contracts, preferring instead to buy
aircraft on much shorter notice once they have generated suf-
ficient financial resources with which to make the purchase.
Assuming the decision has been made (as part of the long term
planning process) to continue production of the airplane or
of some modified version, a decision concerning the produc-
tion rate for the coming year must be made. This production
rate must satisfy the constraint on the minimum feasible pro-
duction rate, which is imposed by the technical conditions
of production.
In contrast to the special planning problems associated with
commerical aircraft sales, planning for the sales of other
commerical products generally does not lead to problems any
different from those faced by the airframe builders' non-aero-
space commercial competitors. The main difference, in terms
of planning, between these sales and sales of commercial air-
craft is in inventory planning. In planning commercial
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aircraft sales, production schedules are set to conform as closely
as possible to the delivery schedule for firm orders so that in-
ventories of completed aircraft can be held near zero. In plan-
ning for other commercial sales, for which inventories of finished
goods are a normal part of doing business, one of the purposes
of short term planning is to determine the appropriate (in light
of demand and cost considerations) inventory levels.
Overall, the short term planning process is designed to a-
chieve operating efficiency in the area of commercial sales. As
was the case with government sales, short term planning of com-
mercial operations focuses on variable inputs such as the labor
used in the production process and seeks to determine employment
levels consistent with cost minimization.
5. Summary
The short term planning process is concerned mainly with
the allocation of variable inputs among existing and about-to-be-
introduced product lines and with the efficient use of the firm's
existing capital resources, in contrast to the long term planning
process, which is mainly concerned with the acquisition or dis-
posal of capital resources, the winning of new government con-
tracts, and the development of new commercial lines of business.
Because the short term planning process begins once the long term
planning process has been completed and uses the long term plan
as a planning base, short term planning normally requires just
one quarter, as opposed to the two quarters usually required for
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long term planning. Using the long term plan as a basis for
the short term plan also ensures consistency between the two
plans.
One of the important outputs of the short term planning
process is a set of provisional quarterly financial state-
ments for the corporation. That is, once top management has
approved the corporate operating plan submitted by the head-
quarters planning staff (see Figure VI-7) , a provisional profit
and loss statement and a provisional balance sheet can be pre-
pared for each quarter - or for each month, if so desired - of
the corporate fiscal year. These provisional financial state-
ments are used by top management during the fiscal year to
check the progress of the corporation toward its long term and
short term financial goals and objectives.
While the completion of the corporate operating plan and
the preparation of the provisional corporate financial state-
ments mark the end of the corporate planning cycle, there re-
mains a very important follow-on to the corporate planning cy-
cle, namely, the corporate review(s) . The next section describes
the corporate review process, the purpose of which is to measure
periodically the performance of the divisions against the re-
spective divisional plans and to modify the divisional and cor-
porate operating plans in light of operating experience.
G. THE CORPORATE REVIEW PROCESS
Though substantial resources are devoted to formulating
the corporate and divisional plans, the uncertainties associated
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with estimates of product demand, input costs and availabilities,
etc., in the future, as well as unforeseen circumstances, such
as an oil embargo, an unexpected sharp decline in the demand for
airline passenger travel, or an unanticipated contract termina-
tion, will cause actual performance to deviate from the projec-
tions outlined in the corporate and divisional operating plans.
Thus, it has been deemed necessary by the managements of the
major airframe builders to conduct formal periodic reviews -
normally on a quarterly basis, though in some cases, on a semi-
annual basis - to measure these deviations, and if possible, to
determine their cause so that the divisional and corporate oper-
ating plans for the remainder of the fiscal year can be adjusted
in accordance with the firm's operating experience.
The existence of the review process is indicative of the fact
that the corporate planning and review process, when considered
as a whole, is an adaptive process. That is, the planning and
review process exhibits feedback control in that each periodic
corporate review causes information on divisional performance to
be generated that is used by top management and divisional man-
agers to modify their operating plans. In addition, the corpor-
ate reviews enable top management and the headquarters planning
staff to reevaluate periodically the operating environment and
performance of each division. The information collected and the
evaluations performed as part of the corporate reviews for the
third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year are, to the extent
that they enable corporate planners to evaluate the current state
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of demand in each of the firm's product markets, helpful to
the headquarters planning staff at the time it prepares the
environmental forecast.
Figure VI-8 shows the corporate planning and review cycle
for arbitrary year T. The whole cycle spans a period approx-
imately nine quarters in length. The planning for year T
takes place the previous year. The corporate review for each
quarter takes place soon after the end of the quarter, with
the time lag determined by how much time is required to col-
lect and process the data needed to carry out the review.
The fourth quarter review is different from the three earlier
reviews in that, not only can the full year's performance be
measured against the whole operating plan, but also the review
of the year's performance forms the basis for the annual re-
port to the firm's shareholders.
Each quarterly review contains the following basic elements.
First, the actual results - sales by product line, levels of re-
source usage, net operating income for the division, etc. - are
summarized for both the quarter and the year to date. The actuals
are compared with the approved operating plan. Usually this is
done simply by listing the actual figure next to the projection -
and significant variations are noted. Second, based on the ac-
tuals to date, an up-to-date forecast for the balance of the fis-
cal year is presented, along with a statement of any changes that
may have been made in the underlying assumptions since the oper-
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and commercial programs is reviewed, with special emphasis placed
on problems - existing or potential - that might in the future
193
require the attention of top management, e.g. those problems
that might call for large expenditures or major schedule changes
and that could affect other divisions of the company. Fourth,
the status of capital expenditure programs and any cost or
schedule changes to them are reviewed. Fifth, research and de-
velopment activities, their cost, and significant accomplish-
ments are reviewed. Sixth, efforts directed toward winning
new military programs that are near to bidding are reviewed.
For each of the above elements of the review process, top manage-
ment reviews the record to date and suggests appropriate modi-
fications of strategies, expenditure levels, etc. In particular,
one or more of the divisional operating plans may be changed
at the direction of top management in light of that division's
performance to date.
The corporate review process, then, is a device that enables
top management to review periodically the performance of the
corporation's operating divisions and to determine what changes
need to be made, in light of each division's experience to date,
to each division's operating plan in order to improve the likeli-
hood that by the end of the fiscal year the corporation's goals
and objectives for the year will have been met.
H. CHAPTER SUMMAFY
The nine major military airframe builders in the United
States are large diversified organizations whose performance
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is influenced to a significant degree by variations in the size
and number of major military aircraft programs. The business
environment within which these firms operate is characterized
by several different types of risk, some of which arise out of
their special relationship with their main customer, the U.S.
government, and some of which are peculiar to the highly tech-
nical and specialized nature of their aerospace business. In
addition, the apparent decline in the number of major military
aircraft programs, the stagnant demand for commercial passenger
jet aircraft, and the increasing foreign competition from firms
financed by their governments, have limited the opportunities
for growth in these firms' traditional markets, and more im-
portantly, have threatened the structure of the industry.
Due in part to the nature of the aerospace business and in
part to their dependence on the sale of high technology air-
craft to the government, these firms have had to evolve a long
term planning process capable of coping with the risks they
face. These firms must plan their allocation of human capital
on the basis of very limited information, knowing that the
penalty for guessing incorrectly may include the failure to win
a major program. They must allocate research expenditures so
as to develop the technology that will be needed by weapons
systems that may not reach the development stage for a decade
or more. Thoughout the research and development process they
must compete with one another for the favor of their main
customer, the U.S. government, and for the relatively more
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lucrative production contracts that secure for each of their
recipients a place among the select group of prime government
contractors.
Their commercial business, particularly if it includes the
sale of commercial passenger aircraft, can also entail substan-
tial risks. The number of potential customers is greater, but
the financial strength of each is not only weaker than the
government's, but also susceptible to the swings of the business
cycle. Since the cost of developing a new generation of com-
mercial aircraft may exceed the developing company's net worth,
the risk of ultimate financial failure cannot be ignored. More-
over, in recent years a severe recession and an increase in
foreign competition have intensified these risks.
The substantial risks attendant upon their aerospace opera-
tions and the limited growth opportunities provided by the mar-
kets for commercial and military aircraft have caused many of
the major airframe builders to look outside the industry for
opportunities to diversify and grow. But the limited alter-
native uses to which their fixed capital can be put and the
nature of their aerospace business - the production and marketing
of highly sophisticated products to a relatively small number of
commercial and government buyers - have forced these firms to be
very selective with regard to how they choose to diversify.
Similarly, the nature of the aerospace business and the
dependence of these firms on sales of aircraft to the government
give rise to special problems in short term planning. Due to
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the high costs of temporarily shutting down a production line
or of maintaining an inventory of completed aircraft, produc-
tion schedules must be set to conform as closely as possible
to anticipated delivery schedules. Due to the importance of
meeting the specifications of government production contracts,
most of which are granted on a fixed price basis, it is neces-
sary that production schedules and production and overhead
costs be carefully controlled.
All the factors mentioned above combine to make the typical
airframe builder's task of planning a difficult one, the re-
quirements of which are, in the opinion of this writer, more
demanding than those faced by the majority of non-aerospace
firms. This chapter has described how the major airframe
builders conduct their long term and short term planning. The
discussion has highlighted the important aspects of each process
and has indicated the relationship between the two. The chapter
has also drawn attention to the important differences between
doing business with the government and doing business with com-
mercial customers and has pointed out the implications of these
differences for the long term and short term planning processes
of the nine major military airframe builders.
This chapter has described the institutional milieu within
which the major airframe builders operate. In the next chapter
the basic theoretical model developed in chapters three through
five of this thesis is modified and a model of a representative
airframe builder is formulated. The model is developed as an
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analytical model of the planning cycle described in this chapter.
The model is used to characterize the optimal operating and
financial policies of the representative airframe builder and
to study the impact on the behavior of these firms of the govern-
ment's progress payments policy. The model is also used to
examine several procurement policy issues raised in this chapter,
such as the likely impact on the behavior of these firms of




This chapter is based in part on personal interviews con-
ducted at The Boeing Company, Fairchild Republic Company
(a division of Fairchild Industries, Inc
. ) , the Convair
Division of General Dynamics Corporation, Grumman
Corporation, Vought Corporation (formally LTV Aerospace
Corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of the LTV
Corporation) , Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, McDonnell
Douglas Corporation, Northrop Corporation, and Rockwell
International Corporation. The author would like to
thank the executives with whom he spoke for their
generous assistance, though he alone accepts full re-
sponsibility for any errors that may have been committed
in describing these firms' planning processes.
2. The term 'airframe' refers to the body of the airplane
without its engines. For the information of the reader,
the two major producers of engines that are installed in
the airframes produced by the firms listed in footnote 1
are United Technologies Corp. (through its Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft Div.) and General Electric Co.
3. See "A shakeout for U.S. fighter-plane makers," Business
Week (June 9, 197b) , and "General Dynamics: Winning in the
Aerospace Game," Business Week (May 3, 1976). According
to these articles, the threatened firms are Fairchild,
Grumman, and Vought (LTV). However, Joseph G. Gavin, Jr.,
President of Grumman Corp., has stated publicly that he
expects follow-on orders to carry F-14 production beyond
the currently projected 1980 termination date. See "The
New Face of the Defense Industry," Business Week (January
10, 1977), p. 55. A recent study conducted jointly by the
Department of Defense and the Office of Management and
Budget concludes, however, that there is excess capacity
in the aircraft industry costing the Department of Defense
approximately $400 million per year to maintain and
recommends that the industry be consolidated. See
"Washington Roundup," Aviation Week & Space Technology
(January 24, 1977), p. 11.
4. See "Conferees Vote Money for the Bl Bomber And for Nuclear-
Powered 'Strike' Cruiser," Wall Street Journal (July 28,
1975); "Bl Decision Is Delayed by Senate Panel In Passing
Defense Appropriations Bill," Wall Street Journal (July 22,
1976); and "Conferees Vote to Put Bl Bomber Funds On Tight
Rein Until After Inauguration," Wall Street Journal (September
1, 1976).
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5. See "Early Revival Unlikely As Jumbo-Plane Sales Continue
to Languish," Wall Street Journal (August 10, 1976), and
"Aerospace and Defense," Forbes (January 1, 1977), p. 136.
There are some signs, however, that the demand for commer-
cial aircraft, and in particular, the Boeing 727, is be-
ginning to pick up. Revised noise standards and the need
for replacement aircraft are at least partly responsible.
See "Airlines give Boeing a one-shot boom," Business Week
(October 11, 1976). The long term outlook is also bright-
ening, though many airlines will require a period of sus-
tained profitability if they are to be able to satisfy
their need for new aircraft. See "Billions and billions
and billions to grab for," The Economist (September 11,
1976); "Time To Fasten Seat Belts?," Forbes (October 15,
1976); and "Nation's Airlines Face A Key Problem: How To
Pay for New Airplanes," Wall Street Journal (October 22,
1976).
6. See "Lockheed Woes Increase as Plan For Rescue Fails,"
Wall Street Journal (March 3, 1975), and "Biting the
bullet on the TriStar," Business Week (April 12, 1976).
However, indications are that the patient is on the mend.
See "The Fabulous Invalid," Forbes (August 15, 1976), and
"Lockheed Restructuring Voted by Owners Of Common; Debt-
Holder Approval Seen," Wall Street Journal (September
30, 1976).
7. See The New Face of the Defense Industry
?




8. That is, 'total package procurement' , in which companies
were forced to accept a single fixed price contract covering
both development and production, is no longer part of the
Department of Defense's procurement policy. The current
DOD policy regarding major system acquisitions is outlined
in Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Major System
Acquisitions" (January 18, 1977) and in Department of
Defense Directive 5000.2, "Major System Acquisition Process"
(January 18, 1977).
9. And, in at least one case, in accordance with the wishes of
the firm's debt-holders. See footnote 6.
10. K.G. Harr, Jr., "A Short Course in Aerospace Economics 1976,"
Aerospace (September 1976), p. 11.
11. Ridder and Heinz classify 634 firms as belonging to the aero-
space industry based on the industry classifications provided
by Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory , Standard
and Poor's Register of Corporations , and several other
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sources. See W.C. Ridder and M.K. Heinz, "Structure,
Conduct, and Performance of the United States Aerospace
Industry," unpublished M.S. thesis (Naval Postgraduate
School; Monterey, California; March 1976). Ridder and
Heinz provide an interesting historical perspective on
the industry as well as a careful analysis of the in-
dustry's structure, conduct, and performance. An earlier
study of the aerospace industry that carefully examined
the major airframe builders is H.O. Stekler, The Structure
and Performance of the Aerospace Industry (University of
California Press; Berkley; 1965). After allowing for
mergers and after excluding Martin Marietta, which no
longer builds aircraft, Stekler' s list of the major air-
frame builders is identical to the list of firms in
footnote 1. Ibid
. , p. 47. A second study by Carroll
considers these firms as well as the missile frame builders.
S.L. Carroll, "The Airframe Industry," unpublished Ph.D.












16. Strictly speaking, LTV is not an aerospace firm. Because
aerospace sales constitute approximately 12 percent of
total sales (see Table VI-3 below) , whereas steel operations
contribute 39 percent and meat and food products contribute
48 percent, as reported in the company's Form 10-K for its
fiscal year 1975, the company is usually classified as a
'conglomerate', rather than as a member of any single industry
(for example, see "Multicompanies, " Forbes (January 1, 1977),
p. 101). The firm does, however, participate in the industry
through its Vought Corp. subsidiary, and if the significance
to LTV of this participation were to be judged in terms of
profits, rather than sales, then, in 1975 at least, aerospace
production would become preeminent (see Table VI-6 below)
.
17. These firms also play very important roles in the international
market for commercial aircraft. The Aerospace Industries
Association of America estimates that roughly four of every







19. See, for example, "Cruise Missile's Future Is Mainly Up
to Carter; Its Potential Is Great," Wall Street Journal
(January 3, 1977), and "Defense Budget of $110.1 Billion
Proposes Big Weapons Rise With Little Fat to Cut," Wall
Street Journal (January 18, 1977).
20. These factors, and their impact on the defense industry,
are discussed in M.L. Weidenbaum, The Economics of Peace-
time Defense (Praeger; New York; 1974).
21. Since 1968 total employment within the aerospace industry
has fallen by more than one-third. Moreover, between 1968
and 1975 more than 70,000 highly skilled jobs - scientists,




22. For example, in the Fortune 500 ranking for 1970, Boeing
was ranked 17, Lockheed was ranked 33, and McDonnell Douglas
was ranked 44. See "The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest
Industrial Corporations," Fortune (May 1971).
23. One added indication of this is the fact that, if Vought
Corp. were ranked separately from the rest of LTV, it
would rank number 330 in the FORTUNE 500.
24. Six of the top 10 are airframe builders. Of the remaining
four top 10 DOD contractors, United Technologies Corp.
(no. 3), through its Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, has
contracts to build engines for three of the four new fighters;
General Electric Co. (no. 7) has the engine contract for the
F-18; and Litton Industries Inc. (no. 8) and Hughes Aircraft
Co. (no. 9) are also important suppliers of aerospace products,






27. It will be argued below that it is human capital - in the
form of the knowledge and experience embodied in skilled
engineers and scientists - rather than physical capital -
in the form of plant and equipment, some of which is owned
by the government - that is the scarcer of the two components
of the firm's total capital resources and that is, consequent-
ly, of greater concern to each firm's strategic planners who





29. D.E. Raphael of the Stanford Research Institute believes
that the aerospace industry faces an impending widespread
capital shortage, and he estimates that the working cap-
ital requirements of these firms will rise from $5.9
billion in 1975 to $8.8 billion in 1980 and to $15 billion







p. 52, and Department of Defense, Defense Procurement
Circular Number 76-3 (Washington, D.C.; September 1,1976),
p. 12.
31. Comparative figures are provided in "Where Private Industry
Puts Its Research Money," Business Week (June 28, 1976).
32. Ibid.
,
p. 65. Even though DOD funds a large proportion of
defense-related research, it does not finance 100 percent
of the research, and on a project-by-project basis each of
the airframe builders is risking large sums of money. For
example, Boeing Co. spent $41 million of its own money, in
addition to $95.2 million supplied by DOD, for research and
development connected with the YC-14, the new short take-off
-
and -landing transport being developed for the Air Force (in
competition with McDonnell Douglas's YC-15). Ibid.
,
p. 66.
33. The references that set out current DOD policy regarding
major weapons system acquisition are given in footnote 8.
34. The implications of the type of contract for risk-sharing
between the government and the contractor are discussed
below in subsection 6.
35. One aerospace executive told the author that his company
estimated that approximately 56 percent of IR&D funds were
spent on projects that would never result in fruitful mili-
tary applications, and that, of the remainder, only one
quarter (i.e. 11 percent of the total) would be spent on
developing weapons systems that his company would produce
(the other three quarters being spent on projects that
would lose out to other firms)
.
36. One of the earliest articles on the subject was T.P. Wright,
"Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes," Journal of the
Aeronautical Sciences (vol. 3; no. 4; February 1936), pp.
122-128. See also K. Hartley, "The Learning Curve and Its
Application to the Aircraft Industry," Journal of Industrial
Economics (vol. 13; no. 2; March 1965), pp. 122-128. The
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existence of the learning curve has been taken into account
in production and cost planning by military, as well as by
industry, planners. For a survey of Air Force applications
see H. Asher, "Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe
Industry," R-291 (The RAND Corporation; Santa Monica, CA;
1956). It should be noted that the learning curve phenomenon
is not unique to the airframe industry. For other industries
in which it applies see W.Z. Hirsch, "Firm Progress Ratios,"
Econometrica (vol 24; no. 2; April 1956) pp. 136-143. In
addition, the phenomenon of the learning curve also has ap-
plications at the macroeconomic level. See P.J. Verdoorn,
"Complementarity and Long-Range Projections," Econometrica
(vol 24; no. 4; October 1956), pp. 429-450, and K.J. Arrow,
"The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Review of
Economic Studies (vol. 29; 1962), pp. 155-173.
37. An interesting general discussion of learning curves is pro-
vided in S.C. Webb, Managerial Economics (Houghton Mifflin;
Boston; 1976), ch. 17.
38. Hartley, op.cit.
,
p. 122, and Webb, op.cit.
,
p. 251.
39. The equation of the learning curve in Figure 1 is
I = 8000 x -0-32193
}
where I is the direct labor input per airframe and x is the
cumulative number of airframes produced. More generally, a
learning curve satisfies an equation of the form
£ = ax b
where a is the direct labor input of the first airframe pro-
duced and b = log~p, where p is the percent of learning expressed
as a decimal and where log 2 signifies a logarithm to the base
2. Note that the shape of the learning curve implies that
the learning process is subject to steadily diminishing returns.
Though inflation might cause the cost per airframe measured in
current dollars to increase - if rising unit input costs more
than offset the effect of improved labor efficiency - the cost
per airframe would still fall when measured in term of dollars
of constant purchasing power (i.e. in real terms).
41. In essence, the controversy surrounding the Navy's decision to
procure the F-18 despite congressional pressure to procure the
F-17, which was a modification of the F-16 selected previously
by the Air Force, was the result of this sort of disagreement
as to whether the additional costs incurred in selecting a
different design could be justified on the grounds of improved
effectiveness.
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42. The actual point beyond which a major program becomes
virtually nontransferable probably lies somewhere be-
fore the award of the first production contract, but
after the selection of the winner of the prototype com-
petition. That is, during the final development and
the test and evaluation stages of the program, the firm
that won the prototype competition develops the finished
product. Since the technology developed and the ex-
perience accumulated during these stages cannot be trans-
ferred costlessly, at some point the potential costs of
transferring the program become so high as to in effect
preclude a change of prime contractor.
43. That is, a market for a product characterized by a single
buyer (the Department of Defense through one of its ser-
vices) and a single seller (the contractor) . Bilateral
monopoly is discussed in most elementary price theory
textbooks. For example, see R. Sherman, The Economics
of Industry (Little, Brown and Company; Boston; 1974),
pp. 283-287.
44. See "Lockheed Sets L-1011 Charge Of $515 Million," Wall
Street Journal (March 31, 1976).
45. The current competition between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
for a contract worth approximately $2 billion to build
midair refueling tankers is an example. The Boeing entry
will utilize the 747 airframe, while the McDonnell Douglas
entry will utilize the DC 10 airframe. (The Lockheed entry







46. Harr, op. cit.
,
p. 7.
47. This latter figure was computed by treating Vought Corp.
as if it were an aerospace firm separate from LTV Corp.
48. This procedure has a strong impact on Northrop Corp.'
s
government sales. If sales to foreign governments were
included among 'government sales'
,
then 'che share of
government sales in Northrop Corp.'s total sales would ex-
ceed 80 percent. The main reason for this large difference
is that the primary market for Northrop Corp.'s F-5 fighter
is foreign governments.
49. See footnotes 21 and 22.
50. For example, sales of the A-10 aircraft formed 23% of








51. Defense Procurement Circular No. 76-3 , op.cit. The DOD's
primary motive was to encourage defense contractors to
increase their investment in plant and cost-saving new
equipment. The Profit '76 study recommended four major
changes designed to accomplish this. First, interest,
including the imputed interest on contractor-owned facili-
ties, became an allowable cost. Second, the contractor's
level of investment in facilities was introduced as a
factor into the weighted guidelines that government con-
tracting officers must follow in negotiating a profit ob-
jective with the contractor. Third, risk will be weighed
more heavily and cost will be weighed less heavily in
negotiating profit levels. Fourth, productivity improve-
ments were introduced into , and past contractor perform-
ance was deleted from, the list of guidlines used to de-
termine profit levels. It should be noted that the policy
changes will be less favorable to the airframe builders
than they will be to shipbuilders and other government
contractors, according to Brig. General James W. Stansberry,
USAF, Director, Profit '76, quoted in "Pentagon Drafts Policy
to Spur Spending By Defense Contractors on New Facilities,"
Wall Street Journal (July 6, 1976).
52. Ibid.
, pp. 12-15; Aerospace Industries Association of America,
Risk Elements in Government Contracting (Washington, D.C.;
October 1970), pp. 6-9; Aerospace Profits vs. Risks
(Washington, D.C.; June 1971), ch. 4; and J.R. Fox, Arming
America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons (Division of Research,
Harvard Business School; Boston; 1974), pp. 236-240.
53. The argument that risks are high and returns are low in the
aerospace industry in relation to other industries is made
in Harr, op.cit.
,
p. 12, and in J.K. Brown and G.S. Stothoff,
The Defense Industry: Some Perspectives from the Financial
Community
,
(Division of Management Research, The Conference
Board; New York; 1976). The opposite view is expressed in
Weidenbaum, op.cit.
, pp. 69-70, which cites a GAO study of
aerospace profitability over the period 1966-1969, and in
The New Face of the Defense Industry , op.cit.
,
p. 56. For
a discussion of these articles see the next footnote.
54. One of the practical problems encountered in analyzing the
question of the sufficiency of the returns earned by aero-
space firms is the period of time covered by the analysis.
The years 1966-1969 covered by the GAO study referred to in foot-
note 53 preceded the post-Vietnam slump in defense spending,
and much of the empirical evidence cited in the Business Week
article ("The New Face of the Defense Industry") is based on
the same period. In this regard the Brown and Stothoff
study, which focuses on the period 1965-1974, reports statis-
tical results that are less biased .
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55. For example, Risk Elements in Government Contracting , op.cit .
56. Profit '76 Summary Report (U.S. Government Printing Office;
Washington, D.C.; December 7, 1976.)
57. The apparent preference of contractors for investing in
facilities to be used in commercial production, rather than
to support government production, was the major justification





58. An overview of the procurement process is provided in
S.J. Evans, H.J. Margulis, and H.B. Yoshpe, Procurement
(Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Washington, D.C.;
1968) . Several excellent analyses of the weapons acquisition
process have been performed. The classic studies are
M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An
Economic Analysis (Division of Research, Harvard Business
School; Boston; 1962), and F.M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition
Process: Economic Incentives
,
(Division of Research, Harvard
Business School, Boston; 1964). An interesting follow-on
of these studies is Fox, op.cit . An interesting discussion
of the differences between government-contractor transactions
and commercial transactions can be found in J.F. Gorgol,
The Military-Industrial Firm (Prager; New York; 1972), ch. 2.
59. See Peck and Scherer, op.cit
.
, ch. 3, and J.M. Suarez, "Profits
and Performance of Aerospace Defense Contractors," Journal of
Economic Issues (vol. 10; no. 2; June 1976), pp. 386-402, for
more on the non-market character of the weapons acquisition
process.
60. It should be noted, however, that prior to World War II this
commercial- like process was heavily relied on to generate
new ideas for military aircraft. Ibid
.
, ch. 4.
61. See Aerospace Industries Association of America, Monopsony
:
A Fundamental Problem in Government Procurement (Washington,
D.C.; May 1973) and Stanford Research Institute, "The Industry-
Government Aerospace Relationship," two volumes (Menlo Park,
CA; May 1963).
62. See Fox, op. cit
. , pp. 256-257, 467-471. An interesting theo-
retical discussion of the bidding process can be found in
D.P. Baron, "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding,"
American Economic Review (vol. 62; no. 3; June 1972), pp.
384-394; C.C. Blaydon and P.W. Marshall, "Incentive Contracts
and Competitive Bidding: Comment," American Economic Review
(vol. 64; no. 6; December 1974), pp. 1070-1071; and D.P. Baron,
"Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding: Reply," American




64. Due to the abandonment of 'total package procurement 1 this
latter risk has been reduced substantially in recent years.





65. See footnote 42.
66. See the references listed in footnote 38.
67. See A.M. Agapos and L.E. Gallaway, "Defense Profits and the
Renegotiation Board in the Aerospace Industry," Journal of
Political Economy (vol. 78; no. 5; September/October 1970),
pp. 1093-1105; Weidenbaum, op.cit. , pp. 70-72; and J.F.
Weston, ed., Procurement and Profit Renegotiation




69. The six factors are the following: the efficiency of the
contractor, the reasonableness of cost and profits, the
amount and source of public and private capital employed,
the extent of risk assumed, the nature and the extent of
the contribution to the defense effort, and the character










p. 72. Weidenbaum argues that the
board's preoccupation with profits rather than costs is
not in the taxpayer's best interests since cost levels and
cost overruns are so much greater in magnitude than profits.
He argues that the board should pay greater attention to the
reasonableness of contractor costs.
72. C. Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of Military Research and
Development," in E. Mansfield, ed
.
, Defense, Science, and
Public Policy (W.W. Norton; New York; 1968), p. 119. See
also Harr, op.cit.
,




73. See, for example, J. Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest,
and Capital (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1970),
p. 215; Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.cit. , p. 2; and
D. Vickers, The Theory of the Firm: Production, Capital,
and Finance (McGraw-Hill; New York; 1968), p. 7.
74. F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin;
New York; 1921).
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75. G.C. Philippatos, Financial Management Theory and Techniques
(Holden-Day; San Francisco; 1971), pp. 69-70.
76. Ibid.
, p. 70, and J.C. Van Home, Financial Management and
Policy
, 2nd ed. (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.;
1971), pp. 46, 198-200.
77. See, for example, Risk Elements in Government Contracting
,
op. cit.
78. As, for example, the Profit '76 Study. See footnote 56 for
reference.
79. Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op. cit
.
, pp. 2-4.
80. These measures are the ones suggested by Van Home. See
footnote 76 for page references.
81. J.R. Kurth, "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy
(no. 11; summer 1973), pp. 43-46, or J.R. Kurth, "Aerospace
Production Lines and American Defense Spending," in S. Rosen,
ed. , Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex
(D.C. Heath; Lexington, Mass.; 1973), pp. 142-144.
82. For a view of the weapons procurement process contrary to
Kurth' s see A. Kanter and S.J. Thorson, "The Weapons Pro-
curement Process: Choosing Among Competing Theories," in
Rosen, op. cit.
, pp. 157-196.
83. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 1975 Annual Report (Fairchild
Industries, Inc; Germantown, MD.)
,
p. 3.
84. Aerospace Profits vs. Risks
y
op .cit.
, p. 2, makes the same
point, although it adopts 'the probability of obtaining
profits substantially below a competitive average' as the
definition of financial risk and suggests 'a firm's dis-
persion (as measured by standard deviation, coefficient of
variation, or skewness) in the rate of return from its trended
mean' as the best statistical measure of overall risk. Ibid.
y
p. 10. The Profit '76 study chose the standard deviation of
the firm's rate of return from its mean over a ten-year period
as its measure of the firm's financial risk. See footnote 56
for a reference.
85. These might also be called research and development risks. Ibid
pp. 2-3. See also Harr, op. cit
.
,
p. 13. For a practical ex-
ample of these risks see "A plague of faulty fighter engines,"
Business Week (August 25, 1975), and "Grumman Confirms Engine
Problems Of F14 Navy Plane," Wall Street Journal (May 21, 1976).
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86. See Aerospace Profits vs. Risks
,
op.cit.
, pp. 2-3. In
particular, the failure to make the required advance in
one area, for example, designing a radar system of the
required size and weight, may necessitate design changes
in other parts of the system, for example, redesigning
other aircraft components to make them smaller and ligh-





88. Defense Procurement Circular No. 76-3 , op.cit.
,
p. 12.
89. Over time the impact of this source of risk may be dulled
by what Kurth calls the 'follow-on imperative*: about
the time one major government contract phases out another
one phases in. See Kurth, Why We Buy the Weapons We Do
,
op.cit.
, pp. 38-42, or Kurth, Aerospace Production Lines
and American Defense Spending , op.cit.
, pp. 139-142, for
supporting evidence. The reference provided in footnote
82 takes a position contrary to Kurth 's. However, the
observed pattern of follow-on awards may not, in the opinion
of this writer, be the result of government policy designed
to help prospective have-nots, but rather, may simply re-
flect the significant advantages - such as grasp of related
technology, trained labor force, available production fa-
cilities, etc. - a contractor has in bidding on follow-on
contracts.
90. See Sherman, op.cit., pp. 153-154.






93. The twin problems of incurring greater overall cost risk
through subcontracting, while at the same time shifting
cost risk onto subcontractors, become somewhat greater
when work is subcontracted on an international basis, as
it has been on the F-16.
94. Business Week estimates that overcapacity in the U.S. aero-
space industry as of January 1977 might have been as high





p. 58. The impact of such overcapacity is partly mitigated











p. 13, and Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.cit.
p. 5.
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and A shakeout for U.S. fighter-plane makers
y
op.cit.
97. See N. Rosenberg "On technological expectations," Economic Journal
(vol. 86; no. 343; September 1976), pp. 523-535. Introducing
an airplane 'too soon' would give competitors an opportunity
to observe market demand and to modify their aircraft to
suit better the needs of potential buyers, while introducing
it 'too late' would let the competitors capture a dominant
position in the market place. Exactly this sort of problem
confronts Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and their decisions
as to when to introduce the next generation of commercial jet
aircraft. See "The Next Commercial Jet . . . If," Business
Week (April 12, 1976).
98. As, for example, Northrop 's and McDonnell Douglas's joint
venture on the F-18. Joint commercial ventures across in-
ternational boundaries are also likely. See "I'm McDonnell
Dassault, buy me," The Economist (August 21, 1976), and




99. In the case of the McDonnell Douglas - Northrop joint venture,
each will act as a prime contractor on a different version of
the same basic aircraft - McDonnell Douglas on the U.S. Navy
version and Northrop on the land-based foreign version of








100. This was made clear to the author in the course of interviews
with executives of the nine firms listed in footnote 1, and in
particular, during his interview with Joseph G. Gavin, Jr.,
President of Grumman Corp.
101. Government-furnished fixed capital accounts for less than 20
percent of the aerospace industry's total fixed capital.
Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op .cit . , pp. 5-6.
102. This is one of the intentions of the Profit '76 study's recom-
mendations, namely, to get defense contractors to purchase






103. Working capital requirements, expressed per dollar of sales,
are higher in the aerospace industry than in other durable
goods industries because of the long lead times for develop-
ment and the high cost of skilled engineering and technical
talent. The government funds at least one-half of the aero-






104. The desirability of government-furnished capital is a question
debated among the military airframe builders. On the one hand,
Northrop believes that contractors should own all their own
facilities and bear all the financial and business risks -
even to the extent of doing development work under fixed-
price contracts - and receive greater profits accordingly,
while on the other hand, Grumman believes that DOD should
provide a large portion of the capital and shoulder a large
share of the risks, particularly those associated with research




p. 58. Based on personal interviews, this writer's conclusion
is that the Grumman viewpoint is shared by most, but not all,
of the other major military airframe builders.
105. See Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.cit . , pp. 10-11; Risk
Elements in Government Contracting , op.cit . , ch. 1; and
F.T. Moore, "Incentive Contracts," in S. Enke, ed. , Defense
Management (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1967),
ch. 12.
106. Ibid., ch. 12; O.W. Williamson, "The Economics of Defense
Contracting: Incentives and Performance," in R.N. McKean,ed.,
Issues in Defense Economics (Columbia University Press; New
York; 1967), pp. 217-256; F.M. Scherer, "The Theory of
Contractual Incentives for Cost Reduction," Quarterly Journal
of Economics (vol. 78; no. 2; May 1964, pp. 257-280; J.J. McCall,
"The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting," American
Economic Review (vol. 60; no. 5; December 1970), pp. 837-846;
and M.E. Canes, "The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting:
Note," American Economic Review (vol. 65; no. 3; June 1975),
pp. 478-483. The Scherer paper is particularly noteworthy
because it offers empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis
that defense contractors are risk averse. Scherer, The Theory




107. These basic contract types, as well as several variations, are
discussed in Evans, Margulis, and Yoshpe, op .cit .
108. Defense Procurement Circular No. 76-3 , op.cit. , pp. 12-15.
See also Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.cit. , p. 10.
109. An extreme case in which virtually all risk was borne by the
contractor was the 'total package procurement' policy intro-
duced by Robert McNamara when he was Secretary of Defense.
Under total package procurement, companies were forced to bid
on a fixed-price contract covering both development and pro-
duction, and, as Lockheed's experience on the C-5A transport
contract and Grumman' s experience on the F-14 contract attest,
the contractor's risk of severe financial loss due to such
factors as inflation and unforseen costs were intolerably
high, and as a result, total package procurement has been
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abandoned in favor of separate contracts for development and
production, with the former normally on a cost-plus basis and
with the latter normally on a FPI basis for the early stages















112. For example, Fairchild Industries 's attempts to develop its
communications business (see "A Last Run For The Money,"
Forbes (May 15, 1976)) and Rockwell International's acqui-
sition of Admiral Corp. and many other commercially oriented
companies (see "Rockwell walks a rough road to profits,"
Business Week (November 3, 1975) and "Rockwell's surprising
winner: Collins Radio," Business Week (November 15, 19/6)).
In addition, General Dynamics recently announced its inten-
tion to look for potential non-aerospace commercial acquisi-
tions (see "General Dynamics Sees Bright Future On Strength
of Tanker, Fighter Projects," Wall Street Journal (January
27, 1977)).
113. The difference between the median values of the average
return on equity is so much smaller than the difference
between the median values for the average return on total
capital because a significant portion of the major airframe
builders' total capital is provided by the government and
because the major airframe builders tend to have higher
debt-equity ratios than firms in other industries. In
addition, the difference in Table VI-5 between median return
on total capital for the airframe builders and for all in-
dustries probably understates the true difference because
'total capital' in the table excludes human capital, of
which the aerospace industry has proportionately more than
other industries.
114. More rigorously, a difference of medians test was performed.
See W.L. Hays, Statistics (Holt, Rinehart and Winston;
New York; 1973), pp. 194-197. Testing the null hypothesis
that the average rate of return on equity for the nine major
airframe builders has the same distribution as the average
rate of return on equity for the other eight aerospace firms




against the alternative hypothesis that the other eight firms
have a higher median return yielded a critical (at the .05
level) score of six. Since the 'other' sample had only five
values above the grand median, the null hypothesis could not
be rejected. Since, by inspection, the industry median and
the all-industry median are not significantly different, the
conclusion stated in the text follows.
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115. Several other studies have reached the same conclusion.
For example, see Weidenbaum, op.cit.
, pp. 69-70. It
should be emphasized that this conclusion carries no im-
plication regarding the question of whether profits are
adequate in relation to risks. Further, it should be
noted that if either of the other two measures of profit-
ability in Table VI-5 are used as the basis of comparison -
as they often are in studies sponsored by the aerospace
industry - then the opposite conclusion is drawn, namely,
that aerospace profits are significantly lower than profits
in other industries. See Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.
cit.
, pp. 13-17.
116. See Rockwell walks a rough road to profits , op.cit. , for
a discussion of these acquisitions and the growth motive
that lay behind them.
117. This dominance is, of course, one factor that tends to
discourage potential entrants.
118. See R.C. Fraser, A.D. Donheiser, and T.G. Miller, Jr.,
Civil Aviation Development: A Policy and Operations
Analysis (Praeger; New York; 1972), pp. 9-12.
119. Both to replace older, less fuel efficient aircraft and
to meet new federal noise standards. See Harr, op.cit.
,




120. See Nation's Airlines Face A Key Problem: How To Pay for
New Planes
,
op.cit. The problems, financial and other-
wise, that confront the commercial aircraft end of the
aerospace industry are discussed in R.C. Fraser, A.D.
Donheiser, and T.G. Miller, Jr., op.cit.





p. 14. As a result, losses can be large.




pp. 14-15. The significance of foreign sales
and foreign competition is discussed in the next subsection.
124. Ibid
., pp. 15-16.
125. For example, Fairchild Industries is experiencing large
losses in trying to start up its communications business
and plans to use the profits it hopes to earn on its A-10
contract to pay these start-up costs. See A Last Run For
The Money
, op.cit. As a second example, Lockheed has ex-
perienced large losses on its L-1011 TriStar program, but
due to its profitable defense business, is able to meet
bond interest payments. "Haack at Lockheed proclaims an
upturn," Business Week (June 28, 1976.)
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126. This point was made hy several of the executives inter-
viewed by the author. Problems these firms face in trying
to diversify into commercial markets are discussed in
J.S. Gilmore and D.C. Coddington, Defense Industry Diversi-
fication (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
Washington, D.C; January 1966).





Rockwell's surprising winner: Collins Radio , op.cit. An
earlier study by Gilmore and Coddington reached the oppo-
site conclusion, namely, that aerospace firms favor growth
by internal means. Gilmore and Coddington, op.cit. How-
ever, their study covered a time period in which the growth
prospects in these firms' traditional markets were excellent.
Since the managers of these firms were preoccupied with
developments in their traditional markets, it is not sur-
prising that Gilmore and Coddington found that the degree of
diversification undertaken by these firms was insignificant
in terms of its impact on company sales and profits.






129. During interviews conducted by the author, executives of
several of the firms that are more heavily dependent on
government sales expressed a desire to see their companies
expand their commercial operations enough to attain a 50-50
sales split between government and non-government business.
David S. Lewis , Chairman of General Dynamics Corp., has also
stated publicly his company's goal of a 50-50 sales split.
See "General Dynamics renews its Pentagon romance," Business
Week (February 3, 1975).
130. However, as several aerospace executives have recognized,
government sales can provide stability when commercial demand
weakens - provided the business cycle and the political







132. "Anatomy of the Arms Trade," Newsweek (September 6,1976).
133. See, for example, L. Kraar, "Grumman Still Flies For Navy,
But It Is Selling the World," Fortune (February 1976). Over
the last decade Northrop Corp.'s major product has been the F-5
,
the market for which has been almost entirely overseas. See
"The New Adventures of Tom Jones," The New York Times (Sep-
tember 19, 1976).
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134. See "Belgium Joins Others, Picks U.S. -Built F-16," Wall
Street Journal (June 9, 1975); "The Politics Of The F-16,"
Forbes (December 15, 1976); and "NATO Defense Chiefs Agree
in Principle To Buy AWACS if Financing Is Settled," Wall
Street Journal (December 9, 1976).
135. Harr, op.cit.
, p. 16. For a practical example, see "Iran
Seeks 300 General Dynamics F-16s, Near Double of What U.S.
Agreed to Sell," Wall Street Journal (September 13, 1976).
136. See "Lockheed Signs $1.03 Billion Agreement With Canada for
Planes, Related Work," Wall Street Journal (July 22, 1976);
Belgium Joins Others, Picks U.S. -Built F-16
,
op.cit. ; and




137. See "Buying guns to sell planes," Business Week (June 23,
1975).
138. See "European Members of NATO Strive to Build Weapons Industry




p. 15. The foreign-owned airlines have also
contributed greatly to overcapacity on international routes,
and, to the extent that such overcapacity has hurt the U.S.
international airlines financially, this may have had a detri-
mental impact on commercial aircraft sales of the U.S. aero-
space industry. See T. O'Hanlon, "The Mess That Made Beggars
of Pan Am and T.W.A.," Fortune (October 1974).
140. See "Air Transportation: The Real Issues," Government Exec -






142. See Free-world partners plan .jets for the 1980s
,
op.cit.
143. These longer periods are, in one case, a short term planning
period of five years and a long term planning period of ten
years, and in the other case, a short term planning period of
two years and a long term planning period of seven years.
The other seven firms use the one year and five year time
horizons stated in the text.
144 In many cases there is more than one division, as for example,
McDonnell Aircraft Company, which produces mainly military
aircraft, and Douglas Aircraft Company, which produces mainly
commercial aircraft (and which was a separate company until
taken over by McDonnell in 1965) of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
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145. In several cases, such as LTV's Vought Corp., the aero-
space operations are centralized in a wholly owned sub-
sidiary, rather than a division, and the parent company
is a holding company. For the purposes of this chapter,
the distinction between a division and a wholly owned
subsidiary is not an important one since it does not af-
fect the corporate planning process.
146. These are discussed in chapter two of this thesis
147. See section G in chapter two of this thesis.
148. See section II in chapter two of this thesis.
149. For the eight of the nine firms that have a company presi-
dent - General Dynamics has instead three executive vice
presidents with specific area responsibilities within
which each serves in the same capacity as the president of





) - that individual (and often one
or more other top executives) sits on the board of directors
150. Major shareholders are particularly influential at McDonnell
Douglas and Rockwell, where they hold top management posi-
tions, including chairman of the board of directors, and
at General Dynamics, where the major shareholder personally
recruited the chairman of the board of directors. See
Rockwell walks a rough road to profits , op .cit. , which de-
scribes Chairman Willard F. Rockwell's role in determining
Rockwell International's objectives, and General Dynamics:
Winning in the Aerospace Game , op.cit . , which describes the
influence of the firm's largest stockholder, Henry Crown.
151. To make the author's view of the typical airframe builder's
objectives more clear, it is his belief that each of the
three theories - traditional, managerial, and behavorial -
has something to contribute to the overall understanding
of these firms' objectives, though any one of the three
on its own gives an incomplete picture.




153. The question of weapons system quality and the preferences
of the U.S. government with regard to quality, cost, and




154. This carryover effect is probably stronger the greater is
the technological complementarity between the particular
commercial product and the firm's high technology military
aircraft, e.g. it is likely to be stronger for commercial
aircraft than for such items as refrigerators or canoes.
155. The connection between proposed projects and managerial
emoluments may appear somewhat tenuous. In many cases,
however, a portion of managerial compensation is based on
an incentive compensation scheme, so that proposed pro-
jects can affect compensation through their impact on the
company's performance, For example, Boeing has an incentive
compensation plan. See The Boeing Company Form 10-K, op.
cit.
,
p. 14 and Exhibit 15.
156. For eight of the nine firms - Rockwell, whose fiscal year
ends September 30, is the exception - the fiscal year
parallels the calendar year. Unfortunately, the one ex-
ception makes it necessary to describe the planning cycle
in terms of quarters (of the fiscal year) , rather than in
terms of calendar months.
157. For example, if the objective is held to be expected util-
ity maximization, then specifying the appropriate utility
function involves theoretical, as well as practical, diffi-
culties. See G.M. Heal, The Theory of Economic Planning
(American Elsevier; New York; 1973), ch. 2.
158. For example, formulating the planning problem as a non-
linear programming problem that contained an objective
function that reflected not only the objectives discussed
in section C, but also the existence of uncertainty, and
that also contained the many constraints needed to charac-
terize the real-world planning problem, might lead to any
one, or possibly several, of the problems often encountered
in trying to solve large scale nonlinear programming prob-
lems. See H.M. Wagner, Principles of Operations Research,
2nd ed. (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1975),
chs. 14-15.
159. A third reason could be added to the two already mentioned:
a basic distrust of planning models. Several of the plan-
ning executives interviewed by the author were steadfast
in their belief that planning models of any kind - whether
of the mathematical programming variety, of the simulation
variety, or of some other variety - would disrupt, rather
than promote, the long term and short term planning process.
160. The notion of a planning process that is optimal in the
sense of being most cost effective, rather than in the sense
of leading to an optimal solution to the planning problem,
is analogous to Baumol's and Quandt's optimally imperfect
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rules of thumb for business decisions. See W.J. Baumol
and R.E. Quandt, "Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect
Decisions," American Economic Review (vol.54; no. 2;
March 1964)., pp, 23-46,
161. The terms 'division' and 'divisional', it should be re-
emphasized, are used to refer to the principal operating
units of the corporation. These principal operating
units are variously referred to as companies (e.g. Douglas
Aircraft Company and McDonnell Aircraft Company of McDonnell
Douglas Corp.), as divisions (e.g. Convair Division and
Fort Worth Division of General Dynamics Corp.), as subsidi-
aires (e.g. Vought Corp of LTV Corp. and Grumman Aerospace
Corp. of Grumman Corp.), and as groups (e.g. Admiral Group
of Rockwell International Corp.). Often the principal
operating units will themselves have divisions, but in what
follows the focus is on the principal operating units, and
the terms 'division' and 'divisional' refer to these units
only and not to their subdivisions.
162. See the previous footnote.
163. Note that the three plans outline the division's needs for
three classes of resources. The technical plan deals with
human capital resources; the manpower and production plan
deals essentially with labor resources (although managerial
talent also contains a large human capital component); and
the facilities plan deals with physical capital resources.
164. See footnotes 3 and 94.
165. It is almost universially accepted within the industry that
once a new weapons program appears in the Five Year Defense
Plan it is generally too late to begin the research and de-
velopment process for that program.
166. Also, as will be pointed out in the next section, it is the
division's responsibility, in formualting the operating plan,
to allocate sufficient manpower and funds to form the required
bid and proposal teams for those new programs on which the
company (through the division) intends to bid.
167. Early Revival Unlikely As Jumbo-Plane Sales Continue to
Languish , op. cit
.
168. Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed are doing this, but
Boeing's 747 production line and McDonnell Douglas's DC-10
production line were each operating at approximately 20% of
capacity at the end of 1976. Ibid .
169. See "Swissair Seeks to Launch New DC9 Model With Order to
McDonnell Douglas Corp,." Wall Street Journal (January 20,
1977).
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170. For example, an airplane that costs $30 million to build
will involve an interest cost of $250,000 for every month
it remains unsold (assuming an annual interest rate of 10
percent
.)




172. See, for example, T.W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital
(Free Press; New York; 1971); R.A. Wykstra, ed., Human
Capital Formation and Manpower Development (Free Press; New
York; 1971) j B.F. Kiker, ed., Investment in Human Capital
(University of South Carolina Press; Columbia, S.C.; 1971);
F. Welch, "Education in Production," Journal of Political
Economy (vol. 78; no. 1; January-February 1970), pp. 35-59;
and G.S. Becker, Human Capital
, 2nd ed . (Columbia University
Press; New York; 1975)
.
173. Schultz, op.cit. , ch. 3.', B.F. Kiker, "The Historical Roots
of the Concept of Human Capital," in Kiker, op.cit.
, pp.
51-77; and Becker, op.cit. , ch. II. A broader definition
of human capital would also include the skills and know-how
embodied in the firm's production workers, but since the
focal point of this section is long term planning, and in par-
ticular, the allocation of scientists, engineers, designers,
and technicians, the narrower definition provided in the text
seems to this writer more appropriate.
174. The distinction between fixed capital and human capital, as
well as the distinction between these types of capital and
other types of capital, are discussed in the papers cited in
footnote 172.
175. Under the wider definition of human capital, which was men- '
tioned in footnote 173, one would have to include also the
services of human capital (embodied in production workers)
that are provided during the production phase of the pro-
gram. This particular flow of human capital services under-
lies the learning curve discussed in section B.
176. This is particularly important in the airframe industry,
where, as discussed in section B, a significant portion
of the total fixed capital is provided by the government.
177. One of the consequences of the human capital embodied in
aerospace engineers and scientists may be the existence of a
segmented labor market for persons embodying these skills
and knowledge. This body of theory is discussed in G.G. Cain,
"The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox
Theory; A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature (vol, 14;
no. 4; December 1976), pp. 1215-1257.
1023
178. The difficulties and costs associated with trying to
evaluate a prospective employee's stock of human capi-
tal are discussed in J,G, Riley, "Information, Screening
and Human Capital," American Economic Review (vol. 66;
no. 2; May 1976), pp. 254-260.
179. And this is likely to become increasingly important as
the Department of Defense implements its new design-to-
cost policy. The policy is outlined in several DOD
and service instructions beginning with Department of
Defense Directive 5000.28, "Design to Cost" (May 23,
1975) . The concept of design to cost is explained in
J.J. Bennett, "Design to Cost", Commander's Digest
(vol. 19; no. 17; August 12, 1976).
180. These firms' reluctance to lay off key engineering
personnel, for example, has led to accusations of
hoarding of engineering personnel. Several studies
have provided evidence that engineering talent is
being wasted in jobs that require only routine skills.
See Peck and Scherer, op.cit.
, pp. 515-517. This sup-
posed 'hoarding' may, in the opinion of this writer,
still be less costly to the firm than a policy of
hiring and firing due to the potentially high costs




182. The two exceptions are noted in footnote 143. In each
of these cases, however, the first year's operating
plan is given in the greatest detail and is presented
in the form of a budget.
183. The budget preparation process is described in manage-
ment accounting textbooks. See, for example, R.N. Anthony
and G.A. Welsch, Fundamentals of Management Accounting
(Irwin; Homewood, 111; 1974), ch. 11.
184. In some cases, however, the projections for the first few
years of the long term plan are broken out on a quarter-
by-quarter basis.
185. The overhead rate is a ratio that is applied to the cost
of an hour of direct labor in order to allocate indirect
costs, such as general and administrative expenses, de-
preciation and maintenance, utilities, etc., over the
goods produced. Often several different overhead rates
are used. For example, government procurement regulations
favor the following three: a manufacturing overhead rate,
an engineering overhead rate, and a general and adminis-
trative expenses overhead rate. See Defense Procurement
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Circular No. 76-3 , op.cit. , p, 11. A general discussion
of overhead rates and their computation can be found in
Anthony and Welsch, op.cit.
, pp. 70-74. Using their
terminology, the contractor and the government negotiate
a 'predetermined overhead rate' for each overhead cost
pool once a year. The evaluation of overheads as part
of determining contractor fees is discussed in Defense
Procurement Circular No. 76-3
>
op.cit
. , pp. 11-12. The
apparent tendency for contractors to try to include in-
direct labor as direct labor in order to reduce the over-
head rates and appear more efficient than they really are
is argued in Peck and Scherer, op.cit.
,
pp. 517-519.
186. This is not meant to suggest that such 'assistance' is
always welcomed by the contractor.
187. Recently, as one result of the Profit '76 study, the
weight attached to contractor performance in determining
the fee to be earned on a contract has been reduced from







189. Due to the importance of meeting delivery schedules, there
may be a tendency for firms to overman. See Peck and
Scherer, op.cit.
, pp. 516-517. Such overmanning, to the
extent that it reduces the risk of late delivery (and poor
contract performance) and to the extent that the cost of
overmanning is borne by the government, constitutes a
transfer of risk from the contractor to the government.
190. See Early Revival Unlikely As Jumbo-Plane Sales Continue
to Languish
, op.cit.
191. Several executives interviewed by the author indicated that,
even when commercial demand is strong, these advance payments
seldom exceed 25% of production costs, as opposed to the
government's provision of progress payments covering 80% of
(allowable) costs.
192. Ibid.
193. This is not meant to imply that divisional managers always
wait until the corporate review to indicate problem areas,
although this may happen. Normally, serious problems are
called to the attention of top management as they arise,
and the corporate review process is one place where top
management can become forewarned of potential problem areas.
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VII. A MODEL OF A REPRESENTATIVE AIRFRAME BUILDER
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter six characterized the nine major military airframe
builders in the United States and described their long term
and short term planning processes. The purpose of this chapter
is to develop a model of a representative U.S. military air-
frame builder that can be used to study several of the issues
raised in chapter six, such as how the desire of these firms
to maintain stable employment for their skilled scientific
and engineering talent affects their behavior. The development
of the airframe builder model proceeds via several modifications
of the author's basic theoretical model described and analyzed
in chapters three through five of this thesis.
While there have been many studies of both the U.S. aero-
space industry and the government-contractor relationship
2during the weapons acquisition process, there have been few
attempts to model a defense contractor. Scherer, McCall,
and Baron have developed models of contractor behavior that
are mainly concerned with the effects that incentive contracts
3have on contractor bidding and contractor performance.
All three models assume that the firm is of the traditional
4 5type. Gorgol has developed a simulation model and Jones
has specified a production-investment-finance model of a
representative contractor. Both these studies were mainly
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concerned with model formulation - indeed, both carefully
tried to formulate a 'realistic' model. Gorgol's study yielded
few analytical results, as it was that author's intention
to try to simulate actual behavior, rather than to explore
changes in contractor behavior in response to changes in
government policy. Jones's study did not deal with analytical
issues as it is that author's intention to treat these topics
in later papers.
In this chapter, two versions of the airframe builder
model are developed, one without progress payments and the
other with progress payments, and the operating and financial
policies suggested by the two models are compared in order
to evaluate the impact of the government's policy of granting
progress payments to cover a portion of a contractor's costs
under ongoing production contracts. The chapter begins
with the development of the airframe builder model without
progress payments. The model employs the time-state-preference
approach to modeling uncertainty and takes into account
o
contractor risk aversion. The model is used in section C
to derive a representative airframe builder's optimal operating
and financial policies. In section D progress payments are
incorporated into the model. The implications of progress
payments are derived by comparing the optimal operating and
financial policies obtained from this version of the model
with those obtained in section C. The airframe builder
model is also used to study the impact of other aspects of
government procurement policy on contractor behavior. In
particular, several of the implications of the new design-
to-cost policy and the recent Profit '76 study are explored
in section E.
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B. THE AIRFRAME BUILDER MODEL
The purpose of this section is to develop the basic model
of a representative airframe builder for the special case
in which progress payments are not needed because the flow
of cash from the government to the contractor matches perfectly
the recognition of revenue and profit by the contractor.
The model described below is an extension of the model of
the expected collective utility maximizer set out and analyzed
in chapters three through five of this thesis. As described
below, the modifications to the theoretical model are made
in accordance with the analysis of the planning processes
of the major military airframe builders presented in chapter
six. The further generalization of the model to incorporate
progress payments is carried out in section D.
As in chapters three through five, it is assumed that
the firm has a finite planning horizon of length T periods.
As indicated in chapter six, in most cases T = 5 years, though
in one case T = 7 years and in another case T = 10 years.
For this reason T is left arbitrary. In addition, T is measured
in discrete time units. It is convenient to treat both short
term planning and long term planning within the same basic
model, so that the units in which T is measured are referred
to as 'periods'. It is to be understood that the discrete
'period' stands for 'year' in the case of long term planning
and for 'quarter' in the case of short term planning.
As in chapter four, it is assumed that at each time t
there are S distinguishable states of nature. These are
designated s = 1, ..., S. The time periods are designated
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t=0, 1, ..., T, where t = denotes the present, at which
the state of nature is assumed known with certainty. Henceforth,
the double subscript t,s, 1 < t < T, 1 < s < S, will designate
the state of nature s at time t.
The states of nature s call for further explanation.
The possible states of nature at each time t are meant to reflect
the different possible actions by the government or by competitors
that might somehow affect the firm in question, as well as
the different possible states of commercial demand (i.e. the
business cycle), the different possible acts of nature that
might affect the firm (e.g. a flood or a fire destroying a
plant), and other conditions of the firm's operating environ-
ment that might have a nonnegligible impact on the firm.
It is assumed that the alternative states of nature lie beyond
the firm's control (which, as discussed in section K of chapter
two, is a standard assumption made in employing the time-state-
preference framework), although it is assumed that the possible
states at each time t are known and that the firm can attach
a (possibly subjective) probability to each.
In terms of the representative airframe builder's planning
process, the states of nature s correspond to the different
scenarios that are identified in (or at least, might be identified
as a result of) the environmental forecast. The planning
process takes these alternative states of nature into account
through the development of contingency plans, which set out
the actions to be taken by the firm contingent upon the
realization of any particular state of nature (i.e. scenario)
s at time t.
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During the planning period the firm will work under many
different government contracts, some of which it has already
won and others of which it will bid on successfully. In
addition, there will be contracts on which it will bid un-
successfully. In what follows it is important to distinguish
among these contracts because each involves a specific output,
a distinctive technology, and hence a separate decision problem
12for the firm. Since the government contracting process
treats manufacturing contracts differently from research
and development, test and evaluation contracts, as discussed
in chapter six, it is also important to distinguish between
13these two classes of contracts. In formulating the model
the subscript c is used to distinguish among contracts.
The aerospace research and development contracts under which
the firm is working and on which it intends to bid are numbered
c = 1, ..., C-. . The aerospace manufacturing contracts under
which the firm is working and on which it intends to bid are
numbered c = C. +1, . . .
,
C-, + Cp. The non-aerospace govern-
ment contracts under which the firm is working and on which
it intends to bid are numbered c = C. + C 2 + 1 , • • • , C- + C2 + Co.
In what follows the set of aerospace research and development






Similarly, the sets of aerospace manufacturing contracts and
non-aerospace government contracts in force at time t in state
s are denoted by C„ and C„ , respectively, and theJ 2,t,s 3,t,s' * J
collection of all government contracts in force at time t







In this chapter it is assumed that the market for contingent
14
output claims is incomplete. It is also assumed that for
each period t, £ t <_ T, and for each possible state of
nature s at each time t, a (possibly imperfectly competitive)
market will exist for each of the contractor's commercial
goods and a perfect market will exist for each of the inputs
employed by the firm. Thus, in the model of the representative
airframe builder developed below, the contractor will be able
to select alternative output levels for each date and state
(t, s) for each good and will also be able to select alternative
input usage levels for each date and state for each input
it employs. But the incompleteness assumption means that
these are alternative output and input levels only. In
the model developed below no trading in contingent claims
of any sort takes place. As in the model presented in section
E of chapter four it is assumed that inputs for date t and
state s are purchased and output for date t and state s
is produced and sold at time t only after state s has been
realized.
On the basis of the discussion of the objectives of the
airframe builders in section C of chapter six, the objective
functional of the model of the firm is assumed to take the
form of the maximization of discounted expected utility,
where the discounting takes place over the period t = to
t = T; where the expectation is taken over the states of
nature (at each time t); and where utility is expressed
as a function of several arguments that reflect the sources
of satisfaction to these firms. The first subsection formulates
the objective functional.
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1. The Objective Functional
As discussed in section C of chapter six, the
objectives of the representative military airframe builder
can be grouped into five classes: sales, net income,
weapons system effectiveness, contract backlogs, and
managerial emoluments.
To take into account the interest of these firms
in diversification, the following four sales goals are
specified in the model: total revenue earned on aero-
space sales to the government, RrA ! total revenue earned
on sales of other goods to the government, Rro ; total
revenue earned on commercial aerospace sales, Rp. ; and
total revenue earned on sales of other commercial products,
RpQ. In addition, there is a net income goal, tt ; a set
of weapons system effectiveness/contract performance goals,
~ 15
E; a backlogs goal, B; and a managerial emoluments
goal, M. The sales, net income, and managerial emoluments
goals are stated for each time period and each state
of nature, and the weapons system effectiveness/contract
performance goal is stated as a set of contract-specific
goals for each time period and each state of nature.
Because contract backlogs in any one period are directly
related to government sales in future periods, the contract
backlogs goal is stated as of the planning horizon t = T
to avoid redundancy. To allow for the value to the firm
of commercial sales, net income, etc., beyond the planning
horizon, the terminal capital stock
}
K(T), also needs to
be allowed for in the objective functional.
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In the model of the representative military air-
frame builder the objective functional is:
T
max { ^WRGA,t,s ; RGO,t,s ; RCA,t,s, ; RCO,t,s ;




where E denotes expectation with respect to the states
of nature; where IL and \J are assumed to be concave
and twice dif ferentiable with strictly positive first
partial derivatives; where r is the exogenously determined
1 7
rate of discount (which is assumed to remain constant);
where the brackets around E denote a vector the arguments
of which pertain to the respective contracts in force at
time t in state s; and where the arguments of the utility
functions are as defined above.
2. The Constraints
In the model under development, the objective
of the representative military airframe builder is to select
the values of certain decision variables, which have
yet to be specified, so as to maximize (1) subject to
certain constraints, which also need to be specified.
These constraints, which are formulated in this subsection,
define the permissible ranges of values of the decision
variables and also relate the decision variables to the
arguments of the utility functions in (1).
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One of the firm's decisions involves the selection
of input levels. The productive resources of the firm are
18divided into the following five classes: capital furnished
Cby the contractor, which is denoted by K ; capital furnished
19 Gby the government, which is denoted by K ; manufacturing
Mlabor, which is denoted by L ; administrative labor, which
Ais denoted by L ; and engineering and scientific labor,
F C
which is denoted by L . In the model K is treated as
exogenously determined. In particular, it is one of the
government's procurement policy parameters.
—
C
Let K denote the available stock of contractor-
furnished capital and let K denote the available stock
of government-furnished capital. Since the amount of
capital allocated to production cannot exceed capacity,
the constraints
KC . < KG et , s — t , s
K°+ < K
G
+t , s — t , s
(2)
must be satisfied for each state s and each time t. It
is assumed that capital of each type is homogeneous; but
it is not required that contractor-furnished capital and
government-furnished capital be perfectly substitutable
for one another in production under each government contract.
It should be noted that government-furnished capital can
be used only in production under government contracts; it
is provided to the contractor rent-free and its depreciation
does not constitute a cost to the contractor. Contractor-
furnished capital can be used in either government or commercial
production; its use involves a cost to the contractor,
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and both depreciation and imputed interest are allowable
20
costs under government contracts. It is assumed that
contractor-furnished capital depreciates at a constant
percentage rate, 6, so that the constraint
—C —C —C —C
AIT, o e IT. o - IT. 1 , = I. - 6-K
U
+ (3)t,s t,s t-l,s' t,s t,s
must be satisfied for each state s and each time t, where
K . denotes contractor-furnished capital at time t in
state s; where s' is used to denote the possible states
of nature at time t - 1 in order to distinguish them from
the possible states of nature at time t; where it is
assumed that investment is made at the beginning of the
period and that depreciation is reckoned on the basis
of the current period's capital stock; and where 1^* * t , s
denotes the contractor's investment in capital at time
t in state s.
The firm's choice of input mix is determined
at least in part by the technology of production. Following
Jones, the technological relationship between inputs and
outputs for production under government contracts is
21
treated as contract specific. That is, there is a
separate production function for each contract. The
general production function for each government contract
is denoted by








[ ] denotes a vector
c = 1, . .., c 1 ,
c
1















t = 1, ..., T
s = 1, . . . , S
Q, denotes output under contract c at time t in state s
c t , s
E^ denotes overall product effectiveness/contract performance
22
under contract c at time t in state s
MThe quantity L . denotes the amount of manufacturing
labor allocated to contract c at time t in state of nature
s, and the other input variables are interpreted analogously.
It is assumed that the production function (4) for each
contract c has a full set of continuous second partial
derivatives. There is a production function of the form




to (4), the quantity of output at each time t and in each
state of nature s is defined as an implicit function of
the alternative amounts of output possible at different
times t and in alternative states of nature s and also of
the amounts of manufacturing labor, administrative labor,
engineering and scientific labor, contractor-furnished
capital, and government-furnished capital assigned at
each time t and in each state s to meet the terms of that
contract. It is assumed that F„ is defined in such a way
that inputs applied in production in period t cannot be
transformed into period t - 1 or earlier period outputs
23(i.e. that the use of inputs precedes output).
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It is assumed that the firm produces two commercial
products, one aerospace and the other non-aerospace.




where the subscript R denotes aerospace production and the
subscript N denotes non-aerospace production and where it
is assumed that each of FR and F„ has a full set of continuous
second partial derivatives. Note that the difference
between (4) and (5) is that the former include government-
24furnished capital and the latter do not.
The firm's choice of capital inputs must satisfy
(2), which may be reexpressed as:
C C C —C






TT J" p 1- t , S L , SU1 i,t,s' '
(6)
where it is required that both constraints be satisfied at
each time t and in each state of nature s, and where
each sum is taken over all government contracts in force
at time t in state s. In addition, it was noted in chapter
six that the airframe builders try to provide stable
employment for their engineers, scientists, and administrative
labor. One method of incorporating this into the model





















where L and L denote the exogenously determined constant
levels of administrative labor and engineering and scientific
labor, respectively; where (7) is required to hold at
each time t and in each state of nature s; and where each
sum is taken over all government contracts in force at
time t in state s. The implications of (7) are explored
25below in section E.
Turning next to the financial constraints, expressions
must be formulated for the various key entries, such as
net income, that appear in the firm's income statement,
balance sheet, statement of retained earnings, and statement
of sources and uses of cash. The discussion begins with
the development of expressions for revenue earned under
government contracts.
The level of sales earned under government contracts
is partly dependent on the type of contract. Research and
development contracts are typically of the cost-plus-
fixed-fee (CPFF) variety, while production contracts are
26typically of the fixed-price-incentive (FPI) variety.
"
In each case allowable costs include the opportunity cost
of fixed capital used in meeting the contract, where a
'cost of money rate' determined by the government is used
27
in calculating this imputed cost. Denote this cost of
money rate by i , which is exogenously determined in the
model below.
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Under research and development contracts total
revenue equals total allowable costs plus the fixed fee.
Total cost under a research and development contract at





O T M T A T EC, = w • L, +w A *L. +win , L J_
c t,s M c t,s A c t,s E c t,s
C (8 >
+ (i + D + 6)q. • K .v t , s /Ht ,s c t , s
,
where wM , w. , and wF are the exogenously determined unit
costs of manufacturing labor, administrative labor, and
engineering and scientific labor, respectively; where
q, is the unit price of capital goods at time t in state
Q
s; and where S*q • K , represents depreciation expense
(figured on a replacement cost basis) charged to the contract
In addition, there is a fee tt, , which the contractor
' c t , s
perceives as being set by the government. In general, the
contractor cannot be assured of being fully reimbursed for
all its costs. Some portion will normally be disallowed.
Therefore, even if the contractor is motivated to increase
revenue, and by implication total cost, as Williamson and
29
others have argued, the contractor's policy choices are
restricted by the possibility that a portion of the costs
already incurred will be disallowed (because disallowed
costs decrease net income). Let y, denote the fraction
of costs that the contractor perceives as allowable on
contract c at time t and in state of nature s. It is
reasonable to assume not only that y-j- s depends on actual
cost, but that it should, at least beyond the contract's














=1, if C < C*
< 1, if C > C*
=0, if C < C*
< 0, if C > C*
=0, if C < C*
dC z < 0, if C > C*
It follows, then, that total revenue earned under a research
and development contract , R, , is given by
R, = Y+ CL + TU , (10)c t,s c't,s c t,s c t,s ' v J
where C, is given by (8) and y, satisfies (9),
and the fee net of disallowed costs, it. , is given by
ff. „
= TT+.
- [1 " Y+ («C. )] C. , (11)c t,s c t,s c't,s c t,s c t,s ' v J
where the expression in brackets represents that portion of
total actual costs that are disallowed.
Turning next to production contracts, two cases
must be distinguished: initial production contracts, for
30
which bidding takes place, and follow-on production
contracts, for which bidding does not take place. In the
case of initial production contracts, the contractor makes
a bid C* , where the subscript t is included for consistency
c t , s *
with the notation adopted earlier in this section. Recall
that states of nature were assumed to be defined in such a
way that the potential actions of competitors (e.g. other
firms bidding on the same contract) were taken into account.
Assuming that a firm never bids on a contract that it does
not wish to win, the bid C* in state of nature s is
c t , s
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defined to be the maximum bid that will ensure the firm
of winning the contract In -dtatQ. ol natuiz -6, i.e. given
the state of the environment, bids by competitors, etc.,
that characterize state s. For subsequent production
contracts there is again a target cost C* that is
c t , s
dependent on the state of nature. But these target costs
are determined through negotiation between the contractor
and the government, rather than through competitive bidding.
Hence, even though the same symbol C* is used (for
notational convenience), the underlying meaning is different
according to whether it pertains to the first production
contract or to a follow-on production contract.
All production contracts are assumed to be of the
31
FPI type. The contract stipulates a target cost C*
and a target fee expressed as a proportion a, of the
target cost. Thus, the target fee is tt = a. '_C*. c •
The contract also specifies a sharing ratio, 8. , which
32gives the firm's share of overruns and underruns.
Following Scherer, absolute floors and ceilings on the
maximum amounts of overruns and underruns for which the
33
government is prepared to share responsibility are ignored,
although an implicit ceiling is built into the proportion
34
of allowable costs function y, . For each production
contract, the constants a. and 8, are treated as
35
exogenously determined, and the function y^ s ( cCt s^
is again assumed exogenously determined and to satisfy (9).
With actual costs, C. , given by (8), total revenue
earned on a production contract is given by
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Bt,s^cC*t,s " cY t,s ( cCt,s ) c^s"1 »
and the fee net of disallowed costs, tt
,
is given by
tt. = a, • C*ct,s ct,s c t,s
+
c
e t,s [ cC*t,s - c^t,s(cCt,s) • cCt,s ] < 13
[1
cY t,s ( cCt,s^ ' cCt,s
where it follows from (9) that y. =1 when CL < C*,.
c ' t , s c t , s — c t,s
in both (12) and (13). According to (12), total revenue
is equal to costs paid by the government, y(C)*C, plus
the fee received from the government, aC* + $[C - y(C)'C],
where the first term is the target fee and the second term
is the incentive adjustment. But the actual fee, or
contribution to the firm's operating income, is, according
to (13), equal to the fee received from the government less
the amount of disallowed costs, [1 - y(C)] • C.
If it is assumed that all non-aerospace government
contracts are of the FPI type, then (12) and (13) give
the revenue and net fee, respectively, earned on those
contracts. In addition, there are two commercial products,
one aerospace and the other non-aerospace. Assume that
for each quantity demanded at time t and in state s is
a function of the product's price for that date and state.
Assuming that each demand function is invert ible (for
each date and state), then the time-state-dependent revenue
levels for these products satisfy
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RCA,t,s ( RQt,s ) ~ RQt,s * Rpt,s ( RQt,s )
(14)
RCO,t,s ( NQt,s ) " NQt,s * Npt,s ( NQt,s ) '
where RQ, and NQ, are the same as in the production
functions (5) and where it is assumed that the demand
functions Rp, and Np are such that both RrA . and
R _ are strictly concave functions of DQ, and ATQ, ,CU ,"C,S K L
,
S JNl,S
respectively. The expressions (14) for RPA , and Rrn ,
express two of the arguments of the objective functional (1)
in terms of the decision variables RQ, and MQ . The
other two revenue arguments of the objective functional

































e t,s { c
C
*t,s " cYt,s(cCt,s^cCt,s } ^ '
where the sums in (15) and (16) are taken over those contracts
of each type that are in force at time t in state s.
Turning next to the firm's financial statements,
a balance sheet for the representative airframe builder is




to equal some minimum level, C. , needed to fund transactions,
plus some additional amount (possibly zero), Ct g , held
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(16)






















and Stockholders' B +E
Equity t?s Z > -
as precautionary balances. It is further assumed that the
transactions demand for cash can be expressed as a function
of the different output levels, so that
:t,s " Ct,s ([ cQt,s ] ' RQt,s' NQt,s } + Ct, (17)
where [ Q. ] denotes the vector of outputs under government
contracts and where Q, = for those contracts c not
in force at time t in state s. It is assumed that
8Ct,s/ 8cVs > ° and 8Ct,s/ 8 kQt ( s > ° ' (18)
where c = 1, ..., C-+C2+C2, and where k = R, N, so that trans-
actions balance requirements rise monotonically with output levels
It is also assumed that the minimum-cost value of inventories
held at time t in state s is some function of the output
levels at time t in state s,
Vt,s = Vt,s ( [ CQt,s]> RQt,s- NVs> • (19)
It is assumed that
8V
t )S / 8A,s > ° and 8Vt, s/\Qt, s > ° (20)
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where c = 1, ..., C-^Cg+Cg and where k = R, N, so that
required inventories (or working capital) increase
monotonically with output levels.
Finally for the assets side of the balance sheet,
—r
fixed assets are contractor-owned fixed assets, K .
' t , s
in (3) and (6), so that
K
t,s "^t.a • < 21 >
As assumed throughout this thesis, fixed assets are listed
in the firm's balance sheet on a replacement cost basis.
The physical stock of fixed capital, K. , is thus valued
at the current unit cost of fixed capital, q, . The
fixed assets entry in table VII-1 represents the replacement
cost of contractor-owned productive capacity only, but
as indicated below, is affected by the availability of
government-furnished capital.
Turning to the liabilities side of the balance
sheet in table VII-1, the quantity of debt outstanding
at time t in state s is denoted by B. . Associated with
37debt is an average interest cost i. , so that total
interest expense per period is given by the product
i • B . New debt issues or redemptions are denoted
by Y. , which satisfies the identity
Y+ = B. - B. - . = AB. o , (22)t ,s t ,s t-1, s ' t ,s
where s' is used to denote the possible states of nature
at time t - 1 in order to distinguish them from the possible
states of nature at time t. Assuming all new debt issues





in (22) implies net issues and AB < in (22) implies
Is • O
net redemptions. It is further assumed, as in chapter four,
that the average rate of interest on debt is a function
of both the amount of debt and the change in the amount of
debt
,
i+ = i+ ( B +. , Y ) , (23)
where
9i + /3B, > and 3i + /3Y. > . (24)t , s' t , s t , s' t , s vy
The amount of equity at time t in state s is
denoted by E, , which is the sum of contributed capital
^E^. , and retained earnings, „E, . It is assumed thatK t , s' & ' R t ,
s
the firm sets its dividend policy at the beginning of the
planning period, thereby establishing a dividend per period
per share that remains fixed throughout the planning period.
Let d denote this dividend per period per share and let n
denote the number of equity shares outstanding at time t
in state s. Then total dividends paid at time t in state
s are given by the identity
D + = d-n + . (25)t , s t ,s '
New equity issues or redemptions at time t in state s are
denoted by Z. , which satisfies the identity
Z. = n. - n. -. . = An, . (26)
t , s t , s t-1, s ' t ,
s
Note that (25) and (26) require that shares be issued
or redeemed at the beginning of the period, so that new
shareholders are entitled to receive dividends in the
period in which they purchase their shares. If the
issue price/redemption price per share at time t in state
1046
s is denoted by v
t g ,
then it follows from (26) that the
book value of contributed capital at time t in state s
is given by the identity
KEt,s " KEt-l,s' + Zt,s • vt,s • < 27 >
Denoting retained earnings at time t in state s by e^
t , s
the accumulated stock of retained earnings at time t in
state s satisfies the identity
R
Et,s " REt-l,s-
+ et,s < 28 >








KEt-l,s' + Zt,s * vt,s + REt-l,s' + et,s
= E, 1 , + Z. • v. + e + , (29)t-1, s' t,s t,s t,s' v '
where Z, is a decision variable and e, is determined
t , s t , s
by the firm's choice of operating and financial policies,
as described below.
The importance of the balance sheet identity between
assets and liabilities is summarized in the following constraint
which must hold at each state and date:
5t,s< [ cQt,s ] > rVs' nVs) + K,» + qt,s lCt,s
(30)
+ Vt,s ( t c«!t,s ] ' R«t,s' N«t,s> " Bt,s
+ Et,s •
Turning next to the representative airframe builder's
income statement and statement of retained earnings, which
are illustrated in table VII-2, an expression for net income
for the period and state of nature, tt and an expression
1/ m O
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Table VII-2 Representative Airframe Builder's




Government sales revenue R~ . +R~~GA , t , s GO , t ,
s
Commercial sales revenue R~. +R~^CA , t , s CO , t ,
Total Sales Revenue R^ A , +R- rN . +R^, A +R™GA , t , s GO , t , s CA , t , s CO , t ,








Depreciation q, »6*K .
Interest i. • B,
t , s t , s MAETotal Expenses w„L +w.L +WtX . +M^^ Mt,sAt,sEt,st,s
+q, -6-KC , +i + B +Mt,s t,s t , s t ,
s
Pretax Income { } =iR. - ew.L^ - M,
, i,t,s L. J t,s t,s
—c
- q+. «6«K . - i. »B.Ht,s t
,
s t , s t , s
Income tax x • { }
Net Income tt, =(1-t){ZR. , - Zw.LJ , - M+t , s v
±
i , t , s j t , s t ,
s
- q. .6'KC . - i. .B. }Ht,s u t , s t , s t , s J
Statement of Retained Earnings
Beginning balance, retained earnings REt-l s'
Add net income for the year ^ t s
Total REt-l,s' +7Tt,s
Less total dividends paid during the year d * nt,s







d * n t,s
1 H4«
for retained earnings for the period and state of nature,
e^
,
must be calculated. In the income statement inMA Ftable VII-2 the quantities L , L , and L are




Z LM + LM + T M






. + DlA + _ TlAt,s TT/r, ^ c t,s R t,s N t,sU{Ci,t,s»
E E
t , s
Z I/\ + LE . + .
T
LE .
xj| C -, c t,s R t , s N t,s
1 , t , s
(31)
Also in that income statement, the sum ZR. is taken over
i
i,t,s
i = GA, GO, CA, CO, and the sum Zw.L"-1 . is taken over
j = M, A, E. It follows from the income statement that net
income at time t in state of nature s, which is one of the
arguments of the objective functional (1), is given by
Vs = (1_T){RGA,t,s + RGO,t,s + RCA,t,s
(32)
13 T M T A+ R„„ - w„L , - w.L ,CO,t,s M t , s A t,s
E —
C
- w^L . - M . - q , • 6 • K .E t,s t , s Ht,s t,s
"
^,3 " Bt,S }
Note that tt as defined by (32) incorporates fees earned
on government contracts, as expressed by (11) and (13). From
the statement of retained earnings in table VII-2 it follows
that the net addition to retained earnings in period t
and state of nature s satisfies the identity:
e, = it, - d«n,
_t , s t , s t , s
(33)
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Turning next to the representative airframe builder's
statement of sources and uses of cash, which is illustrated
in table VII-3, the various factors that contribute to
and draw on the stock of cash are listed in order to
determine the net change in the firm's stock of cash during
period t and state s. For convenience, table VII-3 was
prepared under the assumptions that there were no redemptions
of debt or of equity shares and that inventories were
increased. It is easily checked that the accounting identity
expressing the net change in the firm's stock of cash holds
when there are net redemptions of either or both types of
securities and when inventories are decreased. It should
be noted that in constructing table VII-3 it has been
assumed that each weapons system contract can be treated
as a sequence of contracts, one per period, under which the
contractor receives full payment for costs and for a portion
of the overall contract fee as compensation for work
completed that period. That is, in this version of the
model it is assumed that the flow of cash from the government
to the contractor matches perfectly the recognition of
revenue and profit by the contractor. The impact of
progress payments, which actually cover only a portion
of the costs incurred during the period and the impact of
not paying the fee until the entire contract has been
completed are considered below in section D. Under the
assumptions of this section, the change in the firm's
stock of cash at time t in state of nature s satisfies
the identity:
1050
Ct,s Ct-l,s' (1 T){RGA,t,s+RGO,t,s+RCA,t,s+RCO,t,sMAT?
-w.,L
x
-w.LA , -w-lA -M. -i^. -B+ }M t,s A t,s E t,s t,s t,s t,s i
-C / < 34 )
^t
, s t,s t,s t,s t,s t,s
~qt,s #I t,s""Vt,s+Vt-l,s' '
There remains one argument of the objective functional
(1) that requires further explanation. Total contract
backlogs at time T and in state s , BT , are dependentl
,
s
on the government's willingness to continue purchasing
the items currently produced - i.e. to not terminate the
contracts. The government's attitude is embodied in the
states of nature s. Given the government's willingness
to continue the contract, it is assumed that the total
backlog under the contract is responsive to both the unit
cost and the effectiveness of the item. Assuming that
backlogs occur only under aerospace manufacturing and
non-aerospace contracts, total contract backlogs (measured
in dollars) at time T and in state s can be expressed as
VS = C2,T,s"C3,T,s (cRT ' s/cQT ' s)
'
cVs^Vs/c^s' cET,s ] '
where the sum is taken over all aerospace manufacturing
and non-aerospace contracts in force at time T; where
BT represents total backlogs (measured in physical units)
under contract c in state s and where B = for those
states s that correspond to contract termination; where
R„ / Q„ represents unit cost to the government (i.e.
c T, s' c^T, s ^
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it has been assumed that the dollar value of the physical
contract backlog is computed by multiplying the physical
backlog times the terminal period (and state s) unit cost;
and where it is assumed that
3B/3(R/Q) < and 9B/3E >
. (36)
According to (36), backlogs are directly related to
effectiveness and inversely related to unit cost. The
function B™ might be interpreted as a bivariate quaAt-
38demand 6u.nctJ.on. Since QT is set by the government,
each term in the sum in (35) expresses the backlog (both
in physical terms and in dollar terms) as a function of
c
RT,s and cET,s'
3. The Completed Model
Collecting (1), (3)-(6), (8), (14)-(16), (22),
(23), (26), (29), and (30)-(35), the planning model of
the representative military airframe builder is formulated
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1053
(37c) RGO,t,s ' r
Z [
c







P t,s { oC*t,s-cY t,s ( cCt,s)-cCt,s }]
(37d) M A V
—
C. = Ww« L . +w
rt
- L . %• L/\ +(i. +6) x
c t,s M c t,s A c t,s E c t,s v t,s v




RCA,t,s ( RQt,s )
=
RQt,s*RPt,s ( RQt,s)
RCO,t,s ( NQt,s )
=
NQt,s*Npt,s ( NQt,s )
^t.s
= (1~T)[RGA,t,s+RGO,t,s+RCA,t,s+RCO,t,





,c t,s R t,s N t,s
i,t,s

















-M. -q. '6'K , -1. (B. ,Y, )«B. ]t,s Mt ,
s


















[ RK t,s ] > " °
1054
















(37n) I KG , o < K
G
.
tt-Tp 1- t , s — x,sului,t f s
J
< 37o > Bt,s - Bt-l,s' +Yt,s
< 37P> nt,s
= nt-l,s' +Zt,s
(37q) E. = E. - ,+Z. -v. +tt. -d«n.v M/ t,s t-l,s' t,s t,s t,s t,s
< 37r > St,s"cQt,sJ'R«t,s'NQt,s' +£t,s+qt,s-lCt ' s
.
+Vt,s (C c«t, S^R«t,s'NQt,s ) " Bt,s+Et,s
< 37s > Ct,s " Ct-l, S ' +(1
-T)CRGA,t,s+HGO,t,s+ECA,t,s+EC0,t,s
r v T M T M T M •,





























-M. -i. (B. ,Y, )«B, ]+x-q, -6-KC . ot,S t,S V t,S' t,s' t,s ^t,s t,s
+Y, +Z + -v, -d«n. -q, -I. -V, +V. *t,s t,s t,s t,s ^t , s t,s t,s t-l,s'
T M T M T M T A T A A
c
L t,s'RL t,s'NL t.s'c^ t.s'IT t.s'N^ t,s'
T E T E T E „C „C KC
c
L t,s'RL t,s'N





t , s ' RQt , s ' NQ t , s ' cE t , s '
M
t , s '
C







Bt,s' nt,s > °
1055
denotes a vector
c = 1,..., C 1 , C x + 1,..., C 1 + C2 , C-l + C2 + 1,..., C 1 + C2 + C,
t = 1 , . . . , T
s = 1, . . . , S
and where the boundary conditions on the first order difference
equations are analogous to those in chapter four and so are
left unstated.
The decision variables and the exogenously determined variables
in the model (37) are listed in table VII-4.
Table VII-4 Decision Variables and Exogenous
Variables in the Airframe Builder Model
Decision Variables:
y-Niv. • T M T M T M T A T A(l) labor inputs L .
, nL , XT L- L , , ^L*
c t,s R t,s ' N t,s ' c t,s ' R t,s '
LA E E E
N t,s ' c t,s ' R^ t,s ' N t,s
(ii) capital usage K , , DK , . MK , K ,^ & c t,s ' R t,s ' N t,s ' c t,s




c t , s
(v) gross investment I.
t , s
(vi) managerial emoluments M.
(vii) new issues/redemptions Y, , Z
(viii) precautionary cash balances C
Exogenously Determined Variables/Parameters:
(i) fee on R & D contracts it.v
c t , s
(ii) target cost on production contracts C*
(iii) production contract parameters a. , 3^
c t , s ' c t ,s
(iv) allowable cost function y,




(v) government contract output levels Q^
c t , s
r>




t , s t , s
(vii) wage rates wM , wA , w£
(viii) rate of depreciation 6
(ix) unit prices of capital goods and equity q , v
(x) discount rate and tax rate r
,
x
(xi) firm's dividend policy d
In this section the planning model of the representative
military airframe builder was formulated as a stochastic
optimal control problem. The model (37) developed in this
section is an extension of the basic theoretical model
developed and analyzed in chapters three through five,
modified in accordance with the discussion of the internal
planning processes of the major military airframe builders
presented in chapter six. In formulating the model (37)
uncertainty was taken into account by adopting the time-
state-preference framework. In addition, government procure-
ment policy was taken into account by developing contract-
specific revenue functions that incorporate procurement
policy parameters. The remainder of this chapter is concerned
with several procurement policy issues. In particular, the
impact of progress payments will be evaluated in section D
by comparing the policy implications of the model (37)
developed in this section with the policy implications of




C. THE REPRESENTATIVE AIRFRAME BUILDER'S OPTIMAL OPERATING
AND FINANCIAL POLICIES
1. Introduction
The purpose of this section is to characterize
the representative airframe builder's optimal operating and
financial policies, as implied by the model of a representative
airframe builder formulated in the previous section. Sub-
section 2 characterizes the optimal operating policies -
those concerned with input mix, output mix, and investment
decisions - and subsection 3 characterizes the optimal
financial policies - those concerned with cash management
and leverage policy decisions.
Before characterizing the solution to (37), some
comments should be made concerning the methodology to be
employed. The military airframe builder model (37) was
formulated as a stochastic optimal control problem, with
uncertainty modeled using the time-state-preference frame-
work and with time modeled using discrete time periods.
The advantage of employing the time-state-preference frame-
work is, as noted in chapter four, that the optimization
along any time-state chain is formally equivalent to
optimization under certainty. By applying the time-state-
preference framework, optimization techniques appropriate
to decision-making under certainty may be applied to each
of these time-state chains, with uncertainty taken into
account by weighting the policy decisions appropriate to
each chain by the probability of occurrence of the sequence
of states that distinguish the chain. Therefore, the
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optimal policies implied by (37) can be characterized by
proceeding in a manner that parallels the development of
the discrete time version (since time is measured in discrete
units in (37)) of Pontryagin's maximum principle.
Proceeding to the characterization of the optimal
39
solution to (37), define the following generalized Lagrangian:
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s
t,s t,s t,s t,s
T S
+d»n, +q. -I. +V. -V. 1 , ]+ Z Z A 10 , C,t,s M t , s t,s t,s t-l,s'
1 _-
12 , t , s t,s
where (37b) and (37d) were used to define RGA as aMAE Cfunction of QL tg , cL tg , h t Q , and K ts ; where
RGO,t,s' RCA,t,s> RCO,t,s' fft,s' Ut,s' and Vt,s are similarly
defined as functions of the decision variables and the state
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variables; and where the A's denote Lagrange multipliers.
Due to the large number of equality constraints in (37),
only the signs of A, X and A 10 . can be discerned
on the basis of Kuhn-Tucker theory. At optimality,
X 5,t,s > °' A6,t,s > °> and A 12,t,s > ° for a11 s and t -
For the convenience of the reader, a complete list of
the symbols used in this chapter is provided in the appendix
that immediately follows the footnotes to this chapter.
2. Optimal Operating Policies
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution
to (37) are obtained by differentiating (38) and by setting
out the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker conditions. In this sub-
section these necessary conditions are used to examine the
following six operating policies: (i) allocation of labor
inputs, (ii) determination of optimal size of stock of
contractor-furnished capital, (iii) allocation of capital
inputs, (iv) determination of commercial outputs, (v) determination
of effectiveness/performance levels under government contracts,
and (vi) payment of managerial emoluments.
For any aerospace contract c at time t, < t < T,
and in state of nature s and for any of the three types
of labor j = M, A, E, the following necessary condition must
be satisfied :
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probability-adjusted and time-weighted marginal utilities,
reflecting the stochastic multiperiod nature of the optimization
It is easily verified that (39) and (40) also must hold
for non-aerospace government contracts, i.e. when GO is
substituted for GA.
Before utilizing (40) to determine labor input
allocation rules, two points should be noted. First, the
S
sum Z X Q , , in (40) reflects the impact an increase
in labor usage will have on the firm's stockholders' equity
at time t in state s, depending on what stockholders' equity
was in state s' at time t - 1, and similarly, the sum
S
I X 11 , in (40) reflects the impact an increase in
labor usage will have on cash flow at time t in state s,
depending on what cash flow was in state s' at time t - 1.
The allocation of labor at time t thus depends partly on
interperiod considerations, and the impact of increased
labor usage on expected utility is adjusted to take into
account its impact on stockholders' equity and cash flow.
The first term in (39) is the partial derivative
of the objective functional in (37) with respect to LJ . .
Hence this term can be interpreted as the maig+nal value,
of an additional unit of type j labor working on contract c
during period t and state of nature s, where it is understood
1062
that marginal value is measured in terms of discounted
expected collective marginal utility. Rewriting the difference
of the first and third terms in (39) as the sum of a marginal
revenue effect and a marginal net income effect, in which
the latter is adjusted to take into account the stockholders'
equity and cash flow effects discussed above, leads to
(40). The sum of the first two terms in (40) can be interpreted
as the mt ma.tigi.nal value, of an increase in L. , , where
marginal value is measured in the manner just described
and where the 'net' is understood to mean 'net of the
stockholders' equity and cash flow impact'.
Interpreting the first two terms in (40) collectively
as the net marginal value of an additional unit of labor of
type j allocated to contract c at time t in state of nature
s, (40) leads to the following labor input allocation rules:
Theorem VII-1
For contract c at time t in state of nature s, the airframe
builder should allocate the different types of labor so
that the marginal rate of technical substitution between
any pair just equals the ratio of their net marginal values.
Proof
Denote the two types of labor by j and k. For given
c, t, and s there are two conditions like (40), one for j
and the other for k. Solving each for A„, equating the two
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where the terms within braces in (41) are the same as those
in (40). Moreover, the same result holds when GO is substituted
for GA. Q.E.D.
Remark
The right-hand side of (41) represents the ratio
of the net marginal values of the two different types of
labor. Each net marginal value is expressed in terms of
a sum of discounted probability-weighted marginal utilities,
where the marginal utilities reflect the impact on total
revenue and net income of increased labor usage. Condition
(41) is really analogous, then, to the neoclassical input
allocation rule, according to which the marginal rate of
technical substitution between each pair of inputs must
40
equal the ratio of the unit costs of the two inputs.
Corollary VII-1-1
For contract c and labor of type j at time t, the airframe
builder should allocate type j labor between states of nature
s and s' in such a way that the marginal rate of technical
substitution between the state-specific amounts of type j
labor just equals the ratio of their net marginal values
in the two states.
Proof
Following the steps in the proof of theorem VII-1
leads to the following expression:
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£< X9 f t f 8,B»+Xll,t,8 l B"> }X
™I t
"^ (42)
3tt, /8 LJ .
t , s' c t , s
9tt + ,/3 LJ
"
,t,s" c t ,s '
where the right-hand side of (42) is written on three lines
but represents one fraction. Moreover, the same result holds
when GO is substituted for GA. Q.E.D.
Remark
As would be expected in a stochastic optimization,
the net marginal values in (42) incorporate the corporate
planners' (possibly subjective) state probabilities <j>
and (J), , . Put simply, the value to the firm of any particular
allocation of labor across states of nature at time t is
dependent on the probability distribution over the possible
states of nature at time t. Also, as in the case of (41),
each of the net marginal values on the right-hand side of
(42) is expressed as the sum of discounted probability-
weighted marginal utilities, and each sum reflects the
impact on total revenue and net income, and indirectly on
expected collective utility, of increased labor usage.
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Corollary VII-1-2
For a contract c that is ongoing at times t and t - 1, for
a state s that may obtain at times t and t - 1, and for labor
of type j , the airframe builder should allocate labor usage
intertemporally in such a way that the intertemporal marginal
rate of technical substitution just equals the ratio of the
41
net marginal values of type j labor at times t and t - 1.
Proof
Following the steps in the proof of theorem VII-1
leads to the following expression:
c t-1, s
.












{ h,s'W: <!+?> " ,V X9,t,s,s' +
_J t , s s
'=1 > > >
8U
1 1 t-1 S
{<,> t-l,s"3V • (I+? ) - s4 (X 9,t-l,s,s' +
(43
L- .
, ) } 8tt . /3 iA11, t ,s,s' J t , s' c t,s
>
L. . - ,)}9tt + , /3 LJ , 1ll,t-l,s,s' t-l,s' c t-l,s
where the right-hand side of (43) is written on three lines
but represents one fraction. Moreover, the same result
holds when GO is substituted for GA. Q.E.D.
Remark
The right-hand side of (43) is analogous to the right-
hand side of (42), where the net marginal values in the
former pertain to different time periods (but to the same
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state of nature s in each) and where the net marginal values
in the latter pertain to different states (but to the same
period t).
Thus far equation (40) has been used to characterize
the representative airframe builder's allocation of labor
inputs. The three allocation results summarized as theorem
VII-1 and corollaries VII-1-1 and VII-1-2 concern relative
allocations. An interesting allocation question suggested by
the discussion of the basic theoretical model in chapters
three and four is whether government contractors exhibit an
42
upward cost bias, as so many writers have suggested, by
utilizing labor beyond the point at which a short run profit
maximizer would - in the hope of increasing revenue and thereby
increasing expected utility. As proved in the following
theorem, the representative airframe builder modeled in (37)
does indeed exhibit such an upward cost bias.
Theorem VI 1-2
If the utility function IL is strictly concave with
respect to total revenue and net income, then the representative
military airframe builder modeled in (37) utilizes labor of
each type under each government contract beyond the short run
profit maximizing level.
Proof
An expected utility of profit maximizer would select
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Since 9U../9R > by assumption and since 9R/9L > must
hold at optimality, it follows from (40) that the expression
on the left-hand side of (44) must be strictly negative
at optimality for the firm modeled in (37). Note that
since 9R/9L > whenever 9tt/9L ^ 0, it follows that the
firm modeled in (37) would never use less labor than a
short run profit maximizer. But then, since it can be
shown that A 9 (9














must be smaller at optimality for the representative air-
frame builder modeled in (37) than for a short run profit
maximizer. Moreover, if 9tt, /9 Lr. < 0, then it follows
t , s' c t , s
from the fact that A n • 9F /9 LJ , > at optimality that2,c c' c t , s J
the expression within braces in (44) and in (45) must be
strictly positive at optimality. Then differentiating




. 9tt + 9U 1 , .
, 1 , 1 N t / t,S N 2_L / A 1 , xt
t , s c t , s
S 9 2 7T
I (A ,+A ,)} r1^— < ,
gi_i y,L,S,S 1±,L,S,S ~ , t J \ 2
K
c t , s'
where the inequality follows from the assumed concavity of
U 1 , provided 9
2
tt /9( LJ ) 2 < 0, which, together with
the observation that (45) is smaller for the firm modeled
in (37) than for a short run profit maximizer, implies that
the representative airframe builder utilizes labor beyond
the short run profit maximizing level. Thus, in order to
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complete the proof of the theorem it remains to be shown
that 97T




° and ^t s /8 cLJ t s 2 - ° for each
government contract c. To simplify the notation the sub-
scripts c, t, and s are not explicitly written. To simplify
the exposition, what follows is stated in terms of an aero-
space production contract. Replacing GA by GO extends the
proof to non-aerospace (production) contracts and setting
3=0 extends the proof to aerospace research and development
contracts.
From (8), (15), and (32),
3tt 8R
_LlS = (1 _ T){__^ _ } = (1 _ T){_!r (1 _ 6)Y(C) . c+K] _ w }
dLJ 8LJ J 3LJ J
= (1-t){(1-6)[y'(C)-w C+y(C)-w ]- w } < 0, (46)
where K is independent of j and where the inequality follows




^ = (1-t)(1-6)[y"(C)-w, 2 C + 2y'(C)w. 2 ] < 0, (47)
3LJ2 J J -
where the inequality follows from (9). Q.E.D.
Turning next to the allocation of labor across ongoing
government production contracts in the terminal period t = T,
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which differs from (40) due to the effect on total contract












. As in the case of (40), (48) holds when
3Bm 3 L ._T,s c T,s
GO is substituted for GA, i.e. it holds regardless of the










— < 0, so that the expression
3B™ 3 L3
^T,s c T, s
on the left-hand side of (40) is strictly positive when
t = T. The following corollary to theorem VII-2 states the
intuitively apparent result that the sensitivity of back-
logs to unit cost R/Q tends to restrain the airframe builder's
cost bias.
Corollary VII-2-1
If the utility function U- is strictly concave with
respect to each of its arguments R~. , , R~~ , , andGA , t , s GO , t , s
tt,
,
then the sensitivity of backlogs to unit cost R/Q
has the effect of reducing the contractor's labor usage
under government contracts.
Proof
It follows from the fact that 3U2 /3BT > and
3BT /3 L^-, < that the sensitivity of backlogs to
unit cost cannot cause an increase in labor usage under
government contracts. But then, since A„ (3 2 F /3( LJ T )
2
) >
at optimality, it follows that
3U.
, m 3R„. m 3U.
rx 1 , 1 N Ti GA,T,s , r . 1 , 1 v'
c T, s
S 87TT.s














must be greater at optimality than it would be in the
absence of any relationship between backlogs and terminal
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which follows from theorem VII-2 and the assumed strict
44
concavity of tL . Q.E.D.
The practical import of corollary VII-2-1 is that,
even if government contractors exhibit an upward cost bias,
this upward cost bias is restrained to some extent if
contractors perceive a relationship between unit cost under
ongoing contracts and total contract backlogs as of time
t = T. The theorem and corollary suggest that this restraining
effect would be heightened if government procurement policy
were to impose a relationship between contract performance
45
and future contract awards. If a suitable measure of
46past performance could be devised, then corollary VII-2-1
suggests that government procurement policy should make
contract awards dependent on contractor past performance




Turning next to the allocation of labor to the
production of commercial goods, the following necessary
condition must be satisfied:





s4 (A 9,t,s,s' + A ll,t,s,s' )}x
(51)
8tt , 9F,
^ + A„ r^ = ,
k t , s k t , s
where j = M, A, E; where k = R denotes aerospace production
and k = N denotes non-aerospace production; and where
I = 3 when k = R and I = 4 when k = N. The next theorem
and accompanying corollaries follow from (51).
Theorem VII-3
For production of type k at time t in state of nature s,
the representative airframe builder should allocate labor
so that the marginal rate of technical substitution between
any pair of types of labor just equals the ratio of their
respective wage rates. Thus the neoclassical criterion
for optimally allocating labor inputs continues to hold.
Proof
Denote the two types of labor by j and j ' . Solve
each of two versions of (51), one expressed in terms of j
and the other expressed in terms of j ', for X, , equate the
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It follows from (31) and (32) that
^s_ m _ (1_T)W and x fs_ = _ (1 _ T)w , #
9,LJ + J 8, LJ Jk t,s k t,s
Substituting (53) into (52) and simplifying yields
3,LJ ' w.k t,s
_
_j_





Note that (54) is really just the neoclassical
criterion for an optimal labor input mix. Thus, as was
found in the analysis of the basic theoretical model in
chapter three, the firm is motivated to select the cost-
minimizing input mix for commercial production.
Corollary VII-3-1
For production of type k and labor of type j at time t,
the airframe builder should allocate type j labor between
states of nature s and s' in such a way that the marginal
rate of technical substitution between the state-specific
amounts of type j labor just equals the ratio of their
respective net marginal contributions to expected collective
utility of an additional dollar of net income in state s(s').
Proof
Fix k, j, and t in (51) for two states of nature
s and s'. Solve each expression for A„, equate the resulting
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where the expression on the right-hand side is written
on two lines but represents a single fraction. It follows
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k t , s k t , s '
so that (55) simplifies to
3U
\,s< _
U t,s 3F^ (ITF )1: -^^.t.s.s-^ll.t.s.s"^
>;
3kL
*' 8 { *t.s' W^lkr)* -
s„y A 9,t,s',s" +A ll,t,s',s" )]
where the numerator and denominator in (57) can be interpreted
as the respective net marginal contributions to expected
collective utility of an additional dollar of net income.
Q.E.D
Remark 1
The numerator and denominator in (57) can be
interpreted as the net marginal contribution to expected
collective utility of an additional dollar of net income
for the following reason. The term cf> (3U-/37T )/(l+r)
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represents the partial derivative of the objective functional
S
in (37) with respect to tt. while - Z (A n . ;+X-- ,)t> s
s'=l 9 » t > s . s ll,t,s,s'
y
once again reflects the stockholders' equity and cash flow
impacts of a change in tt
. Allowing for the two effects
simultaneously leads to the interpretation of the difference
within braces in numerator and denominator in (57) as a
'net marginal contribution to expected collective utility'.
Remark 2
Corollary VII-3-1 represents the logical extension
of the neoclassical criterion for combining inputs optimally
to a stochastic environment.
Corollary VII-3-2
For production of type k, labor of type j, and state of
nature s that might obtain at times t and t - 1, the air-
frame builder should allocate type j labor between periods
t and t - 1 in such a way that the marginal rate of
technical substitution between the time-specific amounts
of type j labor just equals the ratio of their respective
net marginal contributions to expected collective utility
of an additional dollar of net income during period t(t-l).
Proof
Fix k, j, and s in (51) for two time periods t
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Note that for the proof of corollary VII-3-2,
(56) still applies, but with 9tt /3 Lj 1 in place
of H, s -/ 3kLJ t,s' •
The second set of operating policies that are to
be considered in this section concern the airframe builder's
determination of the optimal stock of contractor-furnished
—
c
capital for each period and state, K , and accordingly,
from (3), its optimal investment policy for each period
and state, I. . Two cases are considered: < t < T
t , s
and t = T.
First, suppose < t < T. It follows from
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It also follows from differentiating (38) that the optimal
investment levels, I, , must satisfy
S S
s
Equation (59) can be rewritten as
















A 5,t,s " { h,s Bl^TTr") ^.i^g.t.s.s' + A ll,t,s,s' )} X
^- T
^t,s 6 + (TT6>
l
!/l,t+l,s',s + A 10,t,s<k,s < 62 >
"^.^ll.t.s.s'^t.s •
Next an interpretation is given to the equilibrium condition
(62).
From (37m) it follows that A,. measures the
marginal value in terms of discounted expected collective
utility of an additional unit of contractor-furnished
capital at time t in state of nature s. The first term
on the right-hand side of (62) measures the immediate
impact on net income of an additional unit of capital, once
again adjusted for the indirect impact on stockholders'
equity and cash flow. This interpretation follows from
(61). The second term on the right-hand side of (62)
measures the value of an additional unit of capital this
period in terms of reduced capital needs next period,
where (7-7) of each unit will be available next period andl+o
where its value in terms of the next period's needs is
dependent on the state obtaining next period (hence the sum
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^
^i -(-4-1 o ' o)- Tne "third term on the right-hand side
g i _i ljlfijS ,s
of (62) can be interpreted as a measure of the balance sheet
effect of an additional unit of capital. The addition of
q value units to the assets side of the balance sheet
in table VII-1 necessitates an equal increment on the
liabilities and stockholders' equity side - i.e. the
investment must be financed somehow. The fourth term on
the right-hand side of (62) is interpretable as the direct
cash flow effect of the outflow of q. in cash to purchase
the additional unit of capital. Collecting these results,
(62) is seen to be the familiar marginal value equals marginal
cost necessary condition for optimal capital investment.
The important point is that in equilibrium the Lagrange






unit of capital and is numerically equal to the marginal
cost of an additional unit of capital (since in equilibrium
these quantities must be equal). Moreover, since this
marginal cost is strictly positive, except in unusual








Equilibrium condition (62) is appropriate provided
< t < T. For t = T the equilibrium condition takes a
somewhat different form. It follows from differentiating
_C(38) that the terminal capital stocks, K „ must satisfy
i , s
d, (^ L_ T^s Z }/^_>>T + E A ( 63 )*T
-
S^ 3icT mcT (l+r> .-I 1 - T ' S - S '' , s ,
s
S
+ A5,T,s " A10,T,sqT,s
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-) has replaced - ( T—=) I A, , . 1 ,i,s g^c l+r 1+6 gl=1 l,t+l,s f ,s
1 , s
in (58) as a measure of the value of an additional unit of
capital in terms of future needs. Equations (59), (60),
and (61) continue to hold, but with t = T. Using (60)
and (61), each with t = T, to substitute into (63) yields
the following equilibrium condition for optimal investment
in the terminal period:
8U
1 1 T S
A 5,T,s
= {Vs ^T^ (T+T ) "
s ,y
A 9,T,s,s'
+ A ll,T,s,s' )} x
(l-T)qTs 6 - * -2-(l3_) T + x ^^ (64)9K T,s
"
^.f^ll.T.s.s'^s '
Since (64) is clearly analogous to (62) term-by-term, it is
not necessary to give it a separate interpretation.
Turning next to the optimal allocation of capital
inputs, the following necessary conditions must be satisfied
for contractor-furnished capital at time t, < t < T:




)t]V^ + l **'° ^ts^
S 3tt 8F
c
gi-j 9 , t , s , s 1 1 , t , s , s ^ j^C 2 , c g j^L
c t , s c t , s
-
A 5,t,s= ° .
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where k = GA, GO, and
9Fk
X
Z C " A 5 t s
=
° ' < 66 )
d, K ,k t , s
where k = R, N and where I = 3 when k = R and I = 4 when
k = N. Note that (65) and (66) are analogous to (40) and
(51), respectively. Note also that when t = T it is
necessary to take the backlog effect into account and (65)
must be modified in a manner similar to that used to modify
(40) to obtain (48).
Necessary condition (65) applies to contractor-
furnished capital allocated to government contracts while
necessary condition (66) applies to contractor-furnished
capital allocated to commercial production. In comparing
the two, one notes the first two terms in (65) that have
no counterpart in (66). These two terms reflect the impact
of a change in the amount of contractor-furnished capital
allocated to a government contract that arises from the
fact that interest and depreciation are allowable costs.
The existence of such an effect can be seen by examining
(37b), (37c), and (37d). A change in KC in (37d) has
a direct effect on C. , which in turn affects R~. , in
c t ,
s
GA , t , s
(37b) or R„„ , in (37c), depending on the type of contract.
Thus, a change in the amount of contractor-furnished capital
allocated to a government contract has revenue effects that
must be taken into account by the contractor at the time the
capital input allocation decision is made.
As noted above, in equilibrium X- ' is numerically3
y
L j S





5 t s " { } C " { } T ' < 67 >
c t , s c t , s
where the terms within braces are the same as in (65),
can be interpreted as the net ma.A.gtnal co6t o & capttat
allocated to gove.sinme.nt conth.OLc.tb
,
where the 'net' is under-
stood to mean 'net of the revenue-related affects arising
out of the allowability of depreciation and interest expense
under government contracts'. It should be noted that the
net marginal cost of capital allocated to government contracts
given by (67) is positive at optimality, since, as implied
by lemma VII-1, which is proved below, A„ (3F /3 K ) >£ y C C C L , S
in (65).
Given the above interpretation of (67), the following
theorem and corollaries follow directly from (65) and (66).
It is assumed in what follows that < t < T. Perfectly
analogous results can be derived for the special case t = T.
Theorem VI 1-4
For contract c at time t, the airframe builder should allocate
contractor-furnished capital between states of nature s
and s' in such a way that the marginal rate of technical
substitution between the state-specific amounts just equals
the ratio of their net marginal costs in the two states.
Proof
Fix c and t in (65). Specify two states s and s'.
8F
c




d }T +c t s
and divide one by the other to obtain
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3 KC+ , X,- . -{ }3R, . /3 K
C
.
-{ }3tt. /3 KC^c t , s
'




— c ^ ' ( 68 )
9 K +. X K , ,-{ }3R, , ,/3 K
u
+ ,-{ }3tt ,/ 3 IT^ .c t,s 5,t,s' k,t,s'' c t,s' t,s' c t,s'
which is the desired result. Q.E.D.
Corollary VII-4-1
For contract c and state of nature s that might obtain at
times t and t - 1, the airframe builder should allocate
contractor-furnished capital between periods t and t - 1
in such a way that the intertemporal marginal rate of
technical substitution just equals the ratio of the net
marginal costs of contractor-furnished capital under contract
c at times t and t - 1.
Proof
Fix c and s in (65). Specify two time periods t
and t - 1 at which state s might obtain and proceed as in





+c t , s
A, . -{ }3R, . /3 KC + -{ } 8-tt^ /3 K
C
,




L }3R, , - /3 KC^ 1 -{ }3tt + , /3 KC + 15,t-l,s k,t-l,s' c t-l,s t-l,s' c t-l,s
which is analogous to (68). Q.E.D
Corollary VII-4-2
For commercial production of type k, the airframe builder
should allocate capital between states of nature s and s'
at time t in such a way that the marginal rate of technical
substitution between the state-specific amounts just equals
the ratio of their marginal costs in the two states.
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Proof
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For commercial production of type k and state s that might
obtain at times t and t - 1, the airframe builder should
allocate capital intertemporally in such a way that the
intertemporal marginal rate of technical substitution just
equals the ratio of the marginal costs of capital at times
t and t - 1.
Proof
Use (66) and proceed as in the proof of corollary
VII-4-1 to obtain










The capital allocation rules given in theorem VII-4
and corollaries VII-4-1, VII-4-2, and VII-4-3 are analogous
to the labor input allocation rules given in corollaries
VII-1-1 and VII-1-2. Additional rules for trading off
contractor-furnished capital and labor in both govern-
ment production and commercial production could be developed.
The resulting equilibrium conditions would be perfectly
analogous to (68)-(71), and so are not stated explicitly here
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Necessary conditions (65) and (66) apply to
contractor-furnished capital only. In addition, government-
furnished capital must be allocated in accordance with the
following necessary condition:
Vc;/- - Vt, s = ° (72)
c t , s
where \ n . > is analogous to A- and measures the6, t , s — ° 5, t ,s
marginal value in terms of discounted expected collective
utility of an additional unit of government-furnished
48
capital at time t in state of nature s. (72) could be
used to derive allocation rules for government-furnished
capital that are perfectly analogous to (70) and (71).
Due to this analogy, these results are not derived explicitly
here. A somewhat more interesting allocation question
concerns the trade off at the margin between contractor-
furnished capital and government-furnished capital for each
ongoing government contract c. The following theorem
concerns this trade off:
Theorem VII-5
For contract c at time t in state of nature s,
the airframe builder should combine contractor-furnished
capital and government-furnished capital in such a way
that their marginal rate of technical substitution just
equals the ratio of their net marginal values.
Remark
Both Xr- and X n . measure the marginal value5 , t , s 6 , t , s to
of an additional unit of capital allocated in an optimal
manner over the firm's government contracts (and in the
1084
case of L also over the firm's commercial products).
For government-furnished capital this marginal value is
measured in terms of the improvement in expected collective
utility resulting from the unit of capital's direct
contribution to production. For contractor-furnished
capital there is not only this direct effect, but also an
indirect effect due to the fact that imputed interest is
now an allowable cost. Hence, reallocating a unit of
contractor-furnished capital from contract c to its next
best alternative use involves a cost in terms of the effect
on expected collective utility of the immediate impact
on imputed interest. Therefore, in determining the optimal
mix of government-furnished capital and contractor-furnished
capital under any government contract c, this effect must
be taken into consideration. Consequently, as demonstrated
in the proof of theorem VII-5, the value of a unit of
contractor-furnished capital must be figured net of this
effect
.
Proof of Theorem VII-5
Solving (65) and (72) for X„ , equating the
z , c








X _{ }3R /a kC + -{ }8tt. /8 K
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where the terms in braces are the same as those in (65).
The numerator and denominator in (73) are interpreted as
the net marginal values of contractor-furnished capital
and government-furnished capital, respectively, as discussed
in the above remark. Q.E.D.
Corollary VII-5-1
If imputed interest and depreciation were not
allowable costs, then the airframe builder would achieve
the optimal combination of contractor-furnished capital
and government-furnished capital for each contract c at
time t and state of nature s by combining them so that their
marginal rate of technical substitution just equals the
ratio of their marginal values, X R . /X a .
Proof
If imputed interest and depreciation were not allowable
costs, then it follows from (8), (15), (16), and (32) that
9R, /a K ,. = 8tt + /3 K
C
+ e 0. Then from (73), theK,t,S' C t,S t , S' C t,S
marginal rate of technical substitution equals \- l\ n ,& M 5 , t , s' 6, t ,s
Q.E.D.
Corollary VII-5-2
If at time t and state of nature s government-
furnished capital were in such plentiful supply that its
marginal value were zero, and if the marginal rate of
technical substitution between government-furnished capital
and contractor-furnished capital were always finite, then
at optimality the net marginal value of contractor-furnished
1086
capital would be zero for each contract c (at time t in
state of nature s). Alternatively, the marginal value
in production of an additional unit of contractor-furnished
capital, Xj. , would equal the sum of the marginal
revenue-related effects arising out of the allowability of
depreciation and interest expense under government contracts,
k, t , s' c t,s t , s' c t,
Proof













" { } h**- (74)
c t , s ct,s ct,s
leads to the main result. Solving (74) for X- leadsto
o, t , s
to the alternative interpretation of the main result. Q.E.D
The significance of theorem VII-5 is that it establishes
the optimality criterion for combining government-furnished
capital and contractor-furnished capital for production
under government contracts. Corollary VII-5-1 demonstrates
that the optimal trade offs established in theorem VII-5
are sensitive to government policy regarding the allow-
ability of interest cost, and corollary VII-5-2 demonstrates
that the optimal trade offs are also sensitive to the
availability of government-furnished capital. While neither
of these results is counterintuitive, the fact that they
were derived from the airframe builder model (37) is
supportive of the model's validity.
The fourth set of operating policies that are to be
explored in this subsection involve the determination
1087
of the optimal commercial outputs. At optimality the
commercial output levels RQ, and MQ, must satisfy the
following necessary condition:
3U- 3R. . 3U- 9tt. 1 . 3F,
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S 3tt 3C. 3V.
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/ll.t+l.s' ,s l 3,Q. 3, Q, '
s'=l ' ' ' k^t , s k t,s
where (j, k, I) = (CA, R, 3) or (CO, N, 4). Rewriting
(75) in terms of the derivatives of R . . , it. , C. ,
J , L , S t , S L , S
V , and F, yields the following equation:
U , S K
9U 1 1 + 9R " + o
<*t,s 3BjftfB
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Vt,s 3 kQt,s ) £ 3A,s
s
was
- 11 . t . s .
s
s
encountered in (40), where it was interpreted in terms of
The Lagrange multiplier sum E X-- . ,
the impact of operating policy on cash flow at time t in
state s, depending on what cash flow was in state s' at
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time t - 1. In the case of (76) the operating policy in
question concerns setting the optimal levels of the commercial
outputs. The value of an additional unit of output affects
cash flow through its impact on the current period's net
income, and the severity of this effect depends on the
cash flow (i.e. the availability of cash from) the previous
period, which in turn depends on which particular state
S
obtained that period. The Lagrange multiplier sum E A Q ,
can be given an analogous interpretation. The difference
of Lagrange multiplier sums in (76)
e.yil.t,-,- " **«— - < 77 >l. .s.s 1 ,^l"ll,t+l,s 1 ,s
has not been encountered previously in this chapter. The
difference (77) reflects the fact that an increase in
current period output increases both the transactions demand
for cash C and the required inventories of work in process
that are included in V, and that the severity of the resulting
effects on the behavior of the firm are dependent on cash
available from state s' at time t - 1; but that ceteris
paribus the greater accumulation of cash this period reduces
the strain of meeting the transactions and inventory cash
needs next period, and that the importance of this reduction
for the behavior of the firm depends on which state obtains
next period. To capture both these interperiod effects
in the optimization requires the difference of Lagrange
multiplier sums (77).
The foregoing comments suggest that the first three
terms in (76) can be interpreted collectively as the
marginal value to the firm - expressed in terms of discounted
1 o«q
expected collective utility - of an additional unit of
commercial output of type k, k = R, N. This marginal
value consists of three components. The first is the
incremental value transmitted through a change in total
revenue, { }(3R/8Q). The second is the incremental value
transmitted through a change in net income, { }(9tt/3Q).
The third is the incremental value transmitted through a
change in the cash balance and working capital require-
ments, { }(3C/9Q + 3V/3Q). Given this interpretation
of the sum of the first three terms in (76), the following
theorem is easily proved.
Theorem VI 1-6
For commercial output of type k at time t, the
airframe builder should establish production levels for
49
states s and s' such that the marginal rate of transformation
between the state-specific amounts of output just equals
the ratio of their marginal values (or marginal contributions
to expected collective utility) in the two states. For
commercial output of type k and for a state of nature s
that might obtain at times t and t - 1, the airframe builder
should establish intertemporal production levels such
that the marginal rate of transformation between time-
specific amounts of output just equals the ratio of their
marginal values in the two periods.
Proof
To prove the first statement, fix t and use (76)
to obtain expressions for A £( 9Fk / 8 kQt s ) and X z ^k^k^t s'^'
Divide the former by the latter to obtain an expression for
the marginal rate of transformation, - 8,Q o /3, Q, ,
.
K L,S K L,S
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To prove the second statement, proceed in the same manner, but
fixing s rather than t. Q.E.D.
Note that theorem VII-6 contains results that are
analogous to the results contained in theorem VII-3 and
corollaries VTI-3-1 and VII-3-2. Collectively, these theorems
and corollaries extend the neoclassical optimality rules to
the case of the expected collective utility maximizer, as dis-
cussed in chapter four. Theorem VII-6 is particularly important
because it demonstrates the connection between financial require-
ments, and in particular, cash balance and working capital
requirements, and the firm's output decision. The next theorem
demonstrates this connection somewhat more forcefully.
Theorem VI 1-7
In deciding how much commercial output of type k to
produce at time t in state of nature s, the airframe builder
will compare after-tax marginal production cost with the
following sum of three terms: the unit of output's marginal
contribution to net income plus the unit of output's marginal
contribution to total revenue adjusted for cash flow effects,
less the implied cost impact of the marginal increase in cash
balance and working capital requirements. Moreover, this sum
will equal after-tax marginal production cost when the airframe
builder is in equilibrium.
Remark
The exact nature of this 'sum', which is closely
related to the concept of the marginal value of output defined
above, is brought out clearly in the proof of the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem VI 1-7
Fixing t and s, using (51) to obtain an expression






and ( 76 ) to obtain an expression for
A ( 3Fk / 3 kQ-t s )> and dividing the former by the latter yields











7 <*f, s ^ITF^ j 1 ^9,t,s,s'^ll,t,s,s') }7^- ^




+ 3u i i +.
B = U


















Bl^ii,w,8',8 ]}^ + ^of; }
From (31) and (32) it follows that
3tt
j*3- = -d-T)w, . (81)
k" t ,s3, L
J






\%,s'\^t, S Ut>s-3^(I|F ) t-gi^(X9it _ S)S , +XlljtiSiS ,)}





VWV^t.s 8kQt ' s
3U
1 1 t



























9C. Q 3V./ L , S , X , S v
Vt.s 3kQt,s •
The left-hand side of (83) is interpretable as the after-tax
marginal production cost of commercial output of type k, and
the right-hand side of (83) consists of the sum of the three
effects in the order in which they were listed in the state-
ment of the theorem. Q.E.D
The signif ican.-e of theorem VII-7 is that the
equilibrium condition (33) demonstrates clearly the role
that financial factors play in determining the airframe
builder's commercial output levels. In particular, the
output decision would not be independent of financial
considerations unless
S S
L n -[ E A-., . ,- E A-- . ,-, , ] = and10,t,s







sZ (A Q , + X 11 , ) = 0.
In general, it cannot be assured that either of these conditions
will hold at optimality. This is demonstrated, and its
implications for the behavior of the representative airframe
builder are explored further, in the next subsection.
The fifth set of operating policies that are to be
considered in this section involve the determination of
the optimal effectiveness/performance levels under govern-
ment contracts. For each government contract c at each time
t and in state of nature s, the effectiveness levels E,
'
c t ,s




—^ l + X2,cT^~ = ° ' (M)t,s 9E *.* ~,v. 3E
c t , s c t , s
Necessary condition (84) leads immediately to the following
theorem:
Theorem VI 1-8
For contract c at time t, < t < T, and states of
nature s and s', the airframe builder should set state-
specific effectiveness levels E. and E. , in such a^ c t , s c t , s
way that their marginal rate of transformation just
equals the ratio of their probability-weighted marginal
utilities. For contract c and state of nature s that might
obtain during periods t and t-1, 0<t<T, the airframe
builder should set intertemporal effectiveness levels E
C L , S
and E,_
1
in such a way that their marginal rate of
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If t = T in the first statement in theorem VII-8,
then the expressions in the numerator and denominator of
(85) must be adjusted for the impact of effectiveness
under ongoing government contracts on backlogs. For t = T,
it follows from (38) that (84) must be replaced by
A
3U H „ m 9U„ 3Bm „ m 3F
4> -7?







S 3B„ 3 E^ 1+r 2 ' C 3
c T,s T,s c T,s c T,s









must be added to numerator and denominator (with s' in place
of s in the latter) to obtain the appropriate optimality
criterion for the terminal period. When t = T in the second
T
statement in theorem VII-8, the product of (87) and l/(l+r)
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must be added to the numerator in (86) to allow for the
backlog effect.
Theorem VII-8 contains the decision rules for
achieving the optimal effectiveness trade offs across
states and across dates. The next theorem presents a
related result concerning the optimal allocation of labor
under government contracts expressed in terms of marginal
weapons system effectiveness/contract performance. But
first a lemma, which will aid in the interpretation of the
theorem, is proved.
Lemma VII-1
Adopting the convention that for each contract-
specific production function F
,




, S > , r$— < , ^ < , (88)
c
wt,s d E + 9 iA 3 KJ .ct,s ct,s c t,s
for all t and for all s, where j = M, A, E, and where
SO
j' = C, G, it follows that
X 2,c
K ° (89)
for each government contract c. Moreover, if
3tL/8RrA , 1
3Ul /37T t,s "
M (l-6)[Y'(C)-Cn(C)] Li ^U)
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at optimality, then it follows that the cash flow impact of
labor, .M(>, itili ,, ^ll.t.s.s^C'ty^t.s'
in (40), is negative and also that the net marginal value of
labor, { K3RGAjtjS /3 cL
J




It follows from (88), from the assumption
that 3U-./3 E > 0, and from (84) that X <
for each government contract c.
Turning to the second statement, note that





3U 9R an 3tt.
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<j) { I
GA,t,s 1 t,s u 1 t^^' S 9RGA,t,s 3 LJ 3^ - * ^ (l+r>
' ' c t ,s
(91)
t , s 3 1/ .
c t , s
S9follows from (8), (15), and (32). It then follows from
(39) and (88)-(91) that
- {
sI f/ A 9,t,s,s' + X ll,t,s,s'> } ^t, S / 3 c
LJ
t,s> < ° ' ( 92 >
It also follows from (88) and (89) that
{ 1(3RGA,t,s/ 3 o
LJ
t,s>
+ { }(3 *
ty 3 cLJ t,s> < ° ln (40 >- «' E - D
Remark
The left-hand side of (90) is interpreted as the
contractor's marginal rate of substitution between net income
and revenue earned on the sale of aerospace products to the
government (and on aerospace research and development carried
out for the government). The right-hand side of (90) is
interpreted as the rate at which net income and government
53
aerospace sales revenue can be traded off for one another.
(90) requires, then, that the contractor's subjective rate of
trading off net income and government aerospace sales revenue
be at least as great as the (objective) rate at which these




For contract c and for labor of type j at time t
and state of nature s, the amount of labor of type j allocated
to work under contract c should be such that the marginal
contribution of labor of type j to weapons system effectiveness/
contract performance under contract c just equals the negative
of the ratio of the discounted probability-weighted marginal
utility of effectiveness/performance under contract c to
the net marginal value of labor reckoned in terms of its
contribution to total revenue and net income.
Proof
Without loss of generality, assume that the contract
c is an aerospace contract. Solving (40) for X„ (3F /9 LJ )
^
,
C C C L , S
and (84) for A (3F /3 E ), dividing the former by the
latter, applying the implicit function theorem, and
multiplying through by -1 yields
c t , s GA^s' c t,s t,s / c t,s
— — /\
,
3 LJ . <j>. (3U../3 E + )/(l+r)
X
c t,s Y t,s 1' c t ,s y ' v '
(93)
where the expressions within braces in the numerator of (93)
are the same as those within braces in (40). Q.E.D.
Remark
Note that the expressions on both sides of (93)
are positive since, by lemma VII-1, the numerator on the
right-hand side of (93) is negative (while the denominator
is positive). Theorem VII-9 implies that at equilibrium
the airframe builder's use of each type of labor under each
government contract will have been expanded to the point
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at which the marginal effectiveness/performance product of
labor, 9 E. /3 L. or the rate at which labor units can
be 'transformed into' increased effectiveness/performance,
just equals the subjective collective rate of trade off
between net income and effectiveness (in each case discounted
and probability-weighted) embodied in the right-hand side of
(93). Because product effectiveness/contract performance
does not appear in neoclassical models of the firm, (93)
has no counterpart in the neoclassical theory of the firm.
The sixth set of operating policies that are to be
discussed in this section concern the airframe builder's
payment of managerial emoluments. Managerial emoluments












(94) leads to the following theorem concerning the firm's
payment of managerial emoluments when it is in equilibrium.
Theorem VII-10
When the airframe builder modeled in (37) is in
equilibrium, it will pay a level of managerial emoluments
that equates the collective marginal rate of substitution
between net income and managerial emoluments to one minus
the tax rate.
Proof








Substituting (95) into (94) and rearranging terms yields




^t,s( 9V^t,s)/( 1+r ) -
s ,f/
A 9,t,s,s' +X ll,t,s,s') }
(96)
which is the desired result. Q.E.D.
Note that the marginal rate of substitution between
net income and managerial emoluments on the left-hand side
of (96) takes into account the cash flow impact on discounted
expected collective utility of a change in net income.
What theorem VII-10 implies, then, is that the contractor
will have equated its subjective internal rate of trade off
between managerial emoluments and net income to the externally
imposed rate, 1 - t, at which these quantities can be traded
off when it is in equilibrium, and also, that this subjective
rate of trade off takes into account explicitly the cash
flow impact of a change in net income.
This subsection has discussed the optimal operating
policies suggested by the airframe builder model (37)
developed in section B of this chapter. The next subsection
explores the model's implications for the airframe builder's
optimal financial policies.
3. Optimal Financial Policies
For the purposes of this subsection the airframe
builder's financial policies can be considered to be of
two types: (i) issue/redemption policies for bonds and
shares and (ii) cash management policies. The former may
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be regarded collectively as the firm's leverage policy.
Under the assumptions stated in section B the firm's dividend
policy is taken as given, and so is not considered in this
subsection.
Beginning with the bond issue/redemption policy,
the amount of bonds outstanding at each date and state,
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The issues/redemptions at each date and state, Y , must












Solving (98) for Z A 7 , , yields
s ' =1 » ' '
S 8U1 1 t
s
s4 X 7,t,s,s' = {*t,s^W - sl ^^9,t,s,s'
*\ s S
(99)
+Xll,t,s,s' ) 3Yts ^^U.t.s.s'
and substituting (99) into (97) and solving for X 1Q t g yields


















where (32) could be used to obtain expressions for 3n\ /3B
t ,s' t ,s
and 9tt. „/3Y in terms of the partial derivatives of
the interest rate function i. = i, (B._
,
Y^ ).t ,s t ,s t ,s' t ,s y
To interpret (100) note that the first term on
the right-hand side represents the immediate impact on net
income of a change in the amount of debt outstanding, while
the second term on the right-hand side represents the immediate
impact of a change in the rate of new issues/redemptions,
where the two effects are related through (22) and are
transmitted through the induced changes in the interest
rate given by (23). Moreover, each of these terms is strictly
positive since 3tt/3B < and 3tt/3Y < 0, by (24) and (32),
and since the expression { } must be strictly positive
(as a result of lemma VI 1-2, which is proved below). The
third term on the right-hand side of (100) can be interpreted
as the value of an additional dollar of debt in terms of
reduced future needs, as can be seen from (38). As such,
one would normally expect this sum to be nonnegative.
Finally, the last term on the right-hand side of (100)
can be interpreted as the direct cash flow impact of an
additional dollar of new debt. Collectively, the four
terms on the right-hand side of (100), and hence A 1Q ,
itself, can be interpreted as an equilibrium marginal
cost of debt capital, where the marginal cost is adjusted
1102
for the impact of increasing the current stock of debt on
54future debt requirements and also on current cash flow.
Turning to share issue/redemption policy, the
number of shares outstanding at each date and state, n ,
L a O
must be such that the following necessary condition is
satisfied:
S S S
Z X8,t,s,s' " Z A8,t+l,s' ,s
+ d * ZA9,t,s,s'
s =1 s =1 s =1
s
(101)
+ d- E X 1t . , = .
<-,!_-! J-J-,X,S,S
The issues/redemptions at each date and state, Z , must
be such that the following necessary condition is satisfied:
S S S
E Ao +. t - v + * £ A Q , - v. • Z X 1 1 , = .
,_.. o , t , S , S t,S , _
-j y,L,S,S t,S „t_-i J-J-,t,S,S
(102)
In addition, total stockholders' equity at each date and
state, E , must be such that the following necessary
condition is satisfied:
S S
s4 A 9,t,s,s' - s4Vt + l, S ',s + A 10,t,s = ° ' (103 >
s
Solving (102) for E X„ ,
,
yields













s4 X 9,t,s,s. + s ,!^ll,t,s, S .>- < 104 >
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sSolving (105) for Z A Q ,, substituting into (103),








and rearranging terms yields
S S
I A
_., , + E A,10,t,s v
t ,s~
d







+ S A 11
„!_-! -L-L , b , S , S
To interpret (106) note that the first term on the
right-hand side can be interpreted as the value of an
additional dollar's worth of newly issued shares. To see
this recall that, according to (37), each new share is
issued at the beginning of the period, so that net receipts
for the period are equal to the price less the dividend,
v. - d. Also, since A Q 1 , applies to the new equity
issue/share redemption constraint, the effect of dividing
S
v \ „ bv v,. -d is to convert the value measure
S ,Z 1
8,t+l,s' ,s t,s
in terms of shares into one in terms of a dollar's worth
of newly issued shares. The second and third terms on the
right-hand side are perfectly analogous to the third and
fourth terms, respectively, on the right-hand side of (100).
Similar to (100), then, A given by (106) can be
interpreted as the equilibrium marginal cost of external
equity capital, where the marginal cost is adjusted for
the impact of increasing the current stock of externally
raised equity on future external equity requirements and also
on current cash flow.




In equilibrium the airframe builder will have adjusted
its capital structure so that the marginal cost of debt
equals the marginal cost of external equity.
Proof
Equate (100) and (106). Q.E.D.
The importance of theorem VII-11 is that A„^
10, t , s
can be interpreted as the airframe builder's marginal cost
of capital (from either external source).
In view of the results obtained in the previous
subsection, a question arises concerning the relationship









it should be recalled that each is probability-weighted
(by the probability that state s obtains at time t, <j>. )
I j S
and discounted (by (y^r- ) ) since the units in which each
is measured must be consistent with the units in which the
objective functional in (37) is measured. As described
below, the relationship between the discounted expected
S S
values Z A in and E L , is analogous to the
s=l lu - t ' s s=l ,t,S
relationship between the interest rate r and the cost of
capital i = rq + (l-x)qu - q in the deterministic multi-
period model of the firm discussed in chapter three of
this thesis.
.
First, rewrite the expression (62) for the firm's
marginal cost of physical capital as
X 5,t,s
= A 10,t,s* qt,s





Next, summing each side of (60) over s, it follows that
S S S S
s=1 1+<s s .=l l,t +l,s\s s=1 gI=1 ll,t+l,s's
Ht+l,s J
Then summing each side of (107) over s and substituting using
(108) gives
S S
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s 3Ui i t s
+Xll,t,s,s' )} ( 1
-T >qt ) s-
5- {
s! £1
All,t,s,s' qt,s < 110 >
s
"g.f^ll.t + l.s' ,s qt+l,s }]
Comparing (109) with i = rq + (l-x)q6 - q, the first term
in (109) is analogous to rq , with the firm's cost of
financial capital, A-. , playing a role analogous to the
interest rate, r, in the deterministic case. The second and
third terms in (109) are analogous to (l-i)q6 and -q,
EC
respectively, in the deterministic case. This analogy
1106
is brought out further in theorem VI 1-12.
(109) characterizes the equilibrium position of
the representative airframe builder modeled in (37) with
regard to investment. This result is stated formally as
the following theorem.
Theorem VI 1-12
In equilibrium the representative airframe builder
modeled in (37) will have carried investment in contractor-
furnished capital in each period t up to the point at which
the expected marginal value of an additional unit of physical
S
capital at t , H, just equals the expected cost of
s=1 o,t,s s
the required financial capital, E A in q , plus the
s= i
J-'J
> t , s t , s




of tax), E {<j>. ^—
—
(tz-) - £ (A Q * i+X.,., ,)}*
S=l t,S t,S S'=l 9 ' t ' S ' S 11, t, 8,8*"





capital goods prices, E (-1){ E A-- -
, a q + ,. _
S S=l S ,= l ' TJ-> i> > ° L^-Ljfa
i _-i J-J- > t , S , S t , S
Rewriting (109) as (110) suggests the following
investment criterion for each date t and state s.
Corollary VII-12-1
A sufficient condition for meeting the criterion for
optimal investment in contractor-furnished capital at time t
in state of nature s is the following: the contractor should
expand investment until the point at which the marginal value
of an additional unit of physical capital at t in s,
A
, just equals the marginal cost of the required
financial capital, A *q
,
plus the implied cost of
1 U




depreciation {4,^ __(rF? ) - e ( X 9
,
t , s , s
'
+A
11 , t , s ,s ' }
}x





goods prices, ^I^t,.,,.^,. -
s
,£/il, t +l,s' ,s^t + l ,s-
or in equation form,
3ui , i ,t





+ Xll,t,B..'K 1-T >*t..« " {




For given period t, if (111) holds for each possible
state of nature s at t , then (110) follows by summing each
side of (111) over s. But since (110) is identically equal
to (109), the conclusion follows. Q.E.D
(109) also suggests the following important result.
Corollary VII-12-2
If U- is strictly concave; if 3 2 i/3B 2 > and
3
2 i/3B3Y > 0; and if the direct effect of substituting




U t,s B^T^l+F* "
s ,y











[- t > s _ Ld§ 1 4. Ia ^f 1 ^ t }3B
t , s t , s Stt^3B
't,s "'~ -»~ t,s
3u 3tt 3tt
exceeds in absolute value the indirect effect, I, which
is defined below, then substituting debt for equity in
the firm's equilibrium capital structure at time t in
1108
state of nature s will cause its cost of financial capital,
A 10 t s' to increase > and under such circumstances it may be
concluded that the investment decision of the representative
airframe builder modeled in (37) is not independent of its
financial policy choices.
Proof
Consider the effect on A..^ , of changes dB and
dE in the amounts of outstanding debt and equity that are
equal in magnitude but opposite in sign. That is, dE = -dB,
but where dB > when debt is substituted for equity. If
the firm's investment decision were independent of its
financial policy choices, then L , should remain constant
as debt is substituted for equity (and vice versa) in the
firm's capital structure.
From (100) and (106), the change in the firm's
financial cost of capital in response to a change in its
capital structure can be expressed as
dA 10,t,S=
- {
*t,S a?;^)*- J (»B,t.8.-' +Xll,t,B.B'»* (112)
—--7 dYs -<*,. £—rW "
s4 (—5^7
t ,s t ,s
dX 11 , , 9tt 3U 1 1 .
+
dTT, m 3B+ ; abt,s lcpt,s 3tt, 4+r ;t , s t , s t , s
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,S,S dB
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3Bf£) - ( 3B7^ )(Wf^)]dBt,s+ Z >
where Z in (113) denotes the grand sum of all the terms in
(112) that contain rates of change of Lagrange multipliers.
But it follows from (24) and the stated assumptions that
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The second term in (113) is also strictly positive by (24)
and by the assumed strict concavity of U- . While the sign
and magnitude of Z are indeterminate in general, under the
stated assumption that the direct effect outweighs the indirect
effect, dX 1Q . > 0. Thus, by (109), the firm's cost of
physical capital, and hence its investment decision, is
affected by the change in the firm's capital structure. Q.E.D.
1110
The significance of corollary VII-12-2 is that
it states conditions sufficient to ensure that the separability
57theorems do not apply to the firm modeled in (37). The
contractor's investment decision is not, under the conditions
stated in the corollary, independent of its financial
policies - and in particular, of its choice of capital
structure - and there exists an optimum debt-equity ratio,
B _/n. 'V. , that is necessary for discounted expectedL,S I j S L , S
collective utility to be maximized.
Turning next to the airframe builder's cash manage-
ment policy, the amount of precautionary and speculative cash
balances at time t in state of nature s, C. , must be such
t , s
that the following necessary conditions are satisfied:
S S
-A 1rt . + I X-- . , - E L, +i1 . + A 10 , =0 (114)10,t,s
s
,
=1 ll,t,s,s' g , =1 ll,t+l,s',s 12,t,s
X 12,t,sat,s " ° at,si° A12,t,s^° < 115 >
It follows from (115) that two cases need to be considered:
X 10 . > or C, > 0.12 , t , s t ,
s
case (i): A 12>t>s > 0-
In this case the optimal stock of precautionary
cash balances at time t in state s is zero since, by (115),
>.,„ > implies C^ =0. It follows from (114) that12 , t , s ^ t ,s
S S
-Vt,s +
s4 X ll,t,s,s- - s ,f 1 A ll,tH,s's < ° • (116)
This suggests the following theorem:
Theorem VII-13
During time periods t and states of nature s when
precautionary cash balances are zero, the airframe builder's
1111
commercial output decisions are constrained, and in particular,
output levels tend to be restricted, by the impact a change
in the level of output of either commercial product would
have on the firm's transactions balance and working capital
requirements.
Proof
It follows from (18), (20), and (116) that the








A ll,t+l,s t ,s ]}( 8
kQ^ g
9V (117)
so that the equilibrium condition that commercial output
levels must satisfy is not independent of the transactions
balance and working capital requirements associated with
an incremental change in one or both commercial output
levels. Moreover, it follows from (66) and the standard
assumption that the implicit production function F, is
written so that 9F, /9,KC < and 3F /3 Q > that
K. K L
,






(3Fk/a kQts ) < . (118)
It follows from (117) and (118) that the sum of the first
two terms in (76) is strictly positive,






(A 9,t,s,s' +X ll,t,s,s' )} 3^Q^ > °
(119)
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It remains to be shown that (119) implies that output is
restricted. First note that if the commercial output decision
were independent of the transactions balance and working
capital requirements associated with an incremental change
in output, (119) would still hold at optimality, though in
light of (117), the quantity on the left-hand side of (119)
58
would be smaller in magnitude. Thus, it needs to be shown
that the magnitude of the expression on the left-hand side
of (119) decreases with increasing output. But this follows
directly from (32) and the assumed concavity of IL and of
Rj,t,s- «- E - D
case (ii): C. > 0.
t ,s
In this case the optimal stock of precautionary
cash balances at time t in state s is strictly positive,
and by (114), X = 0. It follows from (114) that
the inequalities in (116) and (117) must be replaced by
equalities, which leads to the following corollary to the
theorem just proved.
Corollary VII-13-1
If precautionary cash balances are strictly positive
at time t in state of nature s, then the airframe builder's
commercial output decisions, ,Q, , k = R, N, can be made
independently of the transactions balance and working capital
requirements associated with an incremental change in the
level of output of either good.
Proof
Follows directly from (117) with equality in place
of the inequality and (76). Q.E.D.
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It should be noted that even if the airframe builder
need not consider explicitly the transactions balance and
working capital requirements in making its commercial out-
put decisions, these output decisions are still not, in
general, completely independent of all financial considerations









(1 T){ (1-3)[Y , (C).C+Y(C)]
" 1} (90)
holds when the airframe builder modeled in (37) is in
59
equilibrium, then
J^Yt.s.s' + *ll,t.s,s-> < ° • < 120 >
Proof
Follows directly from (91) and (92) demonstrated in
the proof of lemma VII-1 and from (46) demonstrated in the
proof of theorem VII-2. Q.E.D.
Necessary conditions (114) and (115) also lead to
the following important theorem that characterizes the
contractor's decision as to whether or not to maintain
precautionary cash balances at time t in state of nature s.
Theorem VII-14
For any period t and state of nature s, the equilibrium
expected value (in terms of discounted collective utility)
of additional cash balances at t in s contingent upon s'
at t - 1 less the equilibrium expected value of additional








will never exceed the firm's equilibrium marginal cost of
external capital, X 1Q Moreover, if the difference of
expected values is strictly less than the firm's equilibrium
marginal cost of external capital for any date and state
(t, s), then the firm's optimal level of precautionary cash
balances for that date and state is zero, i.e. C, =0.
t , s
Remark
The expression (121) can be interpreted as the net
marginal value of an additional dollar of cash balances at
time t in state of nature s, where the net marginal value
is computed as a difference of expected values. The first
S
of these, Z X-- . , is the expected marginal value of
additional cash balances at t in s contingent upon s ' at t - 1
,
where the expectation is taken over states in the previous
S
period. The second expectation Z A 1:L 1 , , is interpreted
similarly, although the expectation is taken over states in
the following period. As indicated by (121), the firm's








4*n,t,s, s . -
s
4*ii,t+i, s -, s i*io,t, s < 122 >
for all t and s.
The second statement also follows directly from
(114) and (115) since strict inequality in (122) implies
1115
A 10 . _ > 0, which implies C. = by (115). Q.E.D
The importance of theorem VII-14 is that it links
the firm's decision whether to maintain precautionary cash
balances to the firm's cost of external capital. When the
marginal value of cash balances is less than the marginal
cost of external capital, precautionary cash balances are
zero. If the value of precautionary cash balances should
exceed A..^ for some values of C, , then the contractor10, t ,
s
t , s
will expand its holdings of precautionary cash balances up
to the point at which the marginal value of additional cash
balances at time t in state s, which is given by (121),
just equals the firm's marginal cost of external capital,
A 10,t,s*
Corollary VII-14-1
If in any period t and state s the contractor will
hold nonzero precautionary cash balances in equilibrium,
then the marginal value of cash balances will equal the




It follows from (114) and (115) that C >
y. , S
implies equality in (122). Q.E.D
Theorem VII-15
When the airframe builder modeled in (37) is in
equilibrium, then for each period t and state s for which
the optimal stock of precautionary cash balances is nonzero,
the airframe builder will produce more of each commercial






1 itsi.e. - q > -5—fr1—L— , so that marginal production
cost exceeds marginal revenue at optimality. For each period
t and state s for which the optimal stock of precautionary
cash balances is zero, the airframe builder will also
produce more of each commercial output than a short run profit
maximizer would, although in this case it is marginal
production cost adjusted for the marginal impact of a change
in output on transactions balance and working capital require-
ments that exceeds marginal revenue at optimality.
Proof
First note that it follows from lemma VII-1 and
theorem VII-2 and from necessary condition (40) that
<*t.. $?&>* - J^.t..,-- + A ll,t,s,s.> } > °- < 123 >
It is shown below that the use of (123), rather than lemma
VII-2, leads to a more general result as it does not require
the assumption that (120) holds at optimality.
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follows from (123). (Note that (128) could have been
obtained by invoking lemma VI 1-2, but at the cost of obtaining
a weaker result). Thus the first statement has been proved.
To prove the second statement , it follows from
(114) and (115) that
10,t,s gI=1 ll,t,s,s' gI=1 ll,t+l,s' ,s -
(129)
It follows from (18), (20), (123), (129), and the assumed
concavity of U- that the third term on the right-hand side
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k^t , s k^t ,
s
is interpretable as the adjustment to marginal production cost
required to take into account the impact of a change in output
on transactions balance and working capital requirements.
Proceeding from (130) in the same manner as in the proof of
the first statement leads to the inequality
w. 3R. 3R.
J
• + S = a
J' t>S (l+a) > , 3> Z > S , (132)
3 kQt,s/ 9 k
LJ
t,s 3kQt > s 3A ' S
where a is again given by (128). This proves the second
statement. Q.E.D.
Corollary VII-15-1
The airframe builder modeled in (37) exhibits a
revenue bias in the sense that commercial production is
carried beyond the short run profit maximizing levels and
the application of labor under government contracts is
carried beyond short run profit maximizing levels.
Proof
Theorems VII-2 and VII-15. Q.E.D.
The importance of theorem VII-15 is twofold in nature
First, the theorem demonstrates that the airframe builder
tends to produce more of each commercial good than a short
run profit maximizer would - a result that is consistent
1119
with the mode of behavior exhibited by the firm modeled in
chapters three, four, and five of this thesis. As indicated
in corollary VII-15-1, this behavior is also consistent with
behavior exhibited under government contracts.
Second, theorem VII-15 demonstrates the importance
of transactions balance and working capital requirements on
the airframe builder's commercial output decisions - a
result similar to one obtained in chapter four of this thesis
and also similar to results obtained from the Vickers model
of the firm. More importantly, (131) suggests the general
form of the required adjustment to marginal production cost,
and in particular, the importance of equity considerations
(A... , ,) and balance sheet considerations (A ir. , ) asv 9,t,s,s y v 10 , t ,s'
well as considerations as to the direct impact on cash flow
(X ll,t,s,s* and X ll,t+l,s' ,s ) ' T°gether < 13°) and ( 131 )
indicate the interdependence of operating policies and
financial policies.
Theorems VTI-13 and VII-15 suggest that the
representative airframe builder's commercial output decisions
are not, in general, independent of its cash management
policy. In addition, since A^ was shown in corollary
VII-12-2 to be sensitive to the firm's choice of capital
structure (at least under the conditions specified in the
corollary), it follows from (83), (114), and (115) that when
the optimal level of precautionary cash balances at time t
and state s is zero, the representative airframe builder's
commercial output decisions are also sensitive to changes in
the firm's capital structure:
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Corollary VII-15-2
When the optimal level of precautionary cash
balances is zero, C = 0, and when the conditions
specified in corollary VII-12-2 are satisfied, the commercial
output decisions of the representative airframe builder
modeled in (37) are not independent of the firm's choice
of capital structure.
4. Summary
This section has explored the implications of the
model of the representative airframe builder developed in
section B for the representative airframe builder's optimal
operating policies and optimal financial policies.
The main results generated in this section include
optimality rules for allocating labor to work under
government contracts (theorem VII-1 plus corollaries) and
to work on commercial production (theorem VI 1-3 plus
corollaries); for allocating contractor-furnished capital
to government contracts and commercial production (theorem
VII-4 plus corollaries); for combining contractor-furnished
capital and government- Lurnished capital under government
contracts (theorem VII-5 plus corollaries); for allocating
commercial production (theorem VII-6) and for determining
effectiveness/performance levels under government contracts
(theorem VII-8), each across dates and states; and for
allocating labor to government contracts in accordance with
effectiveness/performance goals (theorem VII-9). In addition,
rules were developed for establishing the optimal levels
of commercial outputs (theorem VII-7) and managerial emoluments
(theorem VII-10). It was shown that the representative
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airframe builder modeled in (37) tends to allocate more
labor to each government contract than a short run profit
maximizer (theorem VII-2) and also tends to produce more
of each of its commercial products than a short run profit
maximizer (theorem VII-15), in each case with the intention
of achieving a higher level of discounted expected collective
utility by sacrificing a portion of maximum possible profit
in order to increase total revenue. It was also shown that,
when the airframe builder modeled in (37) is in equilibrium,
the marginal cost of debt capital equals the marginal cost
of external equity capital (theorem VII-11); that the
expected marginal value of an additional unit of physical
capital at each time t just equals the firm's expected
marginal cost of financial capital at t, plus the expected
cost (net of tax) implied by the increased depreciation
expense at t, less the expected cash flow impact of changing
capital goods prices (theorem VII-12); and that financial
considerations can affect the airframe builder's commercial
output decisions (theorems VII-13 and VII-15 and corollaries
VII-12-2 and VII-15-2).
The results obtained in this section concerning the
relationship between the representative airfrare builder's
operating (i.e. output and investment) decisions and its
financial policy decisions deserve additional emphasis.
It was shown that, in general, the representative airframe
builder's investment decision is not independent of its
choice of capital structure (corollary VII-12-2); that its
commercial output decisions are not, in general, independent
of its cash management policy (theorems VII-13 and VII-15);
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and that its commercial output decisions are also not, in
general, independent of its choice of capital structure
(corollary VI 1-15-2). These results are important because
they specify conditions under which the representative
airframe builder's operating decisions are not separable
from its financial decisions.
Since the model developed in section B was able to
exclude progress payments by assuming that cash flow from
the government to the contractor matched perfectly the
recognition of revenue and fees by the contractor, the
results just summarized are subject to that qualification.
However, as demonstrated in the next section, the qualitative
results obtained in this section are not materially affected
when progress payments are incorporated into the model.
What does happen is that financial restrictions on the
airframe builder's behavior tend to become more severe,
thereby affecting the airframe builder's operating policies
to an extent greater than that implied in this section.
D. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRESS PAYMENTS
In the preceding section the optimal operating and
financial policies of the representative airframe builder
were derived for the special case in which separate contracts
are awarded on an annual basis so that progress payments are
unnecessary. Under such a procurement policy contractors
would be compensated in full for all allowable costs and
paid an annual fee, so that the flow of cash from the
government to the contractor would match perfectly the
1123
recognition of revenue and profit by the contractor.
In this section the model of a representative airframe
builder developed in section B is modified to incorporate
progress payments. This second version of the model is
the more 'realistic' version in that it is more consistent
with current government procurement policy. By comparing
the optimal operating and financial policies implied by the
two versions of the model, conclusions can be drawn concerning
the impact on contractor behavior of the policy of granting
progress payments to cover some fraction of allowable costs.
This is done later in this section.
Progress payments, which are payments to the contractor
for work in process and which are calculated as a percentage
of costs already incurred, serve an important financial
function. Progress payments serve as an important source
of short term finance, much like an interest-free loan,
without which the contractor would have to increase bank
borrowing or issue additional bonds or shares. To incorporate
progress payments into the model developed in section B
it is assumed that during the course of a production contract
the airframe builder is compensated on an annual basis for
a proportion p of its allowable costs, but the fee is
not paid until the entire contract has been completed.
The focal point of this section is the imperfect matching
of cash inflows and cash outflows under government
contracts caused by the government's progress payments policy.
The first subsection modifies the model developed in
section B to incorporate progress payments. The second
subsection derives the representative airframe builder's
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optimal operating and financial policies, as implied by the
modified model. The third subsection summarizes the impact
on the behavior of the representative airframe builder of
the current progress payments policy.
1. The Airframe Builder Model with Progress Payments
The introduction of progress payments into the model
developed in section B requires several basic modifications
of that model. First, progress payments cover only a portion,
<p <1, of allowable costs. Second, the fee is paid only
upon completion of the entire contract. Thus, while the
contractor typically recognizes the full amount of allowable
costs plus a pro rata portion of the fee as annual revenue
under ongoing production contracts, the amount of cash
received from the government in the form of progress payments
is usually a significantly smaller amount, with the differences
accruing in accounts receivable until the entire contract
has been completed.
The introduction of progress payments into the
model requires that greater attention be paid to the time
phasing of the various production contracts. In this
section it is assumed that all production contracts are
of the multiyear variety. For convenience it is assumed
that contracts on which the firm intends to bid during
the planning period will not (or at least are not expected
to) terminate until after the planning horizon t = T.
At time zero there are one or more production contracts
in force, each with exogenously determined total contract
target cost C* , target proportionate fee, a . and sharingCO CO
ratio, 3 . For each time t and for each new production
' CO
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contract on which the firm intends to bid at time t there
is a target cost , C* . , which is interpreted as in
section B as the maximum bid that will secure for the firm
contract c in state of nature s (where the states of nature
take into account the bids of the firm's competitors). In
addition, there is a proportionate target fee a, and
a sharing ratio $, . That is, the values of the production
contract parameters a, and (3. are determined either^ c t , s c t , s
as of time t = or at the time of bidding, rather than
annually as in section B.
Research and development contracts are treated in
this section in the same manner in which they were handled
in section B. For these contracts total revenue earned is
again given by (10) and the fee net of disallowed costs is
again given by (11). That is, it is assumed that all research
and development contracts are written on an annual basis.
Therefore the introduction of progress payments affects
only the treatment of production contracts.
Because of progress payments the expression (12)
for total revenue earned under a production contract must
be modified. In particular, the year of completion must
be clearly distinguished from the earlier yearr of the
contract. For an arbitrarily selected pretermination year
of a production contract, the contractor recognizes as
revenue the amount of allowable costs plus a pro rata portion
of the anticipated total contract fee, a • C* for^ coco
contracts that were ongoing at t = or £ a • QC* t
for contracts secured at time t > 0. The pro rata portion
is assumed to be figured as the ratio of physical output
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in the current year, Q to the total volume of physical
output specified in the contract, Q* for contracts that
were ongoing at t = or
_,Q* + for contracts secured at
time t > 0. For a pretermination year total revenue is
given by
c
Rt,s c^t,s ( cCt,s>-cCt,s
+ C A,s/c«*t,s ] -c°t,s-cC*t,s < 133 >
where
c«*t,s - cQV ca t,s - cV and cC*t,s " cC*o a11
hold for contracts that are ongoing at t = .
For the termination year (133) needs to be adjusted.
Up to and including the termination year the contractor has










where the two sums are taken over the years of the contract.
But if the accumulated sum of allowable costs deviates from
contract target cost, C* , then the actual fee will deviate
from the target fee. Let C, denote the accumulated allow-
able costs at time t in state of nature s, so that
A,s " A-l,s- + c^,s<cCt,s>-cCt,s - < 134 >
where C is exogenouslv determined for those contracts thatco &
are ongoing at t = 0. Then the actual fee paid by the
government is
c
ats ' cC*ts + c 3tjS ( cC*ts - cCts ) and
total revenue recognized in the termination year is given by
c




B t,s<cC*t,s - cCt,s> -
where Q* and a^_ are interpreted as in (133) and
c t , s c t , s
where the third term on the right represents the incentive
fee adjustment.
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Next (133) and (135) are used to determine expressions
for RG . t and RGQ . . In section B the expressions
(15) and (16) were determined simply by summing over the
contracts in force at time t in state s. But (133) and
(135) require that contracts also be distinguished by
termination date. Let C. , denote the contracts ofi,t,s






denote the contracts of type i that in state s remain





C. . = CT . i)C+ + , with CT . O C+ . = <j) .i,t,s i
,
t , s v-/ i,t,s' i,t,s i,t,s r
Also, by definition, C = C~ . With these definitions
' l,t,s l,t,s
(15) and (16) become




+ 2 Y^. ( C+ )• CL +( Q. / Q* )• a. • C* ]+ L c't,s v c t,s' c t,s ^c^t.s'c^ t,s y c t,s c t,s
2,t,s (136)
+ E [ v. ( CL )• CL +( Q+ / Q* )• a • C*L c't,s v c t,s y c t,s ^c^t.s'c^ o J c o c o
L2,t,s
+ g ( C* - C. )]









Y t,s ( cC t ) s)-cCt,s
+ (cQt,s/cQ*t,s)-c at,s-cC*t,s ]
3,t,s




, t,s v c t,s' c t,s v c^t,s'c^ o J c o c o v
L3,t,s
+ 6 ( C*n - C. )]c o c c t ,
where Q* and a. are interpreted as in (133) for contracts
that were ongoing at t = and that are still ongoing at
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t > 0. The expressions (136) and (137) together with
expressions (14) constitute the four revenue arguments of
the objective functional of the modified model.
The modifications (136) and (137) to the expressions
for RGA t g and RGQ respectively, suggest the inter-
temporal nature of policy decisions involving the allocation
of labor and contractor-furnished capital to government
contracts. There is an impact in the current period since
the current period's revenue is affected. There is also
an impact on the total allowable costs under the contract
,
which is felt in the period the contract terminates. To
allow in the model for this future period effect as it
concerns contracts that terminate after the planning horizon,
t = T, the utility function
V [ c£T,s ] r+ ; [ c£T,s ] p+ > < 138 >L2,T,s L3,T,s
is introduced into the objective functional of the modified
model set out below.
The only other changes in the model (37) required
to accommodate progress oayments are modifications of
the balance sheet identity (37r) and of the expression for
the change in the stock of cash (37s). The introduction of
progress payments necessitates the recognition of accounts
receivable on the left-hand side of the firm's balance
sheet. Let R,_ denote the amount of accounts receivable
t , s
at time t in state of nature s. The new balance sheet is
shown in table VII-5, which is just table VII-1 with
accounts receivable inserted on the left-hand side. The




+Ys (CcVs ] 'rVs'nVs> " Bt,s + Et,s •
Table VII-5 Representative Airframe Builder's















*t ,s t , s
Total Assets C. +R. +V, Total Liabilities
,S Z,s ,S
and Stockholders'
+n KC Equity B +Eqt,s t,s t>s t>s
For convenience it is assumed that revenue earned
on sales of commercial products is realized in cash payments
during the period in which the revenue is recognized in
the income statement. Given the earlier assumption that
all research and development contracts have a daration of
one year, accounts receivable reflect allowable costs in
excess of progress payments plus the accumulated unpaid
pro rata portions of anticipated fees under ongoing govern-
ment production contracts. Accounts receivable tend to
increase due to ongoing contracts and tend to decrease due
to completed contracts. Thus R in (139) satisfies the
difference equation,
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Vs=Rt-l,s'V {(1 - p) cYt,s(cCt,s)-cCt,s+ (cQt,s/cQ*t s>L2,t,s




c r t,s^c t,s ; c^t,s
3,t ,s
























where C given by (134) represents accumulated allowable costs
According to (140) accounts receivable at time t in state
of nature s are equal to their value in the previous period
plus increases associated with ongoing aerospace and non-
aerospace production contracts less amounts associated with
aerospace and non-aerospace production contracts terminating
in year t and state of nature s.
The final modification of (37) required by the
introduction of progress payments is the development of
a new expression for the stock of cash. C. , that takes^
' t , s'
into account the imperfect matching of cost and revenue
flows under government contracts. The representative air-
frame builder's statement of sources and uses of cash
modified to take into recount progress payments is provided
in table VII--6. The main difference between table VII-6
and table VII-3 lies in the treatment of revenue earned on
sales to the government, only a portion of which is realized
as cash receipts (i.e. progress payments) under ongoing
contracts. In both tables it is assumed that expenses are
paid in cash in the period in which they are incurred.
As a consequence, total cash generated by operations will
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depending on the time phasing of government production
contracts. The desired expression for the stock of cash
at time t in state of nature s is obtained by rewriting
the expression for the increase (decrease) in the stock
of cash provided in table VII-6.
It should be noted that the stock of cash at
time t in state of nature s, C. , can be reexpressed in
terms of net income at time t in state of nature s, tt
which will prove helpful in modifying (38). From (32),


















= ( 1-T > {RCA,t > s




cY t,s ( c
Ct,s ) -c
Ct,sVt,s }l,t,s
V ?>r+ P Vt,s ( cCt,s>-cCt,su2,t,su 3,t,s
c: _uc;
c't,s v c t,s y c t,s c o v c o c t,s
'2,t,s 3, t,s
V ?, r+ {(1 - p) c^t,s(cCt,s>*cCt,sL2,t,s^ U3,t j




cYt>s ( cCt)8 )- cCtf8
C2,t,s V-)C3,t,s
+( Q^ / Q* )• a • C* }
^c^t , s' c o y c o c o
and hence that








c Y t S ( P C. )t,s t-l,s' t,s Ht,s t,s r+ i r+ ,s c t,su2,t,s u3,t,s
(141)
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C. +( Q. / Q* )• a. C* }
c t,s c t,s'c t,s y c t,s c t,s




+ a • C* [1- Q+ / Q* ]}+Y^ +Z^ -v^ -d-ru -q^ xcoc o L c^t,s'c^ o J t,s t,s t,s t,s Ht,s
t , s t , s t-1, s '
Using (134) and (137)-(141) to modify (37), the model
of the representative military airframe builder adjusted to
account for progress payments can be formulated as the
following stochastic optimal control problem:
maximize {^V^^GA.t.s^GO.t.s^CA.t ,s ;RCO,t ,a'\ ,s ;
c c2,T,s 3,T,s
subiect to R~ A =«£ [ Y* ( C, ) • C . + tt, ]J GA.t.s C. . L c't,s v c t,s' c t,s c t,s
1 , t , s
(142)
+ ^ [ Y + ( C. )• C+
p+ ct,s
v
c t,s c t,s
2,t,s
+ (cQt,s/cQ*t,s ) -cat,s-cC*t,s ]
V E [ c^t,s(cCt,s>-cCt,s +<A,s/cQV :
2,t,s
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i , t , s
1137
U{C, . >c t,s - K t,s
B, =B, 1 ,+Y.t , s t-1, s ' t ,s
nt,s=nt-l,s ,+Zt,s
E, =E, - ,+Z. «v, +tt. -d*n.t,s t-l,s' t,s t,s t,s t,s
+Vt,s< C c«t > s ] 'R«t,s'NQt,s )=Bt > s+Et,s
t,s-t-l,s'V ^-PVt.e^tVcS.R^ _=R
2,t,s
+ ( Q* / Q*+ )• ^ * C* }
^c^t.s'c^ t,s y c t,s c t,s
+ .1 {(1-P) Y+ ( C. )• C.
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+ v Ky c't,s v c t,s y c t,s
3,t,s
v c^t,s / c^ t,s y c t,s c t,s







Z { ( 1
-P)A,s + c at,s-cC*t,s }
3,t ,s
—C
t ,s t-l,s' t ,s M t ,s t ,s
" + V {(1- p) c^t,s(cCt,s)-cCt,C






+ ( Q^ / Q*^ )• a. • C* }v c^t , s ' c* t,s y c t,s c t,s














along with the same nonnegativity constraints as in (37).
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The boundary conditions on the first order difference equations
are analogous to those in chapter four and so are left unstated.
The decision variables and the exogenous variables are
again those listed in table VII-4, with the addition of
the government procurement policy parameter p. The reader
is reminded that a complete list of the symbols used in
this chapter is provided in the appendix at the end of
this chapter.
2. Optimal Operating and Financial Policies
The purpose of this subsection is to characterize
the optimal operating and financial policies of the representative
airframe builder, as implied by the model (142). Since
(142) was developed by modifying (37) to incorporate progress
payments, this characterization is carried out by modifying
appropriately the necessary conditions discussed in section
C. In the next subsection the impact of progress payments
is evaluated by summarizing the analytical results presented
in this subsection.
To obtain the characterization of the optimal
solution to (142) define the following generalized Lagrangian
:
T S MA C
L,= I I <K •U-,fR^ A ( L . , L . , LE. > K + > (143)A - 1 t.s l L GA,t,s v c t,s'c t .s'c^ t ,s, 'c t,s' vt=l s=l '
£ C
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where the first difference equation indicating the change
in accounts receivable has been incorporated last in
the generalized Lagrangian in order that the Lagrange
multipliers A- through A 12 in (143) correspond to the
same constraints as in the generalized Lagrangian (38).
As in the case of (37) and (38), only the signs of
^r + o > ^a + <- > anc* ^io + _ - all must be nonnegative
at optimality for all t and s - can be discerned with-
out further study of the necessary conditions.
In comparing (142) with (37) it can be seen
that the revenue functions ROA , and R^^ . , andGA , t , s GO , t ,
s
therefore, the net income function, tt
,
have been
modified, and in particular, that the airframe builder's
allocation of labor and contractor-furnished capital
to aerospace government production contracts and to
non-aerospace government contracts in one year has an
impact on revenue earned, net income earned, and cash
flow in the year the contract terminates. Thus necessary
conditions (40) and (65) must be modified to take into
account the intertemporal revenue, net income, and
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and cash flow effects attributable to the policy of
granting progress payments. Since the analysis is
similar for labor and contractor-furnished capital and
is also similar for government aerospace production
contracts and non-aerospace government contracts, the
discussion below can deal with the allocation of labor
to government aerospace production contracts without
loss of generality. Thus, the analysis for the allocation
of labor to government contracts is set out in full,
and then the analogy between the allocation of labor
and the allocation of contractor-furnished capital is
exploited to summarize the important implications of
the government's progress payments policy for the
allocation of contractor-furnished capital to govern-
ment contracts.
To discuss these intertemporal effects connected
with any particular contract c at time t and state of
nature s, three cases need to be distinguished:
- the contract is terminating at time t
- the contract is ongoing at time t and will also be
ongoing at time t = T
- the contract is ongoing at time t but will terminate
at time t ' < T
These three cases are considered in order below.
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In the first case, time t is the year of termination.
To abstract from the backlog effect, which was considered
in the previous section, assume t < T. By differentiating
(143) it is found that the optimal labor allocation
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377 3 C S
g C 9 LJ S'=l 11 ' t ' S ' S ±J,t,S,S
c t ,s c t ,
s
3 C. 3 CL
[ c t,s c t,s j = Q
3 LJ . 8 LJ +c t , s c t , s
To interpret (145) note that the first three terms on the
left-hand side of (145) are identical to the left-hand side
of (40). In addition there are three other terms on the
left-hand side of (145). The first two of these
r i3R 3C , r -, 8tt 3C
X
gj 3L
ana l ^ 3L (146)
reflect the indirect impact on current period revenue and
net income, respectively, of a change in the current
allocation of labor (of type j ) to contract c, where
this indirect impact is transmitted through the change
in total accumulated allowable contract costs, C,
c t , s
The last term on the left-hand side of (145) reflects
the cash flow impact of a change in the labor allocation,
_LJ . . Note that it follows from (9) and (134) that the
difference l^tt - ttf] < , so that the sign of the last
a Li oLi —
term on the left-hand side of (145) is determined by the
sign of the sum of Lagrange multiplier differences
s J 1
(A ll,t,s,s' - A 13,t,s,s'> • < 147 >
In general the sign of (147) is indeterminate, being
dependent on the time phasing of government contracts,
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and in particular, on the differential cash flow impact
of contract termination (when the contractor receives
cash amounting to allowable costs for the current year,
plus p times the sum of previous years' allowable costs
under the contract, plus the fee) and nontermination (when
only p times the current year's allowable costs are
received in cash). The significance of the sign of
(147) is indicated below in corollary VII-16-1.
In the second case, the production contract c,
which is ongoing at time t, will not terminate until
after the planning horizon t = T. The optimal allocation
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where the sum of Lagrange multiplier differences (147)
once again has indeterminate sign. While (148) is similar
in form to (145) - the first three terms on the left-hand
side are identical and the remaining terms reflect the
intertemporal cash flow impact of progress payments - the
nature of the impact of progress payments is different
in the two cases. In (148) there are two effects, the
first interpretable as the expected marginal impact on
expected collective utility of the amount of accumulated
allowable costs under the contract as of the planning
horizon, and the second interpretable as the cash flow
impact of the proportion (1 - p) of allowable costs that
are not received as cash but that must be added to accounts
receivable.
In the third case, the production contract c, which
is ongoing at time t, terminates at some time t' <_ T.
The optimal allocation Lr , must satisfy the following
necessary condition:
U L_ (^_)t } GA,t,s
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(149) is similar in form to (145) and (148), though there
are now four terms required to convey the intertemporal
impact of progress payments. In (149) the two terms
I { }^5 |f and I { A |p (150)
s=l ac dL s=l 9C dL
are analogous to (146) in that they reflect the indirect
impact on the revenue and net income, respectively, of
the period in which the contract terminates of a change
in the current allocation of labor (of type j ) to contract
c, where this indirect impact is once again transmitted
through the change in total accumulated allowable contract
costs, C
.
, . What distinguishes (150) from (146) is
the period in which the contract terminates - the current
period in the latter and some future time period in the
former. The last two terms in (149) are collectively
analogous to the last term in (145), with the fact that
the period in which the contract terminates differs from
the current period in (149) being responsible for the
two terms, rather than one, that indicate the separate
period-specific cash flow impacts of progress payments.
To summarize briefly, then, the necessary conditions
(145), (148), and (149) arose out of the need to consider
explicitly the impact of progress payments on the allocation
of labor (and in view of the comments made at the beginning
of this subsection, contractor-furnished capital also).
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where the first three terms on the left-hand side are identical
to the left-hand side of (40) and where 6 is the sum of
two or more terms that reflect the intertemporal cash flow
impact of progress payments.
The comparison of (145), (148), and (149) with
(40) leads to the following theorem.
Theorem VII-16
If the utility function tL is strictly concave
with respect to each of its arguments R„
A
, , Rro , ,
and it. , then labor usage under government contracts is
directly related to the value of 6 . If < in (151),
then the effect of the present policy of progress pay-
ments is to reduce th 3 contractor's labor usage under
government contracts. If Q > 0, then the effect is to
increase the contractor's labor usage under government
contracts.
Proof
If 6 < 0, then the left-hand side of (40) is
strictly positive. Since it was shown in the proof of
corollary VII-2-1 that (50) holds under the assumptions
of this theorem, it follows that labor usage is restricted
when 6 < 0. When 9 > the left-hand side of (40) is
strictly negative. Since (50) still holds, it follows
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that labor usage is increased when > 0. Thus, labor
usage under government contracts is directly related
to the value of 6. Q.E.D.
Examination of the model incorporating progress
payments (142) suggests a possible interpretation of
theorem VII-16. During a period in which there are many
ongoing government production contracts, but only a very
small number, or possibly even none, terminating, the
combined effect of the cash outflows in excess of cash
inflows may be sufficient to threaten (or possibly even
to precipitate) a cash flow crisis for the firm. Mathematically
such a crisis would correspond to 6 < and restricted
labor usage by the firm. In the opposite case, many
contracts terminating would correspond to G > 0. The
variable corresponds, then, to a particular type of
variation in the state of the firm's financial environment -
a type of variation attributable to the system of progress
payments and explainable on the basis of the imperfect
matching of cash outflows and cash inflows that is a
direct result of the policy concerning progress payments.
The significance of the sign of 6 is brought out
more clearly in the following corollary to theorem VII-16,
which links the sign of (147) to the sign of one of the
terms that comprise in (145), (148), and (149).
Corollary VII-16-1
For any government production contract that is terminating
S d 6. 3 C. a
v r C t ,S C t ,S -i
at time t, -(1-p) Z (A..-. q ,-^io t <. ^ . H t2 i
C t ,S C L ,£>
in (145) is positive, zero, or negative as (147) is positive,
zero, or negative, respectively. If instead, the contract
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zero, or negative as (147) is positive, zero, or negative,
respectively; and in addition, 6 < when (147) is negative,
if 8Uo/9C < 0. If instead, the contract is ongoing at









(149) is positive, zero, or negative as (147) is positive,
zero, or negative, respectively, Whereas the future cash
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(149) is positive, zero, or negative, respectively.
Proof
The first statement follows directly from < p < 1
8 C, 8 C +
and [ r-2 - r2 ] < 0. The second statement follows
8 LJ . 8 LJ .
c t , s c t , s
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where the first term is strictly
negative when 8U.,/8CT < 0. The third statement follows
directly from < p < 1 and 8 C, /8 iA > andJ K ct,s'ct,s
8 C,
,
/9 LJ . > 0. Q.E.D.
c t '
,
s' c t , s ^
The significance of corollary VII-16-1 is that
the sign of (147) plays an important role in determining
the sign of the 'intertemporal cash flow impact of progress
payments' term, 0, in (151). Theorem VII-16 and corollary
VII-16-1 suggest that when (147) is negative for any
11R1
date t and state s, the cash flow impact of a change in
the labor allocation, _LJ i.e. for that date and state,
is negative, tending to cause < and thereby tending
to reduce the contractor's labor usage under government
contracts. However, as the last term on the left-hand
side of (149) suggests, this effect is partially muted
by the positive impact on termination year cash flow.
Finally, when (147) is positive for any date t and state
s, the effects just noted are reversed, i.e. the immediate
impact is positive, tending to cause 6 > 0, and the
termination year impact is negative. In view of the
comments made following the proof of theorem VII-16,
it can be suggested that (147) tends to be negative for
those dates and states when relatively few contracts
terminate and tends to be positive for those dates and
states when relatively many contracts terminate.
The foregoing has dealt exclusively with the
contractor's allocation of labor to government contracts.
Similar results could be obtained for the allocation
of contractor-furnished capital, and in particular, necessary
conditions analogous to (145), (148), and (149) could
be developed for the extension of (65). Bu. rather than
repeat this analysis, the following summary necessary
condition for contractor-furnished capital, which is
analogous to (151),
9U i 1 + dRrn + o
j- a 1 ( 1 v t , GA , t , s , 15




^7; ( l+^ ) g.j^S.t.s.s'^ll.t.s.s'^g Kc'
1152
3F
3 K t> , t , S
c t , s
where the first four terms on the left-hand side are identical
to the left-hand side of (65) when k = GA and where 8
represents the sum of two or more terms as in (151),
is used to determine the important implications of the
government's progress payments policy for the contractor's
allocation of its own capital to government contracts.
Theorem VII-17
When > in (152), the effect of the government's
progress payments policy on contractor investment behavior
is to cause the contractor to substitute contractor-
furnished capital for government-furnished capital.
When 6 < 0, the effect is reversed, causing the contractor
to substitute government-furnished capital for contractor-
furnished capital. When 0=0, the impact of the govern-
ment's progress payments policy is neutral with regard to
contractor investment behavior.
Proof
Solving (72) and (152) for A 9 , equating theA
,
c
resulting expression? , and rearranging terms leads to the
following modification of (73):
3 K
G
. A- , -{ }3R- A . /3 K
C
















where the terms in braces are the same as those in (152).
When > the equilibrium marginal rate of technical
substitution between government-furnished capital and
contractor-furnished capital expressed by (153) diminishes,
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(153)
causing contractor-furnished capital to be substituted
for government-furnished capital, as illustrated in
64figure VII-1. When 6 < the reverse occurs since
the margina.l rate of technical substitution expressed
by (153) increases. When 9=0 (153) becomes identical











Figure VII-1 Diminishing Marginal Rate
of Technical Substitution
Corollary VII-17-1
When 6 > in (152) the government's progress payments
policy tends to decrease the equilibrium net marginal
cost of contractor-furnished capital allocated to each
government contract,
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When < in (152) the equilibrium net marginal cost
is increased. When 0=0 the net marginal cost is un-
affected.
Proof
Follows directly by comparing (154) with (67)
for different values of 0. Q.E.D
The importance of theorem VI 1-17 and corollary
VII-17-1 is that they demonstrate the impact the government's
progress payments policy can have on contractor investment
behavior. When > and cash flow is relatively strong
due to the cash receipts associated with contract completion,
the cost of capital adjusted for the implicit cost of
cash utilized for investment purposes rather than for
alternative uses is, in effect, diminished. As a result,
the contractor is induced to invest in plant and equip-
ment and to substitute contractor-furnished capital for
government-furnished capital. This may account in part
for contractor willingness during certain periods to
purchase government-*- wned plant and equipment. When
9 < and cash flow is relatively weak, the above effects
are reversed since the implicit cost of cash used for
investment purposes has risen.
In addition to the just discussed effects of the
government's progress payments policy on the representative
airframe builder's operating decisions, there is an
important financial impact due to the required growth in
total accounts receivable in the years prior to the year
of contract completion. To highlight this effect, it was
assumed in formulating (142) that commercial sales are
matched perfectly by cash flows, i.e. that accounts
receivable are due solely to the government's progress
payments policy.
Differentiating (143) with respect to R , setting
the resulting expression equal to zero, and solving








As discussed above, A.„ can be interpreted as the10 , t ,
s
^
contractor's marginal cost of money capital. The right-
hand side of (155), which is analogous to (121), can be
interpreted as the marginal value of accounts receivable,
which is expressed as the difference between the expected
value of additional accounts receivable at t in s contingent
upon s' at t - 1 less the expected value of additional
accounts receivable at t in s contingent upon s' at
t + 1. This interpretation of (155) leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem VII-18
When the representative airframe builder modeled in (142)
is in equilibrium, the marginal value of accounts receivable
at each date t and state s will equal the firm's marginal
cost of money capital.
The significance of theorem VII-18 is that accounts
receivable represent a form of trade credit extended
by the contractor to the government. The financial resources
tied up in accounts receivable involve an opportunity cost
1 1 t^c
to the firm that is measured by L rt . In order that the10 , t ,
s
amount of accounts receivable be optimal from the standpoint
of the airframe builder, the marginal value of accounts
receivable (in terms of discounted expected collective
utility) must equal the marginal cost of the financial
resources used for that purpose. Put somewhat differently,
if A-,~ were actually the interest rate the firm had10 , t ,
s
to pay to borrow funds, then extending trade credit of
R, to the government would involve an interest cost of
t ,s &
A in *R, per period. The important point to be
made here is that the government's progress payments
policy implicitly involves the extension of trade credit
to the government by the contractor and that such trade
credit involves a cost that must be borne by the contractor.
Theorem VII-18 together with theorem VII-11 and
corollary VII-13-1 lead to the following result.
Corollary VII-18-1
When the representative airframe builder modeled in (142)
is in equilibrium, if it is optimal for the contractor
to hold nonzero precautionary cash balances, then the
marginal value of cash balances will equal the marginal
value of accounts receivable; the marginal value of
each of these alternative uses of funds will equal the
firm's marginal cost of money capital, L„ , ; and
this marginal cost of money capital will be the same
for both debt and equity.
Corollary VII-18-1 is a characterization of
balance sheet equilibrium, since as seen previously, the
marginal cost of money capital, A-.Q . , plays a crucial
1157
role in the contractor's investment decision. Thus,
^"10 t s
measures "the marginal cost of funds obtained
from the sources listed on the right-hand side of the
firm's balance sheet in table VII-5 and is numerically
equal to the marginal value of those funds applied in
the uses listed on the left-hand side of the balance
sheet in table VII-5.
The necessary conditions (145), (148), and (149);
the analogous modifications of (65) for the allocation
of contractor-furnished capital to government contracts;
and the necessary condition (155) for accounts receivable;
are the only modifications needed to the necessary conditions
presented in section C. The new necessary conditions
do necessitate minor modifications in the rules, such
as (41), for the optimal allocation of inputs under govern-
ment contracts. These can be handled simply by redefining
the net marginal values of the labor and capital inputs
to incorporate 9 - that is, to redefine net marginal
value to reflect the intertemporal cash flow impact of
progress payments discussed above.
3. Summary: The Impact of Progress Ppvments
In this section the model of the representative
airframe builder formulated in section B was modified
to incorporate progress payments. This modification
required several changes in order that the model adequately
reflect the intertemporal nature of the revenue-, net
income-, and cash-flow related effects associated with
the current progress payments policy. These changes
resulted in terms having to be added to the necessary
1158
conditions stated in section C for the allocation of
inputs to government contracts.
The main result of this section is that the current
progress payments policy can have a significant cash
flow impact on the behavior of the airframe builder,
depending on the time phasing of government contracts
(theorems VII-16 and VII-17). In years prior to the
year of contract completion the contractor receives
some portion (p < 1) of allowable costs in the form
of cash. The balance, along with the fee (if any)
earned under the contract , is received during the year
the contract is completed. Thus, cash outflows and cash
inflows are imperfectly matched. As a consequence, a
large number of ongoing production contracts coupled
with zero (or some small number of) contract completions/
terminations tend to cause the contractor to reduce its
allocations of labor and o.^ its own capital to government
contracts, while a relatively large number of contract
completions/terminations would, by improving the firm's
cash position, tend to have the opposite effect.
This section has considered just one aspect of
government procurement policy. Several others are dis-
cussed in the next section.
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E. ADDITIONAL PROCUREMENT POLICY ISSUES
The purpose of this section is to apply the model
of the representative airframe builder that was developed
in sections B and D of this chapter to attempt to explain
the hoarding of labor, of which the airframe builders
have often been accused, and to suggest some important
implications of the design-to-cost policy and also of the
recent procurement policy changes resulting from the
Profit '76 study. In discussing these procurement policy
issues it is the author's intention to demonstrate the
applicability of the airframe builder model formulated
in this chapter to these issues and to indicate that the
model could be employed fruitfully in further research
involving government procurement policy.
1. Labor Hoarding
65
As discussed in chapter six of this thesis.
it has been suggested by Peck and Scherer, as well as
by others, that the major airframe builders have at
times hoarded engineers, scientists, and administrative
personnel, and that this hoarding has manifested itself
in the assignment of these personnel to routine jobs
not requiring their skills. The purpose of this sub-
section is to offer two possible explanations for this
sort of behavior, one of which might explain 'permanent'
hoarding and the other of which might explain 'temporary'
or 'cyclical' hoarding. The former is most easily dealt
with, and so is discussed first.
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According to theorem VII-2, the representative
airframe builder modeled in (37) employs labor of each
type under each government contract beyond the short run
profit maximizing level. To the extent that the amounts
of administrative labor on the one hand and engineering
and scientific labor on the other exceed their respective
profit maximizing levels and to the extent that these
'excess' amounts are allocated to jobs that do not require
such skills, a government auditor could reasonably interpret
this sort of behavior as 'hoarding'. But such behavior
is not the result of management's reluctance to lay off
workers - i.e. its desire to hoard. Rather, the observed
behavior is the result of management's willingness to
sacrifice some potential profit in order to increase
total revenue and expected collective utility. Moreover,
since the contractor modeled in (37) will always allocate
more of each type of labor to each contract than a short
run profit maximizer, there is what may appear to be
'permanent hoarding' of labor by the contractor. Thus,
one possible explanation for the hypothesized hoarding
of labor is the nature of the firm's objectives, which
can lead it to hire labor beyond profit maximizing levels.
The foregoing explanation of hoarding brings
out an important issue associated with government contracting
For any given weapons system (e.g. plane or missile)
already in production, it is in the government's interest
to promote cost minimization, since ceteris paribus a
lower unit cost tends to lead to an increase in the number
of units that can be procured (this is true when, for
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example, there is a fixed total budget for a particular
program). If contractors were interested in maximizing
their fee on each FPI or CPIF contract, then their interests
would also be served by cost minimization. Thus, cost
minimization would be a mutual objective. However, if
contractors attach some positive weight to total revenue
and to managerial emoluments, as in (37) and in (142),
then cost minimization is no longer a mutual objective.
Under such circumstances, and as long as the airframe
builders pursue alternative objectives while the govern-
ment strives for cost minimization, it is likely that
government auditors looking for evidence that costs are
not being minimized would be able to gather such evidence.
The central issue here is not whether or not contractors
are technically efficient, but rather, whether their objectives
are consistent with the government's (i.e. cost minimization)
- and the analysis presented in sections C and D of this
chapter suggests they are not.
The second explanation, which suggest that the
hypothesized hoarding of labor - or at least a major
component of such hoarding - is of a temporary or cyclical
nature, is based on the existence of imper - actions in
the markets for administrators, engineers, and scientists.
As discussed in chapter six, the major airframe builders
are particularly concerned about providing stable employ-
ment opportunities for their skilled engineers and scientists
as well as for their skilled administrative personnel
(division managers, their staffs, etc.). One reason for
this concern is the high cost of a hire-and-f ire policy
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since laid off engineers and scientists may be hired by
another airframe builder and hence be unavailable when
a new program is won. To locate and hire new managers,
engineers, and scientists can thus involve high costs
of search in addition to the cost of training/retraining
(of which at least some minimum amount must be done in
order to familiarize newly hired or rehired personnel
with the program on which they will work).
In the extreme case, the firm may react to these
—A
costs by setting manpower levels L for administrative
-p
labor and L for engineering and scientific labor that
are to remain constant throughout the planning period.
In terms of the airframe builder model (37), this policy
can be incorporated into the model by formulating the constraints
—A —
E
(7), where L and L are treated as exogenously determined.
Then modifying the generalized Lagrangian (38) by appending
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where (j, j') = (A, 14) or (E, 15). While in general
it is impossible to determine the signs of A 14 and
A 1t- , since (7) are equality constraints, the following
lemma suggests that, by characterizing the firm's attitude
toward its levels of administrative labor and engineering
and scientific labor at any time t and state of nature
s as either 'would hire one or more workers in the absence
of the constraint' or 'would lay off one or more workers
in the absence of the constraint
'
, it is possible to
determine the signs of A 1 . . and A 1C- . during these
(alternating) periods and to use this information to
explain labor hoarding as a cyclical phenomenon.
Lemma VI 1-3
For time periods t and states of nature s for
which the contractor would hire one or more administrative
(or scientific and engineering) workers in the absence
of the constraints (7), A 14 , (or A 15 . ) _> 0. For
time periods t and states of nature s for which the contractor
would lay off one or more administrative (or scientific
and engineering) workers in the absence of the constraints
< 7)
'
A i4,t,s (or Hs.t.s' 1 °-
Remark
In the first case there is a scarcity of labor
within the firm and A 14 (or A 1& . ) acts as an
internally imposed tax, rationing the use of whichever
type(s) of labor is (are) in short supply, by deflating
the net marginal value of labor,
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In the second case there is a surplus of labor within the
firm and X 14 , (or X 1 _ . ) acts as an internally
imposed subsidy by inflating the net marginal value of
labor given by (159) in order to ensure that all available
labor is allocated (and that the constraint is satisfied).
Proof of lemma VII-3
Since (156) and (157) are identical in form, the
proof is the same for both types of labor. So consider










from which it follows that \* . . > 0. In the second14 , t , s —
case, the inequality in (160) is reversed and so is the
sign of A14ts . Q.E.D.
The significance of lemma VII-3 is that the Lagrange
multipliers A 14 . a'-.d X-. t- . serve as indicators of
the state of the film's labor requirements. A positive
value indicates a ocarcity. All available labor of that
type has been allocated to those positions in which they
are of the greatest relative value to the firm due to
the rationing role played by X > in (159) . A negative
value indicates the opposite situation. There is a
surplus and \ < in (159) acts as a subsidy. This case
corresponds, of course, to the temporary hoarding of
administrative and/or scientific and engineering labor.
Moreover, this hoarding is of a cyclical character
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as the firm finds itself alternating between periods
of scarcity and plenty (and X 14 and X 15 alternating
between positive and negative values - though not necessarily
in synchronization).
The second of the two explanations of labor
hoarding is, in the opinion of this writer, the more
likely cause of the hoarding of scientists and engineers
during the periods between major programs. During such
periods labor hoarding would be a rational response on
the part of the contractor provided the prorated cost
per period (in terms of expected collective utility)
attributable to severance, search, and rehiring/retraining
per unit of (scientific and engineering) labor exceeded
X, the amount of the subsidy. The main point is that
'labor hoarding' might, in spite of the negative connotation
the terms carries, constitute a rational response on
the part of the contractor to its cyclical need for a
specialized class of labor, the market for which is imperfect.
2. Design-to-Cost
The second major procurement policy issue that
is discussed in this section concerns design-to-cost,
which is an attempt by the government to redesign the
weapons acquisition process in such a way that the massive
cost overruns experienced in recent years can be avoided
in the future. The purpose of this subsection is to
suggest one method of altering the current procurement
policy that would reduce, and possibly even eliminate,
the cost bias exhibited by the representative airframe
builder modeled in (37).
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As discussed in section B of this chapter, for
each government contract c at time t and state of nature
s, there is a target cost C* , an actual cost CL
' c t , s ' ct,s'
and a function y, ( C. ), which expresses the proportion
of actual costs that are allowable and which satisfies
(9). Suppose that the government were to establish
C*. as the absolute cost ceiling for contract c at
c t , s to
68time t and state s. This could be accomplished within
the model (37) by defining
1, if C f C*
(161)
(^C*/C, if C > C*
Y ( C ) =
c ' t , s c t , s
for in that case total allowable costs are equal to
Y + ( C. )• C. = C. . if C < C*, and are equal toc't,s c t,s c t,s c t,s' — ' M
,Y + ( C. )• C, = (C*/C)-C = C*, if C > C=t , s c t , s' c t , s v ' J ' From
(161) it follows that
0,
^v







if C > C*
0, if C < C*
2C*/C3
,
if C > C*
(162)
J
With y(C) defined by (161), it follows from (8), (15),
and (162) that for an aerospace research and development
contract
,
f TIrJ -i -p r <- r*
(163)
^T = [Y(C)+Y , (C)-C]-^
3L l 3L l
w , if C < C*
0, if C > C*
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if C < C*
(164) I
0, if C > C*.
It also follows from (8), (15), (32), and (162) that for
an aerospace research and development contract
,
^tt %r zr f 0, if C < C*
-*T = (1-t){[y(C)+y , (C).C]-^t - ^> =\ . ~ (16
9LJ 9LJ 9LJ [_(1_ T )WJ > if C > C*.
Similarly, for an aerospace or a non-aerospace production
contract
,





-(I-t)w^ , if C > C*
(163)-(166) lead to the following theorem.
Theorem VII-19
For the representative airframe builder modeled
in (37), the cost level C, = C* is optimal undervy ' ct,sct,s ^
government aerospace research and development contracts
and the optimal cost level under government production
contracts is some cost level C. „ < C* . That is,
c t , s — c t , s
in neither case is it optimal for the contractor to over-
run C*
c t , s
Proof
In the case of research and development contracts,
it follows from (163) and (165) that 9R/9LJ > and
8tt/3L*^ = 0, if C < C* but that
3R/3LJ = and 3:r/3LJ < 0, if C > C* . (167)
Thus, when C < C* the contractor can increase revenue without
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suffering a loss of net income by increasing LJ . Thus,
expected collective utility must increase with LJ when
C < C* . But when C > C* increases in LJ reduce net income
without increasing revenue, so that expected collective
utility falls as LJ increases. Thus, the labor usage
level LJ that gives C = C* is optimal.
In the case of production contracts, it follows
from (164) and (166) that (167) holds, so that under
government production contracts it is again not optimal
to use labor beyond the level Ir for which C = C*. However,
since
9R/9L > and 8tt/8L < 0, if C < C*
,
C = C* is not necessarily optimal. The optimal level
of labor usage, which by the foregoing must lead to
C £ C* , is that which satisfies the necessary condition
(40), which may be written as
(l-3)wJ { }-(1-t)3wj { } + A 9 „ —j = . Q.E.D.Z
'
c 9LJ
The significance of theorem VII-19 is that it
demonstrates the possibility of designing government
procurement policy to prevent overruns. Whether the
government would want to be as restrictive with regard
to cost allowability as (161) implies, particularly in
an era of high inflation, is a much more difficult issue
to resolve. The main point is that if the government
were to implement an effective design-to-cost policy -
one coupled with tight restrictions regarding the allow-
ability of costs exceeding the contract's target cost -
69the problem of persistent cost overruns could be ameliorated.
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3. Profit * 76
The last major procurement policy issue discussed
in this section concerns the policy changes resulting
70from the recently completed Profit '76 study. The
purpose of this subsection is to explore the implications
of two of these changes: (i) the allowability of interest
expense and (ii) the introduction of capital investment
as one of the determinants of the contract fee, ti\
c t , s
As a result of the Profit '76 study, interest
expense is now an allowable cost under government contracts
It was hoped by the Profit '76 study team that making
interest expense an allowable cost would encourage
contractors to substitute contractor-furnished capital
for government-furnished capital for work done under
71government contracts. The following theorem states that
the representative airframe builder modeled in (37) would
react as expected to the policy change making interest
expense an allowable cost.
Theorem VII-20
The representative airframe builder modeled in
(37) would react to the making of interest expense an
allowable cost under government contracts by substituting




As before, without loss of generality assume the
government contract is of the aerospace production variety.





= d-8)[Y(C) + Y'(C)-C](i + 6)q.
> (1-S)[Y(C) + y'(C)-C]-6. qi
8 K
c t ,s (168)
L t , s
It also follows from (8), (15), and (32) that
3tt
Y S = (1-t){(1-3)Cy(C) + Y'(C)-C](i. + 6)q. }
c t , s
(169)
> (1-t){(1-3)[y(C) + Y , (C)-C]*6-qt } ,
where it is assumed in (168) and (169) that the overall
_C
stock of contractor-furnished capital, K . , remains
t , s
72fixed and where the inequalities in (168) and (169)
follow from 0< T < 1 and the fact that (1-$)[y(C) + Y'(C)x
Cli^. »q. > 0. Thus, making interest expense allowable
t , s t , s to ^
Chas the effect of increasing both 3R,-,. . /8 K . and
° GA , t , s c t , s
C
8tt, /8 K , . Since 8U 1 /8Rr . , > by assumption,
it follows that the product
Ut
'
s 3RGA,t,s 1+r> 3 KC t '' ' c t , s
which appears as the second term in the numerator of
the expression (73) for the marginal rate of technical
substitution between government-furnished capital and
contractor-furnished capital, must have increased as a
result of making interest expense an allowable cost.




U. T —(TZ-) ~ Z ( A n * . +A -.-i + . )> must beY t,s 37T
t s
1+r'
S '=i 9,t,s,s' ll,t,s,s
,y
strictly positive at optimality. Hence the product
31L . S 3tt





(A 9,t,s,s' +A ll,t,s,s' )} „ VCt ,
s
s ' =1 ' ' ' 3 K
t , s
c t , s
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which appears as the third term in the numerator of (73),
also must have increased as a result of making interest
expense an allowable cost. Since A,. and A„ are
5, t , s 6 , t , s
unaffected, it follows that the marginal rate of technical
substitution diminishes, causing contractor-furnished
capital to be substituted for government-furnished capital,
as illustrated above in figure VII-1. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorem VII-20 is that making
interest expense an allowable cost will have the desired
•effect on the behavior of the airframe builder modeled
in (37). This result is an extension of corollary VII-5-1
because it makes clear how the allowability of interest
expense affects contractor behavior. The following corollary
contains the further obvious extension, namely, that
increasing the cost of money rate i will induce a
further substitution of contractor-furnished capital for
government-furnished capital.
Corollary VII-20-1
Increasing the cost of money rate I. with
which the imputed interest expense under government contracts
is computed will have the effect of encouraging contractors
to substitute contractor-furnished capital for government-
furnished capital.
Proof
It follows from (8), (15), (16), and (32) that
—(^) > and —(W ) > ,di di
which imply by (73) that
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The second important policy change resulting from
the Profit '76 study discussed in this section concerns
the addition of contractor investment in facilities and
equipment to the list of factors that are considered in
negotiating the contractor's fee. The purpose of this
change was to provide a direct incentive to contractors
to modernize their facilities and to purchase new labor-
73
saving equipment. As proved in the next theorem, this
policy change will have the desired impact on the behavior
of the airframe builder modeled in (37).
Theorem VI 1-21
By making the fee negotiated for each government
contract a function of contractor investment in facilities
and equipment, and hence, by making net income a function
74
of investment, it, = tt, (I, ), the government will
' t,s t , s t , s' ' &
stimulate the representative airframe builder modeled
in (37) to increase total investment (or decrease total
disinvestment) during each period t and state of nature s.
Proof
Proceeding as in the development of the necessary
condition (62) for optimal investment, both (58) and (59)
must be satisfied simultaneously. Making the contractor's
net income directly dependent on its level of investment
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«><*t fB 8T—<!??> " ,£ < X 9,t f s f s' +Xll,t,s,s'»
t,s ' t,s S'=l ' > > > ' >
1
S S
where the right-hand side is the same as in (62). But
Bit
since (l+6){ }-^y on the left-hand side of (171) is
strictly positive, it follows that the adoption of contractor
investment as a determinant of its fee has the effect
of increasing the marginal value of each unit of capital
without affecting marginal cost, thereby inducing an
increase in contractor investment, as illustrated in
figure VII-2. Q.E.D.
The significance of theorem VII-21 is that it
indicates that making the contractor's fee dependent on
its level of investment will produce the desired effect
by augmenting the marginal value of capital. That is,
contractor investment still has an indirect effect on
expected collective utility, which is measured by X^ , ,















Figure VII-2 Increase in the Optimal Stock
of Contractor-Furnished Capital
Due to tt(I) Relationship
collective utility, which is represented by the term
(1+6 ){ }-^p in (171). Given any initial capital stock,
1
the effect of the policy change under discussion is to
—Qincrease the optimal size of the capital stock K
,
as
illustrated in figure VII-2, by causing the marginal
value of capital curve to shift to the right. It should
be noted that if contractor-furnished capital is in surplus,





the policy change under discussion causes the contractor
to reduce disinvestment, or possibly even to engage in net
investment when disinvestment would otherwise be called
for. On the one hand, such investment could have the
positive effect of improving the quality of the firm's
capital stock, while on the other hand, it could also
1175
have the negative effect of exacerbating the problem of
excess capacity. Hence, the incentive structure needs
to be carefully designed so as to ensure that the quality-
quantity trade offs made by the various contractors are
optimal from the government's standpoint.
This subsection has used the representative air-
frame builder model developed earlier in this chapter to
demonstrate that two of the important changes resulting
from the Profit '76 study - making interest expense an
allowable cost and making contractor investment in facilities
and equipment one of the determinants of the contractor's
fee - will have the desired impact on contractor behavior.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter a model of a representative airframe
builder was developed in two stages. At the first stage,
the model was formulated under the assumption that the
recognition of revenue and fee by the contractor is perfectly
matched by a flow of cash from the government to the
contractor. This was done in section B, and the implications
of the model concerning the optimal operating and financial
policies of the representative airframe builder were
explored in section C.
At the second stage of the model's development,
progress payments, or cash payments to the contractor
amounting to some fixed proportion p < 1 of allowable
costs under each ongoing production contract, were incorporated
into the model. This was done in section D, where it
was also found that the progress payments policy produces
cash flow effects that tend to force the firm to alter
its labor usage policy (theorem VII-16) and its invest-
ment behavior (theorem VII-17). In particular, where
cash flow is restricted, so too is labor usage under
government contracts, and where cash flow is enhanced,
so too is labor usage.
The model was used in section E to explore several
additional procurement policy issues. Two explanations
were offered for the often cited hoarding of administrative,
scientific, and engineering labor by defense contractors,
and it was suggested that such behavior may in fact be a
rational response by contractors to their cyclical needs
for labor. In addition, it was suggested how the treat-
ment of the allowability of costs could be handled so as
to eliminate, or at least reduce the likelihood of,
cost overruns, and it was shown that the representative
airframe builder would react in the expected manner to
the Profit '76 study's policies of making interest expense
allowable (theorem VII-20) and of making contract fees
sensitive to contractor investment (theorem VII-21).
The representative airframe builder model formulated
in this chapter is an extension of the author's basic
theoretical model, which is developed and analyzed in
chapters three through five of this thesis. The optimality
rules established in this chapter (theorems VII-1,
VII-3, VII-4, VII-6, VII-7, VII-10, VII-11, and VII-18)
are similar to rules developed in chapter four. As in
chapters three through five, it was found that the
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representative airframe builder tends to use more labor
and produce more output than a short run profit maximizer
(theorems VII-2 and VII-15). As in chapter four, it
was found that the airframe builder's optimal operating
policies are not, in general, independent of financial
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p. 16, makes the same assumption.
12. Ibid.
13. Research and development contracts could also be
distinguished from test and evaluation contracts.
Ibid.
,
pp. 13-20. For convenience, the two are
treated collectively. In the opinion of this writer,
the differences between manufacturing contracts on
the one hand and research and development contracts
and test and evaluation contracts on the other are
significant enough as to preclude treating all
three types collectively.
14. See sections E and F of chapter four for a discussion
of the meaning of 'complete' and 'incomplete' markets
for contingent claims for outputs.
15. The variable E, where the subscript c denotes
c ' ^
the contract, measures the overall effectiveness
of the weapons system produced under contract c,
and in addition, the firm's overall performance
(e.g. in meeting delivery schedules under the contract).
Thus, E is best regarded as a contract-specific
index of effectiveness/performance. In theory at
least, such an index could be constructed as a
composite index, with the scales adopted in constructing
each of the component indexes based on provisions
of the contract (e.g. penalties for deviating from
the delivery schedule), and with the composite index
formed by weighting the component indexes according
to the contractor's perception of how the government
would weight them.
16. Note that incorporating K(T) also allows for growth
as an objective. However, due to the substantial
excess capacity in the industry, the two indicators
of growth could move in opposite directions, i.e.
sales and backlogs could be increasing at the same
time that capacity was decreasing.
17. As argued below, (1) may be interpreted as the
embodiment of the goals and objectives of the firm
as formulated each year at the beginning of the
planning process described in chapter six. In the
model r is assumed to be an exogenously determined
constant. In actuality, r would be selected by
the firm's planners at time t = 0. It should be
noted that, since planning is repeated in an annual
cycle, r could change in a real time sense (i.e.
from one plan to the next). But within each planning
cycle, and hence within the model, it is reasonable,
in the opinion of this writer, to treat r as a constant.
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18. Similar treatments have been given defense contractor
productive resources in ibid, and in Peck and Scherer
op. cit.
19. The historical importance of the two classes of
capital are discussed in ibid.
,
ch . 6.
20. Defense Procurement Circular No. 76-3
,
op. cit.




22. Jones treats performance/effectiveness in a similar
manner, although he allows explicitly for multiple
performance/effectiveness criteria. Ibid.
23. Jones defines contract-specific production functions
similarly. Ibid.
24. Note that in (5), as in (4), for any time t and
any state of nature s, the output level at t in
s, VQ, (k = R or N) is defined implicitly asK. X
,
S
a function of other possible output levels at t
in the other S - 1 possible states that might obtain
at t , as well as of the possible output levels at
other dates and states (t', s), t f t'. That is,
the technological relationship between inputs and
outputs is defined implicitly over the entire time
period <_ t < T and over all possible states that
might obtain at any time t, £ t £ T. For given
t, < t < T, and for any two states s and s' that
might obtain at time t, the marginal rate of transformation
3A,s- 8V 3A,s
can be interpreted as the instantaneous rate at
which a unit of output contingent upon state s
occurring could be traded off for a unit of output
contingent upon state s' occurring, where this rate
of trade off is conditioned by the alternative productive
techniques that will be available in these two states,
as well as by input and output levels in previous
periods, and where all input levels and all other
output levels are, by definition, held fixed.
25. Another way of formulating the constraints (7) is
to specify a slack variable for each to stand for
the allocation of labor to 'special' projects during
periods (and states of nature) when the rate of
production slackens. (7) does not allow for this
device, but rather, assumes that all available
administrative labor and engineering and scientific
labor are allocated to ongoing government contracts
or to commercial production.










28. Note that since i is a money rate of interest,
total interest expense must be computed by multiplying
— c
i. by the value of fixed assets, q x • K ^t ,s ' Mt ,s c t ,s






and R. Spady, "The Persistence of Cost Overruns,"
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and Buyer Dependence on Seller Provided Information,"
Journal of Economic Issues (vol. 10; no. 2; June
1976), pp. 430-452; and L.J. Dumas, "Payment Functions
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Firms," Journal of Economic Issues (vol. 10; no. 2;
June 1976), pp. 454-474.
30. It is assumed here that final bidding on major
programs does not take place until production is
ready to begin. When bidding takes place before
the end of the development process, then for the
purposes of this paper, subsequent development
contracts are treated as production contracts.
The line of demarcation between 'research and develop-
ment contracts' and 'production contracts' in this
paper is the contract for which final bidding for
the entire program takes place. Because of the
learning curve effect discussed in chapter six,
once such bidding has taken place the government
is virtually obligated to sole source its purchases
from that point in time onward, with the consequence
that all subsequent contracts are determined under
conditions of bilateral monopoly.
31. This is the type most frequently adopted, although
later production contracts may be of the firm-fixed-






32. That is, the government reimburses the contractor
for a proportion 1 - ft. of costs in excess of
the target cost and the contractor 'returns' to the
government the same proportion of cost savings in
the event that actual cost is less than _C*
Normally, <
c 3 t g
< .3.
33. Scherer, The Theory of Contractual Incentives for




34. Cost floors can be ignored, since seldom have major
programs had cost underruns in recent years. It
should be noted that if cost ceilings are ignored
altogether, then the contract is really of the
cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) type. In addition
to the use of y^ , a second possible justification
c t , s
for ignoring explicit cost ceilings is the fact that
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the government has shown a willingness in recent
years to modify contracts so that contractors can
be compensated for overruns.
35. Since a, and 3, will actually depend on thect,s ct,s * ^
government's bargaining posture, variability in
a. and 3 + in response to the contractor-govern-
ment interaction is allowed for in the definition
of the states of nature.
36. As a check, note that R, - ir. = C, , as it
should. cx,s c x,s cx,s
37. Note that nothing requires that i, = i, , since
the latter is the result of current government procure-
ment policy while the former reflects the state
of the financial markets.
38. The use of the prefix 'quasi' is intended to denote
the fact that the price-quantity relationship modeled
in (35) is dependent implicitly on prices and quantities
from previous periods, which makes it different
from the usual demand function.
39. Where it is assumed that all decision variables but
C, and all state variables are strictly positive
all along their time-state trajectories. The reason
for giving precautionary balances special treatment
is discussed below.
40. See section B of chapter two of this thesis.
41. Note that because of lemma VII-2 it is possible
to state a more general result that permits the
states at times t and t - 1 to differ. By holding
the state of nature fixed in corollary VII-1-2
it is the author's intention to focus on the 'pure'
intertemporal nature of the allocation.
42. Peck and Scherer, op . cit
.









op. cit ; and Dumas, op. cit.
43. It is shown below in lemma VII-1 that X < at
z,c .
optimality when F is defined so that 3F /3 LJ . < 0.
^ J c c. c t,s
By the assumed concavity of F
,
3
2 F /3( LJ ) 2 < 0.
44. Note that it follows from the derivation of (47)
that 3 2 R/3(L^) 2 < 0.
45. Recent procurement policy changes have worked in
the opposite direction. For example, past performance
has been deleted from the list of weighted guidelines
that are used to establish the target fee. Defense




46. This is an important qualification because one of
the major reasons given for dropping past performance
from the list of weighted guidelines was the lack
of an objective measure of past contractor performance.








= or 3Fk /9 kK
C
ts = 0. In general, X £ f 0.
Since the marginal productivity of capital is given by
3Q . 9F/3KC
8F/8K = implies that the marginal productivity
of capital is zero at optimality. If it is assumed
that 9F/3KC < for all KC
,
then it can be inferred
that A,- , > and A < at optimality.
48. As in the case of L , it is possible, though
unlikely, that A
fi
= at optimality. In general,
A„ < (as shown below in lemma VII-1), so that
A 6,t,s " °=*W 9kG " °
by the same line of argument employed in footnote
47. If it is assumed that 8F/8KG < for all values
of K
,
then it may be inferred that, in general,
X a , > at optimality. The special case Xa =0
is considered in corollary VII-5-2.
49. See footnote 24 for an interpretation of this particular
marginal rate of transformation.




51. Note that it follows from (9) that y(C) < 1 and
Y'(C) 5 0, and hence, that y'(C)-C + y(C) < 1.
Since < 3 < 1 it follows that the expression within
braces on the right-hand side of (90) is always
strictly positive. Therefore, it is not assured
that (90) must hold for all t and s, although it
is argued in the next footnote that or.e would expect
(90) to hold normally.
52. (91) is demonstrated as follows. From (8) and (15),
= (1-3)[Y'(C).C + Y(C)]w, , (*)8RGA,t,s J
and from (8) and (32),




r. 9U 9R 9U 3ttw_1 vt ^ n
{
*t,s ^r JL + a¥ 9L> (TTF> >°
^ 9U 9R 3U lH > n^^ 9R 9L 9tt 9L - u
^
|n { (i_ B )[ Y . ( c).C + Y(C)] Wj }
+ |2{(1- T )[(1-3)[Y'(C)-C + Y(C)]w. - w.]} >
°" J J —
<c \ 9U/ 9R . /(_ \ r 1 -. -l
9U/9tt - K± Tn (l-3)[Y'(C)-C + y(C)] Li '
where the first implication follows from <j>. >
and r > 0; where the second follows by substitution
of (*) and (**); and where the third follows by
dividing through by
OU/9tt)(1-3)[y'(C)-C + Y(C)]w, > 0.
(91) implies that (90) would be expected to hold
normally. That is, one would expect that for the
airframe builder modeled in (37), further increases
in labor usage under any government contract would
lead to increases in expected collective utility,
but that the firm was constrained from doing so
by the potential balance sheet and cash flow impacts
of such increases.
53. This interpretation follows from the steps carried
out in footnote 52 - i.e. the right-hand side of
(90) is identically equal to
9tt/9L
9R/9L '
54. That is, a change in the debt level has an immediate
impact on cash flow since the firm's bond interest
obligations are altered. A change in the rate of
issues/redemptions also has an immediate cash impact
as new debt issues are a source of cash while redemptions
use up cash. In addition, a change in the level of
debt outstanding in the current period will, given
the firm's debt requirements next period, affect
next period's required issues/redemptions decision,
which in turn will affect next period's average
interest rate i = i(B, Y). This impact is measured
S
by -EX in (100).
55. This is necessary because the impact of changing
capital goods prices on the optimum size of the
firm's capital stock is dependent on both the state
of nature at time t and the state of nature at
time t + 1. The change in capital goods prices,
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as it affects the optimum size of the capital stock,
is thus computed below as a mathematical expectation
with respect to the states s that might obtain at
t and the states s' that might obtain at t + 1
.
56. As noted in section E of chapter four, the Lagrange
multiplier for the balance sheet identity, in this
case A 10 is measured in utility units. By
dividing each side of (109) and (110) through by
the coefficient { } of the (l-x)q »6 term in
(110), this units problem can be avoided.
57. These separability theorems are discussed in sections
I and K of chapter two of this thesis.
58. Just how much smaller depends on the magnitude
of 8 2 F /8( Q ) 2 , which reflects indirectly the
change in input requirements (since the constraint
F, [ ] = must be satisfied in equilibrium). These
secondary effects are ignored, and hence the qualification
'tends to' in the statement of the theorem.
59. The interpretation of (90) is discussed above in the
remark following the proof of lemma VII-1. Also,
note that if (90) fails to hold at optimality, the
sign of the sum on the left-hand side of (120) becomes
indeterminate
.
60. See section I of chapter two of this thesis.
61. Typically p = 0.8. Actually, the constant p constitutes
an upper bound on the proportionate flow of cash
from the government to the contractor. For example,
if the government is dissatisfied with the item
under production or with the rate of production,
it can pay a proportion smaller than p. The model
developed in this section abstracts from this complication.
62. Note that the effect on discounted expected collective
utility of cumulative allowable costs that is embodied
in U„ is related to, though is not identical to,
the backlog effect embodied in U ? . The latter is
sensitive only to allowable costs in the terminal
period and involves the quantity of units that are
planned to be sold to the government beyond the
planning horizon. The cumulative allowable costs
are of interest primarily for their financial and
cash flow impacts at the time the fee is determined
(again, beyond the planning horizon).
63. The foregoing statements suggest conditions that
would be sufficient to determine the sign of 6
in (151). They also suggest the basis for an empirical
investigation of the cash flow impact of the govern-
ment's progress payments policy. For example,
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one would expect to find systematic variations in
commercial receivables and payables and in borrowing
requirements over time depending on the relative
cash-generating and cash-absorbing impact of govern-
ment contracts.
64. Note that the shape of the isoquant in the figure
implies that contractor-furnished capital and govern-
ment-furnished capital are not perfect substitutes.
This is consistent with the form of the production
function (4), which contains these two types of
capital as separate arguments.
65. See subsection 5 in section E of chapter six, and
see also footnote 180 of chapter six.
66. The discussion could also proceed in terms of the
modified model (142), although care would have to
be taken to specify the date of contract termination.
The use of (37) avoids this complication (without
biasing the results).
67. Department of Defense Directive 5000.28
,
"Design
to Cost , " op. cit
.
68. Strictly speaking, design-to-cost is concerned with
unit cost, and only indirectly with total contract
cost. However, since a given order quantity Q,
and a given unit cost imply a particular total
contract (target) cost _C* , it is the opinion
of this writer that dealing directly with total
contract cost is at least consistent in spirit with
the design-to-cost policy a.nd should not bias seriously
the results obtained in this subsection.
69. A particularly important possibility from which this
subsection has abstracted is the possibility of
bankruptcy, which, in view of Lockheed's difficulties
under the C-5A contract and Grumman ' s difficulties
under the F-14 contract, would have to be considered
carefully before the more restrictive attitude toward
overruns discussed in this subsection could actually
be implemented. This subsection was concerned with
an 'if ... then' type of analysis, rather than with
trying to recommend a specific course for govern-
ment procurement policy.




72. Given the excess capacity in the aerospace industry,
this is not an unreasonable assumption. Moreover,
specific incentives to encourage investment in




74. It follows from the change in procurement policy
that functions of the form it. = tt, (I. ),
c t , s c t,sc t , s '
where I, denotes contract-specific investment,
c t , s '
can be defined. It is assumed here for convenience
that these contract-specific functions can be used
to define net income as a function of overall invest-
ment, tt, = tt, (I. ), where 9tt, /3I. „ > 0.t,s t , s t , s ' t,s' t,s
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER SEVEN
DEFINITION OF SYMBOLS
I . Roman
t index denoting the time period, where t = 0,
1, . . . , T, with t = denoting the initial
period (in which the values of all relevant
quantities are assumed to be known with certainty)
and with t = T denoting the terminal period
s index denoting the state of nature, where
s = 1, . . . , S
t,s ordered pair denoting the state of nature s
at time t





Bm total contract backlogs (as of the terminal
i , s
period)
BT contract-specific backlog function, expressing
total contract order backlog as a function of
unit cost and weapons system effectiveness/
contract performance in the terminal period
C total cash (listed in the balance sheet)
C, total precautionary cash balances




set of government contracts for aerospace research
and development ongoing at t in s




ongoing at t in s
C
. set of government contracts for non-aerospace
3, t ,s
manufacturing ongoing at t in s
C. denotes the set of government contracts of typei,t ,s
i, i = 1, 2, 3, that remain ongoing after t in s
C. denotes the set of government contracts of type
i
, t , s
i, i = 1, 2, 3, that terminate at t in s
C, actual cost under government contract c
c t , s &
C* target cost for government contract c won at
c t , s & &
t in s
C* target cost for government contracts ongoing
at t =
C. accumulated allowable costs as of t and s under
c t , s
government contract c
d dividend per share (exogenously determined)




e + retained earningst , s &
E expectations operator




T.E^ book value of contributed capitalK t , s
F book value of accumulated retained earnings
R t , s
1 -i on
E, weapons system effectiveness/contract performance
under government contract c
F government contract-specific production function
F„ production function for commercial non-aerospace
product
F„ production function for commercial aerospace
product
i, average interest rate on debt
t , s &
i, cost of money rate (exogenously determined)
L • fa





K , total stock of contractor-furnished capital
t , s y
i
t ,s
c" t , s
—
G
K , o total stock of government-furnished capital
K . quantity of contractor-furnished capital employed
under government contract c
C
„K . quantity of contractor-furnished capital employed
in commercial non-aerospace production
C
RK . quantity of contractor-furnished capital employed
in commercial aerospace production
K . quantity of government-furnished capital employed
under government contract c
—A




L exogenously determined constant level of engineering
and scientific labor
1191
A \L . ) amounts of administrative labor employed under
. ( government contract c, in commercial non-aerospace
N t,s production N, and in commercial aerospace production
T
A | R, respectively
RL t,s_ !
E "~\




^ 1 under government contract c, in commercial non-
LN t , s / aerospace production N, and in commercial aero-
T




L , amounts of manufacturing labor employed under
„ ( government contract c, in commercial non-aerospace
N t,s ' production N, and in commercial aerospace production
,M R, respectively
R t,s
M. total managerial emoluments paid
n total number of equity shares outstanding
„p. price of non-aerospace commercial product (expressed
IN L , o
as a function of ^Q, )
Rp price of aerospace commercial product (expressed
as a function of DQ. )K L
,
S
q price per unit of (physical) capital
Q output (per period) under government contract c
C L , S
Q* total volume of physical output specified in
government contract c won at t in s
Q* total volume of physical output specified in
government contract c ongoing at t =
Q output (per period) of non-aerospace commercial
IN L , o
product
Q output (per period) of aerospace commercial
p 'oduct
1192
discount rate (exogenously determined and taken
to be constant throughout the planning period)
FL total accounts receivable
t ,s
R„ A total revenue earned on aerospace sales to theGA , t , s
government




R^. total revenue earned on commercial aerospace sales
R/-^ u. total revenue earned on commercial non-aerospaceCO , t , ^
sales
R, total revenue earned under government contract c






stock market value of a share of stock







unit prices of administrative labor A, engineering
and scientific labor E, and manufacturing labor
M, respectively
wM J
t,s new issues/redemptions of debt
't , s
new issues/redemptions of shares of stock
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II. Greek
a. ratio of target fee to target cost under govern-
ment contract c won at t in s
a ratio of target fee to target cost under
government contract c ongoing at t =
$. the contractor's share of cost overruns andC L
,
S
underruns under government contract c won
at t in s
3_ the contractor's share of cost overruns and
underruns under government contract c ongoing
at t =
Y t proportion of costs incurred that are judged
allowable under government contract c
6 constant percentage rate of physical depreciation




obtain at time t
it. net income (after tax)
t , s v '
7T, actual fee earned under government contract c
c t , s to
_,
tt target fee under government contract c
P proportion of allowable costs in any period
under an ongoing government contract that is
granted as progress payments (actual p < 0.8)
constant tax rate
A.
. value of an additional unit of (physical)
1, t , s ,
s
'
capital at time t in state s contingent upon
the transition to s at t from s' at t - 1
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A„ Lagrange multipliers associated with government
z , c
contract-specific production functions
Ao Lagrange multiplier associated with the production
function for the commercial aerospace product
A. Lagrange multiplier associated with the production
function for the commercial non-aerospace product
A- value of an additional unit of contractor-s'
,
s
furnished capital (A^ > 0, \/t
,
\/s)






, _> 0, yt, V s )
A 7 , value of a change in the amount of debt out-
standing at time t in state s contingent upon
the transition to s at t from s' at t - 1
A *. t value of a change in the number of shareso , t , s
,
s
of stock outstanding at t in state s contingent
upon the transition to s at t from s' at t - 1
A Q , , value of a change in the book value of total
equity at t in state s contingent upon the
transition to s at t from s' at t - 1
A-
, Lagrange multiplier associated with the balance
sheet identity (interpreted as the firm's
marginal cost of financial capital)
A-... , , value of an additional dollar of cash balances11, t , s,
s
at t in state s contingent upon the transition
to s at t from s' at t - 1
A 19 measure of the impact of the nonnegativity
constraint on precautionary cash balances
(A 12,t,s ± °' V*' V s )
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A.,0 , , value of an additional dollar of accounts13, t , s ,s
'
receivable at t in state s contingent upon
the transition to s at t from s' at t - 1
A.. . value of an additional unit of administrative
14 , t , s
labor
Lr . value of an additional unit of engineering and
scientific labor
With the exception of t and s, the symbols drawn from
the roman alphabet are listed in alphabetical order
Wherever the pair of subscripts t,s appears the
statement 'at time t in state of nature s' should
be added to the definition of the symbol. In the
interest of brevity this is not done for each symbol
in the table bearing these subscripts.
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VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
At the end of an undertaking such as this it is important
to take stock. This is done in this chapter by first,
indicating what sparked the author's interest in the theory
of the firm; then reviewing the research results reported
herein and summarizing the major contributions of the
thesis; and lastly, suggesting what might lie ahead.
During the period 1971-1973 the author studied at
the University of Cambridge, where he worked under Ajit
Singh and attended two series of lectures given by Robin
Marris. The latter, whose managerial model of the firm
is presented in section G in chapter two of this thesis,
and the former, whose empirical studies of the role of
takeovers were also discussed in section G, indicated
to the author the limitations of existing models of
the firm and stimulated the author's interest in developing
more 'realistic' models of the firm that could be used
to explore a wider range of issues than those for which
the models that had appeared in the literature were suitable.
Even before leaving Cambridge it had become apparent to
the author that the formulation of more meaningful models
of the firm would likely entail the use of more sophisticated
1197
mathematical techniques than those that had previously
been employed.
In selecting the specific research topic for this
thesis it was the author's intention to utilize the technique
of optimal control theory in order to extend the theory
of the firm by developing a stochastic multiperiod model
of the firm and by using the model to study the operating
decisions and financial decisions - and the relationship
between them - made by the firm in the face of uncertainty
in general and systematic demand shifts - e.g. the business
cycle - in particular. It was also the author's intention
to study the behavior of a representative firm in a specific
industry - the industry selected was the U.S. airframe
industry - in the context of that industry's institutional
and regulatory milieu. The purpose of such an analysis
would be to formulate a model that incorporated these
industry-specific phenomena and to use the model to study
analytically the behavior of the firm under alternative
institutional and regulatory settings.
1. The General Literature and Its Patterns
The initial phase of the research effort involved
a survey of the literature in order to ider. ify clearly
the state of the art in modeling the firm and its behavior.
In order to make sense out of the multiplicity of models
that had been formulated, a taxonomy was developed and the
most significant of the previous contributions to the theory
of the firm were classified according to their principal
economic and mathematical attributes. The results are
presented in chapter two and a convenient summary of the
1198
results is provided in tables 11-34 and 11-35.
The principal economic attributes are: the nature of
the firm's objective (traditional/managerial/behavioral/modern
traditional); the treatment of financial considerations
(subsumed/ internal only/external - debt only/external - equity
only/external - both debt and equity); the existence of
uncertainty (or lack of it); the consideration (or lack of it)
of disequilibrium issues; and the treatment of time (single
period or multiperiod) . The principal mathematical attributes
are: the nature of the optimization (static or dynamic); the
existence (or lack of it) of nonlinearities ; the nature of
the constraints; and the solution technique employed. The
survey revealed the following lacunae in modeling (and under-
standing the behavior of ) a firm making operating and financial
decisions in an uncertain world:
- Due at least in part to the conceptual difficulties associated
with specifying the appropriate objective for the traditional
type firm operating within a stochastic multiperiod environ-
ment, there were no models that considered the behavior of
the firm within a context that was both multiperiod and
stochastic in nature.
- There were no models that permitted an interaction between
phenomena external to the firm and phenomena internal to it.
- The models classified firms into those in which the share-
holders' goals always predominated (traditional and modern
traditional); those in which the firm's professional
manager's goals always predominated (managerial); and those
in which goal setting was assumed to take place through
some internal bargaining process, with the consequence
that specific goals at any point in time were ill-defined
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a stable relationship (over time) between the goals of
both shareholders and managers.
2. The Basic Model and Significant Results
Thus it was decided to develop a model of the
firm with the following attributes:
- The model would explicitly allow for the objectives
of shareholders and managers - and a stable relationship
between these sets of objectives over time - within
a single collective utility function.
- The model would integrate factors relevant to the firm's
operating policy decisions and those relevant to its
financial policy decisions into a stochastic multiperiod
model in order to permit conclusions concerning the
relationship between these two sets of policies to be
drawn
.
- The model would explicitly recognize the interaction
between phenomena external to the firm and phenomena
internal to it in order to permit systematic changes
in the behavior of the firm in response to shifts in
demand, such as those caused by the business cycle, to
be studied.
- The uncertainty version of the integratec production-
finance model would employ the time-state-preference
approach to modeling uncertainty.
- The uncertainty version of the integrated production-
finance model would be formulated as a stochastic optimal
control problem and its optimal solution characterized
using appropriate mathematical techniques.
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The specification of the model possessing the
aforementioned attributes permitted the following results
to be obtained:
- The traditional, managerial, and behavioral views of
the firm were synthesized and conditions under which
traditional objectives would rank ahead of managerial
objectives were distinguished from conditions under
which managerial objectives would rank ahead of traditional
objectives (chapter three).
- The extent of managerial discretion, as indicated by
whether or not the profit constraint was binding, was
shown to have a significant effect on the behavior
of the firm (chapter three).
- It was shown that factors external to the firm could
play an important role in determining the firm's choice
of operating policies, and in particular, that the behavior
of the firm over time could vary systematically between
the traditional and managerial modes due to shifts
in demand, such as those attributable to the business
cycle (chapter three).
- The firm's optimal operating (i.e. output, input usage,
and investment) policies and optimal financial (i.e. cash
management, leverage, and dividend) policies, and the
relationships between these two sets of policies, were
derived (chapter four).
- It was shown that, except under special circumstances
(which were specified), the firm's output decision
is not independent of its cash management policy, and
also that, except under special circumstances (which
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were also specified), the firm's cost of capital, and
hence its investment decision, is not independent of
its leverage policy (chapter four).
- Given the lack of separability, it was shown how a
planning algorithm not requiring separability could
be devised for the multidivision firm (chapter five).
- It was also shown how the firm's degree of organizational
slack can vary systematically in response to external
pressures brought on by changes in demand over the business
cycle (chapter five).
- Internal resource allocation rules were derived for
the decentralized multidivision firm and the possible
implications for internal control and X-efficiency when
division managers are able to exercise discretion were
derived (chapter five).
- It was further shown throughout the model's development
that mathematical programming theory could be invoked
in order to develop economically meaningful interpretations
of the Lagrange multipliers (chapters three through
five)
.
3. The Representative Airframe Builder Model
The study of the U.S. airframe industry proceeded
from a review of the relevant literature that revealed
few previous attempts to model a defense contractor -
with the main exceptions being the contract bidding literature,
in which just one aspect of contractor behavior was modeled,
3 4
and the models due to Gorgol and Jones, which, as noted
in chapter seven, were concerned mainly with model formulation,
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rather than with obtaining analytical results. In order
to obtain a better appreciation for the institutional
constraints the airframe builders face and how these
constraints affect their long term and short term planning,
5interviews were conducted at the nine major airframe builders,
which resulted in the description of their internal planning
processes presented in chapter six.
Based on the work of Jones and the aforementioned
interviews, a model of the representative airframe builder
incorporating the following distinguishing features was
formulated
:
- The objective function reflects the principal objectives
of these firms, and in particular, their interest in
diversification, which is modeled by specifying four
sales objectives: aerospace sales to the government,
non-aerospace sales to the government, commercial aerospace
sales, and commercial non-aerospace sales.
- The model integrates those factors relevant to the airframe
builder's operating decisions and those factors relevant
to its financial decisions into an analytical model.
- The model is of the stochastic multiperiod variety
and draws heavily on the author's basic theoretical
model formulated in chapter four.
- The model incorporates the government's principal
procurement policy parameters and explicitly takes
into account the government's progress payments policy.
- The model is formulated as a stochastic optimal control
problem, with uncertainty modeled using the time-state-
preference framework.
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The representative airframe builder model is
used in chapter seven to characterize the airframe builder's
optimal operating policy decisions and optimal financial
policy decisions and to explore how these two sets of
policy decisions are related. As in chapter three, it
was found that the representative airframe builder tends
to produce more commercial output than a short run profit
maximizer. In addition, it was found that the representative
airframe builder tends to allocate more labor to each
government contract than a short run profit maximizer.
As in chapter four, it was found that the representative
airframe builder's optimal operating policies are not,
in general, independent of financial considerations.
The representative airframe builder model was
also utilized in chapter seven to study the impact of
alternative government regulatory policies, with the
following results:
- It was shown that the progress payments policy produces
cash flow effects that tend to cause the airframe builder
to alter its labor usage policy, and in particular,
that labor usage under government contracts (beyond
short run profit maximizing levels) varies inversely
with the degree of cash flow stringency attributable
to the time phasing of government contracts.
- The model was used to provide two explanations for the
often cited hoarding of skilled labor by defense contractors
- It was shown that the representative airframe builder
would react in the expected manner to the Profit '76
study's recommended policies of making interest expense
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allowable and of making contractor fees sensitive to
contractor investment.
In the analysis of the airframe builder's policy
decisions the optimality criteria of the short run profit
maximizer were used for comparison. This was done for
two reasons. First, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPR) assumes that contractors are motivated to maximize
6
short run profit. Second, short run profit maximization
(i.e. the traditional model discussed in chapter two),
which leads to Pareto optimality in the context of a perfectly
7
competitive economy, has been adopted by economists as
the bench mark in the analysis of alternative modes of
behavior on the part of the firm. How close the behavior
of actual firms comes to short run profit maximization
is an empirical question, and several studies dealing
with this issue were discussed in chapter two. This
point is an important one because, as the literature on
8
the theory of second best makes clear, if large firms
outside the airframe industry depart from the ideal of
short run profit maximization, as the basic theoretical
model developed in chapters three through five suggests,
then forcing the airframe builders to adopt short run
profit maximizing policies may lead to a decrease, rather
than an increase, in social welfare. More important,
in view of ASPR's assumption concerning contractor motivation,
if the model formulated in chapter seven of this thesis
could be validated empirically, then a basic conflict
would be shown to exist between actual contractor behavior




The model formulated in chapter seven and its
use in studying several procurement policy questions should
be viewed, then, as a general discussion of public policy
regulatory analysis, and not as a call for further immediate
reforms in U.S. government procurement policy. Hard
policy recommendations must await careful empirical research.
It is the author's hope that the model of the representative
airframe builder formulated in chapter seven will serve
as an important first step toward a fuller, more comprehensive
and scholarly analysis of the difficult issues involved
in setting a procurement policy.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
During the course of the development of both the basic
model and the representative airframe builder model alternative
approaches were eschewed in favor of those reported in
the thesis. Several of these alternative paths are reason-
able directions for further research. In addition, the
specific directions taken in the author's research can
be pursued further, and this further evolution of the
basic model and these further refinements of the airframe
builder model are discussed below.
1. Extensions of and Empirical Tests of the Basic
Model
The basic theoretical model presented in chapters
three through five placed the firm in a partial equilibrium
setting. The analysis of the (expected) collective utility
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maximizer focused on the individual firm, its behavior
over time under uncertainty, its choice of optimal operating
policies and optimal financial policies, and its internal
allocation of productive resources. Further research
could explore the interactions between firms of the type
modeled in chapters three through five and the implications
of such interactions for the behavior of the individual
firm. Such research would be welcome because, as noted
in section D of chapter one, the bulk of the research
within the theory of the firm has dealt with the firm
in isolation. By imbedding the firm within alternative
market structures, the importance of market structure
as it affects the behavior of the firm, for example
9
the quality of goods produced, could be studied.
At an empirical level, the basic theoretical model
yields the following empirically testable propositions:
- The behavior of the typical large firm varies systematically
over the business cycle, being more consistent with
the managerial models during the upswing and more consistent
with the traditional models during the downswing.
- An increase in the tax rate on corporate profits will
tend to cause the firm to increase managerial emoluments
at the expense of dividends and to substitute debt
for equity in its capital structure.
- The typical large firm's payment of managerial emoluments
and hiring of (nonproductive) staff will vary systematically
over the business cycle, both increasing relative to
other variables during the upswing and decreasing relative
to other variables during the downswing.
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- The level of relative X-efficiency within the typical
large firm will vary directly with the degree of centralization
i.e. the more centralized the firm, the greater the
relative degree of X-efficiency. Put somewhat differently,
the relatively higher the extent of decentralized decision-
making, the relatively greater the degree of organizational
slack (nonproductive administrative labor within each
division as a percentage of the division's total labor
force)
.
2. Extensions of and Empirical Tests of the Representative
Airframe Builder Model
The second main direction for further research
concerns the further development of the model of the
representative airframe builder. For example, the model
presented in chapter seven abstracted from the Renegotiation
10
Board and its impact on the firm's behavior. Recently
Agapos claims to have shown that the Renegotiation Board
11
has had a positive effect on pre-tax profits. By reformulating
the model presented in chapter seven to include the Renegotiation
Board the role of that board in regulating defense contractors'
profits could be studied.
The representative airframe builder model could
also be extended in the same manner as suggested above
for the basic theoretical model to study the interactions
among airframe builders, particularly during the bidding
process. Such a model might also prove useful in studying
the contractor-subcontractor relationship and the extent
to which the subcontractor's relationship to the contractor
parallels the contractor's relationship to the government.
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The representative airframe builder model formulated
and analyzed in chapter seven abstracted from the determinants
of the government's demand for aircraft. It was assumed
that the government's demand for aircraft could be expressed
in the form of a bivariate quasi-demand function, which
12
was specified in section B. Additional research could
be directed toward illuminating the determinants and form
of the actual demand relationship.
At an empirical level, the model of the representative
airframe builder yields the following empirically testable
propositions
:
- The airframe builder systematically allocates labor
to government contracts and sets commercial output
beyond the levels consistent with short run profit
maximization.
- The airframe builder's tendency to allocate inputs
to work under government contracts beyond short run
profit maximizing levels is directly related to the
cash flow impact of the number of contracts being
completed/terminated
.
- The procurement policy changes resulting from the Profit
'76 study will induce contractors to substitute contractor-
furnished capital for government-furnished capital and
will induce contractors to increase their investment
in plant and equipment (i.e. such investment will be
greater than it would have been without the changes).
It is this writer's hope that a careful reading




1. See subsection 4 in section K of chapter two.
2. See footnote 3 of chapter seven for references.
3. Gorgol, op. cit.
4. Jones, op. cit.
5. The nine firms at which interviews were conducted
by the author are listed in footnote 1 of chapter six.













8. R.G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, "The General Theory
of Second Best," Review of Economic Studies (vol. 24;
no. 63; January 1956), pp. 11-32, and E.J. Mishan,
"Second Thoughts on Second Best," Oxford Economic
Papers (new series, vol. 14; no. 3; October 1962),
pp. 205-217.
9. A recent study that explores the relationship between
market structure and the durability of capital goods
is A. Raviv and E. Zemel , "Durability of Capital
Goods: Taxes and Market Structure," Econometrica
(vol. 45; no. 3; April 1977), pp. 703-717.
10. The Renegotiation Board is included in the model
specified by Jones. Jones, op. cit.
11. A.M. Agapos, Government-Industry and Defense: Economics
and Administration (University of Alabama Press;
Alabama; 1975).
12. See footnote 38 in chapter seven.
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